



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**LEDRU-ROLLIN AND THE SECOND
FRENCH REPUBLIC**

STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAWEDITED BY THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF
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**LEDRU-ROLLIN AND THE SECOND
FRENCH REPUBLIC**

BY

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BY

ALVIN R. CALMAN

To

MY UNCLE
HENRY CALMAN

WHOSE UNFAILING GENEROSITY HAS BEEN FELT
BY EVERY MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY

PREFACE

THE material on Ledru-Rollin is rather extensive. Among the printed documents, newspapers, and books, which give voluminous information about his part in the Second Republic, particularly valuable are two histories of the revolution of February, one written by Delvau, Ledru's private secretary, the other by Regnault, his chief of cabinet. Besides, there are in the Bibliothèque de la Ville de Paris a few thousand letters by or concerning Ledru-Rollin; most of these, however, deal with the period posterior to June 13, 1849, and therefore lie outside the range of this study.

This thesis, the reader will find, is filled with quotations. I have adopted the method of rendering them all into English. Some words are almost incapable of translation and I apologize in advance for the equivalents I have used; thus *républicains de la veille* I render *old-line republicans*; *chef de cabinet*, *chief of cabinet*; *émeute*, *uprising* or *riot*; *conciliabules*, *cabals*; *procureur-général*, *attorney-general*. One word I have even left in the original form: *rappel*.

The abbreviation "LR Papers" used in the foot notes refers to the Ledru-Rollin manuscript material in the Bibliothèque de la Ville de Paris.

I wish to give thanks to Professor Hazen of Columbia University for his invaluable advice, to Professor Renard of the Collège de France for his counsel, to Miss Mudge of Columbia University Library for her aid in locating material, to M. Stiegler of the Bibliothèque de la Ville de Paris for his assistance in deciphering manuscripts, and to Professor Hayes of Columbia University, Mr. S. W. Drenan of Middletown High School, and Professor J. B. Stearns of Princeton for their valuable help in work of revision.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

OF all the periods of modern French history probably the least studied is that of the second republic; particularly in Great Britain and America it is remarkable how few books have been published about it. Except Curtis's extremely clear work on the constitution of 1848 and Whitehouse's life of Lamartine, far better as a literary biography than as a political study of the eminent poet-politician, there exist in English no secondary works of real value.

Even in France the field of biography has been left undeveloped. There are scores of books on the literary men—Lamartine, Victor Hugo, Lamennais—a few of which treat adequately their political views.¹ The career of Louis Napoleon has been dealt with by many writers, but by none in a satisfactory manner. The conservative statesmen—Berryer, Falloux, Montalembert—and the socialists—Cabet, Leroux, Proudhon—have received ample treatment, but the great mass of radicals and liberals have so far found no chronicler.² Alone of the eleven members of the provisional government, Lamartine, Marie, and Louis Blanc have been competently handled. A striking lacuna is a biography of Ledru-Rollin; it is remarkable that *the father of universal suffrage* has received no comprehensive treatment.³

Alexandre Auguste Ledru was born on February 2, 1807

¹ Notably Quentin-Bauchart on Lamartine and Carsou on Hugo.

² Only Barbès, Blanqui, and Jules Favre have found an adequate biographer.

³ See bibliography for critical list of biographies.

in Paris near the church of St. Gervais. His grandfather was Ledru-Comus, a prominent physician and physicist, who, owing to his love for spectacular experiments, earned the reputation of a prestidigitator. Ledru-Comus accumulated a considerable fortune which ultimately descended to his grandson. He had two sons; Jacques Philippe Ledru, a successful doctor, a member of the Antiquarian Society and of the Academy of Medicine; and Jacques Auguste Ledru, inspector of pawn-shops. The latter married Marie Honorine Gay, and from this union resulted two children, Emilie and Alexandre Auguste. The son took a classical course at the Lycée Charlemagne and then proceeded to the law school of the University of Paris. His record as a student, if not brilliant, was at least full of promise. In 1828 Ledru was admitted to the bar. To distinguish himself from a well-known colleague, he added to his surname that of Rollin, the maiden-name of his maternal great-grandmother.¹

By his eloquence in court, Ledru made a rapid success at the bar. Already his quickness in mastering a subject made itself apparent. He usually studied the case which he was to argue, on the morning of the trial, often on the way to the court-room, "nevertheless developing his case with that audacity of thought and that clearness of expression which made him one of the most distinguished lawyers of the supreme court."² He took part in the editing of two leading legal periodicals.

But this work did not satisfy his ambition. He threw himself into the liberal movement in politics. In 1832, he drew up a brief on the state of siege, which Odilon Barrot, one of the most distinguished lawyers of the day and leader

¹For the period of childhood and youth see Hartmann in *La Cité* 4: 3-10.

²Regnault, *Histoire de la Révolution de Février*, 153.

of the liberal monarchic party in the legislature, utilized in his successful plea before the court of appeals. In 1834, Ledru published a pamphlet on the Transnonain Affair (an insurrection put down with great vigor and cruelty by the government), a pamphlet which created a great sensation. Thereafter he was frequently called upon to defend liberal newspapers and persecuted republicans.¹ Odilon Barrot was acquainted with the promising young lawyer and supported him in his candidacy for the legislature in 1839, but Ledru's platform was too radical for the constituency of St. Valéry, and his conservative opponent won by eleven votes. Two years later, Ledru was successful at Le Mans. The death of Garnier-Pagès the elder had left vacant that seat, and there was much discussion as to who should replace that leading liberal orator. Trouvé-Chauvel, a republican and a former mayor of Le Mans, finally lent his support to Ledru-Rollin, and this all-powerful advocacy gained him the seat.²

Ledru's profession of faith in the meeting that preceded the election merits particular attention, for it portrays his views at the outset of his political career. After lamenting the misery of the poor, the candidate enunciated the sovereignty of the people as the chief principle of government. The first step towards this goal, he said, ought to be electoral reform, that is, universal suffrage, for the entire existing political system was absurd and dishonest. The dynasty of Louis Philippe was a sickly compromise resting firmly neither on divine right nor on popular sovereignty. As to the political parties, that of Thiers really desired few changes, and that of Barrot was merely a slightly better nuance of the same party. The legitimists were only pretending to be liberal. Alone the republicans like himself be-

¹Caussidière was among those defended by him.

²For manuscripts on the election see LR Papers 4: Part 2; for letters of Regnault see *op. cit.*, I: 106-118.

lieved in the people and advocated for them serious reforms. Meanwhile what did the Chamber do? It wasted time over the address from the throne and inspired hopes that never matured. In foreign affairs France vacillated and allowed England to triumph; for Algeria no satisfactory measures were taken; the fortifications of Paris were built to subdue the faubourgs, not the foreigner; nothing was done for the people as the deputies were busy logrolling. Fear and venality dominated the legislators. As for himself, Ledru-Rollin promised not to follow the lead of the deputies; he would fight for democracy.

In this speech the beliefs to which the orator adhered throughout his lifetime were clearly enunciated: popular sovereignty as the goal, universal suffrage as the means thereto; detestation of constitutional monarchy; desire for a bold foreign policy; a domestic program for the amelioration of the condition of the poor.

This speech marks the appearance of Ledru as a leader. There were men of position who, like Odilon Barrot, opposed the conservative tendency of Louis Philippe's ministers; there were others who, like Dupont de l'Eure, went so far as to state their ideal preference for a republic; but Ledru was the first representative elected under the July monarchy who openly declared that the constitutional form of monarchy was fundamentally bad. This meant necessarily a rupture with the statesmen who headed the parliamentary opposition, with Odilon Barrot who had supported him in 1839.

It took courage to attack Louis Philippe and his government so audaciously, and Ledru was prosecuted for his electoral speeches. This merely gave him a new platform from which to preach republicanism. Ledru was acquitted on a technicality and in December 1841 took his seat in the Chamber. He was reelected with ease to the

legislature that sat from 1842 to 1846 and spoke therein fairly frequently. Repeatedly he attacked the government on various phases of its policy, domestic, colonial, and foreign, but only in one field was he listened to with attention: in discussions concerning the abolition of negro slavery. It was not what Ledru said that created his importance; it was his presence as an irreconcilable republican in a monarchist assembly that attracted attention. In 1846 he was still opposed to the entire policy of the government. On January 19, Ledru delivered a violent attack on all the dynastic parties, speaking of the illusory glory of France abroad and the illusory prosperity of France at home. Bankruptcy was approaching, he said. The working class was in a deplorable condition. In the recent union of the left centre and the left ¹ the latter had abandoned nearly its entire program. Although the foreign policy advocated by Thiers was laudible, that statesman was not sincere in his advocacy of it, and his internal policy was essentially the same as that of Guizot and the existing ministry. There was no use in appealing to the Chamber; it was to the country that he appealed.²

Ledru-Rollin sorely felt the need of a republican organ to propagate his advanced ideas. The *National*, although edited by republicans, was not sufficiently radical for him and Godefroy Cavaignac; accordingly they founded the *Réforme*. At first Cavaignac controlled the newspaper, but when after his death Flocon became editor-in-chief, Ledru's influence became more keenly felt.³ Ledru's connection

¹ In France and other continental countries the parties are often called after their position in the legislative chamber, the liberals sitting on the left side.

² *Discours politiques* I: 217-231.

³ In 1845, other members of the directing board were Etienne and François Arago, Louis Blanc, Pascal Duprat, Guinard, Récurt, and Schoelcher.

with the journal was fourfold: he was its representative in the Chamber of Deputies and received from it unqualified support and fulsome praise; he was on the directing board and helped determine the general policy of the newspaper; he wrote articles for it—of course all his utterances in or out of the Chamber were published verbatim, but he was also the author of many unsigned essays and of several manifestoes; he was its banker, for the periodical never was a financial success and Ledru-Rollin impoverished himself supplying funds to maintain its propaganda.

It was during this period, in 1843, that Ledru married Henriette Sharpe, a rich young Irishwoman and protestant.¹ Mgr. Affre, later Archbishop of Paris, performed the ceremony, and the groom's future colleagues, François Arago and Lamartine, acted as witnesses. It is interesting to speculate on the influence of Ledru's wife in his dislike for England. It is notable that in the same year as his marriage Ledru-Rollin went to Ireland as the representative of the French republicans and was present at O'Connell's gigantic meeting at Tara.

Ledru was happy in his married life. Henriette held the same political opinions as her husband. She helped him in his work, wrote letters for him when he was sick, gave him money for political propaganda when his considerable fortune was exhausted,² and while he was minister took her place as patroness of various public charities.³ The couple occupied a large house, 4 Rue de Tournon, which had a

¹For marriage contract see LR Papers 4: 12. For permission to make a mixed marriage see *ibid.*, 4: 10.

²In 1848 Ledru transferred to his wife all his remaining possessions, consisting of real estate in Paris and Le Mans, and his share in the family mansion at Fontenay-aux-Roses, a house built by the Scarrons.

³Melun 2: 12-19 praises her work for his *Fraternités*, an organization in which each wealthy lady acted as guardian of one poor family.

garden with trees and a small pond. Across the street they rented a carriage house and a stable. For this they paid four thousand francs a year.¹ They kept four servants and their total household expenses, carefully kept to the smallest item by Henriette Ledru-Rollin, amounted to about ten thousand francs a year.²

¹For contract see LR-B55.

²LR-J7 for expenses for 1848.

CHAPTER II

THE BANQUETS

IN 1847 Louis Philippe was reigning in France; for seventeen years he had maintained himself on the throne and felt himself at last strongly established. Guizot, his minister for the last seven years, had just received a new and large majority in the Chamber of Deputies; ¹ the opposition was broken up into fragments. France had passed through an era of prosperity, for the citizen king favored the bourgeoisie.

The era of prosperity, however, was clearly ended. The government's finances were in a lamentable condition. Many prominent business firms were on the verge of failure. In the legislature the king and Guizot had a majority, but a majority composed of officials and place-hunters elected by a small minority of the population. The great majority of non-voters were dissatisfied with the government, and the proletariat was even antagonistic to the existing social system. Some advocated socialism, for the theories of Fourier and St. Simon had penetrated into the working classes, but the greater part had no clear idea of what they desired in place of the existing system; any catchword might rally them to revolt.

In the Chamber the monarchical opposition, composed of the left centre under Thiers and Dufaure and the left headed by Odilon Barrot, was stronger in ability than in numbers. In the government ranks only Guizot and his

¹ Ledru had, however, been reëlected at Le Mans without difficulty.

minister of the interior, Duchâtel, stood out, whereas the opposition included many effective orators and prominent statesmen. At this time Thiers probably differed little from Guizot except that the latter was in, the former out of power, but he had joined Odilon Barrot with the avowed aim of parliamentary and electoral reform. Lamartine, though cooperating with them, was a member of no party, but a free lance, already headed towards republicanism.

The irreconcilable parties were the legitimists, supporters of the principle of the divine right of monarchy, and the republicans. The latter were divided into two groups. The *National* coterie, the moderate wing, was far more powerful in the Chamber where Bethmont, Carnot, Dupont de l'Eure, Garnier-Pagès, Marie, and Pagnerre had seats. They wished for a republic but accepted the constitutional monarchy as a *pis aller*. They were interested in wide political reforms, but they ignored social questions. Above all they opposed with all their strength violent methods. This attitude did not satisfy the more ardent republicans of the *Réforme*, whose sole spokesman in the legislature was Ledru-Rollin, though François Arago was mildly sympathetic. For them monarchy was fundamentally bad and the dynasty of Louis Phillippe an unmitigated evil. Moreover, they desired social as well as political transformations. Peaceful means for overthrowing the monarchy, mere propaganda, were insufficient; when the moment was ripe, violent measures, a revolution must be resorted to.¹ Between these two sections of the republican party, between these two newspapers, between Garnier-Pagès and Ledru-Rollin, between Armand Marrast and Flocon, a violent feud existed; duels were even threatened. The final goal was

¹ The leader of this party, Ledru-Rollin, however, although theoretically he saw the need of resorting to violence, was averse to an insurrection unless success would be almost certain.

the same, but their methods of reaching it differed fundamentally.¹ Thus, whereas the *National* republicans joined the coalition of the lefts, Ledru-Rollin, although he usually voted with them, took no part in their councils and their conferences.

The opposition decided to show its strength in the country by a series of banquets. The ballot box had given a majority to the government, but the lefts wished to show that the majority of citizens were on their side. Public meetings would have attracted large crowds, but it would have been difficult to count those present and many persons, merely curious to hear prominent speakers, might have attended. On the contrary, the buying of a seat at a banquet was a formal adherence to the principles of the organizers, and the toasts at the close of the feast gave an excellent opportunity for expounding doctrines. Guizot and Duchâtel had each had a banquet in his own honor, and the opposition leaders felt that the government could not reasonably object to the adoption of the same tactics by others. All shades of opinion from Dufaure to Garnier-Pagès were represented at the first banquet, held at Châteaurouge on July 9, 1847. Thiers, however, the most conservative adversary of the government, although evincing sympathy, refused to take part; and Ledru-Rollin, the most radical, did not attend. "At the banquet of Châteaurouge, which commenced that series of reform demonstrations which had such a sad result," says Barrot in his memoirs, "M. Ledru-Rollin had been left out, and that not as an oversight, but as an exclusion premeditated and decided on by a committee in which the moderate republicans were the most eager to repulse him."² In fact at first Ledru-Rollin and the *Réforme*

¹ For a good discussion by a contemporary see Garnier-Pagès 4: 67.

² Barrot 2: 25.

adopted a rather contemptuous attitude towards the movement.¹ But finally, realizing the great influence of the banquets, and possibly influenced by Lamartine's speech at Macon,² the radicals determined to enter the combat and chose in November 1847 the friendly city of Lille for their first appearance.³

A committee composed of liberal monarchists and of radical republicans, the latter headed by Delescluze of the *Impartial du Nord* and Bianchi of the *Messenger*,⁴ had invited to the banquet which was to be held in Lille on November 7, Barrot, Crémieux, and the deputies from the department of the North, Garnier-Pagès and Ledru-Rollin, prominent republicans like Louis Blanc and Récurt, and journalists like Etienne Arago, Dornès, and Flocon. Barrot was extremely irritated when he heard that Ledru-Rollin was to attend; he feared that the presence of this radical would give to the banquet a tone too revolutionary. To counteract this he demanded the insertion of a toast to the king. Only once before had this been demanded and then at Cosne it had caused the retirement of Gambon. Immediately Ledru and Testelin withdrew their acceptance. This was not to the taste of the organizing committee and it refused absolutely the toast to the king. Barrot tried to impose his will. Now he in his turn refused to be present, expecting that the committee would submit to his demand rather than lose his presence. But only his fellow-deputies,

¹*Réforme passim*; Alton-Shée 61. For good study of position of Ledru at this time see Lévy-Guenot in *Révolution de 1848* 6: 17-28, 58-75.

²"The speech of Lamartine... was for Flocon, Ledru-Rollin, Louis Blanc a first beam of light."—Alton-Shée 61.

³The government late in 1846 had refused to allow Le Mans to give Ledru a banquet,—N. Gallois 61—but this formed no part of the banquet campaign; accordingly Ledru's first appearance was at Lille.

⁴Later on January 6, 1848 Ledru wrote to Bianchi asking him to aid Caussidière in a special mission at Lille—For letter see Gossez 106.

the president of the banquet, and a score of guests followed him. The remaining twelve hundred banqueters appeared; a new president was elected; a deputation composed of monarchists and republicans visited Ledru and induced him to be present; and the dinner passed off peaceably as an ovation to the deputy from Le Mans. The conduct of Ledru-Rollin showed a happy contrast to the uncompromising attitude of his opponent. In order to conciliate the more conservative guests he had agreed to substitute a toast *to the workingmen* for one *to the national sovereignty*. He would not drink a toast to the king, but otherwise he was willing to accommodate himself to the wishes of the people of Lille. The affair was "for the chiefs of the democratic party more than a triumph of pride; it was a powerful propaganda, causing numerous conversions to the republican faith."¹

Most surprising was the moderation of Ledru-Rollin's speech. He deprecated the false picture of the proletariat incapable of political power, deplored its misery, praised its patriotism and devotion, attacked the selfishness of the dominant bourgeoisie. Who represents the people in the Chamber today? he asked. *You, you*, cried the guests. He was doing his best, the orator declared, but he had never shared the misery of the people. Universal suffrage was needed to bring the working people into their own. Napoleon said that in fifty years Europe would be either Cossack or republican. How true! Europe shall not be Cossack; the

¹Alton-Shée 63; cf. Stern 1:25. On the banquet see Gossez 96-105; Alton-Shée 61-2. The account of Barrot 1:464-6 is typical of its author, mixing truth and misrepresentation. He pretends that the radicals obtained control of the banquet by trickery, not informing him of the presence of Ledru till the last minute, whereas the Lille newspapers had announced the attendance of that deputy several days previous. He inserts his speech of resignation and insinuates that this oration made a serious impression, whereas nobody noticed it.

repressive laws, he said, prevented him from discussing the other alternative. Then Ledru-Rollin eulogized the men whom he considered the great apostles of liberalism: Chateaubriand, Lamennais, Béranger, Lamartine, François Arago, David d'Angers. He spoke for an independent Poland, a united Italy, a democratic Switzerland. He ended with a prophecy of the inevitable approach of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.¹

Lamartine praised this speech in his newspaper. (Was it because Lamartine himself was praised in it?) "The speech of M. Ledru-Rollin is one of the most eloquent and well reasoned that he ever pronounced. . . . The communism of M. Ledru-Rollin is practically ours; that is, an intelligent love of the people. . . . There is nothing to be angry at, but much to reflect on."²

Emboldened by the success at Lille, the radicals continued their campaign, and their leader took part in two more important banquets. Exactly two weeks later (November 21) he spoke at Dijon. To this affair the dynastic liberals³ were not even invited. This time Ledru was permitted to toast *the sovereignty of the people*. In a more radical manner he developed the doctrines enunciated at Lille. He advocated universal suffrage and defended it as practicable. He denounced the wishy-washy tactics of the parliamentarians and proclaimed the uncompromising principles of the republican party. He told how democratic ideas were spreading even among the upper classes and appealed to his audience to aid in the propagation of the spirit of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.⁴

¹*Discours politiques* 1: 328-339.

²*Bien Public*, November 14.

³Another name for the party of Odilon Barrot. For details on Dijon banquet see Alton-Shée 70.

⁴*Discours politiques* 1: 340-350.

The last of these radical banquets was held at Chalon-sur-Saône a month later, December 19. Lamartine refused to be present but sent a friendly letter and urged his friend, Lacratelle, to attend. The latter begged Lamartine not to show apparent disapproval by absenting himself. The poet replied: "That is what I desire, however. I do not wish to combat Ledru-Rollin in public; I admire him and consider him a force for democracy, but my sympathies are not with the radicals."¹ Two thousand guests listened to Ledru, who enunciated the same doctrines as at Lille and Dijon. This speech is interesting as showing three cardinal features of Ledru's policy: admiration for the Convention of 1793, dislike of England, belief in the fraternity of all democratic peoples.²

After the public banquet there was a private dinner at which Lacratelle met Ledru, "this powerful instrument in democratic ranks. . . . He had made a splendid speech but did not seem at all exhausted. That great chest had breath enough for twenty speeches, but there were ladies present, and he did not impose on them longer than to satisfy curiosity. He proved himself a temperate and attractive speaker and left the impression of being a thorough man of the world. . . . Flocon abandoned himself to his theories and frightened the ladies." In a private conversation with Lacratelle during the dinner, Ledru-Rollin declared: "The great service that Lamartine has rendered to the public is that now one may discuss Robespierre without being considered a cannibal."³ Lamartine praised Ledru's Chalon speech as "bold, eloquent, significant."⁴

¹Lacratelle 120.

²*Discours politiques* 1: 351-360. For details on banquet see Alton-Shée 78.

³Lacratelle 123.

⁴*Bien Public*, quoted by Lacratelle 124-5.

Although Ledru-Rollin was the recognized leader of the radical republicans, he had not as yet achieved much reputation as an orator. Rémusat in 1874 told Gambetta: "It was after February 24 that Ledru-Rollin surprised us; previously he had always spoken in a mediocre manner as a good lawyer, but in a very prosy way."¹ A conservative even claimed: "He brought to the Chamber neither ability nor distinction nor urbanity. He took his seat but not his position; a lawyer without a name, without depth, he had in his head not the spirit but the scenes of the Revolution."² Lamartine asserts that "In the eyes of the materialistic government M. Odilon Barrot was only honest eloquence without will-power, M. Ledru-Rollin only sonorous popularity, sounding the clarion of the republic without believing in it, in order to disconcert and mislead the opposition."³

In their action within the Chamber as well as in the banquet campaign, the left (party of Thiers, party of Dufaure, dynastic liberals, *National* republicans) formed a single united group at the end of 1847. Only Ledru-Rollin was not invited to their councils.⁴ He spoke frequently, particularly on colonial matters, but he made little impression. The session as a whole was unproductive. The government opposed all attempts at reform, and the mild proposals of Duvergier de Hauranne for an extension of the suffrage, and of Rémusat to exclude office-holders from the legislature were defeated by the obedient majority.

¹Scheurer-Kestner 103.

²Granier de Cassagnac 1: 117. The same writer, speaking of Ledru later in his career, declared: "He was not violent, he was extravagant. The glare, the noise, the sudden blows of the Convention went to his head."—*Ibid.*, 1: 317.

³Lamartine 1: 31. Cf. Adam 279.

⁴Garnier-Pagès 4: 89 mentions one meeting of the extreme left which Ledru attended.

Ledru-Rollin's devotion to the ideas of 1793 and his admiration for the members of the Convention were manifest in all his speeches. Other persons were now instilling love of the first republic into the country. The lectures of Michelet, Mickiewicz, and Quinet spread republicanism among the eager students of the colleges. On the continent, especially during the first half of the nineteenth century, the universities were the hot-bed of liberal thought, the soil where the ideas of the future germinated. Equally important were the historians of the Revolution. Even Thiers' work stirred people to enthusiasm, but of greater influence were Lamartine's poetic (for it cannot be called historical) panegyric on the Girondins and Louis Blanc's eloquent eulogy of which he dared to make Robespierre the hero. The effect of these two books was widespread. Everybody read them, and many began to feel that perhaps the republic had been maligned.

Interesting light on Ledru-Rollin during this period is thrown by the philanthropist, Melun, one of the leaders of The Society of St. Vincent de Paul:

A few days before the revolution I visited him; he lived in the Rue de Tournon in a rather fine house . . . for the popular demagogue was rich and did not affect the austerity of a Cato or of a Diogenes. He received me politely; the conversation without being political concerned popular education and the institutions best fitted for boys. I profited, by the bye, in making him take lottery tickets for the benefit of my *apprentices*, a thing he did gladly. There was nothing in the interview that could irritate me; only he reproached the friars as having an air too vulgar and too unintelligent. Finally while seeing me to the door, he said: *M. de Melun, we are both interested in the people although undoubtedly in a slightly different manner. Well, you can be certain that if ever it becomes master, we shall be the first to be hanged.* I laughingly threw myself, to

escape his prediction, on my obscurity and on the little noise my work aroused, but he more than once in his political vicissitudes was very near seeing his prophesy realized.¹

The legislature reassembled in December 27, 1847,² and immediately hostilities began. The King in his address from the throne spoke of the banquets as "an agitation due to blind and hostile passions." The phrase could not be overlooked by the opposition and all efforts at conciliation were fruitless. Orator succeeded orator, and on February 9 Ledru entered the debate. He treated the right of meeting, the right to hold public political assemblies. He commenced by refuting four claims of Hébert, the Keeper of the Seals. This government spokesman had claimed that there was no law authorizing the meetings; Ledru protested that it was for the cabinet to find a text forbidding them; and moreover, the constitution of 1793 did specifically permit them. Hébert had maintained that whereas all other liberties were enumerated in the Charter, liberty of meeting was not included and hence did not exist; Ledru controverted this: there were many things not in the Charter that were generally recognized, such as the sovereignty of the people and the right to speak in the legislature. The Keeper of the Seals had stated that the right of meeting was the same as the right of association, the right to form political organizations; Ledru asserted that his adversary knew the difference very well. Lastly Hébert had contended that the right of meeting engendered the right of association expressly prohibited; Ledru affirmed that as a matter of fact the right of association came first historically. However, continued Ledru-Rollin, the entire question is one of justice not politics. By denying all unwritten rights, the

¹ Melun I: 262-3.

² For official notice of the opening of the Chamber see LR Papers I: 197.

authorities deny fundamental liberties. Remember the banquets of 1829 and the fall of Charles X! In an eloquent peroration the orator turned to the left and begged that it cease all recriminations and unite on this question.¹

Ledru's speech was a great success. "For the first time perhaps since he sat in the Chamber, he was listened to with serious attention; for the first time also did he rise to the heights of the orators of the great assembly. His argument was logical, his speech passionate but restrained; his eloquence borrowed, for the sacred cause he defended, a vital force."² Odilon Barrot had feared that Ledru "would bring the government a useful diversion by his revolutionary exaggerations; such was not the case; he confined himself to treating with elevation and even with relative moderation the legal and constitutional question of the right of public meeting."³ All the newspapers of the left praised the speech. The *Réforme*, naturally, was eulogistic. The *National* declared: "M. Ledru-Rollin in a discourse justly applauded completely overturned the poor scaffolding of M. Hébert." The *Siècle* wrote: "He profited very skillfully from the mistakes of M. Hébert. . . . His argument was concise . . . and caused a real sensation on the ministerial benches." Even the governmental *Débats* admitted his "real ability." When Ledru's oration was discussed in the presence of the King, one of the courtiers feared that such a speech might intimidate the majority, but Louis Philippe replied that possibly there were "fifteen or so capable of being thus influenced, but that the government would none the less have a majority."⁴

¹ *Discours politiques* 1: 361-371.

² Stern 1: 76.

³ Barrot 1: 492.

⁴ Marnay 301.

The left took up the challenge of the government and decided to close the series of banquets with a monster demonstration in Paris. Eighty deputies were to attend at the hall in the twelfth arrondissement (Latin quarter), but on condition that Ledru should not take part. Eight hundred students petitioned that Ledru be allowed to speak at the banquet, even if that should cause the absence of all the other deputies. The extreme democrats of the organizing committee desired Ledru's attendance, and the legitimists supported them, but the members of the dynastic opposition and the moderate republicans preferred the presence of eighty deputies to that of one. Ledru made matters easy; he told the organizers of the banquet that if his colleagues in the Chamber objected to his presence, he would not be offended at being told so. "I am very much flattered by the honor you do me," he said, "but it is preferable that eighty deputies attend rather than one. I advise you to take the greatest precautions to maintain order at the banquet, to authorize no republican or legitimist toast, to keep within legal bounds, so that the authorities cannot make capital out of any irregularities which would serve it admirably, for it has decided to use violence in order to strengthen its position since legality is contrary to its existence."⁴

The government exerted itself to the utmost to prevent the banquet, threatening a direct prohibition. Finally Thiers and others brought about a compromise between Guizot and Barrot. All the guests were to appear at the meeting, Odilon Barrot was to take the chair, a police commissioner was to appear and order the guests to disperse, Barrot was to make a formal protest, the banquet was to dissolve, and the case should then be submitted to the courts. February 22 was the date agreed upon, but on the twentieth

⁴Roinville 23-4, Castille 1: 384-7; Alton-Shée 84-8; Crémieux 55.

complications arose. The *Réforme* announced that Ledru-Rollin would attend the banquet. Probably Ledru was dissatisfied with the compromise and wished to precipitate matters. His presence would mean the attendance of the extremists and the men of the secret societies;¹ it would threaten the control of the banquet by the monarchists.² More important than Ledru's proposed attendance was the manifesto drawn up by Armand Marrast, editor-in-chief of the *National* and the most prominent member of the committee in charge of arrangements. As the banquet was to be a mere simulacrum, the demonstration would consist largely of the procession to the banquet hall. Marrast published in all the liberal newspapers on February 21 an order of march in which the National Guard was to march as a unit. This would constitute an act of defiance of the government, for the National Guard was not supposed to assemble except at the order of its leaders. When Guizot heard of this on February 21, he repudiated his compromise with Barrot and definitely forbade the banquet. Was the left mildly to give up the contest or boldly to defy the government?

¹The republicans under the July monarchy organized in secret societies to overthrow the King.

²See Alton-Shée 208.

CHAPTER III

THE FEBRUARY DAYS

FEBRUARY 21 was a crucial day. The opposition deputies gathered at Odilon Barrot's house. The timid liberal monarchists wished to draw back. In spite of the opposition of Lamartine and of Alton-Shée, the liberal peer,¹ it was decided that the members of the Chamber should not attend the banquet in the twelfth arrondissement. Emile de Girardin suggested that the deputies of the left should hand in at the Chamber a collective resignation, but the idea was rejected.² All that these deputies could agree on was an impeachment of the ministry.

All hope of action now depended on the radicals. Flocon invited his colleagues on the *Réforme* to meet at 8 p. m. at the office of the newspaper to consider the financial situation of that journal. This summons deceived no one; all knew that the question of a revolution would be discussed. At the appointed time there assembled under Flocon's presi-

¹ Alton-Shée was an anomaly, a republican peer. The following is his opinion of Ledru-Rollin: "He was a fine man, pleasing and attractive, light-hearted, rich among democrats, open, generous, impressionable, credulous in his desires and as to his capacity as a statesman, dreaming of Danton as M. Thiers of Napoleon. Unfortunately he lacked the qualities for which he was most ambitious: firmness, character. A well-informed jurist, he knew better than any one his Constituent, and particularly his Convention. . . . His natural eloquence acquired an argumentative force, an audacious form, well-calculated to deceive others and himself. . . . For want of a better man, the weak leader of the Mountain."—Alton-Shée 52.

² The *Réforme* of February 22 made the same suggestion.

dency over sixty of the most ardent republicans: collaborators on the *Réforme*, delegates of the National Guard, leaders of the secret societies. Alton-Shée, Caussidière, and others wanted the radicals to start an uprising, but Louis Blanc declared for inaction.¹ Then Ledru-Rollin took the floor. This was the supreme moment of the meeting, for his influence was sufficient to turn the scale in either direction.

If we look at Ledru's antecedents, we wonder how any one could have doubted that he would oppose an uprising. Emile Ollivier later declared: "At this time I was well acquainted with Ledru-Rollin and his friends. There is not one of them I have not often heard repeat that before the death of Ledru-Rollin nothing could be attempted toward establishing a republic."² Ledru had never been a member of any secret society; he had never taken part in nor abetted any conspiracy. "Consult all my friends," he himself said later, "all those who have fought with me, behind me; never under the old government did I wish to belong to a secret society, to a conspiracy. Conspiracies produce riots; open discussion produces revolutions."³ Always extremely violent in words, Ledru showed himself circumspect if not timid when it came to action.⁴ Yet by Alton-Shée and others his moderation was unexpected.⁵

¹Alton-Shée 223-4; Sarrans 1:282-5; Castille 1:137-8; Delvau 127; La Hodde: *Naissance* 40-49; Nougarede 46. Others present were Albert, Etienne Arago, Guinard, Quinet, and Thoré.

²Ollivier 1:470.

³Speech of August 3, 1848, in *Discours politiques* 2:44.

⁴"Impetuous in his speech, but weak in his acts," says Babaud-Larivière 1:17. "An artist in revolutions. He loved fine gestures and sonorous words. . . . Danton thundering at the Convention was his model. . . . He loved splendor and enjoyed life. The sight of blood troubled him. . . . A man of the tribune, he was incapable of action. Weak in character, he was ruined by his friendships." So speaks the conservative Breynat 15-6. Cf. N. Gallois 105.

⁵Alton-Shée 225. Cf. praise of his moderation in Sarrans 1:295.

Ledru in the speech which he now delivered said: "During the first revolution, when our fathers appointed a day for an insurrection, they organized for it long in advance. Are there enough of us? Have we arms, munitions, a plan of battle? The government is well prepared. It has a numerous army, a formidable artillery; its troops merely wait a word to overwhelm us. I believe a battle begun under these conditions is utter folly." As Rey insisted on action, Ledru resumed: "Let us not take our desires for realities. For several months we have been gaining ground; by precipitate action we shall compromise the future, we shall risk the annihilation of our party."¹ This speech decided the assembly. The police spy and *agent provocateur*, La Hodde,² tried to revive the sentiment for revolt. But the meeting favored Ledru-Rollin. Quinet supported him, and Flocon, in closing the conference, advised that those present preserve a quiet attitude unless a special occasion offer itself. Thus the meeting dissolved, having determined on no course of action. The next day the *Réforme* deprecated violence.

When dawn broke on the twenty-second the leaders were still undecided; not so the people. They paraded the streets shouting *Down with Guizot* or *Hurrah for reform*, cheering

¹ Alton-Shée 225-6.

² When the republicans came into power in February, they discovered that La Hodde and another member of the secret societies named Chenu were police spies. Caussidière, then prefect of police, called together his friends, tried the spies secretly, and would have sentenced them to death had not Albert intervened. Caussidière had apologized for Ledru's absence, but it is uncertain how much Ledru knew of this irregular trial.—See Chenu 150-8; Stern 181-3.—Naturally La Hodde had a low opinion of Ledru. . . . In his *Naissance de la République* 30, 381-6, La Hodde belittles Ledru's ability as an orator, saying: "his chief characteristics are redundancy and boasting," and describes him as "simply a lover of noise, fame and enjoyment... a man of intellect but without broad comprehension, of varied but superficial attainments."

for Barrot or Marrast or Ledru-Rollin. They erected barricades here and there, but with no definite system. Although the banquet had been called off, the students and the workingmen who were to march to it assembled at the Madeleine and added to the uproar. Clearly all Paris was against Guizot. Fortunately for the revolution the King was as undecided as his adversaries. Had he adopted at that moment a policy of vigor, the uprising could have been suppressed; had he adopted a policy of conciliation and dismissed his obnoxious ministry, the excitement would have subsided. But Louis Philippe and Guizot espoused the tactics of watchful waiting, taking no effective measures of any sort. Liberal monarchists and radicals continued to hold meetings. A group of republicans assembled in the Rue St. Honoré in the afternoon. Caussidière declared that affairs were progressing well; such was also the opinion of Flocon, Ledru, and Louis Blanc. In the evening they met again in the Palais Royal. No definite measures were taken, but they agreed that in case of need the secret societies should assemble in the Boulevard S. Martin.¹

The twenty-second closed in a quiet manner. The agitation seemed to be subsiding. About 4:30 in the morning of February 23 Ledru-Rollin met his confreres in a small restaurant and the general opinion was that there was little hope of a revolution. Ledru, who had never believed in the success of the uprising and who feared arrest, manifested his satisfaction. Flocon was in an angry mood; only a few did not despair.²

Although the republicans were despondent, Louis Philippe was equally so. Now the terrified king tried a compromise. Had he abdicated at this moment in favor of his

¹ Nougarede 85-6.

² Nougarede 149; La Hodde *Naissance* 65-6.

grandson or had he even called Odilon Barrot to the premiership, all would have been well; but from now on he yielded step by step, but always just too late. What would have satisfied the mob a little earlier Louis Philippe granted only when the propitious moment was passed. Thus the king on February 23 dismissed Guizot and called on the colorless Molé to form a cabinet.

The Chamber met amid general agitation. The impeachment of the ministers was moved and merely aroused a sneer on Guizot's lips. At last Guizot took the floor. All wondered what he could say; how great was the stupefaction when he calmly announced that the king had summoned Count Molé. The left broke out into open cheers which were calmed with difficulty by Barrot. The right and centre were dumbfounded at seeing themselves abandoned with such pusillanimity by the king they had defended through thick and thin.

February 23 had passed without bloodshed, and it looked as though the threatening uprising might subside. But suddenly conditions altered. Someone fired a stray shot in the Boulevard des Capucines. Thereupon the troops replied with a volley and scores of innocent bystanders fell dead or wounded. This spark ignited the smouldering insurrection. The people raised barricades in every part of the city. A torchlight procession bearing the victims of the *massacre* paraded the streets, leaving behind a trail of indignation and enthusiasm. The National Guard, which till now had maintained a benevolent neutrality, threw in its lot with the people; the bourgeoisie had joined the proletariat.

It was now that Ledru-Rollin changed his ideas as to a revolt. Until the resignation of the prime minister and the events of the Boulevard des Capucines he had considered an insurrection foolish. Now he said to his friends: "Even if we do not succeed, it will habituate the people to street-

fighting, and if blood is shed, it is on Barrot that the responsibility will fall.”¹ Ledru-Rollin and Alton-Shée went to the offices of the *Réforme*. The leaders assembled there were congratulating each other on the course of events when the sound of an approaching crowd was heard. The Parisians loved to hear patriotic addresses and this group had come “to get the password from the *Réforme*.” After Flocon had told the news of Guizot’s fall, Ledru-Rollin praised the energy of the people who had broken the will of a despot and urged them not to lay down their arms till they had gathered the fruits of victory. The concessions they should demand were: amnesty, liberation of all political prisoners, recognition of the right of meeting, and suppression of the property qualification in voting. After the deputy, the peer; Alton-Shée reiterated Ledru’s four demands.² The day closed with the people in open revolt clamoring for Barrot and reform, Ledru-Rollin committed to the cause of revolution, the king terrified and yielding slowly.

On the morning of the twenty-fourth the tumult continued, and the demands of the people increased. They had at first demanded merely electoral reform, then the dismissal of Guizot. Later no one less than Odilon Barrot would be accepted as premier; now the abdication of the King and the regency of the Duchess of Orleans was the minimum demand. Some even went so far as to urge a provisional government during the minority of the Count of Paris, the grandson of Louis Philippe. The King yielded inch by inch, but always when it was too late. Molé had been unable to form a ministry, and Thiers, to whom the King next turned, insisted on the inclusion of Barrot; but this advance toward liberalism had been neutralized by the appointment of Marshal Bugeaud, a cold-blooded general and confirmed

¹ Nougarière 156. Cf. Barrot 2: 304.

² Alton-Shée 253-4; Sarrans 1: 364-5.

reactionary, to the command of all the military forces. The uprising was gaining ground. Even the soldiers of the line wavered in their devotion and showed a repugnance to firing on the revolutionists. At last the King made his final sacrifice; he abdicated in favor of his grandson with the Duchess of Orleans as regent and Barrot as premier. Again he had waited too long; even this did not now quiet the people; they were demanding a provisional government.

The idea of a provisional government which should rule in the name of the Count of Paris was slowly growing, for no one had yet dared to propose a republic. Numerous proposals for membership in the new executive were circulated through the crowds that thronged the streets. Of twenty-five different combinations, Arago's name appears on all but one, Ledru-Rollin's on twenty-one, Lamartine's on nineteen; then in order of popularity came Marie, Louis Blanc, Garnier-Pagès, Marrast, Flocon, Albert, Dupont de l'Eure, Barrot, Récourt, Crémieux, and Lamennais. The centres of agitation were the two republican newspapers. At the offices of the *National* a coalition with Odilon Barrot was preferred to one with Ledru-Rollin. There the idea of a provisional government was not new, for several days before at Goudchaux's house the project had been discussed and it had been determined to eliminate Ledru as well as Louis Blanc.¹ Now the names of Francois Arago, Garnier-Pagès, Lamartine, and Marie were accepted unanimously by the moderates, assembled at the National offices, those of Marrast and Barrot with difficulty. Carnot and Crémieux were rejected. The name of Ledru-Rollin caused the longest discussion. It was finally rejected, as those present felt his time had not yet come.² Louis Blanc and his

¹ Goudchaux in Quentin-Bauchart Report I: 288; Stern 2: III.

² Sarrans I: 412-6, Crémieux 370.

brother arrived from the *Réforme*, but the *National* would as yet make no compact with its rival. At the offices of the *Réforme* Barrot, of course, was rejected, but many moderate republicans were included. The accepted list consisted of Ledru-Rollin, Albert, Arago, Louis Blanc, Flocon, Marrast, aid Marie. Later in the morning Martin de Strasbourg induced the *National* to compromise, and in a conference with Louis Blanc a list of nine, the same as that finally adopted plus the names of Albert and Crémieux, was agreed on and was approved by the two newspapers.¹

Of Ledru-Rollin during the morning we have two glimpses. At ten o'clock he met General Bedeau in the Place de la Concorde. The general declares:

About ten everybody seemed disposed for peace. I was accosted at that hour by a large fine looking man, accompanied by a younger and slighter friend, as pale as the first was red. *General*, the former said to me, *I see you are making sincere efforts toward conciliation; I assure you we also desire it. I am Ledru-Rollin, and I am actively employed on that mission.* The friend was M. Jules Favre. Was M. Ledru-Rollin then thinking of revolution and did he seek to put my vigilance to sleep by his words? I doubt it, and several persons of the revolutionary party have told me since that at ten o'clock he did not even desire it.²

At noon Ledru told some conservative deputies: "You have no time to lose; if in an hour the abdication of the King and the regency are not proclaimed, the sections will come here, disperse the Assembly, and there will be a complete revolution."³ As yet Ledru had not come out for a republic or even for a provisional government.

¹ Martin in *Réforme* June 2, 1848; Sarrans 1: 422-3.

² *Revue de Paris* for 1898, 3: 463. Cf. Ledru at Barbès trial, *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 948.

³ Garnier-Pagès 5: 112.

Another incident too commonly accepted is probably without foundation. Regnault declares: "In a morning conference between M. Caussidière and M. Ledru-Rollin, it was decided that the former should unite about him the armed squadrons of the secret societies and march on the Chamber."¹ However, this would not fit in with the other two incidents of the morning. Note especially the unlikelihood of Jules Favre, who was accompanying Ledru, being a party to deceiving General Bedeau. Secondly several persons seem to have believed in Ledru's pacific intentions. Thirdly Caussidière did not go to the Chamber but to the prefecture of police. Fourthly the latter did not mention the incident in his memoirs and he is not usually reticent about such matters. Fifthly Regnault has a tendency to see plots everywhere; we shall come across this trend of his again. As to the other accounts they are either brief and vague or they have a flavor of absurdity and improbability.²

The centre of interest now shifts to the Chamber. Ledru-Rollin was not yet ready to declare for a republic; when the extreme left held a meeting, he with the other members voted for a regency.³ His colleagues overwhelmed him with questions and begged him to use his influence to put an end to the struggle. "No," he told some deputies of the centre, "not until the people had obtained all the satisfaction they have the right to demand."⁴

The session of the Chamber began about one o'clock;

¹ Regnault 56. Cf. Nougarede 224; Sarrans 12:15; Gallois 68.

² Crémieux 367 accepts the story. Stern 1:223 believes it "devoid of all foundation."

³ *Spectateur de Londres* July 1; Lamartine 1:134. Blind in *Fraser's Magazine* 91:243-4 declares that Ledru told him personally that he, Ledru, had won Lamartine over to the idea of a republic. But there is no corroboration for this statement and Blind often makes mistakes.

⁴ Carnot in *Révolution de 1848* 6:24; Sarrans 1:456.

half an hour later the Duchess of Orleans entered the hall, accompanied by the Duke of Nemours, her two sons, and several deputies. One of the latter, Dupin, was forced into the tribune and in a woefully weak speech proposed the regency of the Duchess.¹ Lamartine demanded that the session be suspended till the members of the royal family had retired, and Sauzet, the conservative president, with characteristic weakness agreed, thereby abandoning the only hope of obtaining the regency. After Oudinot had defended the claims of the Duchess, Marie of the *National* openly demanded a provisional government. He was supported by Crémieux; this was important, for it was the first defection from the ranks of the liberal monarchists. A legitimist, Genoude, declared that only an appeal to the people could decide the future form of government. Barrot now appeared in the tribune and made a final appeal in behalf of the Duchess: "As for me, I cannot take the responsibility of civil war. The regency of the Duchess of Orleans with a ministry of the most reliable men will give a more certain guarantee of liberty, and an appeal to the country . . . can then be made, and made without leading to civil war." Barrot closed with the declaration that he was in favor of true liberty.²

A legitimist, La Rochejaquelin, was the next speaker; he was interrupted by the entrance of a small band of armed men, whose leader advanced and planted the tricolor in the tribune in spite of the resistance of the president. Many deputies left the hall. Tumult reigned. Many

¹By the law of 1842 the Chamber had granted the regency to the Duke of Nemours, uncle of the Count of Paris, but he was unpopular; accordingly the King in abdicating had named as regent the new king's mother, thus illegally by his own authority abrogating a formal law of the legislature.

²*Moniteur*, February 25. When no reference for parliamentary debates is given, the *Moniteur* of the following day is meant.

orators crowded to the tribune. Crémieux, Lamartine, and Ledru-Rollin pushed to the front. The latter succeeded in attracting the attention of the mob.

This was the moment for which Ledru had been waiting for years. Lamartine says concerning it :

Almost the only republican in the Chamber, inspirer of the republican press, orator of democratic banquets, declared opponent of all compromises, of all reservations, of all half-hearted movements by the dynastic left, a man who carried his opposition inside the Chamber to the point where factiousness began, and outside to the point where it became sedition, M. Ledru-Rollin, young, well-built, with a full-blooded countenance, impetuous in voice and gesture, but preserving the deliberate coolness of a politician under the apparent frenzy of an orator, seemed the man prepared for and demanded by the occasion. His words, strongly affected by a study of the forms of popular eloquence, possessed the slightly posthumous accents of the Convention. The language of Danton breathed again in his orations. His facile and rich imagination seemed to turn to the past for a model for the future, and he seemed to regret the lost opportunity for struggle, for glory, for immortal death in the vanished drama of the great revolution. Isolated at the extreme left of the Chamber in a premature republicanism, M. Ledru-Rollin was remarked only for his ability. His colleagues had up to that time listened to him rather with curiosity than with terror ; in their eyes he was merely a revolutionary ghost ; to their ears he was only the sonorous echo of a time forever silent and buried. Suddenly the roles had changed. It was his colleagues who were in the past ; it was the impossible that had become the reality.¹

“ In the name of the people you represent, I demand silence,” cried Ledru-Rollin in his stentorian voice ; the mob caught up the cry : “ In the name of M. Ledru-Rollin,

¹Lamartine I : 132.

silence!" In relative quiet, but amid numerous interruptions the orator continued:

In the name if the people everywhere in arms, master of Paris . . . I come to protest against the kind of government just advocated from this tribune. And this is not the first time I have protested, for in 1842 during the discussion of the regency law I alone in the chamber declared it could not be passed without an appeal to the people. (*La Rochejaquelein: I also.*)

You have been told of the glorious constitution of 1789; see to it that the people who speak of it understand its true spirit. . . . In 1791 in the very text of the constitution it was declared that the Constituent Assembly, the Constituent Assembly you understand, with its special powers, did not have the right to pass a regency law, but that an appeal to the people was necessary. . . . Well, gentlemen, for two days we have been fighting for that right. If you resist, if you dare assert that a government by acclamation, an ephemeral government . . . exists, we shall fight on in the name of that constitution of 1791 which soars above our history. . . . Suddenly, without due deliberation, you break the law you passed in spite of our opposition in 1842. You do not desire it. That expedient would gain no adherents in the country. In the name of justice, which must be respected even in revolutions. . . . I protest against your new usurpation. . . . The shedding of blood affects us, it can cease only when principles of justice are satisfied. . . . In the name of the people which is everything, I ask you . . . what guarantee your law gives us.

At this point one of the few deputies of the centre who remained protested. One of the mob menaced the interruptor with a sabre, but he was restrained and the interlocutor removed by the deputies themselves.¹ The Chamber was tiring of this oratory which seemed to

¹*Siècle*, February 25.

come to no conclusion and Berryer, a legitimist member cried: "Conclude! The provisional government!" Regnault and others claim that Ledru was merely trying to gain time till Caussidiere should arrive with his legions; we have seen the improbability of this theory. In their opinion Ledru only stopped when he felt sure that Lamartine would hold forth at his usual length. It is far more likely that the novelty of the situation to the orator caused the vacuity of his speech; he was at last playing a leading part in the history of France, and this overpowered him for the only time in his career.

"In 1815," Ledru continued, "Napoleon wished to abdicate in favor of the King of Rome. The country was opposed, the country refused. In 1830 Charles X wished to abdicate in favor of his grandson. The country was opposed, the country refused." Again Berryer interrupted him: "We know our history, conclude!" Then at last Ledru-Rollin arrived at the point for which everyone had been waiting since the beginning his speech: "Today the country is opposed and you can do nothing without consulting it. To sum up, therefore, I demand a provisional government, named not by the Chamber but by the people, a provisional government and the immediate calling of a convention to establish the rights of the people."¹

This oration was not highly thought of at the time and certainly is inferior to the later addresses of the popular tribune. Lamartine followed Ledru and also advocated a provisional government; it was the weakest of the poet's discourses during these trying days.

By this time only a handful of deputies were left in the Chamber, members of the extreme left and the extreme right. Dupont de l'Eure, the patriarch of republicanism,

¹ *Discours politiques* 1: 372-4.

was forced into the chair. He read ¹ a list of seven names as the provisional government. His own and those of Lamartine, Ledru, and Arago met with universal approval, those of Garnier-Pagès, Marie, and Crémieux with slight opposition. Dupont and Lamartine then left to go to the Hôtel de Ville. Ledru-Rollin was almost the only deputy remaining in the Chamber. He seemed to think it wise to have the provisional government more formally proclaimed by the populace present. He made a brief speech and the seven names were again approved, though there were a few *noes* against Garnier-Pagès and Marie². It was now about four o'clock and Ledru in his turn set out for the city hall.

He soon caught up with his colleagues. The procession proceeded amid the cheering throngs with drum beating and colors flying. A shabby public hack had been found for Dupont. The other members walked arm in arm with their friends. Jules Favre and Félix Pyat accompanied Ledru. The people took off their hats out of respect for the newly chosen executives. Finally the members of the provisional government reach the square in front of the Hôtel de Ville. In vain those who accompanied them tried to force a way through the dense masses. Individually the new governors of France had to push on to the city hall.³ It was during this journey that Ledru made his celebrated remark to Lamartine "We are marching to Calvary."⁴

¹ There is much doubt as to who read the names; the *Moniteur* is here followed. Alton-Shée 143 and Louis Blanc 1: 71 attribute the reading to Ledru, but they probably had in mind the second reading a little later. Still other writers assert that Crémieux read the list, taking occasion to insert his own name.

² *Moniteur* for 1848, p. 501.

³ Garnier-Pagès 5: 295; Sarrans 2: 43; La Hodde: *Sociétés secrètes* 486; Robin 1: 343.

⁴ Speech of August 3, 1848—*Discours politiques* 2: 43.

At the Hôtel de Ville Garnier-Pagès had just been proclaimed mayor.¹ As soon as the crowd recognized Ledru they opened a passage for him amid cheers. Placed on a platform, he made a speech, asserting the sovereignty of the people but avoiding the question of the proclamation of the republic. From there he was carried by the crowd into a room of the city hall. Here the people insisted on ratifying the election of all the members of the provisional government. Dupont was accepted without a speech. Ledru mounted a wobbly table, told of the naming of the provisional government, and praised the populace for asserting its sovereignty. He hoped that the people would decide in favor of a republic, but he did not suggest that it be immediately proclaimed.² He and Lamartine were greatly cheered. Arago, Garnier-Pagès, Marie, and the absent Crémieux were also accepted, although with less enthusiasm. After these seven members had retired from this room, Flocon and Louis Blanc spoke, openly advocating a republic, and they were acclaimed members of the government.

No deliberation could be held amid the crowd, and accordingly Ledru and his colleagues had withdrawn to the chamber of the municipal council. When the crowd invaded this room, they moved to an office adjourning that of the prefect of the Seine, then to that of the secretary-general.³

Once more the government had to interrupt its discussion

¹ Léon de Maleville had refused to act as his assistant; for a letter of Maleville on this subject see appendix.

² Sarrans 2:42; Beaumont-Vassy 4:114; Stern 1:245; La Hodde: *Sociétés secrètes* 486-7; Blanc 71-2; Drevet 22; Lavarenne 26-7. All these state or imply that Ledru did not proclaim the republic. But Robin 1:243 quotes a letter to himself from Félix Pyat: "I found you standing beside Ledru-Rollin who was proclaiming the republic," and Delvau 249 makes a similar statement.

³ Stern 1:247; Sarrans 2:44; Drevet 22.

to appear before the people. The cheering was so loud that Dupont de l'Eure could not make himself heard. But at the sound of Ledru's voice silence was established. Ledru related the proceedings at the Chamber of Deputies, the nomination by the people of a provisional government which recognized that its rights and powers came from the populace. The crowd confirmed by acclamation the acts of the Chamber. Still it was not completely satisfied. The presence of Ledru in a government with six moderates did not seem a sufficient guarantee of advanced sentiments, and the ultra-revolutionary followers of Blanqui declared that the ideas of Ledru-Rollin must prevail. The mob shouted *Proclaim the Republic!* and a workingman waved a scroll on which could be read: *Three Cheers for the Republic!* Accordingly Ledru replied that the republic was the unanimous desire of the provisional government, and that the government would summon all France to a constituent assembly which could found the republic. He asserted that he shared the desire of the people, that the popular will was for him law, and that he would retire with his colleagues to deliberate on the form of the proclamation of the republic. This declaration was received with wild enthusiasm. Ledru's speech, which Garnier-Pagès called "wise, opportune, full of enthusiasm and energy," had not absolutely satisfied the crowd, though it had put it in a better humor; Lamartine followed and his magic eloquence carried away those who heard him as it was to do again and again during the next few days.¹

Several outsiders were present while the provisional government deliberated. A feeling of brotherhood pervaded all who were gathered together. There had been disagreements between the radicals like Ledru and Flocon and the

¹ Garnier-Pagès 5: 302-3; Stern 1: 247; Laviron 13-14; Robin 1: 344-5.

moderates like Garnier-Pagès and Carnot, but their common victory was a bond. As soon as Garnier-Pagès saw Ledru-Rollin, he held out his hand and said: "Let us forget our quarrels. Let us have only one wish, one desire, that of consecrating ourselves to the safety of our country, to the success of democracy, to the definite triumph of the republic." Ledru warmly shook the proffered hand and said: "Those are my sentiments; I was looking for you to tell you so." Carnot also, who had been repeatedly attacked in the *Réforme*, embraced Flocon and Ledru-Rollin.¹

It was now seven o'clock in the evening and Lamartine was busy drawing up a draft proclamation which contained the phrase: "The provisional government declares that the republican form is adopted provisionally." On Ledru's suggestion *republic* replaced *republican form*. All agreed and the manifesto was sent off to the printer.² The provisional government next turned to the distribution of ministries. Dupont de l'Eure was unanimously chosen president of the council. He was too old to take a portfolio. No opposition was made when Marie chose for his ministry that of public works and Lamartine that of foreign affairs. Garnier-Pagès was fully occupied with the mayoralty of Paris. Crémieux wrote his name down opposite commerce and then asked Ledru to choose that which suited him best, "Whichever you wish," was the modest reply. Garnier-Pagès, supported by Marie and Pagnerre, pointed out Ledru's aptitude for the ministry of justice and the need in that post of a strong man capable of carrying through lasting reforms. Ledru accepted, but when Crémieux'

¹Garnier-Pagès 5:302; Carnot 67.

²Garnier-Pagès 5:305-6; Delvau 250; Sarrans 1:44; St. Amant 7; Hugo 1:319-320. It was never published as a later manifesto replaced it. For the proceedings at the Hôtel de Ville the account of Garnier-Pagès is followed; his account is the fullest and most sequacious.

pointed out the desirability of having the interior department in the hands of a popular figure, a man who should represent the active element of the revolution, Ledru after a brief consultation with his friends, changed his mind and accepted the ministry of the interior.¹ Crémieux was then forced to take the ministry of justice. The navy went to François Arago. This provided for the seven members of the government. The remaining portfolios were given to Carnot (education), Bethmont (commerce and agriculture), Goudchaux (finances), and Bedeau (war).² Pagnerre became secretary-general of the government. Cavaignac was made governor of Algeria.

Now the council, at the suggestion of Bixio and Pagnerre and despite the protests of Ledru and Crémieux, decided to reconsider their proclamation of a republic. But before they could decide on the manifesto to replace it, there came a new interruption. Louis Blanc, accompanied by Flocon and Marrast, entered and demanded that they three and the workingman Albert be admitted to a place in the government. He based his claim to this place on the lists in the republican newspapers and on the acclamations he had received in the streets and in the city hall. This addition was strongly opposed. The ex-deputies felt that the government was already overlarge. The admission of even Crémieux had been contested by Marie and Garnier-Pagès. The inclusion of these four new men would bring the council up to the unwieldy number of eleven. Moreover, as three of them belonged to the *Réforme* group, the moderates felt that their power would be thereby decreased. Arago showed himself the most energetic in opposing them, and the quarrel became so

¹Garnier-Pagès 5:312-3. Carnot declares: "I was offered the ministry of the interior, I refused"; but there is no other evidence to support this assertion.—*Révolution de 1848*, 6:29.

²Later in the day Bedeau refused; see *infra*, p. 54.

heated that Louis Blanc was on the point of appealing to the mob when Ledru-Rollin intervened and urged him in the name of patriotism not to sow discord in the ranks of the new republic. Flocon and Marrast immediately agreed and accepted Garnier-Pagès's suggestion that the four new candidates be included as secretaries only. Louis Blanc, unsupported, was obliged to yield.¹ This inferior rank, however, was soon forgotten, and within three days they were treated as regular members of the provisional government.

The council now took up again the question of the proclamation of the republic. "The scene is worth describing" says Louis Blanc "M. de Lamartine appeared radiant, M. Ledru-Rollin resolute, M. Crémieux excited, M. Marie suspicious and sombre. The face of M. Dupont de l'Eure showed noble resignation. M. Marrast's lips had their customary smile, a smile of light and mocking scepticism. M. Garnier-Pagès seemed to be surprised at our presence. As to M. Arago, how little like himself I found him!"²

The question before the council admitted of three solutions. Flocon, Louis Blanc, and Ledru-Rollin demanded the immediate and unconditional proclamation of the republic. Dupont de l'Eure, Arago, and Marie asserted that they had no authority to make such an assertion. Lamartine, Garnier-Pagès, and Crémieux held a middle ground favoring proclamation subject to ratification by a constituent assembly. Marrast was silent. The argument waxed fierce. Louis Blanc was particularly violent. Ledru-Rollin spoke in a spirit of conciliation; the victory had calmed him and the responsibility of office already weighed

¹ Stern 1: 249-250; Garnier-Pagès 5: 318-321; Robin 1: 348. Blanc 1: 76 insists that the four were admitted immediately as full-fledged members, but on the decree summoning a constituent assembly he himself signed *Louis Blanc, secretary*. For a facsimile of this document see Stern, end of volume 1.

² Blanc 1: 75.

on him. Finally a version by Lamartine was accepted: "Although the provisional government acts solely in the name of the French people and although it prefers the republican form of government, neither the people of Paris nor the provisional government pretends to substitute its opinion for the opinion of the citizens who will be consulted on the definitive form of government which the sovereignty of the people will proclaim." Although this statements "did not suit" Louis Blanc and although he found it "singularly equivocal," he accepted it after *prefers* had been changed to *believes in*.¹ But Ledru refused to sign so ambiguous a proclamation, and Flocon struck out his signature on finding that Ledru would not add his.²

At this point the provisional government interrupted its proceedings in order to receive General Bedeau, who refused the ministry of war, but who accepted the command of the first military division (Paris). The General insisted that discipline must be maintained, that the officers must be upheld, that no attention must be paid to denunciations of military leaders. Garnier-Pagès and Lamartine promised him their support. "I also promise you what you ask, for I understand its importance," said Ledru-Rollin.³ He never swerved from this assurance. The war department was now given to General Subervie.

The failure to receive the signatures of Ledru and Flocon caused a reconsideration of the proclamation of the republic, and each member now spoke in turn. Ledru-Rollin began. He told how the people clearly wished for a republic. "Whether the members of the provisional government wish

¹ Blanc 1: 85.

² Stern 1: 253; Carnot in *Révolution de 1848*, 6: 32. For facsimile with signatures, see Stern, end of volume 1. The entire manifesto was very long; only the vital phrase has been quoted.

³ Bedeau in *Revue de Paris* for 1896, 3: 477.

it or not, the republic is proclaimed," he said. "How can you hesitate to confirm the wishes of the people, which is the law?" Flocon seconded this speech in almost identical words. Louis Blanc declared that the republic was the only form of government by the people. Garnier-Pagès desired its immediate proclamation. "Well, the affair is settled," said Ledru, but Garnier-Pagès insisted that the others be heard. Marie opposed haste. Dupont and Arago repeated that a provisional government had no right to initiate a republic. Crémieux then proposed that Lamartine's paragraph be replaced by: "The provisional government proclaims the republic subject to ratification by the people who will be immediately consulted." Lamartine, Carnot, and Marrast approved this version. Garnier-Pagès suggested the substitution of *wishes* for *proclaims*, and this modification was accepted. Then all signed; a happy solution had been found.¹

But these important affairs were not the only matters which the government had to decide. Numerous decrees and appointments took up much time.² The question of the royal family was brought up. "Bah," said Ledru-Rollin "let them go;" and no order for their arrest was issued.³ Already prominent officers began sending in their adhesion to the republic.⁴

¹ Garnier-Pagès 5: 339-347. For proclamation, see *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 499.

² Most appropriately the first decree that Ledru signed proclaimed the abolition of slavery. The second repealed the taxes on salt and wood. The third, which he had great difficulty in obtaining from the government, established a home for old and infirm workingmen.—Delvau 297-9.

³ Garnier-Pagès 5: 349-350. Later Ledru opposed the confiscation of the Orleanist property; he destroyed several projects of confiscation drawn up by Jules Favre.—Stern 3: 78.

⁴ Later the reading of these letters of devotion took up so much time in council meetings that Ledru asked what value there was in these declarations "on the part of men ever ready to swear new oaths," and the government no longer troubled itself with them.—Regnault 91.

Soon after the proclamation of the republic, about midnight of February 24, Ledru left the Hôtel de Ville for the ministry of the interior, but he did not go there directly. He wandered through the capital, pacifying the street-fighters. He visited the prefecture of police, heard from Caussidière and Sobrier how they had taken possession of the prefecture, conferred with them on the situation, and received from them the keys to the secret funds of the treasury.¹

Thus on February 24 the revolution of 1848 was completed. Four days earlier hardly any one had expected an uprising; few had desired one; no one had dreamed of the immediate proclamation of the republic. But now, to the great surprise of all, and not least of the chief actors in the drama, the republic was an actuality and all France acclaimed it. The King and all the members of the royal family were in flight, a provisional government composed of republicans had been installed and was now ruling the country with Ledru-Rollin as a member and as minister of the interior.

¹ Lamartine I: 182, 204-5; Garnier-Pagès 6: 29.

CHAPTER IV

THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

LEDRU-ROLLIN was what the French call *un bel homme*, but his personal appearance would not appeal to Anglo-Saxon tastes. He was a large man with a powerful frame but too fat. Good nature was reflected in his features, and the strength of his jaws and of his eyes was contradicted by the flabbiness of his cheeks. Contemporaries naturally differed in their descriptions of him. Jules Favre says:

Ledru-Rollin belonged to that race of privileged beings whom the hand of God has marked with the seal of their predestination. He was born an orator, an athletic tribune. A large, well-set . . . chest, a massive head attached to robust shoulders by a neck both ample and graceful, a firm and cadenced walk, gravity and decision in each of his movements, the natural authority of his features made of him a type of physical force and intellectual superiority.¹

Audebrand is less laudatory:

A sort of giant, a kind of modern Danton with a bourgeois figure. A large chest, a voice of fine quality. Enough natural gifts, enough knowledge also, so that there was in him a natural orator. . . . He had a countenance of insipid beauty. Some of his friends said in a whisper: that is not a Brutus; he has the rosy figure of a Dolabella. His paunch was Rabelaisian. . . . His sybarite traits never let him lose sight of the interests of the cause to which he was devoted; perhaps he might even be accused of being too zealous.²

¹ Favre 345-6.

² *Revue Bleue* 46: 179.

Estimates of his character differed equally. Louis Blanc writes :

A very keen and nervous temperament, a political energy tempered by fresh and engaging manners, zealous will-power, integrity, a violent desire to insure the triumph of the revolution, an oratorical talent of the first order . . . were set off by a good figure, an imposing form, and a certain magnetism. . . . M. Ledru-Rollin, a generous and confiding character with the nature of an artist, was less capable of offending a friend than of courageously holding his own against an adversary, a fact which made him too accessible to the influence of his environment. . . . He was haunted by glorious visions of the first republic, and he would gladly at one stroke have revived the past. He did not pay sufficient attention to the thinkers of the nineteenth century.¹

On the other hand, Persigny, the friend of Louis Napoleon, declares :

In person he was a big fellow, a jovial voluptuary, of whom nature wished to make an honest bourgeois . . . but whom flattery and vanity pushed to ambition for popular honours. An able lawyer, but with few brains and little courage, made to be dominated by the violence of his party and not to guide it, puffed up with pride, filled with chimeras.²

¹ Blanc 1:280-1. Similarly Castille 2:39 says: "He is too honest, too good-hearted, too affectionate to resemble Danton. . . . There is much of the artist in his frankness, generosity, and sweet and friendly manners. . . . He is not a thinker or a philosopher but a true orator."

² Persigny 72-3. The Orleanist, Ernest Charles, writes in the *Revue Bleue* 12:519. "Ledru-Rollin far surpassed Barrot in lack of foresight, in stupidity, and in vanity." The extreme revolutionist, Lavarenne, 80, 144 describes Ledru as follows: "Popular tribune and marvellous agitator, he felt boiling in his veins the blood of the old Mountain; but he lacked the means or the force to bring about his desires. . . . He was a demagogue . . . totally lacking in political capacity." Mirecourt 5-13, 52-4, 68-70, 77 describes Ledru as "a superb orator but a mediocre

The best estimate of Ledru-Rollin is probably that of Daniel Stern, the Countess d'Agoult, whose republican salon became well-known under the second empire:

Ledru-Rollin was an indolent but able lawyer . . . a man of easy habits and nonchalant humor, fond of comfort, even luxury. . . . The natural weakness of his character and his inexperience in political matters led him into errors from which the republic suffered. He allowed himself to be led by subordinates. . . . Neither his sincere but emphatic patriotism, nor his open and generous but unstable character, nor even his natural uprightness, too often perverted by his love of popularity, fitted him for leadership. He realized this incapacity . . . and fearing lest he should not impose success, he wished to inspire terror. . . . This man whom the provinces considered a terrorist . . . this children's bogey . . . has the best of hearts, is without hatred, is the most easily influenced of men. An optimistic conspirator, a lazy minister, above all a pleasant political comrade . . . a man of entrancing eloquence and no evil passions . . . but of no lofty statesmanlike conceptions. . . . M. Ledru-Rollin belonged to that class of republicans who have a mediocre idea of the reasoning power of the people and preserve even in their search for popularity a certain air of condescension.¹

politician, resembling the grotesque and pleasant hero of Cervantes whose head was turned by books of chivalry . . . in that his reason was perverted by wretched revolutionary literature. . . . He was ambitious and unintelligent . . . extravagant . . . a devil of a Lovelace . . . self-seeking."

¹ Stern 1: 27-8, 62, 65-6; 2: 41; *Lettres républicaines* No. 16, pp. 9-11. This last statement is born out by other writers. Marx 13 calls him the representative not of the proletariat but of the small traders. Herzen 2: 298 makes a similar remark. The conservative Chamier 1: 212-3 writes: "His personal appearance is highly favorable . . . but marks a haughty aristocrat rather than a leveling republican. . . . He speaks with great force and fluency. . . . He is a man of unquestionable ability, of great perseverance." Napoleon Gallois 105-7 describes his friend, Ledru, as an aristocrat by fortune, a democrat by heart, a clever conversation-

Perhaps this description is too severe, but it does indicate Ledru's outstanding characteristics.

Naturally a man in Ledru's position was the target of numerous calumnies. Pamphlets against him were hawked about in the streets; songs ridiculing him were sung in aristocratic salons. The press, Orleanist and Bonapartist, clerical and ultra-revolutionary, made every kind of wild accusation. "One member of the provisional government," says John Stuart Mill,

has been a mark for greater inveteracy of assault than the rest: M. Ledru-Rollin. Everybody has heard scandalous stories concerning him; and in his case some of these were specific and accompanied by name and circumstances. If those that did not enter into particulars had no better foundation than those that did, M. Ledru-Rollin as to personal integrity is the statesman of most unimpeachable character in Europe.¹

Ledru declared in the Constituent Assembly:

In the period of trouble and anguish, day and night I watched without slacking. It was by an absolute devotion to my duties that I replied to the infamous calumnies of which I have been the object. I have never seen in this unexampled outburst anything except an additional reason to defend with greater intrepidity a cause which the fury of certain fanatics wished to injure by attacking me. I have trusted in the good sense of the nation, in the justice of the Assembly, and I thought that as a soldier of the revolution I should suffer all for it and not lose in refuting odious calumnies the precious time that its services claimed of me.²

alist of artistic tastes, lazy except when aroused by a sense of duty. Bouton, an extreme revolutionist, says of Ledru: "Insincere, without virtues, he has no stability at all. Vain, the fool of popularity, loving the people only at a distance, he does not possess the true revolutionary force."

¹ Mill 367-8. Cf. Delvaux 366-8; Audebrand in *Revue Bleue* 46: 179.

² Speech of May 6, 1848, *Discours politiques* 2: 25.

He was accused of wild extravagance and licentiousness, exorbitant luxury and drunkenness. In the provinces the story was spread that *Le Duc Rollin* indulged in orgies with two courtesans, *La Martine* and *La Marie*.¹ Garnier-Pagès and Pagnerre took a day's holiday to hunt in the forest of Chantilly. The account was changed and elaborated by the royalist press and the *Constitutionnel* printed: "News of the court: Yesterday there was a luncheon at the Petit Trianon. There were women. M. Ledru-Rollin was host. There was also a hunt at Chantilly." This was the only calumny to which Ledru-Rollin deigned to reply. He denied the statement categorically and added: "Since February 24 I have not left Paris for a moment; out of twenty-four hours, I devote twenty to work."² A drunken man abused the National Guard; an officer of that body without any investigation spread the story that the drunkard was Ledru.³

The commonest form of vilification consisted of attacks on Ledru's abuse of his ministerial position. It was claimed that he insisted on the release from Brest prison of a dangerous forger, that he gave the position of director of the *Opéra Comique* to pay an old debt, that he gave public positions to his valet, to the husband of his wife's maid, to

¹ Caussidière 2:6; St. Ferréol: *Proscrits* 1:326; Blanc 2:50-1. For amusing story of an actress, see Regnault 160-1; Blanc 2:34; Robin 148-9.

² *Constitutionnel*, April 27, 28; Blanc 2:33; Regnault 159-160. In answer to Ledru the *Constitutionnel* declared the whole affair a joke. It said: "If Ledru-Rollin has not done for the people all the good he desires, it is not because he has not been wide enough awake, but because he has not slept enough."

³ Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:244; 2:272-4. In October Ledru sued this officer for libel. The court decided that malice had not been proved and assigned costs to the plaintiff. At the same time Ledru had sued several other persons for calumny, but the court held that it was incompetent as Ledru was a public official.—*Moniteur* for 1848, 2732, 2812-4.

a cousin, to a revolutionist as a reward for killing a stable boy who was defending Louis Philippe's horses, that he had taken £14,000 from the public funds and placed them to his credit in an English bank, that Goudchaux, minister of finances, resigned because he would not agree to Ledru's financial extravagance.¹

Fulsome laudation was equally common. Songs were written in praise of him. Medals were struck in his honor.² A citizen of Roubaix wanted to call his son Ledru-Rollin Victor.³ The father of Juliette Adam was of the opinion that: "A Ledru-Rollin, a Louis Blanc is the continuator of Christianity."⁴

That Ledru-Rollin was scrupulously honest and not even over-extravagant there seems to be little doubt. On August 21, 1848 Ledru defended in the Assembly his expenditures:

What do you have at the ministry of the interior? Two things. Those expenses that were ordered for general services; these the minister merely signs, as you know; the chief accountant distributes to the employees the sums indicated in the budget. . . . Besides these there are the secret funds. . . . Well, these secret funds . . . remained below the abnormal average existing under the late monarchy. . . . The budget of 1847 could not foresee the establishment of the *Garde Mobile*, of the Guardians of Paris, of the commissioners sent into the departments, the organisation of universal suffrage, the men who sought aid from the ministry of the interior. . . . All this was taken from the secret funds.

¹ Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 232, 297, 334-5, 347; *Moniteur for 1848*, 2732; *Constitutionnel*, May 18, 1848, January 1, 1849; *Courier de Lyon*, March 25, 1851; *Voix du Proscrit* 1: 348-350; *Lanterne*, May 4, 1848; *Tirel* 60-63; *Mirecourt* 72; *Bonde* 48.

² For letter about one such medal, see appendix.

³ Archives départementales of Lille M 134/24.

⁴ Adam 256.

Ledru gives further details as to expenses and ends with a declaration of the impossibility of concealing misuse of funds.¹

A through examination was made by the hostile and conservative Ducos commission. Agreeing with an earlier report, Roger Ducos declared to the Constituent Assembly that the great expenditure was justified by the extraordinary times and that there were no irregularities. Though entitled to two hundred thousand francs,

M. Ledru-Rollin took no salary as minister of the interior . . . As under the administration of his predecessors, M. Ledru-Rollin delivered a great number of *orders to bearer*, but we must recognize that he took great care to stipulate on each one, except five or six for sums of no great importance, either mention of its destination or the initials of the person for whom it was destined. Thanks to this precaution, which the previous ministers did not think necessary to take because they were accountable to no one but the king . . . it has been possible for us . . . to obtain explanations about each one from M. Ledru-Rollin.

Various economies were pointed out. A few expenses were blamed: expenditures by some of the commissioners, railroad-fare to foreign workingmen returning to their own country, money to watch his colleagues in the government. But Ducos admitted that every single outlay was regular.² A more complete justification of the minister would be difficult to find.

Most of the strictures on Ledru's administration of the home department were the result of the personnel of the min-

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 59-64.

² Ducos report, presented April 14, 1849, published *Moniteur* 1552-9, 1532. For excellent discussions of the subject of expenditures, see Antony and La Place de Chauvac.

istry. But this was more the result of the situation than the fault of the minister. All the trained officials were monarchists; so choice had to be made between retaining experienced men who were not in sympathy with the reforms to be instituted or leaving the work to friendly but inexperienced republicans. In his circular of March 8 Ledru gave his solution: "Political offices is no matter what degree of the hierarchy must be filled with tried republicans. . . . Less rigor need be used in regard to officials whose role is purely administrative. Those may be maintained who, strangers to all political action, have reached their position by useful services."¹

Most of the higher offices were filled with competent men. When Ledru-Rollin arrived at the ministry of the interior, he found it occupied by Andryane, a former prisoner of Austria who had passed some time in the dungeons of the Spielberg, and whom the provisional government had appointed under-secretary of the interior department without consulting Ledru. Andryane had already on his own authority signed the liberation of Teste, an ex-minister of Louis Philippe, who had been condemned for bribery. Ledru insisted on the retirement of Andryane and obtained his resignation, but not without difficulty.² For a time Flocon acted as under-secretary, but either he felt that a subordinate position did not become a fellow-member of the government or believed that he could be of more service by representing the radicals at council meetings instead of devoting himself to the details of administration. No one succeeded him as under-secretary.

Jules Favre was secretary-general and, after Ledru, undoubtedly the most important person in the department. His position in politics is almost inexplicable. At heart certainly a republican and seemingly a radical, in the Con-

¹ *Discours politiques* 2:2-3. See also Regnault 151-2.

² Stern 2:66-7; Regnault 151, 154; *Constitutionnel*, February 25.

stituent Assembly he was to exert his eloquence to overthrow a ministry of his party. One of Ledru's closest friends and partisans in February, Favre later in the year violently attacked him. In his relations with George Sand, Favre seemed to be leading Ledru toward socialism; yet generally he was a moderating force. Regnault calls attention to Favre's respect for legality in contrast to Ledru who cared little for it.¹ In spite of their differences, throughout his term of office, Ledru-Rollin placed the greatest reliance upon Jules Favre.

Ledru-Rollin's chief of cabinet was Elias Regnault, a moderate of the *National* group, but a loyal supporter of the minister in all his reforms. He was a newspaper man from Le Mans and had aided the election of Ledru in that city. Although always ready with counsels of moderation (and therefore the *bête noir* of the extreme revolutionists), he was by no means a conservative but an advocate of slow progress and reform. He was not a man of extraordinary ability, but a painstaking and reliable official. Regnault's opinion of his chief was as follows:

In taking under his direction the ministry of the interior M. Ledru-Rollin did not deceive himself as to the weight of the task on which the success of the republic depended. With an ardent desire to develop new institutions, to awaken republican sentiments in the departments, he judged himself proper for the role he had chosen and boldly took his place in the ministry of the interior, that centre of the most reactionary traditions and most hostile passions. Audacious by temperament and naturally progressive, he was not frightened by obstacles or ill-will, and for the mission which he accepted he had no need of apprenticeship, or rather he had served his apprenticeship in the struggles of the tribune and the press. In purely administrative matters, experience has its value; in political matters,

¹ Regnault 155.

it is routine that is called experience, and M. Ledru-Rollin knew that it was against routine that he would have to fight. . . . Prompt in action and quick in thought, he was unequalled in the facility with which he seized on the different phases of a question. . . . When a new subject was presented for discussion, he needed only to provoke a short argument, and at the end of a rapid conversation he could mount the tribune, full of his subject and able to throw light on a question to which he had hitherto given little thought . . . Without having the brilliance or grandeur of M. Lamartine, M. Ledru-Rollin made a deeper impression on the hearts of the masses, and with less diffuseness went straight to the point; with less poetry he had more fire.¹

The direction of the police department was in the hands of Carteret, who, like Regnault, was a hard-working official, a moderate, loyal to Ledru-Rollin. The prefect of police was that colossal revolutionary Caussidière, of whom we shall hear more later. The head of the political police was Carrier, one of those clever weathercocks who violently advocate the doctrines of whatever party is in power or soon will be. When the reaction set in during July 1848, we shall find him turning against his former chief. Later still he was to become one of Louis Napoleon's notorious prefects of police.

The private secretary of Ledru was Delvau, an extreme revolutionist. Delvau regretted that his leader had accepted a cabinet position, believing that he would have better served the interests of the country as leader of the opposition. In support of this position he mentioned the case of Mirabeau and called Danton's acceptance of a portfolio the cause of his overthrow. He continually bewailed the fact that the minister was not sufficiently revolutionary. At the same time he absolutely worshipped his chief and believed him

¹ Regnault 152-3.

"the man of the hour" and one of the greatest men of all the ages. Describing him more in detail, Delvau said:

He was the man of the masses, the popular tribune *par excellence*. . . . He had a strong and resonant voice which profoundly stirred those who heard it. He had a sanguine temperament combined with ardor, impatience, anger. . . . His countenance was lighted up by a smile of irresistible kindness . . . and his glance revealed power and nobility. . . . Ledru-Rollin led a life overfilled with work. Ardent in the task he had undertaken, desirous to prove his devotion to the people by his acts and by his words, he laboriously filled the hours of each day so well that it took all the energy of his will, reinforced by the energy of his robust temperament to resist fatigue and sickness. He arose at six in the morning and went to bed regularly at two hours after midnight. Twenty hours of work, ye chroniclers who calumniate him so freely.¹

Constantly at Ledru's elbow, Delvau continually urged him on to action and probably to a break with his moderate colleagues in the provisional government.² Very likely the private secretary was the centre of these intrigues with Causidière, Sobrier, Blanqui, Flotte, and other extremists, which are supposed to have issued from the ministry of the interior.

For head of the division of Beaux-Arts Ledru's first choice was Etienne Arago, the dramatist. Arago would have been glad to accept, but he was already director of posts or, as we call it, postmaster-general, and his subordinates insisted on his retaining this position.³ In spite of this refusal, Etienne Arago remained an influence at the ministry of the interior; like Ledru-Rollin himself, he was

¹ Delvau 285-304, 367.

² The moderate, Cuvillier-Fleury 1: 267-283 pictures Ledru as a weak man, subject alternately to the good influence of Regnault and the bad influence of Delvau.

³ Arago 42-3.

a radical but conciliatory. Finally the office was given to the painter Jeanron. This choice was universally applauded. Lockroy, the dramatist, was appointed head of the bureau of theatres; he played no part in political affairs.

The minor officials in the department were less satisfactory. The men connected with the *Réforme*, the men of the secret societies, all those who were ultra-revolutionary through self-interest, hastened to the ministry controlled by a radical, and many obtained positions. Their chief concern was not their work but the revolutionizing of the country. Some of these men were undoubtedly adventurers, but most were probably fanatics with a love for almost anarchic liberty.¹ Many of the old professional bureaucrats were also retained in the ministry. Between these two classes of men, the one trying to urge the minister on too rapidly, the other unwilling to aid in any change, there was constant antagonism. Ledru-Rollin simplified the administration to a slight extent and made some changes in order to do away with monarchical practices or to introduce economy. Too radical measures he dared not undertake. His loyalty to the government of which he was a member was unimpeachable and he knew that the controlling moderates would not support him in a thorough program of reform. On May 6, 1848 he told the Assembly:

I would have preferred to introduce into the mechanism of the department changes destined to make it more simple and more democratic. I thought that these reforms should not be isolated and partial and that they could be more wisely accomplished by him who would receive definite authority from your hands. I feared to stir up trouble in the department at the moment

¹ The non-political bureau of fine arts was an exception: "Ledru-Rollin had separated art from the passion of parties," says Garnier-Pagès 8:85.

when it was most essential to preserve its smooth and regular operation.¹

Whenever any definite case of abuse of their position on the part of the radicals was discovered, it was immediately rectified. For instance, Carlier recruited some ex-political prisoners to act as a guard for the ministry. Some of these men composed over-revolutionary placards and issued them from the ministry of the interior. As soon as Carteret pointed out this action, Ledru dismissed the culprits.²

The labor of the minister was enormous. He had to receive numerous deputations and grant a never-ending series of interviews; people came who desired places for themselves, or maybe for their wives' relations; others came merely to give advice or to gain protection for some organization. Life-long monarchists did not hesitate to come to the radical minister, assure him of their devotion to the republic, and beg favors.³ Melun came to ask protection for the Society of St. Vincent de Paul. "As soon as we arrived," says this conservative philanthropist, "he ordered us to be admitted, listened to our observations, and assured us that the republic and its ministers had no such hostile intentions as we supposed, that it was a calumny to say so. We felt more satisfied with his reception than with his companions, and he kept his word to us."⁴

¹ *Discours politiques* 2:25-6. See also Lavarenne 146; Regnault 156. The few changes made were abolished by Sénard and his successors in the ministry.

² Carteret in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:252.

³ Regnault 153 writes: "Every day deputations presented themselves at the ministry . . . some bringing congratulations, others complaints. To both M. Ledru-Rollin showed himself always ready to reply, sometimes by brief outbursts of oratory, sometimes by adroit defense or paternal reprimand." Cf. Delvau 367.

⁴ Melun 1:263-4. For another incident see Lavarenne 150.

A typical office-seeker was the young Ulbach, who desired the position of sub-commissioner and who presented himself before Ledru with a "certificate of civism" which he had obtained through family connections from the minister's wife. "That was my sole title to the favor of the government," says Ulbach, who later became a prominent democratic journalist.

Let me say immediately that it seemed insufficient. Ledru-Rollin put the paper under his elbow so as not to confuse it with more serious papers. I was received and dismissed with an encouraging smile; that was all. As I entered the minister's office, a lady was leaving. I recognized George Sand. . . . I found in the office one of my compatriots . . . this was a pretext to remain. . . . The office of the minister was filled with people. Ledru-Rollin was smiling affably, speaking in a loud voice to those he could salute with the name of combattant or martyr and defending himself in a low voice against the unknown solicitors who surrounded him. . . . I have never seen a finer head, exhibiting more contentment, radiating more serenity than the head of M. Ledru-Rollin. His great forehead, his eyes, his mouth, his quivering nostrils, all indicated the orator. . . . On the slightest pretext he raised his voice. . . . I retain a precise recollection of that morning, the tumult of the audience, and even a procession of several prefects of Louis Philippe who came to offer Ledru-Rollin their devotion.¹

Such was the man Ledru-Rollin; such were some of his assistants; and such were the conditions under which he worked. The tasks to which he was compelled to apply himself were most varied. Some of the most important we shall consider later, such as the organization of universal suffrage, the commissioners to the departments, the famous circulars, the Bulletins of the Republic, the reorganization of the National Guard. The minor topics are too numerous

¹ Ulbach 41-2; *Revue Bleue* 25: 263.

to mention; they include such matters as the reorganization of the government pawn-shops, the appointment of committees to study reforms, even in agriculture, and the improvement of highways and byways.¹

Public charity also fell within the jurisdiction of the department of the interior. Ledru-Rollin deplored the small amount of money at his disposal, but did the best he could. Particular aid was given to those who had been wounded in the street fighting of the February Days. The minister made repeated visits to the hospitals where these unfortunates were treated, spoke to them individually in his affable manner, and distributed relief to their families.²

Ledru gave particular attention to the bureau of fine arts. He reorganized its administration. In spite of his political occupations he presided at the meeting of the committee charged with the question of the transportation to the Tuileries of the National Library, and the union at the Louvre of all the museums then widely dispersed. His democratizing tendency was felt even in this field; he granted to the artists themselves the election of the hanging committee for the annual exhibition.³

Above all Ledru interested himself in the theatres. He was charged with wasting much of his time in them.⁴ On

¹ *Débats*, March 25, 26; Garnier-Pagès 8: 80.

² *Moniteur for 1848*, pp. 534, 662, 683. *Ami du Peuple*, March 26; *Débats, Peuple Constituant*, March 3. For a detailed consideration of philanthropy under the second republic, see Dreyfus.

³ Blanc 1: 286; Stern 2: 347-8; Garnier-Pagès 8: 85; *Réforme*, March 23; *Moniteur for 1848*, pp. 503, 524, 777. Houssaye 2: 347 declares: "We artists did not despair of art in France with Lamartine, Ledru-Rollin, Sand, and Arago. . . . Ledru-Rollin loves art and buys pictures."

⁴ He was accused of being the lover of Judith of the *Palais Royal* and of the celebrated Rachel. The accusations had no foundation. Rachel visited him twice at the ministry to consult with him on her project of arousing enthusiasm for the republic by reciting the *Marseillaise* in the provinces and also to give him pointers on elocution.—Regnault 158-9; *Réveil*, November 5, 1868; Bonde 1: 104.

April 2, Caussidière, Ledru and a priest spoke at the planting of a liberty tree near the Opéra. The minister of the interior aroused enthusiasm by a warm speech in which he enumerated the titles to glory of the Opéra and recalled the great effects produced by singers and by masterpieces.¹

The most important work of Ledru in the dramatic field was the production of several free performances. He first obtained the consent of the provisional government² and on March 24 signed a decree announcing them:

Whereas the state owes it to the people . . . to encourage their participation in the moral pleasures that elevate the soul . . . the government commissioner of theatres is authorized to give free national representations. . . . The tickets shall be sent in equal parts to the city hall and to the prefecture of police to be distributed in the factories, clubs, and schools to the poorest citizens; the tickets shall be drawn by lot.³

On April 6 occurred the first of these free performances. It included Corneille's *Les Horaces*, Molière's *Malade imaginaire*, a prologue by George Sand called *Le Roi attend*, the singing of the *Chant du Départ*, and the recitation by Rachel of the *Marseillaise*.⁴ The next day there was a free performance at the Opéra, and on April 9 Auber's *La Muette de Portici* and the ballet from *Griseldis* were given, followed by a patriotic tableau and the singing of the *Marseillaise*. Ledru-Rollin was present on all three occasions, accompanied by various members of the government; to show their democratic spirit they sat in the orchestra and not in a reserved box.⁵

¹ *Révolution de 1848*, 10: 480-1; Caussidière 1: 186.

² Garnier-Pagès 8: 87-9.

³ *Moniteur* for 1848, p. 682.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 768, 780. Got 1: 235 calls *Le Roi attend* "an appropriate prologue which Ledru-Rollin had ordered of George Sand as a simple *Bulletin of the Republic*."

⁵ Garnier-Pagès 8: 89; *Constitutionnel*, April 12.

CHAPTER V

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

BESIDES being minister of the interior, Ledru-Rollin was a member of the provisional government. Council meetings were held every day, but Ledru's multifarious duties kept him from coming unless important matters were to be discussed. In ordinary cases the minutes of the session were sent to him at his ministry.¹ When Ledru did appear, he took a prominent part and talked much. "Speeches were the great arm, the great force of the provisional government," says Marie. "Through them the crowd was ruled. . . . But in the council itself, they were an obstacle, I almost said a plague. Two men especially allowed themselves to be carried away to oratory on any and every subject: Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin, both endowed with a great and lively imagination, differing in form and quality, identical in result."²

The provisional government contained three elements: socialists (Blanc and Albert), radicals (Ledru and Flocon), and moderates (the remaining seven). All were devoted to the republic, but the minority, that is the radicals and socialists, wished to encourage the revolutionary spirit, to crush opposition, and to shelve the liberal monarchists whose conversion to republicanism they distrusted, whereas the majority desired to restrain the revolutionary spirit, con-

¹ Lavarenne 145-6, who himself carried the minutes to Ledru several times.

² Cherest: *Marie* 144.

ciliate opposition, and cooperate with those dynastic liberals who accepted the republic.¹ The moderates wished to wait for the Constituent Assembly before instituting fundamental reforms; the socialists wished to republicanize French institutions completely before the legislature met; the radicals occupied a middle ground, anxious for reform, but desirous of conciliating the moderates and of working harmoniously with them.

One might think that the moderate party of seven members could easily defeat either other party or the two combined. But there were several things to be considered. Lamartine (particularly after April 16), Arago, and Crémieux sometimes sided with the minority, and then naturally they carried the day. But more important was the fact that the council could not afford to allow any member to resign; a popular tumult might result.² The presence of the four members of the minority restrained the people, prevented a successful uprising. The presence of the majority conciliated the bourgeoisie. Each element relied on powerful groups outside the government, but each also feared that their adherents would drag them further than they desired, the one toward anarchy, the other toward reaction.³ The radicals found as aids the audacious club-leaders who were the advocates not only of progress and

¹ Regnault 8-13 says: "M. Ledru-Rollin believed the republic compromised by too much weakness. . . . His colleagues believed it compromised by too much audacity." Proudhon, *Letters*, 2: 315 describes the three parties: the doctrinaires of the *National* who oppose progress, the honest and devoted radicals who do not understand the century and too frequently look back to 1793, and the socialists who have false ideas as to reforms. See also Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 224, 278, 321, 330, testimony of Arago, Dupont, Marrast, and Pagnerre.

² Goudchaux declared that he alone would have been glad of the resignation of Ledru and Blanc.—Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 289.

³ See Regnault 15.

energetic action but also of anarchy and disorder. To unchain these tumultuous elements would be to provoke a movement of which Ledru and his friends might no longer be masters, which might ruin the republic through its excesses. The moderates were supported by the business and financial interests of the country, the former supporters of the monarchy, and they rightly feared that a break with the radicals would deliver them into the hands of these reactionary forces.

The relations of the radicals and socialists with each other must be noted. Sometimes they were united, sometimes separated.¹ Ledru-Rollin never shared the socialist principles of Louis Blanc. Throughout the second republic he remained merely a social reformer, what the French would call today a radical-socialist. Communism was utterly repugnant to him.² He always declared against the idealistic theories and Utopian schemes of Fourier and St. Simon, of Cabet and Leroux, but he was always interested in practicable social reforms. He believed that the social system needed renovation, but he advocated no specific panacea to make it perfect; he believed in gradual evolution by pacific means. Later we shall find Ledru calling himself a socialist and Mathieu de la Drôme declaring that Ledru had always been one, but really there was no change in his ideas; in order to unite with the socialist party Ledru was willing to call socialistic those ideas which he had always held, the same ones he had formally considered non-socialistic.³ Thus there were certain similarities not of doctrine, but of practice between Ledru and Louis Blanc.

¹ See Arago in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 225.

² See Delvau 448; Cabet 36.

³ Regnault 116 declares that Ledru who worshipped the *conventionnels*, was irritated at meeting a complication that they did not know, although he was not appalled by the audacity of the socialist schemes.

The reforms that the latter desired were far more profound, but Ledru went far beyond his moderate antagonists. Consequently the place of the two socialists was usually beside the radicals and they in return usually received the support of Ledru and Flocon.¹

The leader of the socialist group, Louis Blanc, although still a young man, being only thirty-six, had already made a name for himself. His *Organisation du Travail* had set forth in a brilliant manner the faults of the competitive system. To replace this system the young author advocated cooperation. In each trade the workingmen were to unite and form companies, financed at the outset by the government, which would ultimately drive out the capitalistic concerns and bring the artisans into their own. Equality of wages² and election of directing officials were important items of his program. Confident that the adoption of his ideas would bring about a millennium, he tried to impose them on the government, but never with success. A far more ardent revolutionary than Ledru-Rollin, he was willing to break with the moderates (especially on April 16), but he realized that alone he had not sufficient backing, that a change in the government could be successful only if Ledru-Rollin joined forces with him. Advanced as he was, he was not an exponent of terrorism; he hoped to gain over the bourgeoisie by argument, not by the guillotine. Dogmatic, ultra-revolutionary, he was at the same time loyal, generous, kind-hearted, sincere.

In the provisional government Blanc was steadily supported by Albert, workingman. The latter had no qualification whatever for his place in the government except the epithet of *workingman*, without which his name never

¹ See Regnault 117-8.

² In some of the editions of his book, pay according to needs, that is, a salary proportionate to the size of the wage-earner's family.

appeared. The proletariat was delighted to have one of its members in the government and that purpose Albert served. He had been one of the secondary leaders in the secret societies and to that fact, but more to chance, he owed his place on the council. Honest and sincere he was, but he never displayed the slightest sign of originality or ability. He followed Louis Blanc blindly, always acquiescing in his leader's assertions.

Ledru received the steady support of Flocon. The latter had succeeded Godefroy Cavaignac as editor of the *Réforme*, and for years had with Ledru-Rollin guided the radical republicans. An independent thinker, at times he seemed more moderate, at times more advanced than his colleague. He was less easily swayed by his associates than was Ledru, but he had not the other's ability to sway his audience. To his advice and counsel more than to that of anyone else Ledru turned in times of unrest.

Dupont de l'Eure, the president of the provisional government, was eighty-one years old; he was known as the *patriarch of republicanism*. Since 1798 he had served in the legislatures of France and had constantly advocated liberal measures. He was now too feeble to take on active part in the government, but he threw the full weight of his authority against all radical innovations. Always kindly, he was ever anxious to maintain harmony in the council. Respected throughout France by all parties, he was an ideal figure to place at the head of the provisional government.

Marie was the legal counsel for the *National*. A consistent advocate of republicanism, his tendencies were rather conservative. A man of keen intellect, this hard worker had the steely coldness of the legalist.

Holding the same opinions, Armand Marrast was a distinct contrast in character. A hot-headed Gascon, he was continually quarreling with the radicals. Editor of the

National, he had combined a love for the republic and a steady liberalism with a fear of extreme measures and a dislike of ultra-revolutionists.

Louis-Antoine Garnier-Pagès, known as "the younger," owed his position more to the reputation of his deceased elder brother than to his own qualities. A lawyer, a supporter of the *National*, an old-line republican, he brought to the government a capacity for hard labor, courage in times of crisis, and considerable financial ability. Holding the same opinions as Marie and Marrast he was far more ready than were they to reconcile his view-point with that of the radicals and far more willing to recognize the ability and usefulness of Ledru-Rollin.

François Arago, another member of the provisional government, was probably the greatest French scientist of the day, but since 1830 he had devoted much of his time to political matters. He had formerly been a radical republican and had been connected with the *Réforme*, but he was not so extreme as Ledru-Rollin and had latterly cooperated in the Chamber with the moderates. In Paris, however, he was still frequently considered as an advanced republican, but the politicians realized his conservatism, and when the executive commission was formed later, he received the largest number of votes. Brave and loyal, quick to anger, easily influenced by his environment, indefatigable in labor, he was an able assistant, but he lacked the moral strength to be a leader in a time of crisis.

Crémieux was the only member of the government who was undoubtedly a new republican. He had long been a prominent member of the dynastic left but hardly one of its leaders. His place on the council he owed to the fact that he alone of the supporters of the July monarchy had advocated a provisional government on February 24. His ideas were fluid rather than fixed. He had been a sincere con-

stitutional monarchist; he suddenly became a sincere republican. Later, when reaction set in, it swept him with it at first, but finally it went too far for him, and in the Legislative Assembly he became the leader of the moderate republicans of the left. From his antecedents one would expect that he would be the least advanced of the members of the council. Such was not the case. He was not connected by earlier ties with the *National* group and in consequence frequently sided with its opponents. The facility with which he absorbed new ideas made him more easily accept the reforms advocated by Ledru-Rollin and Louis Blanc.

Undoubtedly the most prominent member of the provisional government was Alphonse de Lamartine. He was recognized as one of the greatest poets of the day, but his ambition was to shine as well in the realm of politics. Under the Bourbons he had been a staunch legitimist, but already showed some liberal ideas. Under the July Monarchy his evolution was gradual. He joined no party in the legislature and had no followers, but the aid of his eloquence was sought by all. Once in support of a Molé cabinet, he maintained the field almost alone against all the brilliant orators of the Chamber. He had been repeatedly offered minor ministries, but he was unwilling to abandon his independent position unless he could obtain one of the chief cabinet portfolios. Exactly when he became a republican is a mooted question. Some claim it was not until February 24, but it is more probable that before the revolution he had accepted the republic as the ideal form of government. His first step in that direction was the glorification of the first republic in *Les Girondins*. When the decisive moment came on February 24, when he arose in the legislature and his words would probably wreck the monarchy or give it a chance, he declared for a provisional government.

He was the person who represented the provisional government at all crises; time after time his was the voice that quelled the mob by its miraculous eloquence and made it change from hisses to acclamations. In the council he was at first the leader of the moderates; he and Ledru-Rollin were considered by France as the protagonists of the two opposing tendencies. But he was the mildest of the majority and, though their leader, constantly moderated their conservatism. Above all, relying on his eloquence, he was the advocate of harmony. His powers of persuasion he tried on the mob, on the extremist leaders (Blanqui, Sobrier, for instance), and on Ledru-Rollin. After April 16 we shall see a change in Lamartine's attitude. He realized more clearly the power of the extremists and believed that the republic could sail on its course successfully only by tacking somewhat in their direction. With this purpose he tried hard to conciliate the radical leader; Ledru-Rollin, delighted to find a supporter in the majority, willingly abandoned half his desires, restrained his ardour, and wholeheartedly joined forces with Lamartine.

Such were the members of the provisional government. As assistants they had chosen principally moderates. The secretary of the council, Pagnerre, and the minister of finances, Goudchaux, both connected with the *National*, were bitter opponents of the radicals. Carnot, minister of education, resembled Garnier-Pagès in his attitude. Bethmont of the department of commerce and agriculture, a moderate, mixed little in the squabbles. General Subervie, for a brief period minister of war, seems to have held opinions similar to Ledru's, as is shown by the following letter written to the minister of the interior on March 19: "My dear colleague, your enemies are also mine. They torment you, they torment me, because they know that our opinions are the same. I must talk with you. I shall come

to see you tomorrow morning. Yours sincerely, General Subervie.”¹ The general had just been removed from his office through the influence of Marrast. This had been done in the absence of Ledru, Flocon, Crémieux, and Lamartine, and only the insistence of Subervie kept them from protesting. Crémieux maintained that, to prove the removal was no slight, the ex-minister should be appointed chancellor of the legion or honour. The council agreed.²

Arago accepted the ministry of war *ad interim*. The permanent appointee was to be Cavaignac, who had already been created lieutenant-general and Governor of Algeria. The latter refused in a letter in which he almost questioned the authority of the provisional government. Ledru, together with Arago, Blanc, and Marrast, demanded his recall, but it was finally decided to leave him in his African command and merely to send a letter of reprimand.³ Ledru in 1850 gave what is probably an inexact account :

Cavaignac aspired to power . . . since February, for from Africa . . . he was meditating the overthrow of those who promoted him in memory of his brother's services. The letter in which he refused the ministry of war . . . almost put in question the legitimacy of the government. . . . This refusal, which took the form of an insolent protest against the revolution, should have caused his dismissal. This I demanded, and the government was on the point of accepting it, but my efforts were neutralized by MM. Flocon and Louis Blanc.⁴

The family of Cavaignac was on good terms with the minister of the interior. The commissioner of the Drôme had been named at the suggestion of Mme. Cavaignac.⁵ On

¹ LR Papers 1: 213. For original text, see appendix.

² Sarrans 307-8.

³ Garnier-Pagès 7: 320; Regnault 325-6; Sarrans 1: 309.

⁴ *Voix du Proscrit* 2: 45.

⁵ Archives Nationales, F, 1B—II, 60 (12).

March 7 General Jacques Cavaignac had written Ledru a letter: ". . . You assure me of the appointment of my son to the ministry, of which everyone was speaking yesterday. Recalling our conversation, I would say that I now believe that my son would refuse. To appoint him minister would be merely to remove him from the governorship. You forbid me to thank you, but you cannot forbid me to be grateful. I assure you, no one thinks more than I do of the burden which weighs on you, or is more reassured in seeing you carry it."¹

There was much dissension within the ranks of the provisional government, but this has been greatly exaggerated. That there was constant friction is unquestionable, but each difference of opinion was amicably settled. Both sides frequently threatened to resign, but no one carried out this threat. Again and again Louis Blanc and Ledru-Rollin, after being defeated in the council, came before the crowd and declared their adhesion to the government decision.²

Ledru had some trouble with Arago and with Crémieux as to the authority of the commissioners over the army officers and the judges. He had slight disputes with other members, but only with Armand Marrast did the dissension become bitter. The latter had succeeded Garnier-Pagès as mayor of Paris and as such should have been subordinate to the minister of the interior, but his pride would not allow him to receive orders from a fellow-member of the government. The position was anomalous. A big man would have realized that the mayor must take orders from the minister; a tactful minister would have induced the mayor

¹ LR Papers 1: 201. See appendix for original document. This letter would indicate that Eugene Cavaignac was the son of Jacques, not of the latter's brother, the *conventionnel*, Jean-Baptiste.

² Arago and Dupont belittle the dissensions; Garnier-Pagès claims that outside influences envenomed the struggle. — Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 224, 276, 284.

to take a subordinate position. But both men had disliked each other long before the revolution of February, and the smouldering irritation broke out at the first opportunity. So far did they go in mistrust of each other that they had police agents to watch each other's action.¹

What caused the most irritation was the police department. Caussidière had seized the prefecture of police on February 24, and the provisional government had given a silent consent but had not regularly appointed him or ratified his position. The desire of the council was to give the place to Récurt, but Caussidière refused to surrender his power and was given a provisional appointment.² On March 2 trouble broke out. Garnier-Pagès, who was still mayor of Paris, declared that he was the equal of the minister of the interior and would hold office only from the council. Ledru-Rollin replied with precedents. Garnier-Pagès retorted that as a member of the government Ledru-Rollin would be permitted to intervene in the affairs of the mayoralty. An agreement was reached by which the mayor was declared independent of the minister but was to inform him of all matters of police. Disagreements should be referred to the entire council.³ After this quarrel Garnier-Pagès assured his opponent that he had acted in good faith and merely desired to have their spheres clearly distinguished. "If your intention is harmony," replied Ledru, "I cannot but applaud and approve it." Again as on February 24 the minister and the mayor shook hands.⁴ On

¹ Stern 2: 154-5. The Ducos commission blamed the expenditure for this purpose.—*Moniteur for 1849*, p. 1557.

² Regnault 182. Bouton 5 claims: "It was a question of replacing not only Caussidière by Récurt but Ledru-Rollin by Cormenin as minister of the interior. . . . Ledru-Rollin was to remain in the provisional government." At the trial of Barbès, Ledru declared: "The police of Caussidière was badly organized; it was composed of patriots who acted voluntarily."—*Moniteur for 1849*, p. 947.

³ *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 529.

⁴ Garnier-Pagès 6: 226.

March 6 Caussidière appeared before the council; he made a good impression, but no resolution was taken.¹

On March 10, the day after Marrast became mayor, Ledru demanded that the prefecture of police should be an adjunct of the ministry of the interior. He emphasized the need of having the police of the provinces and that of the capital under the same government department. Garnier-Pagès insisted on the unity of the prefectures of police and of the Seine. A violent discussion arose and Marrast yielded. "I am not anxious to have daily work with M. Caussidière," he told his predecessor."² On March 17 Caussidière received his definite appointment.³

Friction between the mayor of Paris and the minister of the interior continued. Ledru obtained the consent of the government to the creation of a special additional force of police. Caussidière immediately started enrolling men, but he was informed that Marrast was doing likewise. The latter stopped only when the prefect threatened to arrest anyone wearing the uniform of the police without his authorisation. When the affair was explained to the mayor by Ledru-Rollin, Marrast pleaded ignorance and said that he had believed the force was under his jurisdiction.⁴ To put an end to these discussions a new committee composed of Marie, Flocon, and Bethmont was charged on April 3 with revising and limiting the respective attributes of the two authorities.⁵

One of Ledru's duties was to draw up police reports for the council. These reports told of the state of Paris and the preparations for uprisings. "Every day I read to the

¹ *Ibid.*, 6: 345-6.

² *Ibid.*, 2: 345-6; Blanc 1: 295; *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 601.

³ *Moniteur for 1848*, pp. 636, 643.

⁴ Caussidière 1: 267-8.

⁵ Garnier-Pagès 7: 27.

government," said Ledru a year later, "the report of the police, and each member, particularly citizen Marie, took note."¹ It was Caussidière, the prefect of police, who in person brought the information to Ledru.²

Caussidière is the most picturesque figure thrown up by the revolution of 1848. Large and imposing in stature, he dressed like a brigand and bragged like a bully. He seemed like a conspirator in a comic opera. What his relations with Ledru were is not at all clear. Many writers insist that in spite of his declared devotion to the minister, he was merely using his superior in order to climb into power over him.³ It is certain that Caussidière had considerable influence over the minister, but it is doubtful whether he ever wished to overthrow him or even intrigued with him to overthrow the moderates. Caussidière was a born conspirator and probably was aware of, if he did not tacitly encourage, many of the attempts to overthrow the provisional government. At times of crisis he maintained a neutral position so that he seemed ready to join the uprising if it should prove successful or to remain true to the government if it should win the day. But it must be remembered to his credit that in these troublesome times he actually kept Paris safe.

¹ Barbès trial, *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 947. Arago claims that Ledru was badly informed and that his reports were biased in favor of the clubs.—*Ibid.*, 932.

² Caussidière 2:2-3. One time when Caussidière desired the creation of a special force, he proposed as an inducement that it should wear the workingmen's garb. "But," cried Ledru, "I cannot accept these distinctions. To be with the people, must one be clad in a blouse?"

³ Lamartine 2:89; Barrot 2:119; Regnault 262-4. Favre in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:279 says: "Ledru-Rollin considered Caussidière as a prefect of police impossible in ordinary times but necessary in times of revolution. He flattered himself that he dominated him, whereas Caussidière on his side said: '*Oh, Ledru-Rollin! I shall kick him out when I wish.*'" Caussidière, of course, denied this allegation.—Speeches in National Assembly, August 25, 1848, *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 2172.

CHAPTER VI

FINANCES AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

WHEN the new government came into power, the finances were in a deplorable condition. Goudchaux, the first minister of the treasury, handed in his resignation on March 5 in spite of the unanimous regret of the provisional government; he declared that he could not take charge of the finances at a time when anarchic doctrines were openly preached. Garnier-Pagès bravely took up the burden. Conditions were becoming worse and worse. The bourgeoisie took fright and stocks fell off. The circular issued by Ledru-Rollin on March 12 frightened the bankers and there was a panic on the stock exchange. Duclerc, under-secretary of finances, even went so far as to assert in the Assembly a year later that Ledru was responsible for the need of increasing the taxes on account of his incendiary propaganda.¹ Ledru replied:

If I had expected this discussion, I should have brought here the long list of financial houses which became bankrupt between February 24 and March 12, and you would see by the dates that it was not the circular that brought about so universal and so profound a disturbance. I even declare that the heads of several of the chief banks came to the ministry of the interior a few days after the revolution of February, *long before March 12*, to tell me that their condition was desperate, that they could no longer satisfy their engagements.

¹ Speech of April 12, 1849, *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 1355.

Remember that the distress of most of these establishments antedated even February.¹

Ledru's revolutionary activities probably aggravated the distress, but it is absurd to say that they caused it.

Various methods of alleviating the distress were suggested. Ledru-Rollin favored the issue of paper money since the time was unpropitious for the immediate establishment of a progressive tax on capital. Some time later he told the Assembly:

Like all the government I wished that the republic should establish a proportional and progressive tax on all property, real as well as personal. That was the thought, the principle of the provisional government . . . but times were not ripe for this new tax; we could only discuss the principle and we established another tax . . . I proposed two things; first, banknotes guaranteed by state property. It was said: the state property is not worth as much as is thought but that is of little importance; that property was always worth as much as the bullion in the cellars of the Bank of France, and I wished it to be issued only in reasonable proportion to the real property of the state. I also asked that bonds be issued which should have a forced currency equal to half the taxes. It was an excellent and fruitful measure which would immediately have created an immense resource to subsidize capital and labor, a measure so little revolutionary that it had been proposed by M. Lafitte in 1831.²

Before the committee of investigation Ledru declared: "I believed that if prompt measures were not taken, the

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 272.

² Speech of April 12, 1849, *Discours politiques* 2: 278-9. Duclerc replied that Ledru estimated the state property at four billions whereas the state had only thirteen hundred millions, and that it would have been dangerous to raise a billion on this depreciating security.—*Moniteur for 1849*, p. 1355.

struggle would commence; credit had to be revived, also work and industry. I held that opinion in the provisional government in which I was in a minority. M. Garnier-Pagès was an obstacle; he believed the finances of the government should be administered as in ordinary times." Ledru continued with details, citing the measures of the first republic, and insisting that paper money was the sole means of saving the finances of France.¹

The government preferred the scheme of their minister of finance. Garnier-Pagès proposed the tax of forty-five centimes which was destined to arouse so much hostile comment. For every franc of direct taxes, the citizens were to pay this year an additional forty-five centimes. As the tax was only on real property, the farmers were particularly hard hit. As the regular tax lists were used, those communities that expended money on local improvements had to pay more than their share. Above all the tax weighed down the poorer agriculturists. The last consideration especially impressed Ledru-Rollin. He told the Assembly a year later:

I proposed one franc fifty on the rich, and that idea of exempting the poor was not a passing thought with me; I constantly and perseveringly returned to it. Every day I read to the government reports of the commissioners saying: the forty-five centimes will ruin the republic . . . I proposed it should no longer be left to a tax-collector to decide what small proprietors should be exempted from the tax. (*Garnier-Pagès: It was I who demanded it.*) We demanded it together, if you wish, but as a result of the reports that I read daily. Two weeks later we decided that a circular with the force of law should exempt all overburdened or poor proprietors, all the small farmers. Nor is this all. I considered the tax of forty five centimes so fatal to the republic that several times

¹ Quentin-Bauchart Report I: 313.

I asked that other financial means be substituted for it. . . . Let me be blamed for advocating paper money, but not for the tax of forty-five centimes.¹

Though preferring other measures, Ledru had acquiesced in the tax of forty-five centimes. He desired that a larger amount be asked, but imposed only on the rich; Garnier-Pagès agreed to an informal exemption of the poor. The minister of the interior rightly dreaded the effects of the tax of forty-five centimes, but he loyally defended his colleague of the treasury. Two *Bulletins of the Republic*, the seventh and fourteenth, were devoted to a defense of Garnier-Pagès's financial policy.

Conservatives accused the provisional government, and particularly Ledru-Rollin, of favoring state bankruptcy. This is absolutely false. Dupont de l'Eure, Goudchaux, Duclerc deny the charge and exonerate the minister of the interior.² In fact no one suggested actual bankruptcy, but a suspension of payments was proposed, not by the members of the government, but by two conservative bankers. One was the Bonapartist Fould.³ The other was the Orleanist Delamarre. The latter, according to Ledru, also suggested that the government impose a forced loan and offered to assist in assessing the quotas on the leading bankers. The minister indignantly rejected the offer.⁴ Delamarre denied

¹ Speech of April 12, 1849, in *Discours politiques* 2: 275-6. He adds: "Citizens, a certain member tires us with his cries of '*What is a poor man?*' . . . A poor man is one who can pay only a small tax. It is not a question of class-distinctions, but of shares in the tax-schedule." Cf. Garnier-Pagès 7: 58; Antony 160-1; Delvau 413-417; Blanc 1: 271. For a detailed financial article by Ledru, see a letter in the 1850 *Almanach des Proscrits*, 30-33.

² *Moniteur* for 1849, pp. 1355, 1479.

³ See page 284 in the debate of April 21, 1849.

⁴ Speech of April 21, 1849, *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 1480.

that he had suggested a forced loan and insisted that his scheme was the creation of a large discounting house, the money to be furnished by the government, the Bank of France, and the leading bankers, that Ledru and several of his colleagues endorsed the project, but that Garnier-Pagès's opposition killed the proposal.¹ Etienne Arago and Delvau support the statements of Ledru-Rollin,² whereas none of the statesmen to whom Delamarre appealed made statements in his favor; consequently Ledru's account is probably nearer the truth.³

The financial integrity of the provisional government was frequently investigated by its opponents. The Constituent Assembly appointed two committees of investigation. The hostile Ducos completely exonerated of dishonesty every member of the government. He questioned only the money given to certain delegates of the clubs and a few expenditures by certain commissioners.⁴ Ducos at first wished to make Ledru personally responsible for these, but the committee decided that that would be unfair.⁵ Other investigations made by the Legislative Assembly in 1849, by the court of accounts in 1850, by the council of state and by the legislature in 1852, all completely absolved the provisional government of malversation or extravagance.⁶

In foreign affairs as well as in finances Ledru took his part, although here too his suggestions were not adopted. The foreign minister, Lamartine, had announced his attitude in a circular of March 4:

¹ *Patrie*, April 23, 1849; *Débats, Constitutionnel*, April 24.

² *Réforme*, April 22, 1849; Delvau 393-4.

³ Antony 46 believes Ledru's statements, but it is not clear whether he ever saw Delamarre's defense.

⁴ Ducos Report, *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 1557.

⁵ Antony 250-7. For the entire subject, see this work.

⁶ Garnier-Pagès 8: 368-370.

France is a republic. The French republic does not have to be recognized in order to exist. It is based alike on national and on natural law. . . . The proclamation of the republic is not an act of aggression against any existing form of government. . . . War, therefore, is not now the principle of the French republic as it was the fatal and glorious necessity of the republic of 1792. . . . The differences existing between that period of history and the present time explain the necessity of peace. . . . The French republic will not declare war against any state. . . . It will accept war should conditions incompatible with peace be offered to the French people. . . . The treaties of 1815 have no longer any lawful existence in the eyes of the French republic; nevertheless the existing territorial frontiers are facts which the republic admits as a basis . . . in her relations with foreign powers. . . . If Switzerland should be menaced in the progressive movement which she has undertaken . . . if the independent states of Italy should be invaded, if limits or obstacles should be placed in the making of internal changes . . . the French republic would consider itself entitled to take up arms. . . . She is determined never to curtail liberty within her territory. . . . She proclaims herself . . . the ally of popular rights and progress. . . .¹

Lamartine thus maintained that France desired peace. would accept the treaties of 1815 as existing *de facto* if not *de jure*, would not republicanize by the sword, but would not permit other nations to prevent internal democratic changes in Europe, particularly in Switzerland and in Italy.

Ledru-Rollin would have adopted most of this policy gladly; only he emphasized the mission of France to spread republican ideas, if not by the sword, at least by propaganda and by active alliance with any people that should desire to throw off the yoke of their ruler. This difference between the two men first manifested itself in connection with Italian

¹ *Moniteur for 1848*, pp. 444-5.

relations. When Austria attempted to repress the democratic movement in that peninsula, Ledru desired to intervene immediately; Lamartine wished to wait for the call of the Italian people, and Lamartine had his way.¹

In one field the department of foreign affairs touched the work of the department of the interior. There were many foreign workingmen in France. As there was not enough work in the country for the native artisans, the provisional government decided to give to the foreigners free transportation to their fatherland; Flocon was authorized to distribute sixty thousand francs for this purpose.² Unfortunately many of these workingmen tried to revolutionize their native countries but the purpose of the provisional government in sending them home was not that of spreading propaganda.

In western Germany there was fear of an invasion from France, and Gagern, a leader of the democratic movement, spoke openly in the Hessian legislature of the menace of an invasion from German workingmen in France, and of the belligerent speeches of Ledru-Rollin. The government formally denied any hostile intentions in these speeches: "M. Ledru-Rollin would indeed be astonished were such an interpretation given to his words," it said.³ There was a small and unsuccessful expedition into Baden, headed by the poet, Herwegh, but the government had refused any assistance, and Ledru had written to the officials at Stras-

¹ Barrot 2:84; Regnault 243-4; Mazzini, *Scritti*, 8:63, in a letter to Cavour in June, 1858, says: "The tendencies represented by Ledru-Rollin were not sufficiently seconded by his colleagues, but I affirm that the French republic wished to aid in the emancipation of Italy with arms and that the Sardinian government did not."

² *Discours politiques* 2:63; Garnier-Pagès 7:275; Ducos report, *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 1554.

³ *Moniteur* for 1848, pp. 744, 761.

bourg to prevent the expedition.¹ The government even dissolved all meetings of Germans in the eastern departments.²

Some Savoyard workingmen residing in or near Lyons made an abortive expedition against Chambéry in Savoy, but they were easily repelled by the native mountaineers. The government removed all the refugees from the frontier, and Ledru, Lamartine, and Emmanuel Arago, commissioner at Lyons, worked together to prevent a second attack. The expedition against Chambéry was attributed to the minister of the interior, but there is no foundation for the charge.³

By far the most serious of these invasions of foreign territory from France was the affair of Risquons-tout in Belgium. Secret societies in that country had long conspired for a republic, and one of their agents had approached Ledru-Rollin, but apparently with no satisfactory result.⁴ The chief organizers of the plot in Paris were two Belgian refugees, Blervacq and Fosse, both of whom were suspected of being *agents provocateurs*.⁵ These two agitators acted separately; this is a fact that has not been sufficiently appreciated by historians and which clears up most of the seemingly contradictory testimony. Fosse's group was aided by Marrast and the municipal authorities.⁶ From de-

¹ Letter of Lamartine in Circourt 1:155; Stern 3:311. Circourt 1:251, 312; 2:40 charges Ledru with complicity but gives no proofs. He also speaks of trouble over Savoye, chargé d'affaires at Frankfort and a friend of Ledru.—*Ibid.*, 1:336.

² *Moniteur* for 1848, p. 891.

³ Lamartine 2:167-8; Regnault 274; Stern 2:310; *Moniteur* for 1848, p. 795.

⁴ Bertrand 1:356. Bertrand 1:336-386 gives a full account of the connection of the Risquons-tout affair with Belgian history, but he gives little space to the French ramifications of the plot.

⁵ Regnault 291.

⁶ Garnier-Pagès 7:287; Delvau 421.

puty-mayor Buchez Fosse received the money to pay the expenses of those who should take part in the projected expedition. Caussidière heard of the preparations for departure at the last moment. He sought the minister of the interior to gain his approval or disapproval of the expedition, but Ledru was occupied all day. The prefect of police did not dare stop the Belgians on his own responsibility and sorely against his will let the band enter their special train. The workingman reached Valenciennes safely. Thence they were sent off in Belgian trains by the commissioner of the North, Delescluze, who had received no orders. The train did not stop at the frontier, and the insurgents were surrounded by troops when they reached the first station in Belgium, Quiévrain. They were then quietly sent to their homes.¹ It is evident that Ledru-Rollin, Caussidière, and Delescluze gave no surreptitious aid to this group; if there was a plot—and this is more than doubtful—it was hatched not at the ministry of the interior but at the mayoralty of Paris.

Caussidière was in constant communication with the other set of Belgians. Blervacq, their leader, had collected two thousand men in Paris and pressed the prefect of police for money and arms. Caussidière proposed to Ledru-Rollin that the ministry of the interior should supply the expedition with all that was needed for an armed invasion, should give it an appropriation of one hundred thousand francs, and should add to the expedition two thousand disbanded municipal guards.² Ledru-Rollin refused absolutely to make any irregular expenditure or to take any action without the full knowledge of the provisional government; but he promised to use his influence with his colleagues to

¹ Caussidière 2: 280-2; *Moniteur* for 1848, p. 744.

² This was a part of the police of Louis Philippe which had been dissolved by the republican administration.

gain free transportation for the Belgians. At a meeting of these eleven members Ledru-Rollin made his request, and his colleagues voted a sum of money for this purpose.¹

In his account of this affair Caussidière explains away the chief points in the charges which are usually brought against Ledru-Rollin for complicity. Caussidière himself favored the expedition, desired to abet the conspiracy and suggested this to his superior, but Ledru-Rollin refused absolutely to aid in the plot. The minister furnished funds to transport the Belgian refugees to the frontier, just as he had furnished them to all foreign workingmen, openly and with the consent of his colleagues, but he refused, to Caussidière's regret, to go further. Garnier-Pagès well said of the expedition: "M. Ledru-Rollin desired it, but felt that he ought not aid it; M. Caussidière desired it, but dared not aid it."²

Besides furnishing free transportation Ledru ordered several students of the *Ecole Polytechnique* to accompany the Belgians, partly to take charge of the distribution of supplies, partly to keep an eye on the expedition. Freycinet, the future premier, then a student at the school and, like many of his companions, acting as a guard to the government, asserts in his memoirs:

On March 22 Ledru-Rollin made an appointment with me for that evening in his office, Place Beauvau. I found there three of my companions. . . . The minister proposed our joining the expedition known under the name of *Risquons-tout*. He has been severely blamed for this enterprise. Many people have believed that he premeditated it with the idea of having a republic proclaimed in Belgium, even at the risk of

¹ Caussidière 2: 198-200; Delvau 42; Regnault 270-1; Garnier-Pagès 7: 287; Stern 2: 307-8; Dupont and Blervacq in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 278, 241.

² Garnier-Pagès 7: 287.

bringing about diplomatic complications. The conference at which I took part left on me an entirely different impression. Ledru-Rollin appeared to tolerate this expedition rather than to desire it. Not daring to stop it, he wished to restrain it, keep it within limits. He hoped that having prudent men at its head, it would abstain from excesses on the route and perhaps would not even cross the frontier. The detailed instructions which he gave for its repatriation, the insistence on avoiding all collisions seemed to indicate that in his mind the expedition would reduce itself to a mere promenade in the department of the North. My companions understood it in this sense and agreed to go along. As for myself, incapable for the moment of enduring a long march on foot, I was obliged to refuse.¹

At a second interview on March 24 Ledru-Rollin gave to those who were to accompany the expedition money for transportation and for food, and oral instructions. This time he seems to have more clearly indicated his unofficial approval. One of the students testified later: "M. Ledru-Rollin gave us absolutely no authorization; I understood from the tenor of his remarks, however, that it would be well if we succeeded." Another declared: "I remember that M. Ledru-Rollin said that as minister he could not take part in the expedition, but that as a citizen he approved it."²

The expedition, eighteen hundred strong, arrived safely at Lille. The polytechnicians immediately reported to Commissioner Delescluze. Delescluze was without definite orders and did not like to do anything on his own responsibility.³ He provided food and lodgings for the troops at

¹ Freycinet 31-2.

² Quentin-Bauchart Report 2: 17-9; 1: 271. Other students made similar depositions. One said: "We thought an expedition into Belgium should be made to proclaim a republic there."

³ On these two facts the testimony of the students is uniform, but some say that Delescluze signified his approval, others his disapproval of the expedition.—*Ibid.*, 1: 271; 2: 17-9.

Seclin near the border; that was clearly what the minister of the interior desired. The question of arms was more difficult. Delescluze had received through Ledru-Rollin an order for fifteen hundred rifles for the Lille National Guard. The Belgians asked him for these arms, and after hesitating he sent them to Seclin. General Négrier, in command at Lille, objected to this transfer, but the order was regularly signed by the minister of war. Négrier informed his chief, François Arago, of the proceedings, and the latter telegraphed to him to prevent the Belgians from crossing the frontier and to order the polytechnical students home. This order arrived too late to be of any avail.¹

In his perplexity Delescluze wrote to Ledru on March 27 the following letter, marked *urgent*:

My dear minister, My perplexity increases; the Belgian division stationed at Seclin, two leagues from Lille, is still there; it numbers fifteen hundred men. Its discipline is perfect and I believe its morale is excellent; but the chiefs, who have all finally arrived, do not inspire me with great confidence. I believe them at least incapable, and for the leaders of partisans incapacity is fatal. The situation is difficult for me. The Belgians do not wish to depart without arms; I believe that they should not receive arms unless success is almost sure. But success is more than doubtful. Belgium has 55,000 men under arms; 20,000—perhaps even 25,000—to patrol the frontier between Menin and Maubeuge. Scattered as are the Belgian troops, naturally with their organization they could repel the invasion of 1500 men armed and manoeuvred in a mediocre manner. My advice is that the Belgians return to their homes singly and peacefully to engage in propaganda. As to the Parisians, let them also return home.

The leaders of the Belgian expedition count on an insur-

¹ *Ibid.*, 1: 274-5; 2: 12-7.

rection this evening, March 27, at Ghent and at Bruges. According to the information I receive, I am far from sharing their opinion. The army, the bourgeoisie, and all officialdom are in general hostile to ideas coming from France, even when there is no question of annexation. They have been preaching during the past two weeks against the Belgian volunteers, whom they represent as brigands preparing to pillage. There are great difficulties and, I confess, I hesitate to launch this mass of 1500 badly organized men, even if they were accompanied by 3 or 4000 artisans recruited in the manufacturing towns near Lille.

I found a smuggler who made me the offer of serving as guide to the expedition and promised me to conduct it without striking a blow as far as Ghent, the centre of republican and French ideas, because nowhere else do the people suffer so much. I spoke of it to the leaders; they seem to be suspicious, the misunderstanding of Quiévrain leaving them in doubt as to the intentions of the government. They are continually thinking of betrayal, and in vain have I explained to them that the Quiévrain affair occurred due to an error; they pretend to believe in that fable so as to pose as victims.

I have just received your telegram and I take it as a purely official communication to cover your responsibility in case of failure. Send me another tomorrow without fail. If I should arm and launch the Belgians, reply by the single word: *yes*. If the contrary by: *no*. I shall act accordingly. But I must decide by tomorrow at latest.

The chief of the Belgian police came to Lille yesterday to see me. I did not show my cards. I made him understand that nothing would please me more than to be delivered of the disturbing presence of the Belgian legion, but that I could not deliver it over to the Belgian government, etc.

The Parisians are, I am told, quite ready to leave, but without them the affair is hopeless. I signified to the students of the School that they could not march at the head of the legion in their uniform. The Belgian police manifested to me

certain apprehensions in that respect. I made it understood that the young men had come only to maintain order in the convoys and to protect public safety. The indiscretions of Dégouve-Denunquë's press add to my perplexities; to listen to the *Journal de la Somme* and other correspondents of this man, the Belgian legion is marching to victory.

Why did you not warn me of the band which passed through Valenciennes? All the newspapers will pounce on me, and I see myself in advance sacrificed. After all, what difference does it make? I shall leave the position you gave me and rest a little.

Whatever happens, I do not wish to risk the blood of these men in a ridiculous failure, for the affair may not succeed.

No other news. Reply, reply by *yes* or *no*. Let me have your telegraphic answer by noon at the latest.

Your devoted subordinate, Ch. Delescluze.

In the torn margin of the letter is the note: "Your students of the School are not as temeritous as they seem They have quite a tendency towards peace and civil pursuits."

On the back of the letter in the handwriting of Elias Regnault are the words: "This letter was not received till the morning of the twenty-ninth. Immediately the minister replied *no* by telegraph. The despatch left at 10:30. E. R." ¹

Thus the answer arrived too late, and Delescluze remained without instructions. The commissioner still hesitated. Rifles had been sent to Seclin and distributed among the

¹ *Révolution de 1848*, 16: 46-8; original in LR Papers 1: 247-8. The ordinary version, that Ledru's answer was delayed by a stupid subordinate who believed the single-word message a mistake and did not forward it, is disproved by this note of Regnault, the very man responsible for the false version. See Regnault 271-2. Lamartine 2: 166-7 claims that he intervened in the affair. See also Stern 2: 308-310; Garnier-Pagès 7: 291-5.

Belgians; then most of them were taken back. Finally Delescluze decided to let the legion proceed. The Belgians crossed the frontier at Risquons-tout, near Mouscron. Here they were met by a strong body of Belgian regulars and after an hour's fighting were driven back across the French frontier with seven killed and twenty-five wounded. Their opponents lost an equal number.¹

In a letter on March 28 Delescluze explains his acts and his hopes:

My dear minister, The die is cast; this evening the expedition enters Belgium; tomorrow news. I shall send you by telegraph a line to tell you how Belgium has received her children.

I cannot foresee the outcome, as I am not completely reassured as to the leaders. Let us hope that the fortune of France is with them, and that the sun of the republic begins to rise. But, for God's sake! Do not be diplomatic with me. I am ready to do whatever you tell me. I believe that I can at need take any initiative required by the case, but do not send me ambiguous communications.

In any case I count on a bill of indemnity. If the expedition turns out a failure, I do not know how I shall extricate myself. You must aid me.

I have not time to tell you more. During the night at two o'clock, Courtrai will be in the hands of the legion, if it is not wiped out beforehand on the road.

I confess that it is with anguish that I see the young collegians prepare for this struggle as for a mortal combat, and besides they cannot fight in their uniforms.

At any rate I have furnished them with passports. May France watch over them.

In case of failure there will be a violent reaction against you and me. We must hold out against the storm, but I shall

¹ *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 744.

have need of more patience than I feel capable of to endure the avalanche that menaces me.

Yours sincerely, Ch. Delescluze.¹

The fiasco of Risquons-tout caused agitation everywhere. Foreign powers, particularly England, feared the chauvinist tendencies of the new republic. In France the conservatives thundered against the government and especially against Ledru-Rollin for thus violating the national honor by plotting against a friendly power, while the extreme revolutionists denounced the *betrayal* of the unfortunate democrats.² The provisional government publicly disavowed the expedition. It would have liked to remove Delescluze, but Ledru insisted on the retention of his friend.

On August 25, 1848 before the Assembly Ledru made a defense of the part he had played in this affair. It is probably the only time he discussed the affairs publicly.

In Belgium assembled most of the ministers of the late monarchy, and they conspired without hindrance by the authorities. In the waters of the Scheldt lay some British ships ready to take Antwerp at the first movement made by this country. Well, a Belgian legion, which you all saw, which you applauded when it traversed the Boulevards . . . departed. I did for it what I had done for the Germans, for the Savoyards. That there might be no disorder I had them accompanied by pupils of the *Ecole Polytechnique* and the *Ecole Centrale*. . . . I sent arms for the National Guard who feared disorder on the frontier from these scattered legions. These arms were taken, some say they were distributed. . . . But there is no deposition that says that they were distributed.

¹ *Révolution de 1848*, 16:49; original in LR Papers 1:249, marked *very urgent* and *personal*. It is doubtful whether the collegians accompanied the Belgians across the frontier. In view of this letter one can no longer absolve Delescluze of complicity as does Prolès 16-8.

² See Regnault 277.

Moreover here is a telegram which . . . should have been reported. The commissioner of the North said to me: These men wish to cross the frontier armed; shall I let them pass? I replied *no*. The minister of war said: Let the students be recalled. They were recalled. My telegram was not delivered in time; I removed the operator. Blervacq was arrested; he was at the head of those legions which wished to enter Belgium arms in hand. I ask whether the Belgian expedition, which seems so inexplicable, is not thus explained; I ask whether the Belgian government, perfectly aware of the facts, ever addressed to our government any protest at all? . . . I knew that the policy of France was not in opposition to the manifesto of M. de Lamartine.¹

Considering the letter of March 28 quoted above at length, the complicity of Delescluze is clear. He had not premediated the expedition; he had not even approved it. But he frankly admits that after hesitation he aided it with his advice and furnished it with help. The assistance was secret, but that fact does not absolve him. As to Ledru-Rollin his complicity is less direct. He did not wish the expedition, he refused to aid it when Caussidière asked for aid. He supplied food and transportation, but that was to remove foreign workingmen from France and was done with the consent of his colleagues and the knowledge of the Belgian minister at Paris. He sent along Polytechnical students, but for the purpose of watching the expedition and seeing to the commissariat. That he would have been delighted to see a Belgian republic is undoubted, that he would not have been displeased at the success of the expedition was obvious to many people to whom he spoke, but from start to finish as a government official he refused anything that could be called official sanction. Ledru, however, did

¹ *Discours politiques* 2:71-3. Gossez 129-134 believes Ledru favored but did not help the expedition. The conservative historians believe in Ledru's complicity.

not take adequate measures to prevent the invasion. He gave definite orders to his subordinate, Delescluze, only when it was too late. Besides, he insisted on the retention of the compromised commissioner, thus covering the latter with his own authority. It is notable that the two letters of Delescluze were not left in the archives of the ministry of the interior, but were placed among the private papers of Ledru.

Summing up, Caussidière had the desire but not the power to aid the expedition. Delescluze gave it a direct and surreptitious but no premeditated assistance. Ledru-Rollin gave no official assistance, but his conduct was ambiguous and he accepted after the fact a part of the responsibility.

Besides these foreign workingmen, Germans, Savoyards, Belgians, who made armed invasions, other foreigners, who remained in Paris caused trouble. The Poles threatened to exert pressure on the government to force it to aid their native country.¹ The Irish publicly urged that France attack England, and placarded on white paper² old speeches of Ledru-Rollin promising the aid of French republicans against the *oppressors* of Ireland. When the English ambassador, Lord Normanby, protested, the government sent him a reply which he admitted was "unobjectionable in spirit." Ledru repudiated the inference that as minister he maintained language he had formerly used. Normanby expressed himself as satisfied.³ At Rouen too, foreign laborers created trouble. Normanby complained about discrimination against English artisans in that city. Ledru investigated the matter, and the ambassador declared himself content.⁴

¹ Garnier-Pagès 7: 275.

² Only official posters could lawfully be printed on white paper.

³ Normanby 1: 362-6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1: 230-2, 266-7; *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 932.

CHAPTER VII

FATHER OF UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

As we have seen, the July Monarchy had been overthrown on the twenty-fourth of February, and a provisional government had been formed. But still the mob did not immediately disperse. On February 25 a band of insurgents went to the ministry of the interior, and there were a few moments of anxiety for the public archives. Ledru-Rollin tried to calm the insurgents. He dissuaded them from rushing to Vincennes to occupy the arsenal by assuring them that Flocon had already taken possession of that fort. He urged them to go to the Military School to await the early reorganization of the National Guard. Meanwhile another and larger group had marched to the city hall and had demanded that the red flag be proclaimed the flag of the republic. Only six members of the provisional government were there at the time. Louis Blanc defended the red banner, but he finally yielded to the arguments of his colleagues. Lamartine then went out on the balcony, and in one of his most effective speeches persuaded the crowd to accept the tricolor. Ledru had arrived during the tumult, but all his efforts to get through the crowd were fruitless, and he had been obliged to sit in a concierge's lodge for three hours listening to the rumbling of the riot of which he did not know the cause.¹

Soon after Ledru had finally rejoined his colleagues, a

¹ Stern 2: 17-8; Garnier-Pagès 6: 62; Castille 1: 329-330; *Constitutionnel, Débats*, February 26, 1848; *Times*, February 29.

second invasion arrived demanding the Right of Labor. The *Droit au Travail* was a catch-word drawn from such socialist writers as Louis Blanc and was most popular at this period. It meant the right of every citizen to be guaranteed remunerative work by the government. Lamartine again successfully exerted his inexhaustible eloquence, and the workingmen abandoned their demand. But Louis Blanc hastily drew up a decree that granted them exactly what they had renounced, that guaranteed work to all citizens, and Ledru added the clause: "The provisional government returned to the workingmen, to whom it belongs, the million which fell due on the civil lists." After this the members of the provisional government were obliged to appear once more before the crowd and be acclaimed anew.¹ On the next day the provisional government were again forced to appear before the people. On February 27 the republic was formally proclaimed at the column of July.²

There were also disputes within the council. On February 26 the question of the red flag versus the tricolor was discussed. Ledru displayed the design for a tricolor flag which had been painted by David at the demand of Robespierre, and said: "The tricolor is the flag of the Convention, the flag of '93 and of '94. What more is desired?" Naturally the moderates spoke on the same side although giving different arguments. Louis Blanc alone opposed the tricolor, but he was forced to give way after his colleagues had yielded so far as to order officials to

¹ Stern 2: 40-1; Blanc 1: 127; Freycinet 23; *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 1503.

² *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 507; Lamartine 1: 293. At the Tuileries the rioters who had captured it refused to evacuate the building and were ready to oppose by force the police under Caussidière. The new governor of the Tuileries was obliged to promise a public dinner and reception, and Ledru and several of his colleagues were forced to come in person to confirm this promise before the insurgents would retire.—St. Amant 25-6; Garnier-Pagès 6: 301-2; Stern 2: 179.

wear a red rosette in their button-hole as an emblem of the republic.¹ Again when Louis Blanc demanded the creation of a ministry of labor, Ledru-Rollin joined the majority in opposing the suggestion.²

Some writers claim that the members of the majority were considering the advisability of ousting the radicals and socialists from the council. On the night of February 27-28 the moderates were to meet at 2 A. M. at the house of Marie. Marrast and Pagnerre arrived on time, and Bethmont and Carnot made a tardy appearance. But Garnier-Pagès, exhausted, sent his excuses. It was necessary to get Marie out of bed as he had forgotten the appointment. Lamartine thought the meeting was for the next day. Arago had been informed too late. The absence of the last two made the conference useless.³ It is difficult to believe that this conference was a very serious attempt to change the personnel of the government.

But all was not discord within the provisional government. The abolition of the death penalty for political offenses received unanimous approval. Above all, Ledru-Rollin's decree on the elections was hailed with joy. Ever since Ledru-Rollin had entered the field of politics, he had been preaching universal suffrage, advocating it as the sole means of expressing the popular will. When at last he came into power, as minister of the interior, he was entrusted with the duty of preparing the decree that should realize this aspiration. The importance of the organization of universal suffrage cannot be overestimated. It is the one vital reform of the provisional government, nay more, of the second republic, that has endured to the present day. When

¹ Garnier-Pagès 6: 101-3.

² Stern 2: 44.

³ Regnault 184; Stern 2: 149-150; Sarrans 180-1.

everything else about Ledru-Rollin is forgotten, he will still be remembered in France as the *Father of Universal Suffrage*. From February 25 to March 5 he devoted his energies to the task of preparing a workable scheme. Cormenin and Isambert, who had published essays on universal suffrage, were largely responsible for details, but the guiding force came from the minister of the interior.

On March 5 the decree was submitted to the council and the following day it appeared in the *Moniteur*. Elections to a constituent assembly were to take place April 9. The total number of representatives was to be nine hundred, apportioned among the departments, Algeria, and the colonies on the basis of population. The suffrage was to be direct and universal. All Frenchmen aged twenty-one who had resided for six months in the commune were given the vote provided they had not been judicially deprived of or suspended from the exercise of all civil rights. All Frenchmen aged twenty-five were eligible for the Chamber. Balloting was to be secret. Elections were to take place in the chief town of the canton and the votes were to be counted there, but were to be verified in the capital of the department. Each ballot was to contain as many names as there were candidates in the department (*scrutin de liste*) and two thousand votes were needed for election. The representatives were to receive as pay twenty-five francs a day. The legislature was to assemble April 20.¹

On March 8 a supplementary circular gave further details. The first part dealt with the drawing up of the registration lists and included such subjects as age, nationality, incapacities, residence, and so forth. The second part was concerned with electoral assemblies: the work of the

¹ *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 549. The nearest equivalents in the United States to communes, cantons, and departments are villages, counties, and states.

mayor, advice to be given electors, composition of the board of elections, form of the ballot, duration of the election, counting of the ballots, the army vote, the proclamation of the result.¹ Special regulations for Paris, Algeria, and the colonies, and further explanations to electors, mayors, and commissioners were issued later.²

The work of preparing for the elections was entrusted to the commissioners of the departments. Under Louis Philippe these officials had been called prefects, but the republican regime changed the name, partly because it was desired to indicate a break with monarchical administration, partly because the new officials would accept only a temporary appointment and the position of prefect signified a semi-permanent office. The revolution of 1848 had been a purely Parisian affair, and the prefects had learned of the progress of the insurrection only by five successive telegrams. The last of these despatches was from Ledru-Rollin, informing them of the installation of the provisional government, and adding; "You will take immediately all measures necessary to insure to the new government popular support and public tranquility." The prefects, accustomed to obey any orders received from the central authorities, acquiesced in the change, but in at least thirty of the eighty-five departments local revolutions took place and departmental republican committees replaced the prefects.³

It was the duty of the minister of the interior to provide a regularly constituted administration. Officials who had been appointed by Guizot could not be left to carry out

¹ *Moniteur* for 1848, p. 579.

² *Ibid.*, 579, 605-6, 658, 722, 726, 762, 777-8, 786.

³ Most of the facts concerning the commissioners are drawn from the admirable article of Haury in the *Révolution française* 57: 438-475. My account generally gives a brief résumé of his article, though several additions and occasional slight differences in deductions are made.

republican measures. At an early date Ledru-Rollin convened at his office his colleagues in the government and submitted to them his choices as commissioners. All were approved, only two having been strongly contested. Delescluze at Lille and Deschamps at Rouen were confirmed in their functions only upon the insistence of Ledru-Rollin. We have already seen how Delescluze was later compromised in the fiasco of the Belgian democrats at Risquons-tout. Only the friendship of Ledru-Rollin maintained him in his office.¹ Deschamps also met with difficulties as commissioner. He was the leader of the radical republicans of Rouen, but the moderate republicans, who probably had a majority in the department of the Lower Seine, desired his replacement by their leader, Sénard. The matter was brought before the provisional government. Ledru declared that the removal of the commissioner would weaken the hands of authority, that the Rouen republicans should all unite and forget old feuds as the members of the council had done, that the attack on a subordinate holding the same opinions as himself was really directed against him, that he would yield to his colleagues on most choices, but that he would resign rather than abandon personal friends such as Deschamps and Delescluze. In the presence of such a declaration all objections disappeared, but Sénard went to the legislature two months later with a decided prejudice against Ledru-Rollin.²

Of the thirty departments that had had local revolutions in only twelve were the provincial leaders appointed commissioners, but in five others they were associated with the new appointee sent from Paris. In the fifty-five other depart-

¹ For details as to Delescluze, see Gossez. Later, after Delescluze's check in the April elections, Ledru wrote him a public letter, begging him to remain as commissioner.

² Garnier-Pagès 6: 299-301, 351-2.

ments commissioners came from the capital; thirty-six of these remained in office until at least March 15, thirteen had other commissioners associated with them in their functions, and six resigned or were removed. All the appointees, with the single exception of Emmanuel Arago, and he was not named at Ledru's initiative, were natives of the district to which were sent. Twenty-two had been deputies, ten mayors, eighteen the recognized republican leaders of the department.¹ "The first commissioners," says Haury, "were not selected without deliberation as has been believed; neither were they fierce revolutionists."² Of the eighty whose party affiliations Haury knew, fourteen belonged to the dynastic left, twenty-two were moderates like Lamartine, twenty-two belonged to the *National* group, and only twenty-two followed the banner of the *Réforme*.

The commissioners were not named in a hurry, for it was March 9 before the last of them were appointed.³ By their characters and by their past records most of them seem to have justified their appointment. Of the one hundred and ten commissioners, sixty-seven were later elected to the Assembly, while eleven others who could have been elected were restrained by conscientious scruples from becoming candidates. In sixty of the departments the commissioners

¹ Statistics are available for only sixty-one departments.

² *Révolution française* 57:499.

³ Melun 1:263-4 speaks of Ledru marching around in his office on February 25, wearing a tricolor scarf and a great cavalry sword and hastening the departure of the commissioners who looked like traveling salesmen. One need only point out that on February 25 practically no appointments had been made. Muller 117-8 claims that Struck, a dynastic liberal, was appointed commissioner of the Upper Rhine merely because he happened to come to the ministry for a passport. The only serious bit of evidence is that of Jules Favre in the Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:289: "The commissioners were named without discernment, first come, first served."

appointed before March 15 were popular; in twenty others they seem to have been satisfactory. In only four were their serious difficulties. We have already seen the troubles of Delescluze and of Deschamps. In the Aube there was friction between the two original joint commissioners, easily adjusted when a third one arrived. At Lyons the extremist workingmen broke out in a riot.

From the start torrents of abuse were leveled against the commissioners.¹ The most definite accusation was that brought against a certain ex-convict named Riancourt, who was not a commissioner at all. The conservatives charged that Ledru-Rollin, knowing of this man's past, selected him as commissioner, and that he even believed in appointing assassins to high positions. As a matter of fact, Riancourt was merely a police superintendent; he was appointed not by the minister but by a subordinate; he had been recommended by deputy-mayor Buchez at the suggestion of Mgr. Affre, Archbishop of Paris. Riancourt's case does not require serious consideration when inquiring into the qualities of Ledru's appointees.

At first the commissioners were left largely to their own resources, but when Ledru had completed the decree applying universal suffrage, he turned his attention to giving definite instructions to the commissioners. Jules Favre was entrusted with the work of preparing the first draft. Ledru-Rollin found this too mild. The minister, the secretary-general, and the chief of cabinet, Elias Regnault, discussed modifications and drew up the final form of the instructions to the commissioners. On March 8 it was sent to all the departments.²

¹ See Beaumont-Vassy 4:146; Capefigue 2:215-221; Castille 2:40-1; Chamier 1:153-9; Corkran 335; Lavarenne 149-159; Normanby 2:154-5; preface to the edition of *Bulletins of the Republic*, viii-ix, etc. For defense, see Blanc 1:383-6; Lamartine 2:85-6; Mill 362-4; Regnault 305-7.

² Regnault 155, 193; Favre in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:288.

It declared:

The republic which we have inaugurated is not the chance result of a moment of passion. . . . It was slowly constituted by the progress of popular reason. . . . That is why no hesitation or dissent was manifest; France had but one voice because it had but one soul. . . . Your first duty should be to make it understood that the republic has no thought of vengeance, at least so long as this generosity does not degenerate into weakness. In abstaining from all prosecutions for earlier political acts or opinions, take as your general rule that all political functions can be entrusted . . . only to tried republicans. . . . Do not bind the officials by instructions; animate them by your zeal. Through the elections they hold in their hands the destinies of France; let them work for a National Assembly capable of understanding and achieving the work of the people; in a word, *all old-line, not new republicans*.¹

Less rigor in regard to officials whose role is purely administrative. . . . Seeking thus to remain firm and just towards agents placed under your orders, you will demand active and devoted assistance. This aid should tend to reassure the timid and calm the impatient. The former take fright at vain phantoms, the latter wish to precipitate events in accordance with their ardent hopes. . . . Moreover, do not forget that you are acting provisionably. . . . There will be numerous and diverse protests; note them carefully. . . . It is suppression which alters and corrupts public thought; liberty purifies and expands it. Nevertheless if temerity of language . . . instead of applying itself to general ideas . . . attacks persons, it is your duty to require judicial intervention to stop such an abuse . . . Upon your arrival at your posts you should make friends with the influential patriots; their counsel should always have great value with you. . . . There is no

¹ This is the inadequate translation of *hommes de la veille, pas du lendemain*. These two terms distinguish those who were avowed republicans before February 24 and those who accepted the republic after the revolution.

need of telling you to give special attention to the organization of the National Guard. . . . Finally, devote yourself . . . to whatever concerns the laboring class. . . . It is by and through it that the republic was founded, the mission of which is to end its sufferings and assure its rights. If urgent necessity appears to demand exceptional measures, refer them to me immediately. . . . Do not disquiet respectable vested interests, for their troubles might injure the very persons you wish to protect. . . . By destroying machinery the workingmen injure their own cause. . . . A little longer and these marvels of human genius . . . will enrich all those who now denounce them. . . . The future is ours if we are frankly revolutionary, if . . . our acts conform to the spirit of fraternity. . . . To us belongs the duty of reassuring the public . . . To give the world an example of self-control after a brilliant victory . . . is the goal of our common efforts. In order that mine may be efficacious I need your aid. . . .¹

As a whole the effect of this circular was good. Liberal and radical newspapers praised it mildly; conservatives resented only the exclusion of the *new republicans*. Garnier-Pagès, a typical moderate, writes: "This language is true and noble. It is that of a statesman, firm and at the same time conciliatory."² The idea of propagating republican doctrines is contained in the circular, which, however, is dominated by the idea of conciliation. Workingmen were at last to receive attention, but vested interests were to be reassured and coaxed rather than frightened into a loyal acceptance of democracy. There was but one phrase that could arouse opposition, the italicized words advising that the work of constructing a republican government be left in the hands of old and tried advocates of republicanism, a doctrine sup-

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 1-7; *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 564. This circular was supplemented by a similar one to the mayors the following day.—*Moniteur*, 572.

² Garnier-Pagès 6: 358.

ported by the *National* as well as by the *Réforme*, and at first accepted by many conservative newspapers. But former parliamentarians, particularly the members of the dynastic left, were unwilling to be left out and resented this exclusion. Many of Barrot's partisans had loyally accepted the February revolution (Crémieux, for instance, was a member of the government) and felt that they were entitled to a voice in the new regime. The futility of demanding from the fourteen commissioners who has been members of the dynastic left that they work against their own party is apparent.

A far more vigorous note was struck in the famous circular sent out on March 12:

. . . . What are your powers? THEY ARE UNLIMITED. Agents of a revolutionary authority, you are also revolutionary. The victory of the people has imposed on you the duty of proclaiming, of consolidating its work. For the accomplishment of this duty, you are bound only by your conscience, you should act for the public welfare as circumstances may require. Thanks to our customs, this mission is not a terrible one. Up to now you have had no serious resistance to combat. . . . Republican sentiment should be aroused and for that purpose it is necessary to confine all political functions to sure and sympathetic men. Everywhere prefects and sub-prefects must be changed. . . . If it is for you to make the people understand that we cannot maintain those whose every act was corrupt. The appointment of sub-commissioners replacing these officials belongs to you. You may refer to me whenever you have any doubts. Preferably choose men from the capital of the department. Do not avoid young men Superintend the replacement of mayors and their deputies. Designate them provisionally. . . . If the municipal councils are hostile, dissolve them. . . . but have recourse to this measure only in cases of dire necessity. I believe that the great majority of municipal councils can be maintained if new men are placed at their head.

The armed force is under your orders . . . but you should use great care in this part of your functions. . . . Above all win it over by showing your esteem for it.

. . . . Demand loyal support from the magistracy; whenever you do not receive it, inform me. . . . I shall immediately lay the matter before the minister of justice. As to the irremovable magistracy, watch it, and if any member of it shows himself openly hostile, use your right of suspension.

You will receive from me detailed instructions as to the organization of the National Guard. . . .

The elections are our great duty. On the composition of the National Assembly depend our destinies. The Assembly must be animated by a revolutionary spirit; otherwise we march toward anarchy and civil war. Be on guard against the intrigues of double-faced men who having served royalty now call themselves the servants of the people. . . . You must realize that to win the honor of sitting in the National Assembly one must be free from the traditions of the past. . . . The workingmen, who are the vital force of the nation, should choose from among themselves those who are recommended by their intelligence, their devotion, their morality Enlighten the electors and repeat to them incessantly that the reign of the monarchists is finished. . . . The education of the country is not completed. It is for you to guide it. Encourage the meeting of electoral committees. Examine carefully the titles of candidates. Support only those who appear to present the best guarantees of republican opinion. . . . Let election day be a triumph for the revolution.¹

This circular of March 12 marked the first step in a change of policy, but not a long step. It was rather a change in emphasis than in substance. The idea of conciliation still existed, but had become subordinate to that of republicanization. More importance was given to the duty of commissioners to educate the people in ideas of demo-

¹ *Discours politiques* 2:8-12.

cracy and to guide the voters in their choice of candidates. The commissioners, however, were not given exorbitant powers. The real meaning of the words *unlimited powers* is explained in the text itself. As *agents of the revolutionary authority* their powers were undefined and were to be guided by the general laws of equity. There were specific recommendations not to use their full authority with the army and there were definite restrictions as to their power over the judiciary. It was clearly the idea of Ledru and Favre that intimidation was to be used only in those places where reaction had set in. Favre declared a few months later: "The words *unlimited powers* were merely the exact repetition of the verbal orders originally given to the commissioners. . . . The aim of the circular was to limit the powers of the latter while proclaiming their great extent" ¹ And Ledru told the Assembly: "Do not misinterpret words. I used the phrase *unlimited powers* while telling the commissioners that the limit was the customs of the country Tell me if a single of these commissioners was guilty of any misdeed." ²

There were three ways of dealing with the attempts at reaction. The first was that of conciliation. This was the method the minister seemed to adopt in the circular of March 8; this was the method desired by the minority of the provisional government.³ Probably it would have been the

¹ Quentin-Bauchart Report I: 280-1.

² Speech of August 25, 1848, *Discours politiques* 2: 70. On April 12, 1849, Ledru denied that the circulars gave rise to the reaction; he asserted that the reaction began the very day after the revolution.—*Ibid.*, 2: 272-4.

³ On March 6 Carnot had issued a circular warning the teachers that in choosing representatives education was not everything. This was hailed as an appeal to hand the government over to the illiterate. It was considered as the complement of the circulars of Ledru-Rollin, but, as Carnot was a moderate, naturally there was no connection with Ledru's circulars.

best method, but it might have made the monarchists too audacious and it might have cooled the ardor of the loyal republicans. The second method was that of repression, the method of the reign of terror, of the deputies on mission, of Carrier at Nantes. This was the system which the conservatives attributed to Ledru-Rollin, the system they denounced in the press, the system of truly *unlimited* powers. Such a method is justified only by overpowering circumstances and Ledru was not so bloodthirsty or so fanatically devoted to the precedents of the Convention as to desire the resurrection of the reign of terror. But there was a middle course, the policy of threats. Such a policy was particularly suited to Ledru-Rollin's temperament. It meant making large threats, but not acting on them, frightening the conservatives from open resistance, but not following up these menaces by actions. It meant conferring *unlimited powers*, but refraining from the use of them. In another country than France such a procedure might have worked, but Frenchmen are not terrified by words. The reactionaries quickly realized that the radicals would remain within the bounds of the law, but they realized also that the words would give them a weapon with which to belabor the minister of the interior. These phrases published throughout the country would drown the true message of the republicans, the message of fraternity.

There is some truth in the satirical judgment of Tocqueville:

Ledru-Rollin was merely a fat boy, very sanguine and very sensual, devoid of principles and almost of ideas, with no audacity of mind or heart, and even without naughtiness, for he naturally wished good to every one and was incapable of cutting off the head of any of his opponents, unless perhaps as an historical reminiscence or as a favor to a friend.¹

¹ Tocqueville 169.

Ledru had never expected the circular of March 12 to have any effect on the general public; it was meant for the commissioners alone. Great was his surprise when he received on the following day a police report from Carlier, saying: "The circular has given rise to alarm and almost to panic among the middle classes. The small traders and the small capitalists are persuaded that the government wishes to exclude from the legislature the ex-deputies who had been in continual opposition to the late government, and they conclude that only extreme republicans are wanted in order to arrive at communism and the ruin of all who possess anything."¹ The circular also seriously affected the financial market.² The British ambassador rushed off to Lamartine to demand explanations.³ The conservative newspapers grasped at the circular as the first tangible act of the new government which they could safely attack, and after the troubles of March 16 and 17 their attacks increased in violence.⁴ The *Réforme*, the *National*, and the other governmental journals explained the meaning of the circular.⁵ but their utterances passed unheeded. The extreme revolutionists accepted the interpretation of the conservatives and defended the minister.⁶

Ledru's colleagues in the government were completely taken by surprise; they learned of the circular first by the *Moniteur* and the general excitement. Garnier-Pagès brought up the subject at a council meeting on March 13. The minister of the interior expressed his surprise and re-

¹ Quentin-Bauchart Report 2: 216.

² Garnier-Pagès 6: 376; *Constitutionnel*, March 13.

³ Normanby 1: 216-9.

⁴ The claim that they did not attack until after March 17 will not hold water, as numerous tirades could be cited in the papers of March 13-15.

⁵ *Réforme*, March 15, 1848; *National*, March 14.

⁶ E. g. Delvau 371-2, 402-3.

gret at the impression made which to him was strange and incomprehensible. The circular was read phrase by phrase and in the eyes of the council did not appear to warrant the wave of hostile criticism. Crémieux approved all of the document except the words *unlimited powers*. Garnier-Pagès considered that it was a mistake to utter threats. "You should have acted, not talked," he told Ledru. The council did not wish to be silent; that would mean approval of the circular. Neither would it disavow it; that would weaken its authority. On the advice of the minister of the interior himself it was decided to publish no declaration that day, but at the first opportunity to issue a proclamation tending to soften the effect of the expressions which had gone beyond the objects and intentions of the minister. The provisional government also decided that in future all important circulars should be discussed by the entire government before publication.¹

¹ Garnier-Pagès 6:377-8. The account of Lamartine 2:121-8 differs slightly. False rumors of this meeting circulated. Normanby 1:239 relates that Ledru tried to intimidate the majority of the government, that he threatened to appeal to the crowd from a window of the council room, and that he was only deterred by Garnier-Pagès threatening to shoot him if he moved toward the window.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SEVENTEENTH OF MARCH

IN Paris both extreme parties were dissatisfied with the provisional government. The ultra-revolutionists were displeased that Louis Blanc had not been made minister of labor, and they demanded loudly the right to work. They also desired that the elections be postponed in order that there might be time to republicanize the country. Within the government their spokesmen on the postponement of the elections were the radicals and the socialists, but as the moderate members remained firm, no action was taken.

The conservatives, on the other hand, were particularly aroused by the democratization of the National Guard. Under Louis Philippe the National Guard had been composed solely of the bourgeoisie; the provisional government opened the ranks to all citizens and urged them to join. Ledru considered this a most important part of his work: "In a few days I armed and equipped the National Guard of Paris and tried, though less successfully than I wished, to have that of the departments armed, for I was persuaded that a gun under discipline was an instrument of order because it was the symbol of the dignity of the citizen."¹ All officers except the highest were to receive their commissions through the ballot box. Ledru was opposed to all privileges in the National Guard. The law and medical students asked a special *battalion of the colleges*, but Ledru refused this absolutely. "Join the ranks if you wish to serve the

¹Speech of May 6, 1848 in *Discours politiques* 2: 24-5.

republic," he told them.¹ On March 14 Ledru obtained the consent of the provisional government to the abolition of the existing special companies, including some distinguished by wearing bear-skin caps. "There were several reasons for that," said Ledru later. "First the members of these companies were considered, rightly or wrongly, as aristocrats, and we feared that in case of a popular tumult they would not fire. Secondly as these companies were scattered, it was hard to collect them."²

On the evening of March 15 a numerous deputation from the élite companies came to the ministry of the interior. Ledru-Rollin refused to receive it. A few delegates were admitted to the office of the chief of cabinet. They exposed their grievances with great arrogance and received a severe lecture in return from Elias Regnault, who told them that privileged companies formed eighteen years before could not survive the monarchy of eighteen years standing. The delegates retired, threatening a demonstration for the morrow. When Ledru-Rollin was informed of this threat he said, "If they have a demonstration tomorrow, I promise them one for the day after tomorrow that will serve as a lesson."³

The delegation then proceeded to the ministry of foreign affairs. Lamartine rejected the demand to preserve special companies but added some remarks that constituted a partial disavowal of the circulars: "The provisional government has charged no one to speak in the name of the nation, and above all to speak a language superior to the laws. . . . In

¹Ulrich in *Revue Bleue* 25:263; Ulrich 41-2. For decrees on the National Guard see *Moniteur for* 1848 March 9, 11, 14, 16, 17, 28, April 2, 3, 10.

²Trial of Barbès, *Moniteur for* 1849, p. 947.

³Regnault 211-3; Barrot 2:107-9.

a few days the provisional government itself will speak and will explain whatever in the wording and not in the intention of the circulars could wound or alarm the liberty and conscience of the country. . . . This thought is not mine alone; it is held by the entire government and by the minister of the interior himself."¹

This speech was hailed with joy by the conservatives. Normanby felt sure that it would necessitate the resignation of Ledru-Rollin, and the rumor of the minister of the interior's fall caused a rise on the stock exchange.² The conservatives, ever ready to foment trouble, read more moderation into the speech than was there, just as they had read more radicalism into the circular of March 12 than was in it. Lamartine had merely stated that the intentions attributed to the minister of the interior were neither those of the government nor of the minister himself. The speech did not mean that the government would tolerate no further revolutionary propaganda. It followed out the plan suggested by Ledru himself at a council meeting.

On March 16 the demonstration occurred as promised. It is called the manifestation of the bear-skin caps (*bonnets à poil*). The abolition of the special companies was the pretext; the expulsion of Ledru from the government was the real object aimed at. An officer of the National Guard frankly admitted this to Weill, an editor of the *Presse*.³ A police report asserted that those who were to take part in the manifestation wished to force Ledru to resign.⁴ Most of the conservatives, however, paraded as a vague protest

¹*Moniteur for 1848*, p. 619; Regnault 208-9; Stern 214-6. This was the second delegation of the National Guard that Lamartine addressed that day.

²Normanby 1: 232; *Réforme* March 15, 18; *Constitutionnel* March 15. Limoges threatened an uprising if the rumor was confirmed.

³Weill 119.

⁴Quentin-Bauchart Report 2: 218.

against the radicals. Typical was the essayist, Maxime Du Camp, who later said: "I took part in the expedition. I don't know why, for I was just a simple rifleman and had no right to a bear-skin cap. . . . For us M. Ledru-Rollin, who wished to establish *the terror without the guillotine*, was the representative of a dictatorial policy which only the influence of M. de Lamartine could hold in check."¹

On March 16 Ledru drove to the city hall with François Arago. The demonstrators shouted *Down with Ledru-Rollin* and threatened the minister of the interior, but Arago warned them of the dangers into which they were running. "Don't you know that Foulon was killed on this spot and that you may cause a similar disaster?" he said. By the time Arago and Ledru reached the Hôtel de Ville cries of *Hurrah for Ledru-Rollin* had succeeded to the contrary cries. All together about nine or ten thousand men had collected for the parade. Most were dispersed by the crowds of workingmen before they reached their destination. A delegation penetrated to the square in front of the city hall and was ungraciously received by the provisional government. Marrast declared that the entire government approved the dissolution of the bear-skin cap brigades. Arago made the same statement and added: "Tomorrow we shall have another manifestation in answer to that of the National Guard, a manifestation of the working classes." The deputation departed declaring that it relied on the wisdom of the provisional government.² The demonstration had been an utter failure thanks to the firmness of the moderates in the council and the support of the government by

¹Du Camp 133-7. Cf. Bonde 52-3; Normanby 1:234-6.

²Arago in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:225; Ledru at Barbès trial in *Réforme*, March 21, 1849; *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 627; Stern 2:216-9; Regnault 213-224; Cherest: *Marie* 155-6; Delvau 399; Garnier-Pagès 6:207-213.

the proletariat gathered in the square. It was even worse than a failure; it was a joke, and all France laughed at the parade of the bear-skin caps.

The government held its usual afternoon meeting. It issued a manifesto in which it declared that the abolition of special companies was the work of the entire government.¹ This was clear sailing, but a tempest raged when the vital question of postponing the elections came up. Louis Blanc declared that France was not yet republicanized by education. Crémieux asserted that there were not enough old-line republicans and that therefore it was all-important to keep the good-will of the former dynastic liberals. Marie spoke in favor of immediate elections, but was willing to listen to arguments. Ledru said that he had asked the commissioners to inform him as to how a postponement would affect their departments and that he wished to await these reports. Lamartine urged the necessity of ending the provisional regime. Louis Blanc again insisted on the danger of the republic falling into the hands of its enemies in case the elections were held as planned. Garnier-Pagès wisely declared that it was best to hold the elections during the early period of enthusiasm; to wait meant to let obstacles arise. Ledru did not find Garnier-Pagès's reasoning decisive; he thought time was needed to prove to Frenchmen that "the republic is their right, their law, their interest, their very life." Louis Blanc suggested a month's postponement. "Then we retire," declared Lamartine and Dupont. No decision on the matter was reached that day. The government merely approved a proclamation in which its good-will and the beauties of popular sovereignty were extolled.²

¹ *Moniteur* for 1848, p. 626.

² Garnier-Pagès 6:420-9; Lamartine 2:132-4; Blanc 1:309; Arago in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:225.

It is commonly stated that the great workingmen's demonstration of the following day, March 17, was a reply to the bear-skin cap fiasco. This is not exact. The parade of the workingmen had been planned long beforehand. On March 13 it had been proposed at Blanqui's club.¹ That it received an immense impetus by the abortive manifestation of the previous day is indubitable. The desire of the majority of those who paraded was probably to express confidence in the government and particularly in its radical-socialist minority, and to impress on the council the strength of the sentiment in favor of postponing the elections, of sending the army away from Paris, and of creating a ministry of labor. Carteret, director of the police department, asserts the pacific character of the paraders, and even Barrot admits that there was as yet no idea of modifying the government by the elimination of the *National* group.² That Caussidière and Louis Blanc, if they did not aid directly in the organization of the demonstration, plainly indicated their approval beforehand to the club-leaders, seems unquestionable. That Ledru approved of the demonstration is also clear, but that he aided in its organization or encouraged it beforehand is doubtful. Carteret probably judged correctly when he said: "The minister knew nothing of the demonstration. He took no preventative measures; neither did I. The movement was irresistible."³

At noon on March 17 all eleven members of the provisional government collected at the Hôtel de Ville. The procession of workingmen soon arrived from the Place de la

¹Wassermann 65-9.

²Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:249; Barrot 2:110-2. Wassermann 70-6 declares that Blanqui was not plotting a change in the government, but that his partisans may have had hostile intentions. Cf. Longepied 28. Only Lefrançais 32 insists on the desire to eliminate the moderates.

³Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:249. Cf. Ledru at Barbès trial in *Réforme*, March 21, 1849.

Révolution, and a deputation of about forty prominent extreme revolutionists was allowed to see the government. One of its members read a petition asking the postponement till April 5 of the National Guard elections and till May 31 of the general elections. Louis Blanc replied that the government would deliberate on these questions but could not decide them under the pressure of force. Immediately both Sobrier and Cabet expressed their confidence in the government. Ledru said that the desires of the deputation would be duly weighed as expressing the will of Paris but that he was awaiting reports from the commissioners to learn the wishes of the provinces and to discover whether a postponement would be really beneficial to the establishment of a republic. A Blanquist refused to retire until the demands were granted. But Louis Blanc, this time in an angry tone, refused to deliberate under pressure. He was seconded by Sobrier, Cabet, Raspail, and Barbès. Lamartine closed the interview with a long and eloquent plea for harmony and confidence. Then the provisional government was obliged to appear on a balcony and be cheered by the assembled throng. Again Louis Blanc made a brief address.¹ Ledru later described the demonstration of March 17 as follows: "If I were back at that time, I would act as I did act. . . . The delegation spoke in a very suitable and very restrained language. . . . I replied first; Louis Blanc then made a superb speech; Lamartine also spoke, but it was rather a discourse of tempered eloquence which was very fine like all the orations of M. de Lamartine but which did not bear on the subject."²

¹ *Moniteur* for 1848, p. 632; *Constitutionnel*, March 18; Lamartine 2: 134-149; Garnier-Pagès 6: 429-447; Regnault 234-9; Stern 2: 219-232; Parent de Rosan 174.

² Barbès trial in *Réforme*, March 21, 1849. About three o'clock Lamartine wrote to his wife: "Everything is going splendidly. Ledru-Rollin is conducting himself very well. The people are passing quietly." —*Journées Illustrées* 86.

The crowd filed past the city hall for hours. Some of the paraders carried off Louis Blanc. A larger section, which may have numbered ten thousand, accompanied Ledru-Rollin to his ministry. There Ledru addressed those assembled as follows:

You demand the withdrawal of the army! Doubtless when the army was the instrument of tyranny, it merited the hatred of honorable men. . . . None of you doubt the bravery of our soldiers . . . but during the February Days the army did not want to fight. . . . The army, my friends, is the people Would you expel your brothers? . . . It is the army which in days of humiliation guarded Algeria. . . . Cease your miserable mistrust and cry with me *Three Cheers for the Army!*

And the volatile crowd departed peacefully, shouting *Hurrah for the Army! Hurrah for the Republic! Hurrah for Ledru-Rollin!*¹

In the evening the provisional government met again and after long deliberation decided by seven to three not to postpone the elections of the National Guard. The other matters were not even discussed. Louis Blanc and Albert offered their resignations but withdrew them at the urgent solicitation of Ledru-Rollin who had voted with them.²

For Ledru-Rollin March 17 was a glorious day. As the *Réforme* said: "The applause of the people has amply repaid him for the calumnies and the blind rage of the counter-revolutionists."³ Ledru had shown to the moderates his power over the mob. He had shown the extremists that they could not impose their desires on him, for Cabet, Sobrier, Barbès, even Raspail had supported him against an

¹*Moniteur* for 1848, p. 633; Delvau 408.

²Garnier-Pagès 6: 446.

³*Réforme*, March 18.

importunate Blanquist. The mob could not dictate to the council. Its three demands were laid aside. Ledru almost persuaded them to give up one of them, the removal from Paris of the army. The postponement of the elections in the National Guard was refused; that of those to the Assembly was not voted until later. But the proletariat had achieved part of its desire; the influence of the minority in the council was undoubtedly increased and this became apparent in the republicanization of the commissioners. Ledru-Rollin had also slightly diminished the ill-will of the conservatives. Even Normanby gave him grudging praise for his speech at the ministry.¹ For the republic, however, there was one bad sign. The most revolutionary section of the population, the followers of Blanqui, had indicated their desire to overthrow the government. We shall see this idea spread.

Within the provisional government the demonstration of March 17 produced certain effects. On the one hand Crémieux, Lamartine, and even Garnier-Pagès, feeling the need of conciliating the controller of the mob, voted with Ledru more frequently.² But at the same time the moderates tried to build up a counter-organization. Lamartine was ready to work with Ledru, but he wished to have a force at hand in case their entente did not succeed. He arranged with Négrier, commander at Lille, to attack Paris with his army of twenty-five thousand soldiers in case the radicals should seize the capital. The support of Changarnier, Bedeau, and other prominent generals was also secured. Marie bent all his efforts to obtain the allegiance of the National Workshops. Marrast counted on the support of

¹ Normanby 1: 243.

² Weill 124 claims: "Lamartine assured me that Ledru-Rollin was in complete accord with him, that the only dissentient was Louis Blanc." Cf. Thomas 98; Stern 2: 230-1; *Times*, March 27, 1848.

the National Guard. The moderates also relied on the militia under General Duvivier, angry at the delay in the equipment of his troops, a delay which Duvivier attributed to the wilful interposition of the minister of the interior.¹

Ledru was emboldened by the manifestation of March 17 to make a change in the personnel of the commissioners. Already in the circular of March 12 republicanization had been more emphasized than conciliation. The storm of abuse which had followed the publication of that document made the minister of the interior increasingly doubtful of the liberals of the former dynastic left. For Ledru even the *National* group was too luke-warm. More than ever he felt the need that those whom he considered the true republicans, the radicals, should control the coming assembly, and with that purpose in view he tried to add a more active element to the personnel of his subordinates. The change was made in two ways. First certain dynastic liberals were superseded or associated with radicals. Secondly commissioners-general were appointed whose duty was to busy themselves with propaganda and surveillance rather than with details of local administration, the latter being left to the ordinary commissioners, their subordinates.² Although the new officials were not appointed until after the circular of March 12, this circular was really addressed to them. Ledru had made a great mistake. First he had entrusted the duty of propaganda to ordinary commissioners, although twenty-two of them were dynastic liberals and therefore evidently incapable of republicanizing a country; then almost immediately he took away from them this duty and gave it to the new officials. Such action could not fail to irritate those to whom the duty was originally assigned.

¹Regnault 260. The conservatives speak of Ledru's increased feeling of importance; see Barrot 2: 115; Normanby 1: 247-8; Thomas 99-100.

²Some times an ordinary commissioner was appointed commissioner-general of several departments.

At the beginning of April in the midst of the electoral campaign, there were twenty-four commissioners-general, ten of them being taken from the original commissioners; under their rule were sixty departments. In the remaining twenty-four departments six had received an additional, four a new commissioner.¹ At this time we find forty-eight departments under a radical commissioner-general and sixteen others with at least one radical commissioner. Thus sixty-four departments were in April under the at least partial control of the radicals. On the other hand, only five were under the full control and four under the partial control of the dynastic liberals.

The policy of conciliation was replaced by a vigorous policy of republicanization. But the result was unsatisfactory. The commissioners-general did little to spread democratic propaganda. On the contrary, the change in system strengthened the reactionary feeling, for the new appointees were as a whole unpopular. Was this unpopularity merited? From the outset the commissioners-general were detested as *proconsuls*. The old incumbents disliked them as superiors; the population, as tyrants. Inevitably there were clashes between the old and the new officials. Some of the outbreaks were the result of Ledru's revolutionizing policy, such as the riots at Bordeaux, Bourg, and Périgueux.² Other disturbances were due to the popularity of the old commissioner or the unpopularity of the new one; such was the case at Marseilles, Besançon, and Troyes, and in the departments of Aveyron, Drôme, Somme, and Yonne.³ As

¹In two others to which a new commissioner was sent the original appointee had to be reappointed after trouble had broken out.

²For details on Bourg see *Constitutionnel*, April 10, 1848. For details on Bordeaux see *ibid.*, March 24.

³For details on the Drôme and for troubles of Ledru later in life due to his removal of the new commissioner when he discovered that that official had a bad moral reputation see Calman: *Ledru-Rollin après 1848*, pp. 149-157.

a matter of fact, in only fifteen departments did active dissatisfaction show itself; there was a feeling against the new commissioners in general rather than against the single one with whom the department came into contact. Haury says:

The new commissioners were just as well acquainted as were the first ones with the provinces where they exercised their authority; apparently Ledru-Rollin insisted that the commissioner should have a thorough knowledge of the population under his administration. Ledru-Rollin's choices were called *deplorable*; they were so only for those who did not wish a radical administration, for most of the commissioners were elected to the legislature by the department concerned. The acts of the commissioners, called *revolting*, did not revolt the population except in about ten departments. But some imprudent choices which the minister of the interior himself had to revoke, some injurious acts of extreme intolerance gave almost daily opportunities for attacks. If these circumstances explain the impression on people predetermined against Ledru-Rollin, his acts, and his agents, they do not justify the judgment they have imposed on history.¹

Doubtless the commissioners intervened in the elections, but rather as republican leaders than as commissioners, and probably less than did the officials of Léon Faucher a year later. Their influence consisted chiefly of harmless propaganda. Many of them were elected to the Assembly and none of these elections were invalidated. Their position as officials was for the commissioners a source of weakness rather than of strength.²

¹*Révolution française* 57:469. Haury has again been my authority on the work of the commissioners.

²The hostile Ducos commission admitted their absolute probity and censured only extraordinary election expenses in thirteen of the departments.

Ledru defends his subordinates thus :

To judge the question we must consider the situation at that time . . . and we shall understand that on the morrow of the revolution, surrounded by victors who had come from the barricades, I could confide the defense of liberty to no other hands but those of the successful republicans. Full of ardour, of devotion, of civic faith, they could fill the country with the idea the triumph of which they had brought about. Doubtless some of them were not administrators; who will deny it? That is not the question. Soldiers were needed to organize and extend the victory, above all to make it peaceful and durable. That faults were committed is possible. When I learned of them, I did not hesitate to order their correction. But let any one cite to me in this great and rapid movement a single serious attack on the rights of citizens by these courageous and firm men whom people have dared to call pro-consuls! The people expressed their opinion by casting their ballots for the great number of them that now sit in the legislature.¹

Some of the commissioners undoubtedly pushed their own candidacy too vigorously. On March 29 Louis Blanc explained with regret how such officials injured the republic and compromised its authority. Ledru-Rollin replied with vivacity that the accusations were much exaggerated, that he had dismissed the one or two commissioners who had abused their position, and that the sending out of the commissioners-general would end further procedure of this sort. On April 1 the discussion was renewed and the government determined that the commissioners should be warned in a special circular against pushing their own candidacy. Note that the chief promoter of this suggestion was Louis Blanc, a socialist, the most advanced member of the provisional government.²

¹Speech of May 6, 1848 in *Discours politiques* 2: 23.

²Garnier-Pagès 8: 220-3.

Accordingly on April 5 Ledru-Rollin read to his colleagues a circular in which this subject was treated together with other matters. The document was approved with slight modifications, and two days later it was sent to the commissioners. Ledru had learned his lesson in connection with the previous circular of March 12 and this one was written in a conciliatory tone.

It read as follows:

The elections are approaching. . . . On the eve of this great act of the supreme power it is well for the government born of the revolution to expose its ideas for a last time. . . . On the elections depend the future of the country. Sincerely republican, they open up a brilliant era of progress and peace; reactionary or even doubtful, they condemn it to terrible trials. Your constant effort, therefore, has been, still should be, to send to the National Assembly honest and courageous men, willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause of the people. . . . The government cannot reduce its functions to merely registering the results. It must enlighten France and openly labor to foil the intrigues of the counter-revolution. Does this mean that we are to imitate the faults of those whom we have overthrown? Far from it! They were dominated by corruption and falsehood; we wish to make truth triumphant. . . . They extinguished independence; we give it full play. . . . What is there in common between us? . . . Thus deeply and peacefully influenced, the country will be able to distinguish those who merit the honour of representing it. . . . Can those who accepted the old dynasty and its treachery be elected by a victorious and sovereign people? . . . Let them enter the ranks, but let them not aspire to command. . . . Liberty is the exercise of all the faculties we receive from nature, governed by reason. Equality is the participation of all citizens in the social advantages with no distinction between individuals except virtue and ability. Fraternity is the law of love, uniting men and

making them members of one family. From these three principles result: the abolition of all privileges, the reassessment of taxes in proportion to fortune, a proportional and progressive tax on inheritances, a magistracy freely elected and the most complete development possible of the jury system, military service weighing equally on all, free, universal, equal education, the instruments of labor assured to all, the democratic reconstruction of credit and industry, voluntary association everywhere substituted for the disordered impulses of selfishness. . . . I venture to believe, citizen commissioner, that these thoughts are yours. . . . It would be lowering your mission to devote yourselves to the success of your own candidacy. . . . But if your citizens come to you, accept their mandate as the noblest confirmation of your work. . . . Remember that we give our all to the country, which expects great things from us, and the hour has arrived to rise above mere private interest.¹

This circular is an able defense and a clear explanation of the influence the commissioners were to exert in the impending elections. The rejection of the members of the dynastic left was still urged as emphatically as ever, but pacific means were indicated to achieve this result. Two new points now appeared. A definite program for the assembly was enunciated, and the commissioners were urged not to press their own candidacy.² The newspapers all approved the latter idea, but the conservatives still deplored the exclusion of liberal monarchists and were greatly surprised that the minister of the interior should have traced a complete plan of a constitution in advance. The circular obtained general approval but had little effect.

¹*Discours politiques* 2:16-21. This circular was supplemented by eleven further decrees or details.—*Moniteur for 1848*, pp. 799, 835, 842, 860, 865, 883, 887, 897, 910, 929.

²The *Réforme* of April 3 even urged that the commissioners should not present themselves in their own departments.

Those who took part in the manifestation of March 17 had made several demands. The government had rejected a postponement of the elections in the National Guard. It did not take up the subject of the postponement of the general elections to the Assembly until March 26. Louis Blanc and Albert, favorable to a dictatorship for one year, were not present, being occupied at the Luxembourg, but had promised their adhesion to the decision of the majority. Ledru-Rollin admitted to his colleagues that he had been mistaken in desiring a delay, that the reports from the commissioners convinced him that the elections should be held as soon as possible. However, he declared, the details of administration in preparing for universal suffrage were so great that his subordinates could not have their work completed at the day assigned. These observations were conclusive, and Crémieux proposed a delay of two weeks. Someone objected that this would make elections fall on April 23, Easter Sunday. "Day of social regeneration," replied a member of the government, and April 23 was adopted. May 4 was appointed for the meeting of the assembly.¹

The account just given should dissipate two myths. The postponement of the election was not caused by the manifestation of March 17.² It was not imposed by the minority on the majority. It was passed in universal agreement, due to absolute necessity, in the absence of the only two members who desired the postponement for its own sake.

Only the socialists desired a ministry of labor, and the government never reconsidered its refusal. Even Louis Blanc and Albert joined their colleagues in opposing the other demand of the manifestation of March 17, the removal

¹ Garnier-Pagès 7: 68-9; Lamartine 2: 190-1; *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 693.

² The government pointed this out in a special decree.—*Moniteur for 1848*, p. 693.

of the army from Paris. Five days after that demonstration, on March 22, Ledru had an opportunity to defend the army. A liberty tree was to be planted in front of the Military School, and the minister of the interior was asked to speak. Recalling the federation of 1790, he announced that the mission of France was to spread liberty. Then he turned toward the *Ecole Militaire* and lauded the bravery and patriotism of the soldiers. He protested against the mistrust of the army: "The army has no need of being amnestied. The army, you are the army. Between you and the army let there be complete fraternity."¹

The crowd was swept away with enthusiasm. A veteran seized the hand of the minister without being able to say a word. A witness of the scene, not often friendly to the minister, writes: "No orator since the first republic had produced by his gestures, by his attitude, by the animation of his features, by all his figure, a more truly popular appeal. M. Ledru-Rollin is a demagogue, he has all the corresponding faults and virtues: muscular force, vibrating chest, exaltation, anger, exaggeration. He produced on the surging masses an enormous effect."²

¹*Discours politiques* 2: 13-5.

²*Journées Illustrées* 88-9; Cf. *Moniteur for* 1848, pp. 662-3; *Constitutionnel, Liberté*, March 23; *Commune de Paris*, March 24; *Bulletin de la République*, no. 7.

CHAPTER IX

CLUBS AND CABALS

AFTER the revolution clubs sprang up like mushrooms, for everybody wished to have a place to expose his views. There were philosophical, literary, social clubs, women's clubs, German, Irish, Polish clubs, but above all political clubs. There were legitimist, Bonapartist, Orleanist, moderate, radical, socialist, ultra-revolutionary clubs. The widest influence was achieved by the last named; in fact when *the clubs* are mentioned in connection with 1848, the ultra-revolutionary societies are meant. Ledru-Rollin was not affiliated with any club,¹ but many supported his policy. The Central Republican Society announced its intention of supporting Ledru. Grandmesnil's Club of Rights and Duties was supposed to have as object the dictatorship of the minister of the interior. The Club of the Revolution, Barbès's club, encouraged Ledru to appoint more radical commissioners.² With one club the minister had close relations; the Club des Clubs, according to Raspail, "belonged to Ledru-Rollin."³ This was a central association composed of delegates from most of the radical and ultra-revolutionary societies. Huber was president, and

¹Ledru in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:311. Wassermann 20 denies that he was a member of the Club of the Revolution. Ledru in a letter to the *Patrie* denied the accusation that he belonged to the Club of Militant Democracy.—*Moniteur for 1848*, p. 1449.

²Regnault 180; Ménand 75; Stern 2:168; Garnier-Pagès 7:77-8.

³Barbès trial, *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 1219.

most of the club leaders except Raspail and Blanqui were members. Longepied, Laugier, the nephew of François Arago, and Grandmesnil were in constant communication with Ledru and through them the club was officially supplied with funds to send out delegates who were to preach republicanism in the provinces. Lamartine through Sobrier, Caussidière through Vilain, were also in communication with the Club des Clubs.¹

Besides Longepied and his friends Ledru was on amicable terms with several of the club leaders, notably Barbès who frequently dropped in at the ministry. Sobrier and Vilain each visited him twice; Ledru found their opinions very advanced, but he believed that they were ready to defend the government.

Originally Sobrier had acted with Caussidière in the prefecture of police, but he soon retired to a neighboring house where he organized an unofficial force of patriots. He acted under the aegis of Caussidière, and on April 15 the latter turned over to him a thousand rifles and three thousand cartridges which the minister of the interior had obtained from the minister of war. It was claimed that Ledru gave these to him in order to have an armed force with which to overthrow the government on the sixteenth. It is clear, however, that neither the minister nor the chief of cabinet, who carried out his orders, knew the destination of the rifles.² Caussidière protected Sobrier, and Lamartine tried

¹Longepied, *passim*; Stern 2:168-9; Regnault 191; Ducos report in *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 1553. For the work of the delegates of the club see *infra*, pp. 162-5. On May 15, we shall see how the members of the Club des Clubs aided Ledru.

²Regnault 286-7. He claims, however that Ledru tolerated Sobrier's "contraband authority,"—*ibid.*, 252. See absolute vindication of Ledru by Portalis and Arago in speeches on August 25, 1848.—*Moniteur*, pp. 2157-8.

to act on the clubs through him, but Ledru had no connection with him. The minister of the interior says: "M. de Lamartine can give more information than I; all I know is that Sobrier one day came to the ministry of the interior. He told me that, although the government made mistakes, the duty of every republican was to uphold it against the royalist reaction. . . . I believed Caussidière gave him a sort of power to survey the Tuileries quarter."¹ Again Ledru states: "I saw Sobrier twice and did not distrust him. I was, however, surprised to hear that he had received arms from the prefect of police. One day Sobrier was presented to me. I knew him no better than many men of the same type. I stood quite alone; I did not belong to any society secret or public, having always held as a principle to conspire openly. Sobrier came to the ministry and complained that he was watched by my order. He said that a big mistake was made in not trusting him, that he had the greatest possible respect for the Assembly, and that in case of need he would assist us against Blanqui, whose disposition was hostile."²

The more revolutionary leaders, such as Raspail and Huber, Ledru never saw. With none of these men did Ledru ever attempt to conspire; even Goudchaux admits that. Other members of the government, notably Lamartine, also had interviews with these captains of the mob.³

With Blanqui Ledru never had any relations though several attempts were made to bring them together. The two men were always antagonistic. Blanqui stated publicly: "M. Ledru-Rollin is no friend of mine, far from it; and

¹ Barbès Trial, *Moniteur for 1849*, pp. 947-8.

² Quentin-Bauchart Report I: 311.

³ Carlier, Carteret, Favre, Goudchaux and Landrin in Quentin-Bauchart Report I: 245, 252, 260, 289, 308; Ledru at Barbès trial, *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 948.

I congratulate myself on that fact, for the hostility of a man who has ruined the republic seems to me as easy to bear as his friendship would be difficult.”¹ When Caussidière, at the instigation of Flotte, suggested an interview, Ledru replied: “Blanqui is a man with a bag of gall where his heart ought to be, and if I should receive him, he would go about boasting of having brought me around to his side. Let me hear no more of this.”² Xavier Durrieu, the radical editor of the *Courier Français*, during the last half of March twice tried to arrange a meeting between the two chiefs, but both interviews were cancelled.³

All hope of bringing them together was ended by the publication of the so-called Taschereau document. To Taschereau, a former monarchist, the minister of the interior had given the task of examining the secret papers of the late dynasty. This friend of Ledru made a thorough investigation and discovered a certain letter which contained information on the secret societies, information supposed to be possessed only by Blanqui, Barbès, and Martin Bernard. The handwriting of the letter bore some resemblance to that of Blanqui and it was commonly believed that while in prison Blanqui had given the information to the police. After several conferences with Ledru-Rollin, Etienne Arago, and Barbès, Taschereau published the letter on March 31 in his *Revue rétrospective*. Barbès, and Bernard broke permanently with their former fellow-conspirator. Blanqui felt the blow and raged against the government, the

¹Letter in *Peuple*, December 2, 1848. Cf. Barbès trial, *Moniteur for* 1849, pp. 1196-7; Geffroy, *Blanqui*, p. 181.

²Caussidière 2: 13.

³Blanqui, *Réponse*; *National, Constitutionnel*, April 15. Wassermann 107-9. Blanqui declared that Durrieu suggested a modification of the government as basis of discussion. Durrieu denied this. Anyway it is certain Ledru never gave authority for such a proposal.

members of which he called cowards and liars. He insisted that the document was a forgery, but he did not accuse Ledru of complicity in its fabrication.¹

Pierre Leroux was another revolutionary who tried to influence the minority members of the government. He augured ill from the manifestation planned for April 16 but desired a new government of socialist chiefs and a new electoral law. Neither Ledru nor Blanc would listen to him.²

Of all the extremist leaders the most intimate with Ledru-Rollin was George Sand, the celebrated novelist. She constantly visited the minister to recommend some protégé. Many contemporaries claimed that she was Ledru's mistress. An Orleanist writes: "George Sand is trying to work up Ledru-Rollin to her own sanguinary level, but he has no pluck and contents himself with receiving from her red roses dipped in blood."³ During the provisional government's

¹Speech of Taschereau on August 28, 1848, *Moniteur* 2206; Blanqui, *Réponse*; *Peuple* December 2, 1848; Regnault 249. Possibly the following letter to Ledru refers to the discovery of the document; although it is vague and undated: "My dear friend, it is *absolutely, absolutely* necessary that I speak to you immediately. I shall not be *long*, but I shall be instructive. Yours truly, J. Taschereau"—LR Papers 1: 199. For original text see appendix. A last attempt to bring Ledru and Blanqui together was made at one o'clock in the morning of April 16, the day of a new manifestation. Flotte, one of Blanqui's lieutenants, came to the ministry of the interior, but Ledru refused to receive him.—Marrast in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 322; Garnier-Pagès 7: 370-1; Stern 2: 333; Wassermann 122; Crémieux 237-8. Lemer 57-8 gives an account of an interview between the two leaders, but it is evidently pure bosh.

²Stern 2: 332. Lefrançais 34-5 claims that Leroux merely begged Ledru not to have the *rappel* beaten and that the minister answered: "We wish to make an end to the socialists." For further developments in 1852 see Calman, *Ledru-Rollin après 1848*, pp. 157-8.

³Bonde 132. Cf. *ibid.*, 129; *Recueil*, November 5, 1868; Castellane 4: 66. The report was spread that Ledru had given George Sand all the fields in one canton.—Sand, *Souvenirs* 121.

tenure of office George Sand was a great admirer of the minister of the interior. In May she found him moderate and attacked his policies in the *Vraie République*, but she wrote him a letter to assure him she still admired him deeply.¹ But his conduct in the Constituent Assembly did not meet with her approval and in 1850 George Sand gave the following estimate of Ledru:

He is a weak and dangerous instrument destined to be broken in the hands of the people. . . . He is pleasant, expansive, confiding, physically brave, sensitive, ardent, disinterested in money matters, but he is not a man of action. . . . He is vain, he loves power and popularity as much as Lamartine; he is womanish in the bad sense of the word, that is, he abounds in eccentricities, dislikes, and political conquestry. . . . He is not brave morally as he is physically; he has a bad set of friends and he yields to evil influence; he loves flattery; he is of unpardonable instability; to sum up, he will betray the true popular cause . . . without wishing to, perhaps without knowing it. . . . He will compromise the most serious matters from motives the frivolity of which no one would suspect. . . . No one more impressionable, no one more versatile, no one more capricious than he.²

In one case George Sand embarrassed the minister of the interior extremely. A leaflet called *Bulletins of the Republic* was published to give information and advice to the departments. "It was elementary education for the rural districts," says Jules Favre.³ The idea had originated with postmaster-general Etienne Arago and the editorship was confided to Regnault, the moderate chief of cabinet. Jules Favre, Delvaux, Anselme Pétetin, Charles Lecointe, and

¹Sand, *Lettres* 2: 26-8.

²*Ibid.*, 3: 146-155.

³Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 281.

George Sand aided in the editing.¹ Ledru's part in the publication consisted in obtaining from his colleagues in the government permission to let the bulletins appear. He explained their utility, but in order to prevent misuse he asked that each member of the provisional government should in turn have the oversight of a number. This plan was adopted, but the members of the government never paid any attention to this duty, and the editing was left entirely to subordinates of the interior department.²

Twenty-five of these bulletins appeared between March 13 and May 6. They contained praise of the republic, advice to electors, speeches of Ledru-Rollin, decrees of the government, defense of the financial policy of Garnier-Pagès. In several of them the workingmen were urged to abstain from violence and it was emphatically stated that a republic did not mean scaffolds. Probably the most eloquent of all the bulletins was the twelfth, in which George Sand deplored the lot of the working women and advocated an amelioration of their condition. Except for the sixteenth, the innocuousness of these bulletins is apparent. They had no effect in the cities and little more in the country, but what little influence they did have was beneficial. Yet not only did Léon Faucher declare them "emblems of terror," and Barrot assert that they were filled with the "spirit of demagoguery and violent socialism," but Arago called them "deplorable," Dupont "deplored their effect," and Lamartine described them at "burning with the inspiration of socialism."³

¹Regnault 197-200; Garnier-Pagès 6:379; Delvau 371-2; Monin in *Révolution française* 37:545-552.

²Garnier-Pagès 6:397; Lamartine 90-2; Regnault 200.

³Faucher on April 11, 1849 in *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 1834; Barrot 2:130; Arago and Dupont in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:225, 276; Lamartine 2:91.

These hostile criticisms apply only to the notorious sixteenth bulletin which said:

We could not pass in a day from the regime of corruption to the regime of right. . . . If social truth does not triumph in the elections, if the interests of a class prevail . . . the elections, which should be the safeguard of the republic, would undoubtedly be its destruction. *There would then be only one path of safety for the people who erected the barricades; that would be to manifest once more its wish to postpone the decision made by unrepresentative deputies.* Could France wish Paris to recur to this extreme remedy? No, France has confided to Paris a great mission. . . . Paris rightly regards itself as the guardian of the nation, the van of the army that fights for the republican idea. . . . Everywhere let the citizens of the country districts unite with those of the cities. Everywhere the cause of the people is the same, everywhere the interests of the poor and oppressed are one. If the republic succumbs at Paris, it will succumb not only throughout France, but throughout the universe. Citizens, it is not necessary that you force yourselves to violate the principle of your own sovereignty. Against the danger of losing that conquest by the action of an incapable assembly or by a movement of popular indignation, the provisional government can only warn you. . . . Formerly the representatives saved the country by proclaiming the danger. . . . Take courage, put aside . . . material interests, narrow local passions; let us save ourselves from the enemies who flatter and caress us the better to strangle the liberty that serves them as a shield; let us save the republic at any price.

That this bulletin was inflammatory there can be no question. The italicized portion distinctly declares that Paris has the right to dissolve the coming legislature if it was not satisfied with the choice of France. Such an abuse of popular sovereignty was here urged in a semi-official publication. The conservatives were justified in their denuncia-

tion of it. The day after its publication an uprising occurred; did not this bulletin seem like the summons for the insurrection?

Who was responsible for the sixteenth bulletin? Elias Regnault was charged with the supervision of all manuscripts destined for that publication. This particular article had been written by George Sand. Regnault was about to start for George Sand's when he heard that his mother was dying. He jumped into a cab, drove to the home of the authoress, was given the manuscript, and without reading it handed it to the printer. This was dereliction of duty, but who would blame a son under such circumstances? George Sand contributed her literary ability to the bulletins, but she refused to accept any political responsibility. She counted on the revision of Regnault. She wrote what she as a private citizen believed and left to the chief of cabinet the decision as to the advisability of printing such sentiments.¹

Ledru-Rollin can hardly be accounted responsible for the bulletin. He could not see everything that issued from his ministry, and the provisional government itself had realized that the bulletins would give him too much work, for the members of the council were to supervise them in turn. That they failed to do so was not Ledru's fault. He first heard of this incendiary article when his colleagues criticized it at a council meeting on April 15, the day of publication. He was deeply distressed and ordered Carteret to prevent its being sent to the departments. Carteret rushed to the post-office, but it was too late; he could prevent the despatch of only a comparatively few copies.² Ledru's own statement

¹Regnault 284-6; Sand, *Lettres* 2:60-1; Carteret and Favre in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:252, 291; Garnier-Pagès 8:213.

²Garnier-Pagès 8:213; Carteret and Favre in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:251, 281. Favre had also tried unsuccessfully to stop the despatch to the departments.

on this matter was: "Whereas my day and night were hardly sufficient for my work, it is said that I was responsible for a certain bulletin that was contrary to the law, the law I have professed all my life. That bulletin is not mine Let any one consider the duties that kept me busy and he will see how easily it might escape my attention, my notice." ¹

Naturally in this connection there was no collusion between the minister of the interior, or even those responsible for the sixteenth bulletin, and the instigators of the uprising of April 16. It is clear that no government official had any idea what was contained in the article of George Sand; Ledru had no more cognizance of this article before it went to press than he had of any of the other bulletins. There is ample testimony that he was greatly surprised and shocked when he saw it, and that he tried his best to prevent its being sent into the provinces. In fact the spirit of the bulletin, destructive of universal suffrage, was diametrically opposed to his ideas. His attitude is expressed by his secretary-general: "As to M. Ledru-Rollin, I never saw in him any thought other than a fear for the republic if the elections did not conform to the spirit of Paris." ² Most of the conservative newspapers made capital of this blunder and believed (or pretended to believe) in Ledru's complicity, but the moderate and liberal journals, such as the *National* and the *Siècle*, published a disavowal subscribed by the entire government, and even the *Réforme* repudiated the doctrine in the bulletin.

Ledru-Rollin was accused of plotting not only with Blanqui, Barbès, and the other club-leaders, not only by means of the *Bulletins of the Republic*, but also in midnight

¹ Speech on August 3, 1848 in *Discours politiques* 2: 43-4.

² Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 280.

cabals (*conciliabules*) in the ministry of the interior. The truth is told by Elias Regnault:

After the exhausting labors of the day, it was customary to stop work, and at midnight or later a few chosen friends would meet in a little room next to the minister's office. There Ledru-Rollin loved to seek distraction from his political preoccupations, joining in a friendly conversation which made him forget the anxieties of the day. Art, literature, and Gallic wit found there interpretators and exponents. M. Landrin was noted for his inexhaustible sallies, M. Etienne Arago for his brilliant southern wit. M. Jeanron, a cultured spirit with an uncultured exterior . . . would pass from a facetious proposal to a wise dissertation on art and then return by an unexpected anecdote to light words. . . M. Jeanron was the most assiduous at those meetings; when midnight sounded, he arrived. M. Jules Favre was to be found there too, silent in his gaiety, more pensive than garrulous. Near him sat M. Carteret, a clever man who had acquired in journalism more political convictions than the bar ordinarily gives. Mme. George Sand would sometimes appear, less however for a chat than to recommend to the minister some proletarian in whom she was interested. As to M. Ledru-Rollin, he seemed in these intimate meetings to forget his office. He was no longer a minister. Those present were his comrades.¹

Regnault himself, Flocon, Portalis, and occasionally Barbès also attended. Of these men Carteret, Favre, Jeanron, and Regnault were subordinates in the ministry of the interior. Etienne Arago was postmaster-general; Landrin, district-attorney; Portalis, attorney-general; Flocon, a member of the provisional government. All these were personal friends of Ledru-Rollin. All the officials were moderates except Flocon and Etienne Arago, who were radicals. Only

¹ Regnault 157-8.

George Sand and Barbès, who attended rarely, were extreme revolutionists and private individuals.

Some of these meetings were devoted to political discussion. All manner of subjects were brought up. Revision of the personnel of the government, postponement of the general elections, annulment of monarchical elections—all were discussed freely and frankly, and the arguments for and against were weighed. But never was any plot hatched in these midnight gatherings. The minister of the interior cannot be blamed for discussing politics with his personal friends. The prevailing opinions were undoubtedly moderate, for such was the tendency of those present. Landrin wrote to Ledru: "Whatever happens I am with you. But I admit that I should profoundly regret an appeal to arms at this moment, in which a name I love and esteem would be found necessarily coupled to names without a future and without a reputation."¹ Ledru himself said a few months later in the Assembly when he had been accused of plotting at these midnight *cabals*: "Cabals! That word signifies something guilty. There existed . . . business meetings that lasted at times till two or three o'clock in the morning. . . . Very frequently, since I was bound by the most intimate ties of friendship to the two citizens [Portalis and Landrin] . . . we talked not as public officials but as citizens."²

Two meetings are most frequently cited against him by the opponents of Ledru, and both meetings were, as a matter of fact, never held. It is supposed that Ledru had been in-

¹LR Papers 1:214. For entire letter see appendix.

²Speech of August 25, *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 2158. See also Favre, Landrin, and Portalis in *ibid.*, 2158-2161 and in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:280, 308, 334; Regnault 264-6; Blanc 2:34-5; Stern 2:316. Thus there is no truth in the elaborate accounts of debates in Garnier-Pagès 7:346-353; Trouvé-Chauvel in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:362-4. See also Chenu in *ibid.*, 1:184; Barrot 2:149.

duced by Caussidière to consider joining the movement against the moderates, and that Carteret, Favre, and Landrin visited the minister on the night of April 14-15 and extracted from him a promise to oppose the plans to disrupt the government. Even Regnault believed this story.¹ The truth is that the minister had never considered abandoning his colleagues. Favre explained a few months later: "The night before the sixteenth M. Carteret and I saw M. Ledru-Rollin. He gave us his word of honor that he had no part in the movement."²

As to the second of the supposititious meetings, François Arago is responsible for the story that on May 3 in a meeting held in the absence of Ledru-Rollin under the presidency of Jules Favre, Landrin and Portalis declared in favor of the dissolution of the Assembly if it rejected their plans. Arago claimed to have heard this story from Duclerc and Ledru. Duclerc denied having told Arago such a tale, and Ledru explained that Arago had misinterpreted him. Moreover, on May 3 Landrin was far from Paris, Favre was in the suburbs, and Portalis did not enter the ministry of the interior.³ Thus the only meetings on which the accusations were specific did not take place.

¹Regnault 290-3; Garnier-Pagès 7: 351-3; Barrot 1: 129.

²Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 279-280. The demonstration of April 16 is meant.

³Speeches on August 25 by Ledru, Arago, Duclerc, Favre, Landrin, and Portalis in *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 2158; Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 230, 308, 334. Arago was completely defeated on this point, but he had the better of Ledru in a long argument as to whether he had committed a breach of confidence in making public his statements.

CHAPTER X

THE SIXTEENTH OF APRIL

BETWEEN the two manifestations of March 17 and April 16 comparative quiet prevailed. The conservatives, to be sure, took every opportunity to attack or ridicule their opponents. They called the government *le gouvernement dérisoire*, Lamartine *La Tartine*, Ledru-Rollin *Le dur Coquin*, Louis Blanc *Louis Blague*.¹ The newspapers never tired of attacking Ledru.² The most violent were the Orleanist *Constitutionnel*, the legitimist *Assemblée Nationale*, and the independent *Presse* of Emile de Girardin. The attacks of the last-named journal so irritated the people of Paris that they attacked the newspaper offices. Ledru and Landrin, the district-attorney, hastened to the scene of disorder, but Caussidière had already restored quiet. The minister remained till all danger was past and returned again the next day when renewed disturbances were reported. Girardin adopted a petty attitude, refusing to thank Ledru and denied that he had asked for aid or needed aid.³

Preparations were made long ahead for a new and great demonstration to be held on April 16. It is very likely that the purpose of the demonstration was pacific like the earlier one of March 17. People are always too willing to read

¹Bonde 104. On the other hand the workingmen called their friend *Le dru*, that is, the hardy.—St. Férreol, *Proscrits* 1: 327.

²Among other things they attacked his acceptance of the unpaid professorship of French and foreign administration at the *Collège de France*. Even the governmental *National* of April 11 did not approve the appointment of Ledru and three of his colleagues. None of the appointees ever availed himself of his privilege to give lectures.

³*Moniteur* for 1848, pp. 726, 739; *Presse*, March 28-31; Girardin 305; Garnier-Pagès 7: 210-5; Lemer 48-9.

plots into the actions of their opponents. That the leaders wished a great manifestation to show their force, that a few subordinates, particularly among the Blanquists, desired to use the demonstration to overthrow the government, that the mob could easily have been induced to demand a change in the persons composing the executive,—this seems the most likely hypothesis to explain the actions of this “Day”. Proof of this hypothesis cannot be found, but neither is there any proof of plotting. Wassermann has made out a good case for the innocence of both Barbès and Blanqui,¹ and they were the two believed to be most deeply involved. Many groups took part in the parade and probably the wishes of most were pacific. Louis Blanc and Albert undoubtedly favored the movement. All the club leaders supported it. Caussidière did not disapprove and merely feared the influence of the extremists, Blanqui and his followers.

Ledru-Rollin took no part in organizing this affair. It is commonly asserted that he experienced a severe attack of indecision. Urged on by Caussidière, Blanc, Albert, and Barbès, restrained by Flocon, Landrin, Portalis, Favre, and Carteret, he is supposed alternately to have agreed with the former to accept a dictatorship and with the latter to suppress the movement. It is claimed that he knew of the movement, encouraged it, was ready to take part in it, but drew back at the last moment, fearing that, if the existing government were overthrown, the new one might get beyond his control.² If Ledru-Rollin hesitated it was merely as to

¹Wassermann 121-131.

²Even Regnault 260-277 believes this. It is inexplicable that Wassermann after absolving Barbès and Blanqui should still believe the minister of the interior implicated, for with whom could he have plotted? See also Barrot 2: 123-130; Beaumont-Vassy 4: 215-7; Du Camp 142; Sand, *Lettres* 2: 17-27; Carlier in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 244-5; Gradiš 1: 302-7; La Gorce 1: 189-203; Pierre 1: 204-218. Only Hamel 114-8 takes the view that there was no plotting beforehand.

whether he should let the demonstration take place or whether he should take repressive measures. That his friendly attitude toward some of the extremists may have encouraged them is likely, but that he plotted to overthrow his colleagues is without foundation. As soon as he was certain of the danger of violence, he took measures to restrain the paraders.

The chief items in the indictment against Ledru in connection with this affair may be briefly dismissed. The sixteenth bulletin was not issued by him on April 15 in order to stir up the people, for he had nothing to do with its appearance. The conspiracy was not hatched in the midnight cabals, for these were innocuous meetings. Ledru's name was retained on the lists for a proposed new government drawn up by extreme revolutionists, but he could not be blamed for that.¹ Marie said in this connection: "The banner of the revolt bore the names of MM. Ledru-Rollin, Louis Blanc, Flocon, and Albert. But I declare that two of them protested emphatically against this accusation. Those who protested were M. Ledru-Rollin and particularly M. Flocon, who expressed himself with great indignation. . . . The minister of the interior was to be retained in the government but refused the proposition energetically."²

On May 6, 1848 Ledru explained to the Assembly his own attitude at this time:

I was above all anxious to save the revolution and maintain order. I wished to preserve for the popular victory its grandeur, its purity, its social significance. I wished while

¹Marrast and Trouvé-Chauvel in *Quentin-Bauchart Report* 1:322, 2:321; Stern 2:320-2; and Lamartine 2:206 claim that meetings were held at the ministry of the interior to consider new lists, but their accounts are either absurd or vague, and they contradict each other on details.

²*Quentin-Bauchart Report* 1:319. Cf. Carteret and Favre in *ibid.* 1:250, 279.

defending it against all the assaults and attacks of the reaction, to oppose also all violent ambition or dangerous impatience. 'Accordingly when in reply to an imprudent step the entire population came without arms to assure the provisional government of its pacific tendencies, I took part without reserve in this solemn demonstration; but the day when certain fools tried to pervert the nature and spirit of a similar demonstration, I did not hesitate to oppose it.¹

Again he said on August 3:

April 16 has been mentioned and it has been said: *You were a conspirator!* I! But it would be for the first time in my life. Consult all my friends. I never took part in any secret society or conspiracy. And after having acted thus for twenty years, I conspired while in power! But that would be too inane! Yet, after all, if I had wished to conspire against some of my colleagues on April 16—I did not do so, but allow me the hypothesis; I might have done so—I would have been within my rights and you could not accuse me today. What was February 24? An act. And if I had let myself be deceived but had risked my life, if I had ever thought that I could save the country by governing it with other men than my colleagues, could not the people undo on April 16 what they had done on February 24?²

In 1849 Ledru declared that

Reports indicated that the manifestation was partly organized by advocates of the regency and of the elder royalist line. Certain reports said it was for the benefit of the regency; others for that of legitimacy; still others that Blanqui was mixed up in the movement. . . . We were informed that certain men wished to overturn all or a part of the provisional

¹*Discours politiques* 2: 26. In last sentence references are to March 16, March 17, and April 16.

²*Ibid.* 2: 44-5.

government. The police reports stated that the manifestation was to take place for the benefit of the regency or legitimacy. It has been said that he who would have pronounced the name of regency or legitimacy would have been torn to pieces. But when one wishes to overturn a government, one does not cry *Long live the King*. First, the existing government is overturned, and then by a sleight of hand the government desired is established. Finally, the reports asserted that the factions, the usurpers of the sovereignty of the people, wished to divert the manifestation from its primary aim. I heard that at the Champ de Mars leaflets were distributed to this end. What proves that this is true is that all sincere republicans were frightened, as I was, and offered their services for the protection of the republic.¹

It is doubtful whether Ledru at the time believed the reports as to monarchical intrigues; that was probably an after-thought or a political move.²

At the midday meeting of the government on the fifteenth, Ledru-Rollin told of the manifestation prepared for the morrow. He asserted that the demonstration would be directed only against the moderates in the government, but he assured his colleagues of his loyalty, and of his solidarity with them. The council decided not to go to the Hôtel de Ville the next day but to assemble at the ministry of finance in order not to be compelled by the clubs to yield to their demands. In the evening Louis Blanc and Albert declared themselves powerless against the uprising while Flocon strongly insisted on his loyalty to the government.³ Ledru passed the night in examining Paris, in traversing the

¹ Barbès Trial, *Moniteur for 1849*, pp. 947-8, 962.

² At the Barbès trial Blanqui ridiculed the idea and Marie denied that Ledru believed it.—*Ibid.*, pp. 947, 1079.

³ Garnier-Pagès 7: 360-7; Regnault 287-9; Arago in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 226; Marie at Barbès trial, *Moniteur for 1849*, pp. 1078-9.

streets, and did not go to bed till four in the morning to snatch three hours' sleep.¹

On the sixteenth Ledru was at his desk by seven-thirty in the morning. Every quarter of an hour he received a police report. All manner of rumors were rife. The story spread that Ledru-Rollin and Louis Blanc had been murdered. The workingmen had gathered at an early hour at the Champ de Mars to elect fourteen officers to the staff of the National Guard. The crowd was peaceful, but was being affected by the rumors that were flying about. Ledru feared lest some extremists should cause disorder and decided to beat the *rappel*, that is, call out the National Guard. At nine thirty he left his office to consult with Lamartine; as he went out, Carlier heard him mutter: "This must be drowned in a movement of the National Guard, and the *rappel* must be sounded."² Lamartine strongly urged Ledru to call out the Parisian militia, and Ledru returned to his office more firmly convinced of the need of this measure.³ At eleven the minister of the interior was handed a police report which finally decided him. He set out for the Esplanade des Invalides where General Courtais, commander of the National Guard, was reviewing some of his troops, and in the presence of Marrast gave Courtais the order to call out the entire

¹ Ledru in speech of August 3, 1848, *Discours politiques* 2:45; and at Barbès trial 1849, *Moniteur*, 947.

² Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:244-5.

³ Lamartine claims that Ledru was overwhelmed by his responsibility and did not know what to do, that he, Lamartine, advised the beating of the *rappel*, and that Ledru eagerly leaped at this suggestion.—Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:305; Lamartine 2:207-9, Blanc in *Peuple*, December 7, 1848, Stern 2:334-9, and Regnault 293-303 attribute the original idea to Lamartine. But Ledru on August 3, 1848 specifically denied this: "I did not ask M. Lamartine: shall I beat the *rappel*? I had it beaten."—*Discours politiques* 2:45-6.—Cf. Ledru at Barbès trial, *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 947. Carteret bears out Ledru.—Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:250.

National Guard. The General objected that he had sufficient troops to quell a tumult, but Ledru declared that he wished to engulf the demonstration, that partial forces would suffice to overpower but not to prevent an attempt at civil war, and that a riot must be above all avoided.¹ The order to beat the *rappel* met with difficulties at headquarters and at one o'clock Marrast had to repeat the command.²

Ledru returned to his ministry and received the congratulations of Jules Favre. Soon the sound of drums was heard. Louis Blanc and Albert arrived and criticized the minister for his order to beat the *rappel*. Ledru-Rollin replied to this: "Blanqui wished to exploit the manifestation to his advantage. I do not wish to deliver the republic and France to Blanqui." Ledru joined his colleagues at the ministry of finance, as had been decided. Albert and Louis Blanc, frankly disappointed, came also, but when the other members of the government refused to expose themselves to the rioters, these two socialists set out alone for the Hôtel de Ville.³

At the city hall Marrast and Lamartine alone represented the government. General Changarnier had offered his services and was put in charge of the troops. The officials were worried. Which would arrive first, the crowd or the National Guard? It was the latter which came first; even the twelfth legion under Colonel Barbès responded to the call. The procession of clubbists and workingmen, when they arrived, had to pass between the serried ranks of these armed forces. When it was certain that the demonstration

¹Garnier-Pagès 7: 379-80; Marrast on August 3, 1848, *Moniteur*, p. 1874.

²This gave rise to the story of Changarnier that Ledru never ordered the beating of the *rappel*.—Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 260; *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 1874. See Marrast's refutation of Changarnier, *Moniteur*, p. 1874.

³Garnier-Pagès 7: 383-4, 391; Blanc in *Peuple*, December 7, 1848.

was under control, Ledru and his colleagues set out for the Hôtel de Ville. They arrived there at four-thirty, an hour and a half after the procession had begun to defile. Ledru sent off a note to Favre: "Everything is quiet; the people are marching past without disorder." All the members of the provisional government appeared in the square and listened to delegates from the clubs. Louis Blanc and deputy-mayor Adam answered them. Lamartine had made a speech before the arrival of his colleagues, but long after the others retired, he continued haranguing parts of the procession. It was not till ten-thirty that the parade was over.¹

Ledru's actions throughout the day were irreproachable. Such persons as Louis Blanc and Delvau blamed him for beating the *rappel*, but that was his duty. Ledru-Rollin was the minister of the interior, responsible for the maintenance of order. It is possible that even if the National Guard had not been called out, the day would have passed peaceably; that, as Blanqui claimed, the only desire of the manifestants was to demand a ministry of labor and to proclaim their devotion to the republic. But it is certain that there was possible danger, and it was the duty of the minister of the interior to take all proper precautions. As long as Ledru expected the demonstration to be pacific, he let the preparations go on unheeded; when he feared violence, he called out the National Guard to prevent it.

The results of April 16 were on the whole good. Fear of the extremists decreased, for it was seen that they had been controlled. Fear of Ledru-Rollin also slightly diminished. The reactionaries still believed him a Jacobin and a conspirator, but sensible men realized that he had definitely aligned himself on the side of order. In the government too there was a change. The leaders of the majority and

¹ *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 849; Favre in *Quentin-Bauchart Report* 1: 280.

the minority drew close together. The beating of the *rappel* had caused bitter feeling in the hearts of Louis Blanc and Albert, and they drew further and further away from Ledru-Rollin and Flocon. These two radicals had seen the danger from the extreme revolutionists and were ready to postpone their revolutionary innovations. The responsibility of office had its effect on Ledru, and the period between April 16 and June 24 (the day of his fall from power) was the most conservative period of his political career. Lamartine, on the other hand, had realized two facts, namely, the power of the extremists and the real moderation of his radical colleagues. He was ready to admit that a slightly more advanced program might be desirable. The union of himself and Ledru steadily grew firmer as the date for the meeting of the new legislature approached. Ledru was frequently seen at his colleague's house where hitherto he had not gone.¹

The provisional government met on the seventeenth. It caused to be published an account of the demonstration in which both the National Guard and the people were praised, and only the few extremists who incited to disorder were blamed.² The minister of the interior told his colleagues of the plans for a committee of public safety and of the intrigues of Blanqui the previous day. Attorney-General Portalis called for an investigation of the plots. Only Crémieux protested, on account of the difficulty of framing an indictment. The member of the provisional government

¹Des Cognets, *Lamartine* 410. Cf. *Times*, April 21. However, Carteret asserts that the disagreement did not disappear till a few days before the legislature met and Landrin tells how Favre made an unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation.—Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 253, 309.

²*Moniteur for 1848*, p. 849. Pierre Leroux visited Ledru on the seventeenth. "What did you do yesterday?" asked the socialist. "We killed the sectaries," replied the minister. "You killed the republic," retorted Leroux.—Leroux 229.

most anxious for an inquiry was Louis Blanc; Ledru warmly seconded him. A judicial investigation was ordered.¹

The city had not yet quieted down completely after the demonstration. On the eighteenth all Paris was agitated by the renewed beating of the rappel. There was great excitement and many arrests were made, but it all proved a false alarm. The next day trouble was still feared, and on Albert's warning, Ledru urged Caussidière to take precautions; nothing, however, occurred.² On the nineteenth, on the advice of the prefect of police, Ledru demanded the arrest of Blanqui and his lieutenants. Only Lamartine and Albert opposed this; even Louis Blanc sided with the majority.³ A year later Ledru explained: "There were some members of the government who believed that Blanqui had a great influence; others, and I was of that number, believed that he had few supporters and that his only influence was due to his activity. Blanqui continually disquieted us. On the eve of the *Fête de la Fraternité* an order for his arrest was issued after a lively discussion. The order was signed because it was feared that the disturbances were not yet over; when I saw the magnificent manoeuvres of the National Guard, I said: *A man is nothing against an entire people*, and I gave a counter-order."⁴

¹Garnier-Pagès 8: 24-6; Blanc 2: 48; Stern 2: 343; *Moniteur for 1848*, pp. 859, 954. Landrin had already asked Ledru for permission to make an inquiry, threatening to resign if he were not allowed to do so. "Go as far as you like; proceed and the government will do its duty," had replied the minister.—Landrin on August 25, 1848, *Moniteur*, p. 1857 and in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 308.

²Caussidière 2: 29-35, 59; Bonde 103. On the nineteenth George Sand wrote to her son: "I have just left portly Ledru-Rollin trying to haul himself onto a horse for a ride through Paris, laughing and not caring a fig for what is going on."—*Lettres* 2: 29.

³Garnier-Pagès 8: 37-41; Faure 220.

⁴Barbès trial, *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 947.

This *Fête de la Fraternité*, held on April 20, was a grand review of the National Guard. Ledru arrived early to superintend the arrangements and caused considerable irritation because he occasionally forgot to bow to the audience or to a passing officer.¹ He was obliged to adjust a dispute between the men of the Luxembourg and those of the National Workshops, who were assigned to the same place; the two groups almost came to blows, but Ledru induced them to mix together.² At ten-thirty the other members of the government arrived and took places in a semi-circle under the Arc de Triomphe. Arago made a speech and then each of his colleagues gave a flag to the commander of this corps or that.³ A part of the crowd followed Ledru back to his ministry and forced him to make a speech. Ledru-Rollin preached peace, fraternity, and confidence in the legislature that was to meet.⁴ Due to a misunderstanding part of the third legion had not taken part in the celebration. Accordingly it was reviewed two days later. At nine-thirty in spite of the rain, Ledru, surrounded by several of his colleagues, made a speech. He explained the mistake and lauded fraternity and the republic.⁵

¹ *Assemblée Nationale*, April 21; *Times*, April 24.

² Thomas 210.

³ *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 871; *Times*, April 24.

⁴ *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 878; Delvau 474-5; Caussidière 2: 71-2.

⁵ *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 878; Garnier-Pagès 8: 64-6.

CHAPTER XI

THE ELECTIONS OF APRIL TWENTY-THIRD

DURING the period after April 16 the chief preoccupation of the provisional government was the coming elections to the Constituent Assembly. In Paris Ledru-Rollin entrusted to a subordinate the duty of watching the elections at the mayoralties,¹ but Marrast ordered his officials not to permit any supervision by the interior department. On April 24 Ledru brought up the matter in a council meeting. He was in the right—even Garnier-Pagès admitted that—but he used such unusually severe language that a rupture with his colleagues resulted, and he tendered his resignation. Lamartine, who had not been present at the discussion, offered his mediation. He showed the minister of the interior how a break would encourage the extremists and induced him to withdraw his resignation. Ledru returned to the meeting in a conciliatory spirit, and his colleagues passed a decree giving him complete right of surveillance over the elections of Paris. Marrast yielded, but he formed the resolution never to take part in another administration of which Ledru-Rollin was a member. This was the only time the minister of the interior ever resigned.²

Ledru-Rollin tried to influence the elections by propa-

¹In Paris there was not only a mayor of the entire city, but there was under him a mayor for each arrondissement.

²Minutes of the council, April 24, Marrast, and Pagnerre in Quentin-Bauchart Report 2: 38; 1: 322, 330; Garnier-Pagès 8: 281; Lamartine 2: 225; Normanby 1: 245; *Constitutionnel*, April 23, 1848; *Times*, April 27.

ganda, by moral suasion.¹ The commissioners, mayors, and other officials were urged to spread republican ideas. In some cases they busied themselves with opposing conservative candidates, and sometimes, notably in the case of Thiers, with success. But in general it may be said that the elections were exceedingly free, more free than any other of the times. To aid the commissioners, the *Bulletins of the Republic* were distributed throughout the rural districts for the purpose of instilling democratic principles.

Another means of influencing the electorate adopted by Ledru-Rollin was the sending of workingmen from Paris to preach republican doctrines to their brothers in the provinces. This caused more scandal than any other single act of the minister. The Club des Clubs, composed of delegates from other clubs, chose a committee whose duty was to send to the departments workingmen who should aid the election of designated candidates. Longepied was president of the committee; Laugier, François Arago's nephew, was treasurer. The committee did not have sufficient funds and applied to the secretary of the interior for aid. Ledru refused to commit himself without consulting his colleagues. Accordingly, one day in his daily report to the council the minister of the interior commented on the activity of the reactionaries in the provinces and showed how the clubs were becoming more loyal to the government. Then he spoke of the proposal of the Club des Clubs. He supported it on two main grounds; the emissaries would be able to spread republican ideas through the backward country districts, and the adoption of the proposition would propitiate the clubs whereas to reject it would tend to make them revolt. The government saw the force of these arguments and appropriated 123,000 francs for this purpose, but on

¹The charges of intimidation and bribery are baseless; for charges see Chamier I: 156-9, 186-8.

condition, first that the delegates should not be regarded as official agents, should confine themselves to disseminating doctrines, should not aid individual candidates; and secondly that the minister of the interior should himself superintend carefully the selection of the delegates. Unfortunately these two conditions were not carried out. The delegates believed that one of their chief duties was to designate worthy candidates. Ledru believed that he could rely on the choices made by Longepied, Laugier, and their colleagues.

The committee of the Club des Clubs met every day and kept a careful account of expenditures. In the evening it went to the ministry of the interior and gave to Ledru-Rollin, or in his absence to Carteret, a list of the agents and a memorandum of the sums given to each of these agents. The committee also submitted extracts from the reports of its emissaries. Sometimes Longepied and his friends remained to discuss politics with Ledru, for they enjoyed his confidence. Once, when they told him of their fears of reaction, the minister sent them to Lamartine, but their interview with the minister of foreign affairs was unsatisfactory, as the latter did not share their fears.

Over four hundred delegates were despatched to the departments between the end of March and the twentieth of April. They received six, eight, or ten francs a day, according to the locality to which they were sent. Most of the agents were satisfactory, but some extremists among them preached anarchistic doctrines. Longepied and Laugier claim that the committee gave conciliatory advice to their emissaries and that the delegates had a moderating effect and were not inciters to violence. As a matter of fact, at the time, their actions were little noticed; it was later, when arguments against the radicals were sought, that these club-delegates came into prominence. The project certainly was foolish; it was another extreme example of the popular

movement to exalt the position of the *ouvrier*. It was another bad road to democracy, paved with good intentions.¹

Ledru-Rollin defended his conduct before the Assembly on August 21, 1848:

The men sent into the provinces were paid from a fund determined by the government. Now, at that time you were reposing at leisure in your departments. But in Paris the exuberant forces of the revolution were boiling over. But in Paris the men who had been kings on the barricades wished to impose conditions which at times were unreasonable. Paris could not like an immense furnace contain the exuberant force; an outlet was needed, assistance in regaining their homes for numerous citizens. Moreover, there were departments where the working people misinterpreted the revolution, wished even after the revolution of February 24 to proceed to insurrection. There were great cities like Lyons and Lille to which it was necessary to send workingmen to speak the fraternal language which would not have been listened to from our lips, as we were mere bourgeois. That is why it was necessary.²

Besides sending out these civilians, the Club des Clubs despatched non-commissioned officers to the armies in order to influence the soldiers and to point out to them the commanders whose influence was feared in the elections. Accordingly a member of the directing committee, provided with

¹Instructions to and reports by delegates, testimony of Delaire and Longepied in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 171, 210, 232-3, 315-6; 2: 79, 116-132; Longepied 49-51, 59, 63-109, 131; Garnier-Pagès 7: 233-9; Ducos Report in *Moniteur* for 1849, pp. 1553-4; Sand in *Vie de Paris*, 1904, pp. 388-9; Regnault 352-3; Lamartine 2: 192-3; Wassermann 87-9; Antony 250-267. The Ducos commission examined the affair thoroughly and exonerated Ledru from the charges of dishonesty or misuse of secret funds, but it rejected "the 123,000 francs by the use of which popular sovereignty seems to have been violated." For absurd accounts by conservatives see Barrot 2: 61; *Times*, August 26, 1848.

²*Discours politiques* 2: 62-3.

a letter from Ledru, went to see an aide of François Arago; he desired a furlough for nineteen non-commissioned officers who were to go to different regiments and develop republican sentiments among them. The matter was referred to the minister of war who hesitated several days. Finally permission was granted, but the military delegates were to report to the colonel of the regiment to which they were sent. Some of these emissaries failed to do this and themselves distributed inflammatory articles among the soldiers. As there were many complaints, the non-commissioned officers were recalled on April 16, eight days after their departure. That they caused much disturbance in the army is untrue, for there was less disturbance after April 8 than before. This was another of those well-meaning attempts of the minister of the interior which had no good results, but which was not in itself reprehensible.¹

In Paris election lists were numerous. Everyone had a slate of his own and almost every prominent man was a candidate. In general there were three types of lists. Those of the socialists were headed by Louis Blanc and Albert, those of the radicals by Ledru-Rollin and Flocon, those of the moderates by the other seven members of the provisional government. Frequently the socialists and radicals were included in one list. Occasionally all eleven members were inserted together, or a selection was made among them. The *Peuple Constituant* of Lamennais advised the election of Lamartine and Ledru, and Sobrier followed suit. In general the moderates tried to exclude their more revolutionary colleagues. The most industrious were Marrast and Marie, who used their influence particularly in the National Workshops. Ledru himself took little part in the

¹Deuzy, Longepied, and Larabit in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 273, 316, appendix; Larabit on August 25, 1848, *Moniteur*, p. 2160. Larabit was the aide of Arago.

campaigning, but his partisans waxed virulent against the moderates. Besides being a candidate in Paris, Ledru also ran in six departments and in Algeria.¹ In Saône and Loire he received the support of Lamartine. In Sarthe the influential Trouvé-Chauvel broke with the party of Ledru and ruined the minister's chance of election.² Everywhere the clergy worked against him.

The elections passed off smoothly; except at Limoges and Rouen there were no disturbances. The voting took place on April 23, Easter day. At first the Catholics had complained of this, but they soon realized how they could turn it to their own account. Entire villages marched to the polls headed by their curates. In one way the election was a great triumph for the minister of the interior; eighty-two per cent of those entitled to vote cast their ballots.³ But in the general character of the candidates elected Ledru was grievously disappointed. The elections were overwhelmingly in favor of the moderates. Ledru-Rollin himself, although elected in three places, could derive no pleasure from the result. In Paris thirty-four representatives were chosen. Lamartine came first with 259,800 vote out of 314,986 voters. The other six members of the government majority followed. Ledru stood only twenty-fourth with 131,587 votes, immediately after Albert and just ahead of Flocon and Louis Blanc. In Saône and Loire Ledru was elected thirteenth out of fourteen; in distant Algeria third out of four. Everywhere else he was defeated; in the Sarthe twelve deputies were elected and he was fourteenth; in Côte

¹*National, Constitutionnel*, April 10, 11, 12, 1848. The departments were Côte d'Or, Lower Loire, North, Saône and Loire, Sarthe, and Lower Seine.

²Guyon 2: 49-92.

³Curtis 50.

d'Or ten, and he was seventeenth; in the North twenty-eight, and he was sixty-first.¹

In Rouen the elections turned out badly for the proletariat, and accordingly on April 27 there was an insurrection which the generals in command ruthlessly put down. Little force would have been needed to end this petty flare-up, but the generals exerted their full authority, killing and wounding far more than was necessary. Ledru read to the council a report which was unfavorable to the military commanders, and Louis Blanc asked that they be sent before a council of war. François Arago, minister of war, opposed this proposal and completely defeated his adversaries, for an investigator of the affair was appointed, who was hostile to the radicals.² Except for this difference of opinion the time between the elections and the meeting of the new legislature passed peaceably for the government.

The National Constituent Assembly met on May 4. The provisional government attended as a body and relinquished its powers. During this first session the republic was acclaimed seventeen times. Most of the session was spent in verifying the credentials of the members. Certain conservatives tried to throw the blame for the absence of a few election returns upon the minister of the interior, but the

¹ Saône and Loire:	1st name 129,879	last name 67,178	Ledru 68,462
Algeria:	1st name 5,255	last name 3,335	Ledru 3,412
Sarthe:	1st name 113,016	last name 55,535	Ledru 46,806
Côte d'Or:	1st name 75,916	last name 41,629	Ledru 24,445
North:	1st name 227,765	last name 93,666	Ledru 42,173

No statistics are available for Lower Seine or Lower Loire. Figures taken from *Moniteur*, *National*, *Commune de Paris*. For election in the North see Gossez 141, in the Sarthe see Guyon 2: 91-2.

² Arago in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 225; Blanc 2: 48; Stern 2: 364. Ledru and his commissioner, Deschamps, were accused of being implicated in the riot. The truth is that arms had been sent to the National Guard of Rouen on the order of the minister of the interior, and that these arms were seized by the rioters.

Assembly would not listen to them. The extreme left met later in the day under the presidency of Flocon and arranged a slate for the officers of the assembly. Its list headed by Trélat included many moderates. Fifty or sixty delegates were present, such as Ledru-Rollin, Etienne Arago, Louis Blanc, and Barbès.¹ The next session, May 5, was taken up with further verification of credentials and with matters of organization. Buchez, the Catholic socialist, was elected president of the Assembly. A deputy wished to interpellate Ledru on the post-election riot at Limoges, but the Chamber, desiring to preserve harmony, passed to the order of the day.

On May 6 the provisional government began a series of reports on its conduct in office. First came Dupont de l'Eure's general account. Then the others followed, one after another. The first was Ledru-Rollin, who explained that he could give only a brief account of his acts, that he had tried to reconcile in his ministry the development of republican institutions and the preservation of orderly administration. He defended his various activities: the commissioners, the circulars, the organization of the National Guard and of the electoral machinery, the detailed work of the ministry, his conduct on April 16. Ledru blamed any resort to plotting. He closed as follows:

Nothing can be founded that is not based upon ideas. True superiority consists in discerning the reforms which can reasonably be brought about. Today the hand of the people has torn away the curtain; doubt is no longer possible for any one. Most imprudent and most culpable is he who wishes to stop the revolution at the sterile conquest of political forms. These forms are merely the instruments of liberty placed in the hands of the people now called on to rule itself. But for

¹ *Débats*, May 6. Trélat was not elected, but six of the other fifteen candidates were. After the legislative session Ledru had a demonstration from a portion of the National Guard.—*Réforme*, May 5.

us the path is traced; the goal is indicated. It is to realize in the social order the dogmas of equality and fraternity which should guide all our steps. Sustained by this noble cause, we shall be worthy of our mission; if we accept it in its entirety, we shall not only have given to man his natural dignity, but we shall have assured the glory and happiness of our fatherland and shall have aided the emancipation of the world.¹

This brief speech exactly served its purpose. On the one hand it was the discourse of a minister, advocate of law and order; on the other hand it was the oration of a progressive, anxious to give to his country what was best in the new ideas. The speech was well received by the Constituent Assembly, and the applause was greater than that given to any one except Lamartine.² The newspapers were divided. Whereas the *Débats* thought that Ledru-Rollin made too many complaints, and the *Presse* considered the speech worse than the ministerial harangues of Guizot and Duchâtel, some of the journals, such as the *Ere nouvelle*, were well pleased and declared Ledru's language better than his reputation. The radical newspapers, of course, thought the discourse a masterpiece.

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 22-7. For extracts see pp. 60, 68-9, 120, 132, 152-3. For notes in preparation see LR Papers 5: 1-9.

² Garnier-Pagès 8: 419; Spuller 64; Stern 2: 376; *Journées illustrées* 127-9. However, two witnesses claim that the speech was received with coldness: Beaumont-Vassy 4: 258; Corkran 32.

CHAPTER XII

THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION

THE question that dominated all minds in the Assembly was the composition of the new executive. The contest centred about Ledru-Rollin. The moderates, who controlled the legislature, had definitely decided to reject Louis Blanc, Albert, and the socialist element. But there were two opinions concerning Ledru. Some of the deputies desired a homogeneous government composed solely of moderates; others desired to include a radical in order to conciliate the extreme left. The former would probably have carried the day had it not been for Lamartine. The poet-statesman refused to enter any combination in which Ledru was not included. Much ink has been wasted in trying to account for this action of Lamartine. The simplest explanation is that Lamartine's one idea throughout this period was conciliation. By his speeches he had tried to conciliate the mob, and he had succeeded. By private conferences he had tried to conciliate the club leaders, and he believed that he had done much to put them in a better humor with the government. By his tact he had tried to conciliate the warring elements in the provisional government, and he had succeeded in patching up quarrels between François Arago and Louis Blanc, between Marrast and Ledru-Rollin. For over two months he had dominated France by this policy of conciliation; the conservatives looked to him as the bulwark against anarchy, the moderates regarded him as their leader, the radicals believed that he alone could obtain from the

National Assembly the reforms which they advocated. Had he desired it, he could have been elected president of the republic by an almost unanimous vote. But ambitious as Lamartine was, he placed first the good of the country. He felt that the policy of conciliation which had worked so happily until now must be continued, must be maintained at least until the constitution was completed. He believed, and he was right, that if the extreme revolutionists were not conciliated, they would rise in revolt. To obtain their support the government must include at least one radical, and Ledru-Rollin was the natural choice as the most prominent member of that party. Besides, Ledru was willing to adopt Lamartine's policy of conciliation. We have seen how these two men had gradually come closer and closer together in the provisional government. Were Ledru in the new executive, he would restrain his friends and yet would not irritate the conservatives by bringing forward absurd demands. How correct Lamartine was, the history of the next few months shows. Had the party of Ledru-Rollin joined the revolutionists on May 15 or during the June Days, probably it would have turned the balance against the Assembly. Lamartine was right when he said to a friend on June 23: "Remember this and repeat it. I lost my popularity and pained all of you when I asked you to include Ledru-Rollin in the executive commission. It was important that the force represented by him should be with us on account of the crisis I saw approaching. It is here. The republic will triumph in the end, I shall have preserved it intact."¹ So great was Lamartine's influence that he imposed his choice on the Assembly, but this body was at heart filled with the exclusive spirit of Marrast and never forgave Lamartine for forcing Ledru upon it. Lamartine lost his popularity, the

¹Lacratelle 153. For discussion of Lamartine's decision see Corkran 69-72; Falloux 1: 315; Normanby 1: 370-1; Tocqueville 168-172.

Constituent Assembly entered upon a reactionary course and, dropping the policy of conciliation, never stopped until the way was open for the Caesarism of Napoleon III. A frank adoption by the moderates of Lamartine's policy (for Ledru and Flocon were ready to coöperate) might have established the republic solidly; its rejection and the consequent bickerings between the various shades of republicans certainly opened the road to the second empire.¹

Even before the Constituent Assembly met there had been numerous plans for an executive. Among the radicals the idea of a triumvirate consisting of Lamartine, Ledru-Rollin, and Flocon was popular. Naturally Lamartine was not willing to serve alone with two radicals.² Garnier-Pagès claims that there were five general schemes: 1° a temporary president (this would be Lamartine). 2° Ministers directly elected by the legislature (plan of the conservatives). 3° President of the council, choosing ministers. 4° Commission of three or five (if three Ledru would probably not be included, if five he would). 5° Continuance in office of the entire provisional government (desired by the extreme left). It was the second and fourth of these plans that gradually attracted most support.³

All the groups in the legislature held meetings at least once every day. On May 4 the moderates debated from ten to midnight without reaching any decision. Garnier-Pagès was for the inclusion of Ledru in the government; Marie,

¹A great deal of scandal was told of the connection between Ledru and Lamartine. Ledru was supposed to have Lamartine in his power because he had discovered that the poet had accepted from Louis Philippe a monetary reward for literary merit.—Alison 1:588-9. It was said that Mme. Ledru-Rollin was the mistress of Lamartine whom she had met only once.—Circourt Papers 516.

²Caussidière 2:87-8; Quentin-Bauchart, *Lamartine* 312.

³Garnier-Pagès 9:8.

Marrast, and Dupont de l'Eure were violently opposed. The next morning Lamartine received two delegates from this meeting; he plainly indicated that he insisted on the presence of Ledru in the executive. Nevertheless in the afternoon the moderates practically decided to leave out their radical colleague. On May sixth they held three successive meetings and definitely agreed to exclude Ledru-Rollin. A commission of Lamartine, Arago, and Garnier-Pagès was to be supported; if Lamartine would not accept this combination, Arago was to be proposed as temporary president.¹

In the meantime the radicals were equally uncertain. Landrin wrote to Ledru two letters from which may be inferred the hesitation of the minister of the interior. He strongly urged Ledru to enter the government with Lamartine and he regretted that Ledru appeared uncertain as to what course to take. Landrin saw only good from a union to which Ledru could bring the support of the populace and Lamartine that of the legislative majority. Even if Ledru were not accepted as a member of the government which was to be formed, Landrin desired that Ledru should adopt a conciliatory policy; only a threat against the republican form would justify a resort to violent means of opposition. From the two letters it seems that Favre and Crémieux were active in arranging a union between Ledru-Rollin and Lamartine.²

On May 7 more than four hundred deputies took part in meetings of their groups. Sixty to eighty deputies of the extreme left gathered in a room of the Palais Bourbon, the building where the Constituent Assembly held its sessions. They favored union and peace, and they proposed the main-

¹ Notes of Barthélemy-St. Hilaire in *Revue politique et parlementaire* 51: 318-320; Garnier-Pagès 9: 8-17; Circourt 138-140.

² LR Papers 1: 217-9. Letters were probably written May 7. For complete versions see appendix.

tenance of the entire provisional government. The moderates, who had the previous day decided on the exclusion of Ledru from the government, were again thrown into a state of indecision when they learned that Lamartine had definitely refused to join any combination in which Ledru-Rollin was not included. Opinion tended to a commission of Arago, Dupont, and Garnier-Pagès. Meanwhile Ledru visited Lamartine and the two had a long conversation. The morning of the eighth two large groups assembled, the extreme left under Trélat and the moderates under Martin de Strassbourg. The two parties agreed to an executive composed of Arago, Garnier-Pagès, Marie, Lamartine, and Ledru-Rollin. A committee headed by Dornès was to propose this combination to the Constituent Assembly.¹

On May 8 the legislature turned to the question of the new executive. As had been agreed upon in the morning, Dornès mounted the platform and moved that the provisional government deserved well of the republic and that the National Assembly delegated its powers to a commission of five members. Amid a great uproar he read the names of the five men selected by the extreme left and the moderates. The entire right protested against adding to a general measure concerning the formation of an executive the names of those who should compose it. Everybody was excited and expressed his opinion at the top of his voice. Finally President Buchez was obliged to suspend the sitting for half an hour. Then Dornès resumed, adding that the executive commission should have the right to appoint the ministers. A vote was taken on the first part of the proposal, that "the provisional government deserved well of the country." Only Barbès and four of his friends voted in the negative.

On May 9 the discussion was resumed. The conserva-

¹*Revue politique et parlementaire* 51:320-1; *Débats*, May 8, 1848; Garnier-Pagès 9:20-1.

tives realized that if the Dornès scheme were accepted, Ledru-Rollin would be elected as a member of the government. Accordingly they bent all their energies to having the legislature elect the ministers directly. After a long debate their proposal was defeated 411 to 385. Before the discussion could proceed further, a deputy demanded whether there had been any unity in the provisional government and made a particular attack on Ledru-Rollin. Flocon and others protested against this interruption, but Ledru insisted on replying:

Citizens. . . . A charge has been made against me. . . . You are told that the provisional government was not united. In the sense that men, all animated by excellent intentions, by absolute loyalty, still in certain respects entertained different ideas as to progress, in that sense alone the provisional government was not united. . . . What gave us our strength? Our very diversity. . . . Which of our official acts did not receive the signature of one and all of us? Not once was there the least bitterness, not once the least rancour, not once a personal attack. There was complete devotion to our task for we were bound together by the myriads of men without bread who forgot their needs to cheer the republic. . . . On the question of means we were not in accord, but when a decision had been made, when the majority had said its last word, the minority acquiesced and signed the decree. . . . Does not this assembly consist of a majority and a minority? . . . That very diversity, which represents all the theories of the moment, makes the power, the strength, the life of the assembly. It is in the name of independence and liberty of conscience that I protest against the accusation. It is only among those who desire to retain power for power's sake that systematic unity is found, allied to baseness Our consciences feel satisfied at having remained good colleagues, at having remained brothers. I do not fear being contradicted when I say this; it is to that union that I invite

you. . . . Like us, forget your shades of difference; consider only the fatherland, the sufferings of the people, their intolerable misery. Be neither majority nor minority, but a single assembly animated by a single sentiment; for the sake of the good that remains to be done, do not lose time in useless oratory! Do as we did; do better than we did! Work, work for the sake of the people!"

The Assembly applauded Ledru vigorously and the friends of the orator crowded around him congratulating him.¹ Ledru's speech had an excellent effect and threw on the conservatives the burden of a desire for dissension. It was eloquent and well-timed, but it was special pleading. It was well to forget the internal disagreements in the government, but was it justifiable to deny them? The oration is filled with exaggerations if not prevarications. The right tried hard to continue the interpellation, but twice the Assembly by overwhelming votes refused to listen to attacks. Most of the representatives still desired harmony.

A modified version of the Dornès resolution, entrusting the government to an executive commission, but not stating the number of members who should compose it was now passed. A proposition that the number should be eleven was rejected. Finally it was decided that the executive should be composed of five members. It looked now as though the question were finally settled and Ledru would be in the government with Lamartine, Arago, Garnier-Pagès, and Marie, as Dornès and his friends had arranged; but still the moderates debated. In the evening they favored the substitution of Dupont for Ledru. Conversations continued throughout the night. Everything depended on Dupont, the head of the late provisional government, who still hesitated. It was not till ten the next morning that Dupont

¹ *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 999; Garnier-Pagès 9: 37-40.

refused to serve in the new executive, and announced his decision in a gathering of moderates. The success of the Dornès list of five was now assured.¹

When the Assembly met on May 10, it immediately set about electing the executive commission. Sénard of the left centre declared that the *list of conciliation* was accepted by all five of its members. After a brief debate, Arago, Garnier-Pagès, and Marie were overwhelmingly elected; out of 796 votes cast they received respectively 725, 715, and 702. Lamartine had lost much of his popularity by his liaison with Ledru-Rollin; he received only 643 ballots. Ledru himself trailed behind with 458 (398 were needed to elect). It was a thorough success for the moderates and a great rebuke to Lamartine, who a week before had been hailed as the saviour of France.²

Immediately after their election the members of the executive commission retired to discuss the appointment of ministers. Ledru desired to give the interior department to Trélat, agriculture to Flocon, and to retain Jules Favre and Carteret. He was opposed to giving offices to Marrast, Récurt, and Pagnerre. No decision was reached that day though the discussion was renewed in the evening in the presence of prominent members of the left. The next morning at ten there was another meeting of the executive commission. Ledru obtained the ministry of agriculture for Flocon and the positions of under-secretaries of foreign

¹*Revue politique et parlementaire* 51: 322-3; Garnier-Pagès 9: 40-1; Barrot 2: 177.

²Most of the newspapers approved the choice made for the executive commission. On the eleventh the *Réforme* declared its confidence in the five, and the *Constitutionnel* asserted that it had opposed many of Ledru's acts but was willing to give him its confidence now. During the session of the tenth Louis Blanc's suggestion of a ministry of labor was overwhelmingly rejected; of the eleven members of the provisional government only Albert supported Blanc.

affairs and the interior for Favre and Carteret respectively. Caussidière remained prefect of police, Etienne Arago post-master-general. Trélat, instead of the department of the interior, received that of public works. On other selections Ledru was obliged to yield. Pagnerre was made secretary of the commission. Marrast retained the mayoralty of Paris. Récurt received the interior department. An agreement had been reached, and the new government set to work in harmony. Over the distribution of other offices there was no trouble. Crémieux, Bethmont, and Carnot retained portfolios as ministers of justice, religion, and education. In the departments of foreign affairs and finances the former assistants Bastide and Duclerc became ministers. The ministry of the navy went to Admiral Casy and that of war to General Cavaignac.¹

The executive commission seems to have worked in far greater harmony than had the provisional government. Albert and Louis Blanc were not there to advocate extreme measures. Absent also was the fiery Marrast. Ledru-Rollin grew more conservative the longer he remained in power. Lamartine and Garnier-Pagès were always anxious to be conciliatory. Arago was testy but easily placated. Marie never flared into a passion. It was commonly asserted that there were two parties in the commission, Lamartine and Ledru forming one. It is undoubtedly true that these two men were more radical than their colleagues, but there is nothing to show that differences of opinion ever went beyond amicable discussion.²

Arago was elected president of the executive commission, for the first month and was retained in that position as

¹*Revue politique et parlementaire* 51: 323-4; Garnier-Pagès 9: 42-4. Barthélemy-St. Hilaire speaks of the insolent demands of Ledru.

²See Garnier-Pagès in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 284; Garnier-Pagès 10: 2, 29-30; 11: 282-3.

long as the executive commission remained in power. Every day from nine to eleven the members of the commission worked with the ministers; from twelve to two they devoted themselves to police reports; in the evening they held a government council. The question arose as to their attitude towards the legislature. They wished to act as a unit. Lamartine and Ledru desired that they should all be present at every meeting of the Assembly; the other three overruled them. On May 17 they agreed not to take part in votes in the Assembly.¹

The executive commission was confronted by a legislature in which at the start there were no definite parties. France had elected prominent individuals rather than representatives of definite opinions. Everyone was a republican, everyone was for progress. But soon the members began to split up into groups. The conservatives met in the Rue de Poitiers under the presidency of General Baraguey d'Hilliers, but their guiding spirit was the Count de Falloux. There collected the entire right: Barrot, Thiers, and the old monarchists who had formed the parliamentary opposition against Guizot; Montalembert and the ultramontane Catholics; Berryer and the legitimists; Bugeaud and other generals. The centre and left assembled in the Palais National to the number of some three hundred. Buchez, Marrast, and Dupont de l'Eure worked in unison here with Landrin, Portalis, Etienne Arago, and other supporters of Ledru-Rollin. Lastly there were about sixty members of the extreme left who met first in the Rue des Pyramides, later in the Rue de Castiglione. This group was composed of socialists and such supporters of Ledru-Rollin as Lamennais and Mathieu de la Drôme.² The Rue de Poitiers group

¹Garnier-Pagès 9: 79; 10: 29; *Constitutionnel*, May 14; *Représentant du Peuple*, May 15.

²For accounts of these groups and lists of members see Quentin-

was steadily in opposition to the executive commission; the Pyramides-Castiglione group, due to the presence of Ledru and Flocon in the government, generally supported it but maintained an independent position; the Palais National deputies were the mainstay of the commission throughout May and the first half of June, and when they abandoned it, the government fell.

In July, after this fall, there was a regrouping. The moderates seceded from the Palais National and founded a club of their own at the Institute. Landrin and his friends united with the deputies of the Rue de Castiglione to form a new club in the Rue de Taitbout, commonly known as the Mountain. Ledru became a member of this group; like the other members of the executive commission during their tenure of office, he had previously belonged to none.¹

Bauchart Report 2:250-260; *Constitutionnel*, July 16, 1848; *Débats*, July 13, 16, 25; Garnier-Pagès 10:44-50; Babaud-Larivière 1:44-9; Stern 3:67-8; Castille 3:8-9; Spuller 104-5; *Journées illustrées* 167; Curtis 65; Bouniols 298; Gradis 2:53-5; 167-8, 176.

¹ Still later Landrin and his friends abandoned the Rue de Taitbout when that group became too revolutionary; they composed the left proper of the Assembly. Again, some time after this, Flocon and a few followers also resigned; they were the independent members of the extreme left. In the organization of committees in the legislature Ledru-Rollin chose that for Algeria.—*Débats*, May 26, 1848.

CHAPTER XIII

THE FIFTEENTH OF MAY

ON May 15 a mob invaded the Assembly and tried to dissolve it. It is hard to decide who were responsible for this attack upon the legislature. A crowd had gathered with the ostensible aim of holding a peaceable demonstration and presenting a petition to the deputies in favor of aid to Poland. Probably a few club leaders like Huber desired an insurrection and carried the mob, and finally even Barbès and Albert, with them. Ledru believed that "most of the people who invaded the legislative hall had as their purpose to bring there a petition and read it at the bar." He claimed that the chief organizers of the demonstration and the sole instigators to insurrection were the monarchists, particularly the Bonapartists; that Blanqui and Raspail, leaders of the extreme revolutionists, had desired a forcible entry into the Palais Bourbon but no uprising; that Barbès had taken no part in the organization of the demonstration but was carried away by the force of events, deeply moved at the sight of the poverty-stricken crowd.¹ Ledru himself has been accused of plotting the overthrow of his colleagues, but this is absurd. The radical orator might have striven to overthrow a *provisional* government, but it was contrary to his every belief and theory to take measures against the elect of the people unless a fundamental right were violated. The

¹ Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 311; Barbès trial in *Réforme*, March 21, 1849; *Voix du Proscrit* 2: 43; speech of June 3, 1874, in *Discours politiques* 2: 480-1.

sole basis for the charge is that his name was on various lists for a new government, but that was not his fault. His conduct throughout the day was unimpeachable.¹

At nine in the morning of May 15 the members of the executive commission assembled at the Luxembourg. They had been informed the previous day of what was coming, but they believed that the demonstration would be a peaceful one. Nevertheless, orders that all needful precautions be taken were given to Caussidière and to General Courtais, commander of the National Guard, who was given supreme control.² About ten-thirty Longepied and some fellow-members of the Club des Clubs called at the Luxembourg; they feared that the manifestation might become hostile to the government and invade the Palais Bourbon, and they offered to circulate through the crowd and do their best to restrain it. François Arago encouraged them in their purpose, and Ledru-Rollin gave them a pass to the Assembly building. Longepied arrived there too late to stop the invasion and proceeded to the Hôtel de Ville in order to try to prevent the recognition of an insurrectionary government. There he was arrested, but he was soon set at liberty by Ledru-Rollin.³

The five members of the executive commission then in session at the Luxembourg decided to separate, Arago and

¹ For accusations, see Falloux 1: 322-3; Chamier 267-298.

² *Moniteur* for 1848, p. 1051; Ledru at Barbès trial in *Moniteur* for 1849, pp. 947-8; Caussidière in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 144. Dupoty, an editor of the *Réforme*, had written to Ledru and Landrin urging the arrest of Blanqui.—*Réforme*, November 13, 1848.

³ Ledru in speech of August 3, 1848. *Discours politiques* 2: 46-7; Longepied, Delaire, and police-agent Picot in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 316, 272, 133; Longepied 129; Wassermann 173-185; Garnier-Pagès 9: 147; Dupoty in *Réforme*, November 13, 1848. The only reason that the Quentin-Bauchart Committee of Investigation gave to reject Longepied's pacific motives was that after his interview with Arago and Ledru he ate lunch before proceeding to the Palais Bourbon.

Garnier-Pagès remaining at the Luxembourg, the other three setting out for the National Assembly. They had already given the command to beat the *rappel*, and they had ordered General Courtais to guard the vital Pont de la Concorde which separated the Palais Bourbon from the Madeleine where the procession of petitioners was gathered. The General had failed to carry out this order and thus the mob was able to approach the building where the legislature sat. When Marie and Ledru arrived at the Pont de la Concorde to insist on its occupation, the bridge had already been crossed.¹

The Assembly had met at noon as usual, and there was a large attendance as the ministers were to be interpellated concerning foreign affairs. Bastide and Lamartine had defended their Italian policy, and Wolowski had just brought up the Polish question when the noise of an approaching crowd was heard. Lamartine, Ledru, and Marie hastened to the courtyard. The building was surrounded by a huge crowd which refused to listen to Lamartine and listened without enthusiasm to Ledru who tried to calm it. The deputies returned to the Assembly hall. Albert declared that if delegates of the mob were not admitted, a calamity would occur. On the advice of Ledru and Marrast this was agreed to. Ledru and Lamartine returned to the gate with President Buchez, but the mob had already climbed over. Nothing could be done to stop them.² Ledru's account is as follows: "During this time the people grew impatient and when I returned, twenty-five or thirty persons had climbed the gate. There was a cry to let the delegates enter; the gate was opened and the people rushed in. I do not know

¹ *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 1051; Barjaud, Garnier-Pagès, and Marie at Barbès trial in *Moniteur for 1849*, pp. 986, 1078; Garnier-Pagès 9: 151.

² Buchez, and Garnier-Pagès at Barbès trial, *Moniteur for 1849*, pp. 829, 1079; Lamartine 2: 278; Malludé in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 82.

whether you have ever seen the people take a military post by assault; iron bars are playthings in their hands; nothing can resist them.”¹

The mob invaded the assembly hall. The deputies were indignant. Ledru-Rollin, Louis Blanc, Barbès showed by their countenances and their gestures as much affliction as the members of the right. Louis Blanc demanded silence out of respect for the right of petition. Raspail, encouraged by some representatives, amid the protests of others, read the plea for Poland. Then President Buchez told the mob that now that their petition had been heard they should retire. Raspail shouted energetically “Those who do not retire are not good republicans.” But Huber insisted on the procession marching past through the assembly hall. Barbès now mounted the platform. Amid cheers he spoke in favor of Poland, but urged the people to leave the hall. His words were having some effect when the sound of the *rappel* was heard outside. The mob became frantic. To gain time Buchez sent a counter-order to stop the *rappel*, knowing that this counter-order would arrive too late to have any effect. Blanqui made a plea for Poland, but soon began a series of violent digressions which had no bearing on the subject.

Ledru-Rollin had been exerting himself to reach the tribune, and at last (it was about half past two) he achieved his object. He said:

Citizens, I speak here not as a member of the executive power, for I have not consulted with my colleagues; I speak as a citizen, as a deputy. . . . You have expressed your desire . . . that swayed by the feeling of fraternity France should extend its hand to the people of Poland. (*Hurrah for Poland!*) Certainly the chord that stirs your heart stirs

¹ *Ibid.*, 947-8. See also Quentin-Bauchart Report I: 311. For Ledru's exculpation of Albert, see Barbès trial in *Réforme*, March 21, 1849.

ours also. . . . You have asked that measures be taken so that the people may live by labor. (*A ministry of labor!*) Finally you ask that the *rappel* should not be beaten. (*Yes, yes! On April 16, you betrayed the people! You have boasted of having sounded the rappel!*) In the revolution of February you gave a proof of your wisdom, of your prudence. (*Interruptions.*) With that admirable good sense that characterizes the people of Paris who will not be deceived, (*A ministry of labor!*) With that admirable good sense that characterizes the people of Paris who wish guarantees and who at the same time perfectly comprehend the sentiments of justice and expediency, you can understand that it is impossible for an assembly to deliberate in your presence; to deliberate thus would ruin its authority. (*It deliberated February 24!*) I demand that the Assembly decree a permanent session, but at the same time I demand that you retire beyond the threshold. (*Yes, yes! No, no!*) ¹

This address was hardly heard beyond the radius of a few yards, and even where it was heard, as the interruptions show, it was badly received. The insurrection had passed far beyond the radicalism of Ledru-Rollin. Pandemonium reigned. Several proletarians threatened the president. One tried to clear out the tribune with the staff of his flag, but Raspail seized it and broke it, slightly injuring Ledru who was standing beside him.² Two representatives even urged Ledru to "take the presidency if only to save us from anarchy." But Ledru replied: "I would rather die for right and duty, would rather let myself be cut in pieces than violate for one instant the rights of the National Assembly."³ President Buchez declared the session at an end.

¹ *Moniteur* 1060.

² Ledru at Barbès trial, *Moniteur* for 1849, pp. 947-8, and *Réforme*, March 21, 1849. There are several variant versions of this incident.

³ Speech of Ledru on August 3, 1848, *Discours politiques* 2:47. Cf. Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:311.

Raspail and others still tried to induce the mob to retire, but Huber and his friends continued the disorder. Huber even declared the legislature dissolved. Finally the cry arose: *To the Hôtel de Ville!* Barbès, Albert, and a large part of the crowd set out to go thither; Louis Blanc was carried off in the arms of the people, but he escaped at the first opportunity.

Ledru, seeing that he could do nothing in the assembly hall and fearing lest the mob should try and force him to join them, had gone into the courtyard. There, he says, "I was met and surrounded by men who wished to conduct me to the city hall. I declared that I would never be carried there alive. I even drew a pistol with which to shoot myself in case the violence towards me did not cease."¹ Ledru retired to the apartment of the concierge. There he was found by a group of a hundred loyal citizens who wished him to head them in an attack on the insurgents. He was in a state of extreme agitation and explained the necessity of awaiting at least one of his colleagues before acting. But Ledru despatched one of the citizens to the Hôtel de Ville with the following verbal message: "Order the commandant to hold firm, to maintain order as best he can, to avoid the shedding of blood. Inform him that, dead or alive, the executive commission will arrive at the Hôtel de Ville at exactly half past five. If it is impossible for me to join any of my colleagues, I shall go alone, I give you my word of honour." With great difficulty the messenger delivered this promise.² Another similar communication was sent to the headquarters of the National Guard.³

¹ Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:311. Cf. Ledru at Barbès trial, *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 947; Garnier-Pagès 9:238; Barrot 2:195; Robin 2:295; Lamartine 2:286. Stern 3:46-8 gives an elaborate but improbable account of this adventure.

² François, who was the messenger, in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:209-210.

³ Hutteau d'Origny at Barbès trial, *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 986.

Meanwhile the assembly hall was cleared of insurgents by the National Guard, who had collected at the sound of the *rappel*, and a little before five o'clock the session was resumed. Lamartine entered and was received with cheers. He mounted the tribune and declared that it was time to act, not talk, that the entire country was with him in putting down this revolt of a small faction. Ledru had been standing near the orator; he was asked to speak but remarked: "It is not worth while."¹ The two members of the executive commission then set off for the Hôtel de Ville accompanied by several deputies and by a part of the National Guard.²

The escort grew as it proceeded, cheering frantically for the government. When they got near the city hall, says Ledru, "M. de Lamartine was separated from me by a group and at that instant the National Guard shouted: *There will be firing from the windows*. I advanced and cried: *All the better; I shall die for right and the republic*."³

The insurgents, after leaving the Palais Bourbon, had marched to the Hôtel de Ville and had entered it. They had ordered Mayor Marrast to surrender his power to them, but the latter had refused, and therefore two antagonistic governments existed side by side in different halves of the city hall. When Lamartine and Ledru arrived with their troops, they easily overpowered the insurrection and arrested the revolutionists. After taking all necessary measures for the safety of Paris in concert with Marrast, Ledru and Lamartine returned to the Assembly through crowds that impeded their progress.⁴

¹ Lagrange, *ibid.*, 828.

² "I mounted on horseback with M. de Lamartine; I did not even have a hat," says Ledru in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 311.

³ Speech of August 3 in *Discours politiques* 2: 47. Cf. Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 311; *République*, May 18.

⁴ Ledru at Barbès trial, *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 947; Hutteau d'Origny, *ibid.*, 986; Lamartine 2: 292-3; Garnier-Pagès 9: 261.

Meanwhile the Assembly had continued its session, listening to reports as to the quelling of the insurrection and arrest of the leaders, proposing drastic measures against all who were suspected of a part in the revolt. It refused to listen to Louis Blanc, who desired to prove his own innocence. Garnier-Pagès gave an account of how the executive commission had conducted itself. Lamartine returned with Ledru and told what they had done. Marie declared that the government must retire and the session was closed after voting that the National Guard had deserved well of the country.

During the evening of this crowded day Ledru, Lamartine, and some companions went to see General Courtais who had been imprisoned, for they believed him merely incapable not culpable.¹ At two o'clock in the morning Causidière appeared before the provisional government. He made a bold defence of his conduct during the day and, enumerated his services to the republic. First, all the members of the executive commission had been inclined to dismiss the prefect of police, but after Causidière had spoken, only Arago and Marie cast their ballots for dismissal.² But Causidière soon realized that it would after all be best to resign, and the next day his resignation was accepted. In his place was appointed Trouvé-Chauvel, the prominent citizen of Le Mans who had obtained Ledru's election under the July monarchy and his rejection in the recent election. The *Liberté* declared that Ledru showed his colleagues a letter which he had received from Trouvé-Chauvel, in which the latter had explained that he could no longer support the author of the March circular and of the

¹ Ledru at Barbès trial, *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 947; Garnier-Pagès 9: 298.

² Causidière 2: 140, 150-1; Favre in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 280; Garnier-Pagès 9: 290-3; Stern 3: 60-1.

policies it represented. "This letter caused the appointment of M. Trouvé-Chauvel if this incident is true, M. Ledru-Rollin has nobly avenged himself and shown the moderate tendencies of his ideas."¹

Many revolutionists had been arrested on May 15 and many others were suspected of having abetted the movement. Portalis, the attorney-general, and Landrin, the district-attorney, desired to have Louis Blanc and Caussidière prosecuted, and they believed that they had received the consent of the executive commission for this through Crémieux, minister of justice. In this they were mistaken; Ledru had strenuously opposed such action. "When the arrest of Louis Blanc and Caussidière was demanded," he said later, "I examined the evidence carefully. Speaking as a jurist, I must say that nothing could justify in my eyes a condemnation which I also opposed for political reasons. As Portalis and Landrin insisted, I asked the dismissal of the attorney-general. The authority to prosecute was refused."² On May 31 the formal demand for permission to prosecute was made in the legislature, all the members of the executive commission being present except Ledru. On June 3 Favre reported for the committee to whom the request had been submitted, in favor of prosecution. But many orators spoke for the accused. Marrast made one of his belated explanations; he admitted his mistake in believing that he had seen Louis Blanc at the Hôtel de Ville. The government did not support the demand for permission to prosecute. Accordingly the Assembly by a small majority rejected the motion. Two days later there were violent accusations and counter-accusations in the legislature; Landrin, Portalis, and Favre vs. Crémieux and Flocon. The first

¹ *Liberté*, May 20.

² Barbès trial in *Réforme*, March 21, 1849. No deputy could be prosecuted without permission from the Assembly.

three named resigned their positions and became the determined opponents of the government. Crémieux, though supported by his superiors, also felt it necessary to hand in his resignation. The events of May 15 had been the first blow to the executive commission, for it had shown its incapacity in defending the capital. This dispute was the second blow, revealing a split in the government itself. For days baseless rumors circulated that Ledru, Lamartine, even Garnier-Pagès had resigned.¹

The weakness of the executive on May 15 made clear the necessity for a definition of its powers so that it might know what action it could take in case another riot were threatened. The government had drawn up a bill defining the relations of the executive to the legislature. The committee to whom the government draft had been submitted had made a few modifications and there was much discussion on these minor points. The greatest difference of opinion arose over the question as to whether the commission should have the right to sound the *rappel* or whether this privilege should be entrusted only to the president of the Assembly. Ledru was the government spokesman. He declared that he saw no fundamental changes in the modifications. He insisted that the executive power must be strong; he blamed the conservatives for wishing to refuse the commission a necessary power because they disliked those who would exercise it. "Distinguish between men and the offices they hold. I have attacked men; I have never attacked their offices. What I wished as a member of the opposition, I wish today as a member of the government. . . . I repeat: What is necessary is a strong government that it may arouse the

¹ Police report in Quentin-Bauchart Report 2:199; *Constitutionnel*, *Opinion publique*, *Organisation du Travail*, *Presse*, June 7; *Courier de la Chambre*, *Esprit national*, *Organisation du Travail*, June 8; *Bonnet Rouge*, June 11.

country and be effective abroad." Ledru accepted the modifications of the committee as they did not weaken the government; were it otherwise, he and his colleagues could not remain in power.¹ This speech was well received. Marie made a similar oration, emphasizing the need for unity in command, and Lamartine supported his colleagues the next day. The executive commission was granted the right to sound the *rappel* and the amended draft was passed almost unanimously. It was neither a victory nor a defeat for the government.

To prevent further riots the executive commission introduced a stringent law against public meetings, which Marie guided through the legislature and in favor of which he obtained an overwhelming vote. It was rumored that Lamartine and Ledru did not approve this law,² but as a matter of fact the draft had been approved unanimously by the government.³ The executive commission also considered measures for regulating the press. Ledru later said: "On June 22 I presented to the executive commission a bill that rejected financial deposits (*cautionnement*) by newspapers and which established moral responsibility by signature; it was accepted by all the members . . . and had it not been for the events of June 24 it would have been presented to the legislature."⁴

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 28-32.

² Corkran 141.

³ Garnier-Pagès in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 284.

⁴ Speech of August 3, *Discours politiques* 2: 54.

CHAPTER XIV

THE JUNE DAYS

AFTER May 15 monarchists and ultra-revolutionists continued their public agitation. The scurrilous newspaper of the extremists, the *Père Duchêne*, planned a great demonstration for Sunday, June 11, in the form of a banquet under the walls of Vincennes prison where were incarcerated those arrested on May 15. Lamartine and Ledru desired to remove the prisoners; Arago, Marie, and Garnier-Pagès considered a concentration of troops in the vicinity the wisest measure. All precautions were needless, for the banquet was abandoned.¹

Trouble was feared from the National Workshops. When the establishment of a ministry of labor had been refused to Louis Blanc, Marie, minister of public works, had opened up workshops where manual labor was given to all workmen out of a position. The scheme was fundamentally opposed to Louis Blanc's principles, and neither he nor Ledru-Rollin had any direct connection with the Workshops. Their head, Emile Thomas, was an avowed partisan of the moderates.² Under the provisional government Marie had tried to use the Workshops as a force against the radicals. But so large had they grown that it was impossible to find

¹ *Esprit national*, June 8; *Organisation du Travail*, June 9, 1848.

² Thomas I: 352-3. Higoumet, the organizer of the first attempt at National Workshops, was "imposed on us by Ledru-Rollin," says Thomas 40; this was the only mention of Ledru's connection made by Thomas in his volume on the Workshops.

any work for most of those enrolled and the financial burden upon the state was becoming oppressive. Trélat, who succeeded Marie as minister, planned out carefully the dissolution of the huge establishment at Paris, and he urged that the government undertake various enterprises in the departments as a way of giving employment to a good many laborers. Trélat was a philanthropic physician but not an able statesman, and his measures for closing the Workshops were not of the wisest; but they were vastly better than those of the wily legitimist, Falloux, chairman of the legislative committee on labor. Falloux during June urged on the premature closing of the Workshops and prevented any adequate measures of relief. Ledru believed that Falloux wilfully fomented disorder in the working classes in order to overthrow the republic.¹ Falloux was quite capable of this, but it is more likely that the conservatives were simply anxious above all to close the Workshops, which they feared as centres of disorder, and that they were willing to face any consequences that might result from such action. Certainly the rumors of the premature dissolution were the occasion for the bloody June Days, and the act dissolving them was passed at Falloux's suggestion during the insurrection. The following was Ledru's opinion on Trélat's schemes: "The National Workshops were the most serious preoccupation of the government. About May 20 the decision was taken to close them. In that respect all the measures which human prudence demanded were taken, but all the orders were not strictly executed."² In 1849 he said: "The National Workshops existed. The executive commission planned to dissolve them; but while avoiding the danger of their existence, it did not wish to expose men

¹ *Voix du Proscrit* 2: 43-4.

² Quentin-Bauchart Report 1: 312.

to starvation. Accordingly the workingmen were to be sent to various parts of the country where they might find bread and work."¹

The monarchists also were scheming for the return of their various candidates to the throne. Most active were the Bonapartists. According to Garnier-Pagès, they even approached Ledru-Rollin. A follower of Louis Napoleon, who was grateful to Ledru for some past actions, urged him to join the party which would soon grasp power. Ledru replied: "If I did not know you and if I were not restrained by the confidential character of your proceeding, I should have you arrested immediately as a plotter."²

The question of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was one that vexed the executive commission sorely. Twice under Louis Philippe this pretender had attempted to seize the crown. To the republic he had sent an offer of service, but his supporters were constantly weaving plots in his behalf. His complicity in them cannot be proved, but it is not unlikely that he favored them even if he did not actually take part in their preparation. He had been elected to the Constituent Assembly in four departments, but there was a law upon the statute books exiling all members of the Bonaparte family from France. The government had not enforced this law in the case of three of his cousins, but they were not pretenders. What was to be the official attitude toward the head of the family? The government was unanimous against allowing him to return to France, and it had sent orders for his arrest if he should attempt to cross the frontier.³ His colleagues approved when Ledru-Rollin said at a council meeting:

¹ Delescluze trial in *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, March 13, 1849.

² Garnier-Pagès 11:95.

³ Garnier-Pagès 10:191-3. Castellane 4:179 writes: "In June, 1848, a

We must be energetic or all will be lost. All information I have received shows the hand of Louis Napoleon at the bottom of these demagogic conspiracies. Do not have such contempt for the little man with the half-closed eyes. . . . An incurable Catiline, he makes a small group of conservatives believe that he is the friend of order. . . . Question even his cousins . . . and if they are in a frank mood, they will tell you that in matters of rascality he can always find a new twist. I ask to be allowed to arrest him.¹

The Bonapartist question came before the Assembly first on June 12 in connection with an appropriation for 100,000 francs. Lamartine took the floor to debate the financial question, but soon a few scattered shots were heard outside the building. Lamartine went out to inquire what had happened; when he returned, he launched forth upon a dramatic account of a Bonapartist uprising in which Clement Thomas, the commander of the National Guard, had been fired upon. He demanded a decree specifically exiling the Napoleonic pretender. This was the last of Lamartine's great oratorical triumphs. The house was swept by enthusiasm. In vain various orators rose to speak in opposition to Lamartine. The appropriation was passed by 569 votes to 112. Lamartine had gained a glorious vote of confidence for the executive commission.²

When the question of the admission of the pretender to the Constituent Assembly came up for discussion the next day, the intoxication of Lamartine's eloquence had vanished.

certain prefect received a telegram: *Arrest, with all the means in your power, Citizen Louis Napoleon, if he appears in your department,* signed Ledru-Rollin; a year later the same prefect received an identical order to arrest Ledru-Rollin, signed Dufaure, minister of Louis Napoleon."

¹ Audebrand 213-6.

² Ledru did not take the floor, but he repeatedly interrupted with effective remarks the conservative orators.

Jules Favre spoke first; he claimed that the government through its usual mouthpiece, Crémieux, had agreed to the election of Prince Louis. When Ledru denied this, a violent altercation ensued in which Favre made a scathing attack on the government, and particularly on Ledru and Crémieux. Favre then ridiculed the fear of this Bonaparte and ended by advocating his admission to the Assembly. Buchez was against admission. "It is not a mere citizen who presents himself, but Prince Louis Napoleon," he said. Various orators spoke pro and con on the subject. One ridiculed Lamartine's account of the previous day, for the *uprising* turned out to be a very small riot. A letter from the absent prince was read, supposed to reveal the disinterestedness of that individual who did not wish to trouble the republic by forcing himself on it as a deputy.

At last Ledru obtained the floor. He spoke in the name of the government which must enforce an existing law. The very fact that the Assembly was discussing its abrogation or suspension proved its existence. Popular sovereignty was not in question, for the vote of three departments was not the vote of France. So had declared the authors of the constitution of 1793. To admit Louis Napoleon was to permit a single department to elect Henry V or the Count of Paris;¹ this would be absurd. The law was not abrogated by the admittance of other members of the Bonaparte family; that was an act of magnanimity to individuals who were not conspirators. Even if Louis Napoleon had not conspired himself, much had been done in his name. Ledru then gave various details as to Bonapartist intrigues. In the presence of these facts, he continued, the executive commission desired the enforcement of the law. The admittance of the pretender would not cause the death of the re-

¹ The legitimist and Orleanist pretenders.

public, but it might lead to bloodshed. The government joined in wishing to abolish the law against the Bonapartes, but it asked that meanwhile it be maintained. It was claimed, the orator said, that Louis Napoleon was a stranger to these intrigues; everyone said so but he. Let him declare so plainly. The law should not be repealed for fear of an uprising. The agitators should be fought to the cry of *Hurrah for the Republic!*¹

At the end of Ledru's speech the session was suspended for several minutes while the partisans of the orator gave vent to their enthusiasm. The newspapers the next day were unanimous in declaring the speech a fine one. The conservative *Débats* declared: "Our readers will easily understand how little we like agreeing with M. Ledru-Rollin, but in this instance we cannot do otherwise. M. Ledru-Rollin is the only person who showed true political sense in the discussion, and we willingly admit that at times he even rose to true eloquence."² The speech certainly stands among the best that Ledru ever delivered. It has his customary warmth, but it possesses in addition a quality in which he was usually deficient, a clear well-developed argument. The speech swept a hostile audience off its feet, and yet it did

¹ *Discours politiques*, 2: 33-9.

² *Débats*, June 14. The *Courier* and the *Constitutionnel*, while disagreeing with Ledru's conclusions, call the speech respectively "the event of the session" and the "only speech worth discussing." Corkran 143-9, who was present in the gallery, writes: "Notwithstanding that I was under a prejudice against this gentleman . . . his oratorical powers took me by surprise. . . . There could be no doubt of the sincerity of his love for the republic. . . . A jovial, restless fellow, full of animal spirits, who while aspiring to lead was likely to become an instrument in the hands of astute schemers. . . . Ledru-Rollin desires to pass for the Danton of February, and he has so far succeeded that he is to Danton what 1848 is to 1793. . . . He wants the lion-like roar of his awful prototype, and affecting it . . . obtains the croaking of a gigantic frog. . . . Not being a moderate republican and not being a socialist, he is nothing."

not convince, for after a few more speeches and the reading of a letter in which Louis Napoleon declared his loyalty to the republic, the Assembly voted in favor of the admittance of the Bonapartist pretender to his seat. The majority was composed of various elements. Many wished to show their hostility to the executive commission. Some were influenced by Louis Napoleon's letters. A few members of the extreme left, such as Louis Blanc, were opposed to all laws of banishment. Thus the future emperor obtained his entry into the Assembly, but three days later that wily politician sent in his resignation. Ledru-Rollin and Napoleon had come into conflict for the first time on June 13, 1848. Exactly one year later to the day they came into conflict again, and that was practically the end of Ledru-Rollin's legislative career.

After the vote adverse to the executive commission was announced, the rumor spread that Ledru, even that the whole government had resigned.¹ For once rumor had a certain foundation. At the evening meeting of the executive commission on June 13 Ledru and Lamartine expressed their desire to resign. Arago and Marie were willing to do the same, but Garnier-Pagès opposed a withdrawal in a time of danger. Ledru explained that his resignation would not be the abandonment of the republic, but on the contrary, a most efficacious way of devoting himself to it; in opposition he could join his friends of the Mountain in a war on all reactionaries and pretenders.²

On June 14 the executive commission held a meeting with the ministers and other prominent officials like Mayor Marrast. A deputation appeared from the *Palais National*, the headquarters of the club of the moderates. Glais-

¹ *Constitutionnel*, *Patrie*, *Peuple Constituant*, June 14; *Lampion*, June 15.

² Garnier-Pagès 10:294-5.

Bizoin, its spokesman, contended that the vote of the previous day was not a vote of lack of confidence, that he and his friends feared that it might cause the resignation of the government, and that they had come to prevent that. After a general discussion in which Cavaignac, minister of war, showed himself the most opposed to the idea of resigning, the government and its ministers decided by a vote of thirteen to five to remain.¹

Beside the extreme revolutionists and the conservatives, many moderates were dissatisfied with the executive commission, and there were many rumors of plans to overthrow it.² One real attempt to divide the government there was. On the morning of June 20 before the arrival of their two colleagues, Garnier-Pagès, Marie, and Arago discussed a proposal made to the latter by some deputies. They were to form a more homogeneous government by separating from themselves their two absent associates. The three members of the government were in perfect accord as to giving an absolute refusal. Lamartine, they knew, desired to resign, and Ledru-Rollin would be delighted to become once more the leader of the extreme left; but they felt that it would rather weaken than strengthen the prestige of the government if they agreed. They did not mention the incident to Lamartine and Ledru in order not to cause them useless vexation and 'just indignation.'³

¹ Garnier-Pagès 10: 295-301; Barthélemy-St. Hilaire on November 25, 1848, in *Moniteur for 1848*, p. 3351. The five in favor of resigning were Lamartine, Ledru, Jean Reynaud, and probably Flocon and Bastide.

² The Landrin-Portalès attempt to institute proceedings against Louis Blanc and Caussidière was supposed to be an attempt by Marrast to reach Ledru through Blanc. — Stern 3: 70; *Organisation du Travail*, June 12. It is also claimed that Marrast tried to make Arago dictator. — Stern 3: 69. Ledru believed in 1850 that Marrast and Cavaignac had tried to form a triumvirate with Sénard or Berger to replace the executive commission. — *Voix du Proscrit* 2: 45-6.

³ Garnier-Pagès 11: 54-6.

Meanwhile an insurrection was threatened and the executive commission was aware of this. The police brought in continual reports of the probability of an uprising. The five chiefs of the government had done their utmost to collect sufficient troops at Paris. It is difficult to ascertain the size of the army in and about Paris or to determine whether more troops could have been stationed there without too much weakening the frontier. But one fact stands out clearly. Whereas Cavaignac, minister of war, may have done the best he could or may have shown incapacity, no blame can fall on the members of the executive commission. They were constantly urging that more troops be brought to Paris. If this was not done, it was due either to the necessity of maintaining the forces elsewhere or to the incapacity of the minister of war, the agent of the government in such matters.

When he discussed this matter later, Ledru-Rollin went too far in his accusations. He placed the "insatiable ambition of General Cavaignac" beside the intrigues of the monarchists and the sufferings of the proletariat as one of the chief causes of the insurrection of June. On this charge Ledru is unconvincing. The only evidence that he gave was certain doubtful plots to overthrow the executive commission in favor of the general and the small number of troops in Paris. As to the intrigues of the monarchists, Ledru proved that partisans of the three pretenders took part in the uprising. But he exaggerates the part of these conservatives and underestimates the share of the ultra-revolutionaries. "The unfortunate people," he claims, "were unconsciously the puppet of the old parties and the insane ambition of a soldier."¹

¹ *Voix du Proscrit* 2:43-8. See also *ibid.*, 1:191-2; speeches on August 3, 1848 and on June 3, 1874, *Discours politiques* 2:47-8, 481-2; and at the Delescluze trial, *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, March

The terrible June Days were rightly called the *insurrection of hunger*. The ultra-revolutionary leaders had been involved in the uprising of May 15 and were in prison or in hiding. Men like Louis Blanc and Caussidière deplored the insurrection. Ledru-Rollin and Flocon coöperated actively in suppressing it; they favored Trélat's plans for closing the Workshops. It was a spontaneous movement caused by the utter despair of the working classes and occasioned by the rumors of the closing of the National Workshops. The proletariat saw no chance of getting money by work and in its desperation turned to the barricades as the only hope. Bonapartist, legitimist, and Orleanist agitators undoubtedly egged on the people; they may have encouraged the movement, but they did not cause it. The uprising was without leaders, without cohesion, without definite object. It was an insurrection of hunger.

The dissolution of the National Workshops was begun by the government on June 21 when some of the laborers were ordered to the provinces where work would be given them. A committee headed by Pujol, a Bonapartist, came to the executive commission to protest against this action. It was received by Marie who showed great firmness and refused to yield to the insolent demands of Pujol. The committee left, breathing vengeance and threatening a revolt. Marie ordered the arrest of the delegates, but the order was not carried out.

On June 22 the executive commission met at eight o'clock in the morning. Orders had already been given to guard the capital, but due to the fault either of General Cavaignac or of one of his aides they were not carried out. Récurt, minister of the interior, desired to stop the insurrection im-

13, 1849. Garnier-Pagès, in a pamphlet of February 23, 1874, also gives details that the June days were a Bonapartist conspiracy. — LR Papers 3:264.

mediately, but the two military men present, Cavaignac, the minister of war, and Clement Thomas the commander of the National Guard, opposed this measure. The executive commission itself was unanimous in desiring to occupy the streets to prevent bloodshed. Ledru remarked that barricades were contagious and that the first had to be prevented if they were not to be multiplied indefinitely. General Cavaignac, on the other hand, asserted that it was a great military mistake to divide the forces. "Let the barricades be built and then retake them with superior forces," he said. Vainly the five chief executives evoked the experience of the past. The council separated without coming to a decision. The two rival methods, that of prevention and that of concentration had clashed for the first time.¹

During the morning the left and the extreme left of the Assembly met together. It was decided that they could not eliminate one or two of the members of the executive commission for all were selected from the left; they must either maintain the commission intact or replace it by an entirely new government, for to eliminate any member would be to blame him and thereby weaken the left. The general feeling at the meeting was that the situation demanded a dictatorship. The names of Dupont de l'Eure, Arago, Lamartine and even Ledru-Rollin were successively proposed as dictator and rejected. Finally the name of Cavaignac was accepted.² A committee was appointed composed of Ducoux, Landrin, and Latrade; the two latter were friends of Ledru-Rollin but had broken with the government over

¹ Barthélemy-St. Hilaire in speech of November 25, 1848 (quoted as B.-St. H.), *Moniteur* 3352. For rival statements as to troops, see Quentin-Bauchart Report I: 312 for Ledru; speech of November 25, 1848, *Moniteur* 3355, for Cavaignac. Later in the morning Lamartine and Ledru wandered through Paris to judge for themselves the true character of the public meetings.—Garnier-Pagès II: 109.

² Stern 2: 201-2.

the prosecution of Louis Blanc and Caussidière. The three delegates went to see General Cavaignac, but the General refused to discuss a dictatorship officially until the executive commission had been informed. During an ensuing informal conversation the General declared that he would accept power if given the authority to appoint his own ministers. The committee then went to see the executive commission, but when they reached the Luxembourg about eleven o'clock only Marie and Arago were present. On hearing their proposition the testy Arago flared into a passion, declaring that the resignation of Ledru would cause trouble among the working people. Marie, who had kept his temper under control, put off the delegates till the next day. About this time the conservatives in the Rue de Poitiers had also come to the decision to work for the dictatorship of Cavaignac.¹

Early on the morning of June 23 the executive commission met. They ordered that the *rappel* be sounded in three arrondissements and also ordered various arrests. Cavaignac now entered and after a heated explanation as to why he had not carried out orders by sending troops to the Pantheon, the two rival plans were again debated. The General advocated that the army be placed under his control, massed, then launched at the centres of revolt. The commission thought it best to attack each barricade as soon as it was built or even commenced. For a long time the commission maintained its opinion and only yielded with regret, leaving to General Cavaignac the determination and execution of military operations.² The executive commis-

¹ Garnier-Pagès II : 107-117.

² Ledru in Quentin-Bauchart Report I : 312. In the *Voix du Proscrit* 2:47 Ledru says: "It was urgent to subdue the insurrection, in which as yet could be found only counter-revolutionary and provocative elements, in order to prevent the true workingmen from being deceived as to the banner and joining the revolt."

sion had seen on May 15 the need for unity of command and therefore gave Cavaignac complete control. Although disagreeing with him as to tactics, its members felt that the military commander must be allowed his own plan of campaign. They were neither soldiers nor military experts and so they yielded to the minister of war. They thought wisely as statesmen who took into consideration mob psychology while Cavaignac acted as a general who saw only an armed force to be defeated.¹

After the early meeting Cavaignac, Lamartine, Ledru, and Marie set out for the Assembly. Arago went to the twelfth arrondissement where with the help of the National Guard he prevented any insurrection. Ledru claims that he had distributed food in this section, thus "contenting the artisans of the twelfth arrondissement who had come to me under the leadership of their mayor and had declared that they did not wish to take part in the revolt but that they were hungry."² Garnier-Pagès, left alone at the Luxembourg, thought that insufficient troops had been sent to protect the city hall, the Palais Bourbon, and the Luxembourg; he therefore gave orders that fresh regiments be sent to these places, but Cavaignac on his return countermanded these orders.

Later in the morning the executive commission held another meeting. Numerous demands for troops had arrived, for serious fighting had begun at ten o'clock. Cavaignac adhered strictly to his plan and rejected all such requests. Ledru-Rollin insisted warmly on furnishing the troops demanded by the commandant at the Porte St. Denis. The general was immovable in his decision; in an irritated

¹ For discussion of this meeting, see minutes of the executive commission in Quentin-Bauchart Report 3: 247; B.-St. H., *Moniteur* 3353; Garnier-Pagès II: 125-134.

² *Voix du Proscrit* 2: 47.

manner he declared that he did not care to expose the regular army, that it was for the National Guard to prevent the erection of barricades.¹

About three in the afternoon Latrade, one of the delegates appointed by the lefts on June 22, visited the executive commission to suggest its resignation. Lamartine showed irritation but Ledru-Rollin was most affable. "My friend," he said, "You come in the name of mutual friends. It is in their name that you advised me to accept membership in the executive commission, and I then told you that you were making a mistake. It is in their name today that you ask my resignation. I wish to be with my friends even when they are wrong. There is my resignation, but my opinion is that if my friends made a mistake in making me enter the executive commission, they commit another in destroying that commission." Latrade refused the signed resignation, replying that if a collective resignation was a mistake, an isolated withdrawal would be an even greater one, and that it was best to wait and see what was decided. The conversation became general and only stopped when Garnier-Pagès cried: "We discuss the form of government when we should be acting against the insurrection that menaces us; our place is facing the uprising." Latrade was obliged to leave without having achieved his object.²

The commission now divided its work among the various members. Garnier-Pagès went to the Assembly and then visited the various mayoralties. Lamartine went to the barricades. Arago remained at the Luxembourg and kept an eye on the left bank. Only Ledru and Marie stayed at the combined military and civil headquarters, now situated in the Palais Bourbon. Ledru later told the story of the next few hours:

¹ B.-St. H., *Moniteur* 3353; Garnier-Pagès II: 134-152.

² Garnier-Pagès II: 196.

About three-thirty General Cavaignac left headquarters to see how affairs were proceeding; he said that he would be absent not more than an hour. He did not return till nine in the evening, and I can never describe the tortures I underwent during his absence. All the mayors of Paris sent to me for reinforcements, all complained of not having troops, the National Guard cried treason, and there was I alone at headquarters in a mortal anxiety beyond description. In the absence of my colleagues I took it on myself to write to the prefects and to demand all their forces that were near Paris. I hastened to send the order to Admiral Casy that he should immediately send troops from Brest and Cherbourg. On the return of General Cavaignac I admit that I showed great wrath.¹

Again on November 25, 1848 Ledru told the Assembly:

At half past three the general departed and went to the barricades; he declared that he would return in half an hour. I know how his time was employed, but I shall not discuss that as that is not the question. Note carefully what passed. The executive commission was meeting in a room of the Palais Bourbon. All Paris, all the faubourgs without exception, came to the two members present, M. Marie and me, came to us for orders. For hours, from three-thirty to nine o'clock, the general, then fighting at the barricades . . . was supreme commander, and it was his duty to be at the seat of authority, for the barricades could be bravely defended by others, and there were sufficient brave and illustrious generals, but the

¹ Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:312; cf. B.-St.H., *Moniteur* 3353. It was at five o'clock that Ledru and Marie sent the following order to the prefect of the Lower Seine (Rouen): "Citizen prefect, The factions have thrown Paris into an extreme agitation. The aid of the National Guard of your department would be useful. Send it immediately to Paris as well as whatever battalions of the army are at your disposal. The minister of war should give the necessary orders to-night. If by chance they do not arrive, let these take their place."—Lille Library, No. 985, p. 683. See appendix.

seat of authority could not be filled by another. Now as the demands for troops came in, what could we reply? We were obliged to answer: *The General is absent.* To this the answer came: *You are betraying us!* The National Guard shouted: *Treason; down with the Executive Commission!*

Then turning toward Cavaignac Ledru continued:

You arrived at half past eight and you left again at nine. *Here is, I said to you, a long list of demands. I have not been able to reply to them. I do not know where a single one of your battalions is. I cannot conflict with your orders.* You left at nine o'clock, and you returned at two in the morning. From nine to two I was again in the same situation. I make no accusations, but I say this: You acted in such a way that the National Guard could accuse me, for as people came in and could not find you, I could not answer. It was said: *Ledru-Rollin is conspiring; Ledru-Rollin is betraying us!*¹

About two in the morning of June 23-24 Cavaignac returned for the second time to headquarters. Ledru later said:

Having asked General Cavaignac how many troops there were in Paris, I was told in reply that he did not know. I believed in beginning the attack again at the break of day and in sending two battalions to General Damesne. This was not the opinion of the general . . . Cavaignac said: *The honor of the army demands that I persist in my system. If even one of my companions were disarmed, I should cut my throat; let the National Guard attack the barricades. If it*

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 135-6. Cf. at Delescluze trial, *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, March 13, 1849. At ten P. M. Ledru and his colleagues sent off a second order to Rouen: "The commission of the executive power asks the prefect of the Lower Seine to send to Paris immediately all the troops of the National Guard and of the line at his disposal. . . . Requisition the railroads to transport the troops."—Lille Library, No. 985, p. 683. See appendix.

*is defeated, I would rather retire to the plain of St. Denis and there offer battle to the uprising.*¹

Cavaignac wished to leave again and go to bed at the ministry of war. Ledru-Rollin opposed this; he declared that the members of the executive commission were worn out and yet remained at their post, that a moment of negligence might mean a calamity, and that the General ought not to leave. Cavaignac deigned no reply, but instead of leaving he went into an adjoining room and threw himself upon a couch. The soldier slept while the civilian, Ledru-Rollin, kept watch. About three o'clock firing began again, and at half-past four headquarters were aroused by a staff officer. The officer was told that Cavaignac was sleeping but he insisted on seeing him. The officer with difficulty was induced to let Ledru-Rollin take his place in awakening the commander-in-chief. Cavaignac merely repeated his orders to keep the regulars massed and inactive. Thus the night wore slowly on. At seven o'clock the executive commission held a short meeting and then Garnier-Pagès started for another tour of the mayoralities.²

The Assembly had passed an exciting day on the twenty-third. A permanent session had been decreed early in the sitting. The Assembly disregarded the suggestion of issuing a circular to appease those insurgents who were sincere and had no ulterior motives. It listened to reports as to the progress of the insurrection and the measures of the government; it heard the accounts of Lamartine, Cavaignac, and Garnier-Pagès. The session was suspended at midnight.

¹ Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:312-3. Cf. B.-St. H., *Moniteur* 3354; Etex 247-8. Ledru also accused Cavaignac of causing a delay in the arrival of cannon which he, Ledru, had ordered up from Vincennes.—See Ledru in Quentin-Bauchart Report 1:312-3 and Cavaignac on November 25, 1848, *Moniteur* 3356-3360, 3364.

² B.-St. H., *Moniteur* 3354-5.

By the morning of June 24, as the insurrection spread and no measures were taken to prevent the building of barricades, the majority of the Assembly began openly to express its desire for a concentration of power. Latrade and his colleagues had already tried unsuccessfully to induce Cavaignac to accept the dictatorship. The conservatives of the Rue de Poitiers had expressed the same desire. In this we can now see one of the ironies of history, although it did not become known until November. The executive commission which had desired to stop the building of the barricades and to attack the insurgents, was to be removed because its advice had not been accepted, and it was to be replaced by the minister of war, the very man on whose insistence the plan of prevention had been abandoned. Thus the Assembly entirely approving the policy of the executive commission, wished to overthrow the commission and put the dictatorship in the hands of that member of the cabinet whose policy is distrusted. It certainly was the height of irony to entrust the sole power to the chief advocate of the system of concentration.

Sénard, who had succeeded Buchez as president of the Assembly, came to discuss with Cavaignac a new executive. The general declared that he would make no efforts to become dictator, but if it were the wish of the Assembly, he would accept the responsibility of government; he left the matter entirely to the Assembly. Sénard saw also the executive commission. Garnier-Pagès declared that the good of the country was his first thought and that the government could not resign in a time of danger. His colleagues agreed with him and refused to abdicate. Sénard left, determined to do his best to overthrow the executive commission in spite of its opposition.¹

¹ B.-St. H., *Moniteur* 3355.

The meeting of the Assembly on June 24 opened at eight o'clock in the morning. After President Sénard had reported on the progress of the uprising and after a motion for a secret session had been rejected, the Assembly passed three motions. A permanent session was decreed by unanimous vote; a state of siege, by a decided majority; and by a small majority "all power is entrusted to General Cavaignac." Three members of the extreme left protested against the state of siege. Quentin-Bauchart and Jules Favre desired to remove the executive commission by a specific decree, but the Chamber wished to spare the five members this humiliation and merely implied their removal by appointing Cavaignac over their heads.

In the meantime a new discussion had opened at headquarters in the Palais Bourbon. It was too late to prevent the building of barricades, but they might be attacked immediately. This was the advice of Ledru and his colleagues. But the General was inflexible and the insistence irritated him. He refused.¹ Finally the news of the appointment of Cavaignac as dictator arrived. According to Garnier-Pagès, he and Lamartine were glad of the deliverance. Marie felt the injustice of their removal. Arago smiled. "M. Ledru-Rollin found it bizarre to be thus rejected by the national representatives whom he had defended so energetically against a Bonapartist insurrection which he could have transformed into an ultra-democratic revolution by taking its leadership and accepting the dictatorship."²

¹ *Ibid.*, 3355. Barthélemy-St. Hilaire places at this point the remark of Cavaignac about cutting his throat if one of his companies were disarmed and preferring to fight on the plains of St. Denis.

² Garnier-Pagès II: 276. Cf. Hugo I: 356-9, who says: "M. Ledru-Rollin, very red, was sitting on the edge of the table. M. Garnier-Pagès, very pale and lying in an armchair, made a great contrast to him. The antithesis was complete. Garnier-Pagès, spare and long-haired; Ledru-Rollin, stout and bald."

The commission, considering a formal resignation necessary, signed the following declaration: "The commission of the executive power would fail in duty and honour by retiring before a public peril; it retires only because of a vote of the Assembly. In returning the powers with which you invested it, it rejoins the ranks of the Assembly to devote itself with you to the common dangers and to the safety of the republic."¹

Lamartine remarked to Victor Hugo on this same day of June 24: "Do not judge me too quickly; I was not minister of war."² This remark sums up the situation. If the government is to be blamed for its actions during the June Days, it is the minister of war who was responsible. If there were insufficient troops, it was due to Cavaignac; as to the reinforcements they were all ordered up, not by the commander-in-chief, but by Ledru-Rollin and Marie. If the barricades were not attacked in time, it was owing to the opposition of Cavaignac; it was his policy of concentration that allowed the insurrection to spread. If there was not unity of command, again on the General falls the whole onus; the executive commission did all that it could; it gave him sole command; it was his absence from the headquarters that caused the lack of coördination. If devotion to duty is considered, recall the picture of Ledru-Rollin on duty while Cavaignac slept.

Cavaignac may be charged with incapacity. He showed no ability in quelling the revolt. His plan of concentration has generally been blamed. He seems to have lost his head and his temper repeatedly during the first day. He spared the army at the expense of the National Guard. On the other hand, of treachery to the government, the minister of war should be acquitted. He showed his loyalty to it

¹ *Moniteur* 1490.

² Hugo I: 359.

by rejecting the first offers of a dictatorship, and on the twenty-fourth he openly avowed his position before the commission. However, he never admitted until the following November that he was responsible for the failure to attack the barricades; it is quite possible that, if he had made a declaration to that effect to Sénard, he would never have received the dictatorship.

To sum up, the executive commission showed energy and ability in facing the insurrection and there was no good reason for removing it at that time. Cavaignac had few qualifications for the position thrust upon him; he was a competent soldier, an honest man, and the brother of a great republican, Godefroy Cavaignac.

For several days the legislature met, merely to listen to reports of the progress of the insurrection. Cavaignac had at last concentrated his troops, and after frightful carnage the uprising was finally suppressed. On June 26 the Assembly voted a commission of inquiry into the affairs of May 15 and June 23; the next day it decreed the deportation of the rebels; on the twenty-eighth it voted that Cavaignac, Sénard, and Mgr. Affre, Archbishop of Paris, who had been killed during the revolt, had deserved well of France. The old ministry of course fell with the executive commission and on June 18 the new ministry was announced. Sénard was minister of the interior and the other members of the cabinet were all moderates, chiefly men connected with the *National*. The assembly showed that it did not withdraw its favor from all the members of the fallen government, for it elected Marie as its president, and Arago became chairman of the seventh bureau. But is viewed with disfavour Ledru-Rollin, Lamartine, even Garnier-Pagès. Rumors were even current that the two former would be arrested.¹

¹ *Times*, June 29; Normanby 2:80-1; Bonde 212.

CHAPTER XV

THE COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION

LEDRU-ROLLIN was now able to assume the position of leader of the Mountain or the extreme left of the Assembly. During the month after his fall he spent little time in Paris but remained mostly at his home in the country at Fontenay-aux-Roses. On July 1 Ledru and Lamartine definitely severed their connection. Dargaud, the *alter ego* of the poet, relates:

On July 1 I arrived at Lamartine's house in time to learn of his break with Ledru-Rollin. It was noon. . . . On the stairway I met M. Ledru-Rollin, who was leaving as I entered. He had the proud air of a bully. Curious, I entered the office of M. de Lamartine, who hastened to tell me the conversation with the former minister of the interior. The conversation was summed up in the phrase of Lamartine: *We are not separating, for if we agreed on politics, our natures never agreed.*¹

Lamartine's last phrase explains the break. He and Ledru might temporarily work together, but the moderate and idealist, Lamartine, could not remain long in harness with the practical radical, Ledru, who would advocate extreme measures in intemperate language when no longer restrained by a ministerial position.

On June 26, as already stated, the Assembly had appointed a committee to investigate the events of May 15 and the

¹ Cognets: *Lamartine* 422-3.

June Days. This committee was composed almost solely of conservatives. It chose as its president the veteran Odilon Barrot, as reporter the young but equally unfair Quentin-Bauchart. The committee summoned a large number of witnesses. Ledru, for instance, was questioned July 5.¹ The committee soon showed that it was determined to do everything it could to discredit the provisional government. It extended its investigations far beyond the limits prescribed and inquired into everything that could be found against the members of the provisional government, and in particular against Ledru-Rollin and Louis Blanc, and also Caussidière. Rumors of its work spread abroad, and it was frequently stated that Louis Blanc, Caussidière, Ledru, and even Lamartine, would soon join Barbès and Blanqui at Vincennes.²

On August 3 the committee of investigation was ready to report. Quentin-Bauchart was its spokesman. He began with the causes of May 15 and June 23; he dwelt on the actions of certain members of the provisional government, on the circulars of Ledru-Rollin and the *Bulletins of the Republic*, read parts of the notorious sixteenth bulletin, mentioned the dissensions in the government, ascribed the Belgian fiasco to the minister of the interior, dwelt upon the unrest caused by the activities of the Luxembourg³ and of the National Workshops. He then considered the crises that had occurred under the provisional government. He

¹ For account of fictitious and absurd visit of Quentin-Bauchart to Ledru, see *Gaulois*, February 28, 1874.

² London *Morning Post*, July 1, 2, quoted in *Réforme*, July 7, 1848; Normanby 2: 80-1, 89; Bonde 212, 220, 243-4. The last-named passage states: "I know for certain that Sénard applied for leave to take proceedings against Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin, and that it has been refused for fear it would shake the republic."

³ A commission presided over by Louis Blanc and concerned with discussion of labor questions.

claimed that Caussidière had published insurrectionary placards and that Ledru-Rollin had aided the uprising of April 16. In connection with May 15, the actions of the Club des Clubs and of Barbès' club were emphasized, and Quentin-Bauchart stated that Louis Blanc and Caussidière were implicated in the insurrection. As to June 23, the government was blamed for lack of diligence, Caussidière for being named as a leader in a placard of June 17 and for being hailed as such by the insurgents on June 25, Louis Blanc for using his influence on the National Workshops to aid the insurrection, Proudhon for praising the defenders of the barricades. Quentin-Bauchart then spoke of the ramifications of these revolts in the departments. He ended with the phrase: March 17 was a popular manifestation, April 16 a conspiracy, May 15 an assault, June 23 civil war. Amid constant interruptions Quentin-Bauchart finished his report and it was clear to all that it was an attack upon the provisional government, but particularly an attack upon Ledru and Louis Blanc, together with Caussidière. Barrot asked that confirmatory documents be published, and the Assembly agreed.

Ledru-Rollin rose immediately to reply:

I hear some of my honorable friends say: Wait for the printed documents. . . . But what need of them have I to defend a principle? For it is not to defend myself that I am here; it is to make respected a sacred principle which can be violated against me today, against you later. What is the investigation anyway? I have been heard by it once, and not one of the facts with which my name is connected, not one was mentioned before me. . . . (*Turning towards Barrot*). You look at me and laugh; instead of laughing, consult your memory. I appeal to your recollections, to your honour. Was I questioned on one of the facts with which I am reproached? . . . And do you believe that to refute you

I have need of printed documents? . . . I appeal to all shades of opinion. I say that the Assembly should be astounded at the report it has heard. Yes, astounded; for such a precedent has not existed in the worst days of legislative assemblies Whenever there have been tribunals, whenever there have been general investigations by legislatures, there have been individuals accused, castigated, but nothing, nothing, like this. Once only . . . after the Ninth of Thermidor; there is no other example. And you know how that report which tried to stain the reputation of the great incorruptible of the Revolution, has been despised by history! Do you wish that reputation? Shall I speak of the revolutionary tribunal? Oh there to be sure the accused was brought before the court, he gave his name, he was condemned. But in what a situation were the judges! In the presence of foreigners and of factions agitating within! . . . Are we today in the same situation? And yet what have you done? You have accused some, you have attacked others, and you have not confronted them with a single witness, not one! You kept no minutes, and yet you say that that does not matter, for later the courts of justice will intervene. And what is your justice to me? A material penalty! The loss of my liberty! What do I care for that? Did not I sacrifice all such considerations on February 24? . . . In marching to the Hôtel de Ville I said to the friend the people had just given me, I said to Lamartine: *We are marching to Calvary*. . . . I have no fear of your material penalties. . . . What does affect me is the opinion of the country, is calumny. . . . For three months attempts have been made to kill me morally. But out of respect for this revolution in peril I have kept silent; I have remained mute. And I am still to wait four mortal days. You must allow me to explain without waiting for the printing of your report and your confirmatory documents. I shall do so briefly without hatred, without anger.

At this point Ledru disavowed responsibility for the sixteenth bulletin, denied that he had had any part in conspiracies

prior to April 16 or in any other plots, explained his actions on May 15, and asserted his energy during the June Days.

I made a record of the facts in case a ball should hit me; I did not wish odious accusations to weigh on my memory, but I had to be silent for a month, overwhelmed by calumnies. . . . Do not bear me ill-will for the heat of improvisation; one thought lies deep in my heart; it must come to my lips. You who formed the committee are not my friends, you do not think as I do. I respect your consciences. I alone in the old Chamber thought it possible to pass without transition from the monarchy to the republic; is not that my crime? Well, search your hearts; are you sure that you like me have forgotten all bitterness? Are you sure that you like me have forgotten all anger? Are you sure that in spite of yourselves some of that rancour has not gone into your report? You cannot be sure, for you are human beings; and I firmly believe that political commissions, no matter how instituted, are not courts of justice; they kill but they do not judge. You speak of concord, and Great God! your report is filled with dissension and hatred. . . . Your report is not a work of justice; it is a piece of partisanship. Parties! The republic should have but one: the grandeur of France and the happiness of the people. We dispute while it is starving. One policy alone can save us: union, concord; yes, save us from perils at home and coalitions abroad.¹

The orator's success was complete. General Cavaignac, who had shown his hostility to Ledru during the past month, left his place and publicly shook his hand. Changarnier tried to refute part of this speech by denying that Ledru had caused the *rappel* to be sounded on April 16, but Ledru appealed to Marrast, the newly-elected president of the Assembly. Marrast in one of his belated explanations completely upheld the former minister of the interior. Ledru

¹ *Discours politiques* 2:40-9. For extracts, see pp. 36, 145-6, 153, 185, 187, 191.

urged that the date for the real discussion on the report be fixed, but no decision was made that day. After short protests by Caussidière and Louis Blanc the session closed.

The committee of investigation had gone too far. The Assembly was willing to take a few steps backwards on the road to reaction, but it was not as yet willing to retreat as far as had the committee. It still possessed some of that feeling of general good-fellowship with which in the opening session it had hailed the republic. Ledru-Rollin had exactly gaged the sentiment of his audience; he did not once strike a false note. His plea for fairness, his plea for concord was received with sympathy. Cavaignac had responded to it when he held out his hand. Marrast had responded to it when he gave Ledru credit for his part on April 16. Ledru had the country with him. Only the *Débats*, the *Constitutionnel*, and the *Avenir National* had a good word to say for the committee, and their praise was not unalloyed.¹ The *Débats*, while blaming the provisional government and saying: "Ledru-Rollin in particular governed as a party man," added: "Ledru-Rollin defended himself with true warmth and with accents by which it was hard not to be affected." The *Constitutionnel* suspended its judgment, admitted that the charges against Ledru were purely political, and declared: "He spoke with conviction. The warmth of his speech, which sometimes sins by excess, was today in perfect harmony with the case." The republican papers were emphatic. The governmental *National* wrote: "France will learn with sorrow what happened today. . . . The report threatens to sow new germs of division and discord. . . . M. Ledru-Rollin's truly eloquent speech produced a profound impression."²

¹ Gradis I: 213.

² *Débats, Constitutionnel, National*, August 4.

So effective was Ledru's attack on the committee that even among the conservatives, only two deputies dared to congratulate Quentin-Bauchart on this, his maiden speech.¹ An unimportant conservative named Carton wrote on August 6:

My dear Ledru, I have just read the report of M. Bauchart and your oration. I have kept aloof from politics, but I cannot now resist the desire to congratulate you. I found in your fervid words that sincerity and that elevation of sentiment which has long attracted me to you, and they are enough to justify, if there were any need of justification, the purity of your intentions and of your conduct in the eyes of all sensible people. In my opinion the case the commission made against you is judged. I should not have allowed myself to trouble you about an emotion which, although deep, has no importance as an element of public opinion, had I not found among my friends, old conservatives like myself, the same opinions which I hold. This small testimonial of sympathy will, I hope, be of some pleasure to you amidst the bitterness of public life.²

"Whatever results flow from this investigation," remarked Marrast, "it need not be regretted since it gave us the speech of Ledru-Rollin."³ Daniel Stern wrote on August 14:

The acclamations drawn from an audience which, if not hostile, was at least unfriendly, constitute one of the most

¹ Quentin-Bauchart 1:80. Neither he nor Barrot 2:292-5 made a satisfactory reply to the accusations of partiality and unfairness. Barrot's inordinate vanity appears humorously when he implies that he gained a success on August 3 because Ledru in spite of his attacks was unable to make him reply. It should be noted, on the other hand, that Quentin-Bauchart severely blames Barrot for this very silence.

² LR Papers 1:244. See appendix.

³ Quentin-Bauchart 1:79.

astounding triumphs of revolutionary eloquence. That session left with the Assembly the impression that if Ledru-Rollin while in power did not show himself as prudent, as moderate as possible, if he sometimes swerved regrettably from the path of duty, he remains by his temperament, by his ability, a powerful defender of liberty, who exercises a decisive and salutary action upon the country at critical moments. The enemies of Ledru-Rollin gave him a chance for a good defense by their outrageous severity and have aided him against their wishes in reestablishing himself in public opinion.¹

Even Lord Normanby admitted: "The feeling of unfairness at the proceedings was very general. . . . The manner of Ledru-Rollin was for the first time very favorable to him. . . . His whole bearing was that of an honest man."²

The accusations of the committee of investigation were unfair, almost absurd, and Ledru-Rollin's eloquent rebuttal united an admirable refutation of the charges with pleas for harmony. He had thrown back the imputation of party feeling on his accusers. The report was not a bludgeon but a boomerang.

The efforts of the extreme left were now directed toward securing an early discussion of the report. Ledru demanded on August 5 that a day be set by the Assembly for that purpose. Barrot explained that the committee was doing its best to have the testimony printed, but he added: "I declare that the details of the report are merely a weak expression of the testimony." Again it was Ledru who replied. He once more pleaded for haste, and then scathingly rebuked Barrot for the unjustifiable remark which embittered the discussion. Quentin-Bauchart promised to do his best to expedite the printing. "You are interested

¹ Stern: *Lettres républicaines*, No. 9, pp. 5-6.

² Normanby 2: 134-6.

in delay, we in hastening the discussion," interjected Ledru. For this remark President Marrast mildly rebuked him. Caussidière supported the leader of the Mountain, but Barrot insisted that it was as yet impossible to fix a day for the debate, and the Assembly agreed with him. Again the honours of the day lay with the left. They had shown their desire that the truth be revealed whereas the right through Barrot's remark had even more clearly displayed unjust partisanship.¹

On August 9 Louis Blanc renewed the discussion. Mornay, a conservative member of the investigating committee, now gave the radicals a new ground for complaint; he resigned from the committee because not all the testimony collected was to be printed. Bauchart protested that only a few documents had been omitted as unessential. Louis Blanc seized the point and developed it. Bauchart, on whom Barrot let fall the brunt of the debate, again replied amid numerous interruptions from Ledru and his friends. Nothing was decided. On August 12 the matter was again brought up. The twenty-first was suggested for the discussion of the report. "Too late," declared Ledru, but the Assembly decided on that or the following day. Ledru extracted a promise from President Marrast that all the testimony should be printed.

Meanwhile the Assembly had taken up the question of the press and a law had been proposed for the bonding (*cautionnement*) of newspapers. This meant that every newspaper must deposit with the authorities a certain sum of money on which the government could draw for any fines inflicted. Louis Blanc opposed the law, declaring that the liberty of the press was the corollary of universal suffrage and that a deposit of money was no guarantee against

¹ *Moniteur for 1848*, pp. 1895-6. For distorted version, see Barrot 2: 295-6.

abuse of the right of free speech. Félix Pyat protested against any restrictions upon the press. Mathieu de la Drôme asserted that requiring a bond was equivalent to re-establishing the censorship. Other orators suggested as substitutes jury trials for infraction of the law or the infliction of fines without a preliminary deposit, or they denounced the plan as monarchical or illiberal. The defenders of the proposal were of two types. Some, like Léon Faucher, pointed out the troubles which had been caused by the newspapers during May and June and insisted on a permanent law controlling them. Others, like the chief government orator, the new minister of justice, Marie, defended the project as temporary and as necessary during the disturbed times.

Ledru's opinions were as follows:

First let me define clearly what we want: liberty of thought—all the world is in accord on that; respect for authority—without this, society is impossible. It is the solution of this problem which now presents itself . . . to harmonize liberty and authority. . . . If it is a penalty that you wish, 24,000 francs are not sufficient. . . . Rich people can easily find that amount. It must then be a preventative that you are seeking so that poor people who have thoughts cannot freely express them.

The argument that this law is merely transitory is that of all bad causes. A better guarantee would be the compulsory signing of all articles; the vehement journalist would be restrained by the moral responsibility of his printed signature. This is not a new idea. Do not follow the example of monarchical England but that of republican America which invented new methods of maintaining liberty.

In America, that great country which is worthy to set an example, there are no stamps, no bonding; there is absolute

liberty. . . . What I am saying to you is not a passing thought with me ; I supported this idea when in opposition ; I supported it on February 24 ; I supported it on June 22 when I was in the government. . . . Let me quote the advice of the great American statesmen, . . . of one of its presidents from whose mouth I had the honour of hearing it ; it is to decentralize the press instead of centralizing, strengthening it. . . . Let the newspapers multiply so that they may neutralize one another.

Under a monarchy the press takes the place of universal suffrage and acts as a counterbalance to the king. Under a republic it should be merely an austere censor, the messenger of new truths. These principles may not be those of the Assembly, but they are neither disorganizing nor anarchical.

I am delighted to defend you, gentlemen of the press, you who have so outrageously, so odiously attacked me. Ledru-Rollin, who speaks on your behalf, is, according to you, Ledru-Rollin the thief, the libertine. It is thus that you have repaid my devotion to the republic. . . . I could not reply to these attacks, but I comforted myself with the words of our master, Franklin: If these are vices for which they criticize me, their censure will cause me to reform ; if they are calumnies, perhaps some day history in its turn will expose them. . . . I believe that what is proposed to you with a good purpose is bad. . . . To enchain, to attack liberty under any pretext whatsoever is some day to kill the government you wish to found Refer the examination of this plan back to the committee, and you will reconcile the two principles of authority and liberty, by which societies should be founded and without which they cannot live.¹

This speech made a deep impression and was admittedly the great oration in opposition to the measure. It was restrained and eloquent. The general structure was logical,

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 50-7.

but at times the orator's emotion carried him to splendid outbursts that wandered slightly from the argument but enhanced the effect. Note the admiration of America and the dislike of *aristocratic* England.

Sénard, minister of the interior, made what the *National* called a "clever reply," paying tribute to Ledru-Rollin's project for signed articles, but insisting that it was better to await a revision of the code before adopting it. The next day Faucher attempted a complete refutation, ridiculing Ledru's proposed substitute and praising the government scheme as permanently desirable. An amendment embodying the idea of signed articles and the personal responsibility of the author was defeated 407 to 342 by a combination of the government and the right, and the bonding law was then passed.

The way in which Quentin-Bauchart's speech of August 3 had been received did not discourage the conservatives. Creton, the most inveterate personal opponent of Ledru in the legislature, desired to make an interpellation on the expenses of the provisional government, and President Marrast reluctantly appointed August 21 for the interpellation.¹ Creton wished to know how much money had been spent in abetting civil war, how much had been given to those *birds of prey*, the clubs' delegates sent into the provinces, how much had been expended on armed propaganda in Belgium and Savoy. The entire left and centre of the Assembly protested against Creton's attack. Naturally Ledru replied. He expostulated against this attempt to stir up ill-feeling. He explained how impossible were any irregularities, how every cent of expenditure had been approved by the entire provisional government; accordingly "its eleven members must have been my accomplices; in

¹ For letters of Marrast to Creton and of Creton to Ledru, see appendix.

that case the dispute descends from the odious to the absurd." Ledru gave details as to all the expenses that might be questioned. He declared himself willing to aid in any further investigations. This plain explanation might have cleared the air if Ledru had not been carried away, as he was so frequently, into accusing his enemies. "There has been a revolution," he said in closing; "before it you belonged to the party of the blind, and you have not yet opened your eyes. You are one of its incurable enemies."¹ Creton resumed his attack, dwelling upon the irruptions into Belgium and Savoy. Ledru-Rollin interrupted him with details, and President Marrast reminded the disputants that they were wandering from the subject before the house. Goudchaux and Duclere, former ministers of the treasury, repelled Creton's accusations. Finally the subject was dropped, but a few days later a committee was appointed to examine into the expenditures of the provisional government.

By the seventeenth of August the first volume of the Quentin-Bauchart report was in the hands of Marrast, who, amid the lively interest of the Assembly, pointed out privately certain passages to Ledru-Rollin.² A few days later the two other volumes appeared. Rarely has a committee of investigation shown such unfairness. It had been told to investigate the events of May 15 and of the June Days, and yet it had devoted but little of its attention to those events. It had obviously neglected evidence that would implicate monarchists and had made a painstaking research into everything that might discredit their opponents. Some justification might be found for investigating the earlier manifestations of March 17 and April 16, and the committee

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 58-64. For extracts, see pp. 62-3, 164.

² *Journal des Villes et Campagnes*, August 18, 1848.

cannot be seriously blamed for inquiring into the dissension within the provisional government or the so-called cabals at the ministry of the interior. But no fair-minded individual can find any reason for making elaborate researches into so unrelated a matter as the complicity of the government in the Belgian fiasco of Risquons-tout, and no words can sufficiently condemn the inexcusable broadening of the sphere of inquiry to include the personal honesty of Ledru-Rollin. The committee seemed to take great pleasure in inserting in their report every calumny they could unearth against Ledru-Rollin. Unfortunately for it, however, the evidence when sifted only proved his unimpeachable integrity. The committee had summoned all the prominent men of the republic but had arbitrarily questioned them on a few matters, never on the matters of which they were accused. Ledru, for instance, had been asked about the manifestation of May 15, Sobrier, the National Workshops, the June Days, the finances of the provisional government, but never a word as to the Risquons-tout affair, never a word as to the cabals at his ministry, never a word as to his relations with the Club des Clubs. Yet these were all matters into which the committee had inquired and concerning which Ledru's statements in defense of his actions should certainly have been considered of importance. Finally, all the calumnies not explicitly refuted (and the committee had been careful to avoid questioning those who might have refuted them) had been included as truths in the report. To sum up, the committee had devoted most of its energy to fields far out of its jurisdiction and had made investigations with the deliberate purpose of collecting everything it could find unfavorable to its opponents. Particularly had it aimed at Ledru-Rollin, Louis Blanc, and Caussidière. And yet Barrot had the audacity to maintain in his memoirs that the committee acted impartially and that Ledru was im-

plicated in plots in April and was morally responsible for the insurrections in May and June.¹ Nearly all the secondary writers as well as most of the contemporaries who have investigated the matter unite in condemning the unfairness of the report. The extremely conservative Victor Pierre is forced to call it "insufficient and exaggerated"; Gradis finds it extreme; only La Gorce defends its "great revelations."² In fact the Quentin-Bauchart report makes great revelations and is invaluable to historians of the epoch. When glanced at superficially it seems to contain many accusations against the prominent republicans; when examined carefully, it constitutes their best defense.

Unfortunately the members of the Assembly could not make a detailed analysis of this voluminous report and therefore believed many of its implications. Still, on most of them was made the same impression of unfairness and party hatred that had been made by the speech of Quentin-Bauchart. Ledru-Rollin apparently spent a couple of days studying the report and was fully prepared to give vent to his indignation when the great debate opened on August 25.³

Ledru's speech on this occasion was largely a repetition of his speech of August 3.⁴ He gave an account of the

¹ Barrot 2: 275-292. Cf. the slightly but only slightly fairer defense of Quentin-Bauchart in his memoirs 1: 67-70. For a just contemporary opinion, see Carnier Pagès 11: 440-454. For extracts from report, see chapters iii-xiv, *passim*.

² Pierre 1: 457-8; Gradis 2: 208-9; La Gorce 1: 416-426. Liberal writers are unanimous in strong disapproval. For instance, Hamel 298-9 calls it an "odious report".

³ He did not take part in two votes of the twenty-second nor in one of the twenty-third.

⁴ Before Ledru's speech there had been a discussion on various minor matters. For instance, François Arago had testified as to seditious meetings, cabals at the ministry of the interior, and he had to defend himself against the combined attacks of Ledru, Portalis, Landrin, and Favre. For details, see p. 149.

various political investigations under the first republic and the tribulations which had followed from them. He attacked the committee headed by Barrot and Quentin-Bauchart as surpassing all previous committees in unfairness, and he accused it of wishing to ruin the men of February. He defended his actions in connection with the circulars, the commissioners, the Belgian fiasco. He violently attacked the men who had founded the July Monarchy and who, when control of it had slipped from their hands, had attacked its foundations and had undermined it without having had any new ideas with which to replace it. He accused these liberal monarchists of a similar purpose of destroying the republic without having any substitute. He refuted the idea that the republic had caused the financial crisis and the misery of the people, for both had antedated it. He digressed to advocate the creation of banks that should lend money to farmers on mortgages. He denied that there was a red republic.

The red republic is a phantom. . . . It does not frighten me, and this is why: It emphasizes a fact to which my heart and my eyes have long been open, the profound sufferings of society. Now, that it is mistaken as to the remedy is my belief. But the means of proving that it is mistaken is to do something to aid the country. The remedy is not in a constitution, I assure you; that is not the remedy. Constitutions! We have had a sufficient number to make us the laughing stock of the world. It is social reforms that we need. Let me tell you that there is no red republic; there are only deluded men who, due to their sufferings, may be carried away; but there is no doubt that the great majority, the unanimity of the country, is attached to the true republic. . . . Shall I tell you what the true republic is? It is not the word *republic*, it is not merely universal suffrage; it is respect for the family, respect for property. . . . The family! We do not wish its

benefits to extend to the few, we wish them to extend to all. To make this possible there must be work for all. Is there any family for the child brought up in an orphan asylum? Is there any family for the girl who cannot earn her living and becomes a prostitute? . . . Is there any family for the aged workingman forced to die in a public hospital? We wish the family to be universal . . . we do not wish to restrain it, but to extend and multiply it. . . . Let me say that those people are fools who do not understand that property is the basis of liberty. We also wish it, for we ask that the workingman be given either credit or the instruments of labor. . . . May the spirit of liberty inspire you in this solemn moment. . . . Nothing comes from talking incessantly of union and concord; these sentiments must be implanted in your hearts. Remember that in beginning a series of proscriptions, all parties, one after another may be subjected to them, and the result will be not only the loss of liberty in France and Europe, but the loss of liberty throughout the world.¹

Ledru's speech made a good impression but, as the *Débats* and the *Constitutionnel* declared, it was far more studied than that of August 3 and had not the spontaneous sincerity nor the eloquent warmth of the earlier utterance. The most effective part was that devoted to making clear the basic principles of the radicals. The Assembly was with Ledru before he started, and his unaccustomed restraint kept it with him to the end whether he denounced his opponents, defended himself, or pleaded for harmony. The oration was well-timed, but it cannot be considered one of Ledru's greatest.²

¹ *Discours politiques* 2:65-81. For extracts, see pp. 101-2, 116, 148.

² Only Spuller 193 considers this speech better than the one of the third. For interesting accounts of the session, see Normanby 2:173-183; Caussidière 2:273-285. Quentin-Bauchart 1:85-104 believes Ledru's speech was fairly good but based on false accusations of the committee. Barrot 2:300-313 makes a violent but ineffectual refutation of the arguments.

The next speaker was Louis Blanc. He contrasted the clemency of the republicans after February with the action of the conservatives, and he defended his own words and actions since February 24. Other members of the extreme left spoke briefly. Finally Caussidière closed the debate, abandoning his customary picturesque improvisations for a labored, written defense. The hostile house, bored, was unmoved.

But now Corne, the attorney-general, demanded permission to prosecute Louis Blanc and Caussidière for their parts in the uprisings of May and June. The prosecution of Ledru-Rollin was not asked; it would have been doomed to failure as Ledru had won the approval of the Assembly. Corne stated that the request was due to researches independent of the committee of investigation, but this statement deceived no one as to the connection between the demand and the Quentin-Bauchart report. Several members of the Mountain defended the accused deputies. Ledru took part in the debate only to oppose a vote of urgency and to interrupt conservative orators. The efforts of the extreme left were in vain; first urgency was voted, then permission to prosecute Louis Blanc and Caussidière for their part in the uprising of May 15.¹

The reaction had strongly set in. The first political prosecutions had begun. The minor individuals implicated in the affairs of May and June had been tried by military courts and deported. But the leaders in these insurrections were to be given a civil trial. Some of these were in prison: Blanqui, Barbès, Raspail, Albert. Others succeeded in escaping, Louis Blanc and Caussidière among them. They settled in England and founded the colony of exiles,

¹ Permission to prosecute Caussidière for his part in the June Days was refused; that to prosecute Blanc in connection with the June Days was not asked.

which fulminated against the moderate and conservative governments of the republic, and later against the empire. Thus the legislature of the republic had proscribed the extremists. Whose turn would be next? The republic was henceforth to be a republic of the bourgeoisie as the previous regime had been a monarchy of the bourgeoisie. February had aroused the hope of a social transformation; August had ended this hope. Not only were no new reforms to be established, but many of those established by the provisional government were to be abolished. The republic had become conservative.

CHAPTER XVI

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1848

THE chief duty of the Constituent Assembly was to draw a constitution for the republic. On September 2 Liechtenberger, a member of the left, presented a bill which provided that the state of siege should be raised before the constitution was discussed. Ledru defended this proposal. He declared that the path which the Assembly was entering was a baneful one, that not physical but moral force would maintain a constitution. He cited the evil results that flowed from constitutions composed under extraordinary conditions, as notably in the cases of the Spanish constitutions and of the French charters of 1814 and 1830. He showed how the press, restrained from criticizing during the period of drawing up the constitution, would attack it relentlessly when completed. He ridiculed the idea that the state of siege was necessary; sufficient forces, he said, could be kept at the capital to insure quiet without maintaining the state of siege. He closed with the words: "Inaugurate your constitution with what is most venerable, most fertile, most indestrucible in the word, the immortal principle of liberty."¹ This speech is to be praised for its restraint; it is adequate to the occasion but is remarkable neither for eloquence nor for clear logic of argumentation. After a few other speeches, the motion to raise the state of siege was defeated 529 to 140, only the extreme left and a few scattered votes supporting it.

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 82-9.

Numerous attempts were now made to incorporate in the constitution an amendment guaranteeing the right to labor, thus to fulfill the promise of the provisional government. A final effort in this direction was made by Mathieu de la Drôme. Many orators spoke for or against his amendment. The most effective speech in opposition was that of Thiers. Of those who spoke for the amendment the most conspicuous were Crémieux, Lamartine, a Catholic socialist named Arnaud de l'Ariège, and Ledru-Rollin. On September 12 Ledru addressed the Assembly.

He said.

The orator who has just quitted the tribune [Tocqueville] has referred to the great principles of our glorious French Revolution. There I agree with him. He has declared that the right to labor is a socialist invention. Socialism is the worst thing in the entire world, he cried, for it is communism. . . . I no more desire communism than does he. . . . The right to labor was a favorite thought with the statesmen of the Convention.

Of Robespierre for instance. Two things are needed: for the strong the right to work, and for the infirm the right to assistance; of these the Assembly wishes to guarantee only the latter. Ledru drew a pitiful picture of the man who could not find work, and he showed how society would do nothing for such a person but send him to jail. The principle of the right to labor, he declared, would not lead to a socialist Utopia; it was a principle of the great revolution. What precisely did the word *socialist* signify? If any one who desired social changes was meant, Tocqueville and his friends were wrong to fulminate against such an individual, for he was merely a good democrat and no extremist. Ledru declared that the difference between his opponents and himself was that while both deplored the misery of the

people, they thought the misery of the people inevitable but he considered it remediable. His doctrine, he said, embodied the true spirit of Christianity, was idealistic not materialistic. Again Ledru drew an affecting picture of the poor. He then turned from an appeal to the emotions to an appeal to reason. He advocated aid to agriculture in order to draw the surplus population from the cities. He denied that state banks which would lend money freely on mortgages, a measure already applied in Algeria, would limit the liberty of industry. "I wish," he said, "to make of the state neither a producer nor a manufacturer, but an intelligent protector." The statement that these ideas were new was not true, for they had been advocated ever since the first revolution. The statement that work could not be found for jewelers and other skilled workingmen was not pertinent, as no one was asking that the principle be extended to such persons; that would be absurd. The state can aid such men only by temporary monetary existence. Let us remember the motto of the Lyons workingmen: *Live by working or die fighting!* Let us guard against further trouble like that at Lyons by incorporating the right to labor in the constitution. "This principle must be recognized; for if you close the door to hope, I fear the republic will greatly suffer."¹

This speech is interesting as defining Ledru's position in regard to socialism. He was opposed to communism and Utopianism but favored social reforms, especially farmers' loan banks. Note also his devotion to the first republic, his general moderation, his cheerful recognition of the good intentions of his opponents. This discourse is a combination of effective appeals to the emotions and strong but ill-arranged arguments from reason.

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 90-103.

Mathieu's amendment introducing into the constitution the right to labor was replaced by one of Glais-Bizoin, a version modified so as to satisfy certain members of the left, but even this version only attracted 187 votes as against 596.

It was soon afterwards proposed that the constitution be submitted to the people. Ledru in a few words declared that in all previous cases that question had been the last to be debated, and he advocated postponing it until the constitution was completed. The previous question was voted. When the subject was taken up again later in the year, the Assembly voted against submission to the people; the Mountain did not vote.

On the question whether the legislature should be bicameral or should consist of a single chamber, Ledru voted with the majority in favor of the latter plan. When the method of electing the president came up for discussion, three schemes were proposed. The committee on the constitution desired election by an absolute majority of the voters. Jules Grévy proposed an amendment that there be no president, merely a chairman of the council of ministers. The government's suggestion (amendments of Flocon and Leblanc) was the election of the president by the legislature. The Mountain was divided on the question.¹ Ledru and most of the extreme left supported the Grévy amendment; Flocon and a part of the Mountain supported the government amendment. Both were rejected, and only a few Montagnards followed Ledru in voting for direct election by the people as a satisfactory substitute. Finally on November 4 came the vote on the constitution as a whole; it was passed 639 to 30. The extreme left was divided. Ledru, Flocon, Mathieu, Lamennais and most of

¹ There was a debate in the Rue de Taitbout on September 28 on what position the Mountain should take, but no decision was made.—*Débats*, September 29, 1848.

the Mountain purposely abstained from voting. Pyat and a few Montagnards joined the socialists in voting in the negative. David d'Angers and many of the members of the extreme left voted for the constitution.

After the defeat of the government on the question of the method of electing the president, Sénard and two other ministers resigned, but Cavaignac remained in office with the majority of his cabinet. So uncertain was Cavaignac's policy that it was not known whether he would turn to the left or to the right centre for the new ministry. Finally he announced his choice of Dufaure and two other conservatives.¹ On October 16 Dufaure, the new minister of the interior, asked for an appropriation of 100,000 francs needed to preserve order. Landrin declared that this was a vote of confidence and that he refused his vote to a reactionary cabinet, one that contained a former minister of Louis Philippe. Cavaignac in a colorless speech said that he desired conciliation. Portalis also desired conciliation, but he declared that that was beside the question. Why were the ministers dismissed? he asked. Was it because they wished to raise the state of siege? Sénard explained that he too was of the party of conciliation; several times he had felt it his duty to resign and finally he had done so after the adverse vote on the mode of election of the president. Dupont de Bussac, another member of the left, wished to know why Cavaignac, Marie, and the other ministers had not resigned also, for they had been more deeply involved in the discussion than Sénard. Cavaignac asserted that he did not consider the adverse vote one of loss of

¹ "It is even asserted that he hesitated till the last minute between Ledru-Rollin and Dufaure, between Flocon and Vivien."—Gradis 2: 307. The *Réforme* of November 15 denied that Cavaignac had offered Ledru a portfolio, as the *Presse* claimed. A rumor of an offer of a cabinet position to Ledru had circulated earlier; see *Times*, September 23.

confidence, and that he was sorry to see Sénard and his two colleagues resign.

Ledru-Rollin was the next speaker. He believed that if Sénard resigned the entire cabinet should have resigned with him. The only explanation of the present situation, he said, is that a new attack on liberty is being planned, to which the retiring ministers would not agree. Governments rule by the support of the majority, but a majority united by principles; the government should not change its principles as the majority in the chamber changes. There are two types of conciliation, that with tried republicans and that with the opponents of democracy. "The pact you have made is no longer a pact with principles but a pact with men." "A pact with France," cried Freslon, who had entered the cabinet with Dufaure. "Do you believe," retorted Ledru, "that the opinions represented by M. Sénard are not the opinions of France?" Freslon replied: "M. Sénard supports us." President Marrast asked Freslon to be quiet. "I thought that the first virtue of a minister was patience," continued Ledru, and even the bench of ministers joined in the laughter. Ledru declared that the principles of the existing cabinet were no longer those of February, for republican officials throughout France were menaced with dismissal. The program of the reconstructed ministry "is so vague, so general that it can be fundamentally changed without fear of having its words called up against it." All through this speech interruptions had been frequent, and Ledru had digressed from his line of argument to make bitter short replies; now these interruptions became so numerous that they gave Ledru, who had probably finished all he wished to say, a chance to make an effective ending: "I am not accustomed to the systematic interruptions which only the most practiced orator can resist. In the name of liberty of speech and for the sake of my own dignity I pre-

fer to leave the tribune." The greatest disorder followed this remark. Some deputies almost came to blows.

As an oration this speech is very poor, for Ledru spent much of his time in replying to interruptions, but in almost every case he came out victorious from these skirmishes and dealt many telling blows against the new ministry. This speech marked the end of Ledru's moderate opposition to those in power. To a government including Sénard, who in spite of his comparative conservatism was a recognized old-line republican, Ledru could give his benevolent support; one including Dufaure, who had been a minister under Louis Philippe and who was still suspected of Orleanist leanings, he could oppose only with an attitude of relentless antagonism. The evolution of the cabinets might here be noted. The executive commission had had a cabinet of the lefts. The first cabinet of Cavaignac had been composed of members of the left centre and the centre; the second drew its support from the centre and the right centre. That of Barrot soon to become into power was to be a ministry of the rights.

Sénard replied to Ledru, insisting on the republicanism of the reconstructed Cavaignac cabinet. But Ducoux, another retiring minister, declared that he had left the government because it was no longer truly republican. Dufaure maintained that in the Constituent Assembly he had proved his worth and the sincerity of his republicanism. A vote was finally taken, and the appropriation asked by the ministry was granted by 570 votes to 155. The extreme left and the left (Lamartine, Favre, Landrin, etc.) composed the minority.²

¹ *Moniteur* 2686.

² At the same session Ledru and fifty-nine other members of the Mountain presented a petition in favor of the amnesty of all political prisoners.

During September an attempt had been made to draw all parties of the left into one united group. For this purpose Ledru and fifteen other members of the Mountain organized a banquet for September 22 at the Châlet in the Champs Elysées. About a hundred and fifty deputies attended. Along with the socialists and radicals of the Mountain there were present independent members of the extreme left such as Flocon and Etienne Arago, and members of the left proper such as Favre and Portalis.¹ About two hundred and fifty other guests were also present. Many speeches were made, but only that of Ledru attracted wide-spread attention.

Ledru-Rollin gave the toast :

To the anniversary of September 22, 1792! To that memorable day on which the Convention proclaimed the republic! . . . Yes, to the republic that our fathers decreed and which we are bound to perpetuate by giving it an indestructible basis in social institutions. [He continued] : Doubtless people will say : Your foolish hopes are nothing but socialism! When our fathers abolished all monastic vows, was that socialism or politics? When they established equality of taxation, was that socialism or politics? . . .

Ledru claimed that the assertion of the right to labor was republicanism not socialism. He protested against the fear of words such as socialism. The eyes of the timid but honest republicans will be opened, he said. The royalists need not be feared if a republic is really founded; if the supporters of the republic are not sincere, there is danger. Nothing has been done for the people since February 24. The taxes on salt and on meat, abolished by the provisional

¹ Of the 121 deputies mentioned by name among the guests, 59 belonged to the Mountain, 19 to the independent extreme left, 43 to the left.—*Démocratie pacifique*, October 9; *Constitutionnel*, October 11.

government, have been reestablished. The republic moves in the old monarchic grooves. Money is not lacking with which beneficent institutions may be founded. It was procured for Louis XIV and for the first republic; after thirty years of peace it should be more plentiful than then. No, money is merely hiding itself; it is not lacking. Even England was able to find money for the Napoleonic wars. The real trouble today is the lack of work, and that must be remedied. It is not money that is lacking but leadership. Our fathers of the first revolution lived by expedients, a necessity in all revolutions. The audacity of Cambon saved France. A remedy must be found for all these difficulties. We must act. But the primal need is that of union, union of all types of republicans. Hail to the men of February! ¹

The chief object of this banquet was to reconcile the socialists, the Mountain, and the deputies of the left. In this respect it was an utter failure. It only succeeded in alarming the conservatives. They interpellated the government because it gave permission to hold the banquet. In the newspapers they denounced Ledru's speech as incendiary, probably because he blamed the lack of progressive legislation. This criticism is unfair; in fact Ledru's purpose in the first part of his speech was to show that socialism was not necessarily incendiary. The second part of the speech, declaring that money could be found, is rather quixotic and laid itself open to ridicule; the periodicals naturally asked how the money was to be found. The *Débats* even printed an article in refutation by the prominent economist, Michel Chevalier.²

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 104-113.

² *Débats*, October 10. The *Constitutionnel*, September 26-27, declared that Ledru had never before been so violent and that his type caused class warfare. Cf. Faucher 1:405-9 and an amusing article in the *Times*, September 26.

In the legislature the conservatives continued their attacks on Ledru. On September 9 a report approving the expenditures of the provisional government had been presented to the Assembly. Nevertheless on October 24 Creton, the inveterate opponent of Ledru-Rollin, again brought up this question. Garnier-Pagès declared that the financial disturbance of February was due not to the ministry of the treasury but to the ministry of the interior. The government of Cavaignac opposed further investigation. Ledru declared that although one committee had already investigated the accounts, he would welcome one, two, three more committees to prove his absolute integrity.¹ An investigation was ordered.²

Trouble was still feared from Louis Napoleon. On October 26 Antony Thouret, member of the left, proposed to banish him. The Prince had at last taken his seat in the legislature after a second election, and he rose to speak in his own defense. "The oratorical failure was complete," says Emile Ollivier, the last prime minister appointed by Napoleon III, "It was believed that nothing need be feared from a man who spoke so poorly. I heard Ledru-Rollin remark as he left the room: *What an idiot! He is ruined.* Anthony Thouret withdrew his resolution in contemptuous terms."³

In one province at least, attempts were made to revive the credit of Ledru-Rollin. He had been defeated in the election to the Constituent Assembly in his old constituency of Le Mans. Trouvé-Chauvel had exerted his powerful influence against him, and the conservatives had spread lies and calumnies, picturing him as desiring wholesale pillage

¹ *Moniteur* 2969.

² This resulted in the Ducos report.

³ Ollivier 2: 101.

and a new reign of terror. Ledru's friends in the department of the Sarthe determined to avenge his defeat by having him elected to the departmental council. A doctor who had expected to be counsellor for La Fresnaye gladly retired in favor of the leader of the Mountain. The two prime movers in the enterprise requested Ledru's consent and they received the answer: "My confidence in you is such that I cannot refuse you." The reaction had been delighted because no republican candidate had come forward at La Fresnaye, but great was their consternation when one week before the election the name of the popular radical was proposed. Legitimists, Bonapartists, Orleanists, and the officials of the prefecture took part in the campaign against Ledru-Rollin. Disgraceful calumnies were spread; nothing was neglected to insure the success of the Orleanist and clerical candidates. A sub-prefect even threatened to arrest one of the radical campaign managers. The vote took place on October 29 and Ledru received 610 votes whereas his opponents had only 542 and 163. Ledru immediately wrote his managers a letter of thanks:

It as a particularly sweet consolation to me after all the calumnies from which I have suffered to find a new bond connecting me with that department whose ideas and principles I represented for eight years. . . . Give my thanks to all those fine rural electors. . . . My name pronounced with sympathy by all these simple and good men is a precious recompense for my small services to the republic of February.

Ledru was never able to take his place at the meetings of the general council of the Sarthe.¹

¹ Guyon 2: 119-126; reprinted in *Révolution de 1848*, 2: 257-265.

CHAPTER XVII

A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE

THE Assembly had decided that the election of the president of the republic should take place on December 10, and all parties girded themselves for the struggle. The conservatives did not dare to put forward a candidate of their own. Changarnier insisted on running, but no one paid any attention to him. Attempts were made to start candidacies for Thiers and Bugeaud, but they came to naught. The reactionary centre, the club of the Rue de Poitiers, determined to support Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, for that wily intriguer had presented himself with a program that might mean anything and that might satisfy anybody. Beside the Bonapartists and the conservatives, numerous sincere republicans such as Crémieux supported the prince. The other nominees were all old-line republicans. The most prominent was the head of the existing government, General Eugene Cavaignac, candidate of the moderates and of the *National*. Cavaignac, however, by his ruthlessness in June and by his alliance with the conservatives of the Dufaure group, had alienated the entire radical party. Lamartine had been in May the almost universal choice for the office of chief magistrate, but by the end of June he was no longer considered for president, and in December no one except himself believed that he could attract many votes.

It had long been known that the candidate of the Mountain would be Ledru-Rollin. He might have had a chance of election if the socialists and extreme republicans had

supported him. In October an attempt at bringing together the various elements had been made. A banquet of socialist deputies was to take place at the Barrière Poissonnière. Proudhon declined the chairmanship and proposed that it be offered to Ledru-Rollin, for he hoped thus to draw the extreme left of the Assembly into the field of socialism. But the organizers of the banquet were opposed to the name of Ledru-Rollin. Thereupon Proudhon put forward Lamennais, president of the Mountain, and this choice was accepted. However, when Proudhon refused to join the extreme left in its attack on Dufaure, Mathieu de la Drôme and five fellow-Montagnards signified their intention of being absent from the banquet if Proudhon should attend. Of course the organizers refused to expel the socialist, and so when the banquet took place on October 17, the chairman of the banquet and the other members of the Mountain were absent. Two thousand guests assembled, but among them only three deputies, Proudhon, his follower Greppo, and Pierre Leroux.¹ On October 22 another socialist banquet was held, this time at the Barrière du Trône. The entire Mountain was again invited, but only six Montagnards accepted.²

The socialists desired to leave the choice of a presidential candidate to a joint committee of socialists and radicals, all to abide by the decision of the committee. Ledru-Rollin, who had promised the Mountain that he would run, would not agree to retire if he were not nominated by the joint committee. Accordingly the socialists put forward Raspail, one of the leaders of the extreme revolutionists now a prisoner at Vincennes. He was to run merely as a protest; the bal-

¹ Darimon 82-3; Mulberger, *Proudhon* 123-5; *Débats*, October 18, 1848.

² *Débats*, October 23, 25. It had been announced that Ledru, Laurent, and Considerant were on the directing committee. Ledru and Laurent denied this in letters to the *République*.

lots cast for him should show France the strength of the extreme revolutionists.¹ Alton-Shée issued an electoral circular declaring: " Raspail is the candidate proposed by the central council of the democratic-socialist electors of all France. . . . In voting for a president all true socialists want to destroy the presidency. For this work we want a revolutionist who has no illusions, one who does not compromise; but Ledru-Rollin is not such a revolutionist. Hurrah for the democratic and social republic!"² In general the socialists were very fair to Ledru, declaring their admiration for him, but asserting that they preferred to register their own strength by voting for a socialist.³ There were a few individuals who were very violent against Ledru; one extremist called him a traitor, who had betrayed the people on March 17 and on April 16, who had betrayed the Belgians at Risquons-tout, who had forged the Taschereau document against Blanqui, and who had bribed the Club des Clubs.⁴ In one case the partisans of Ledru and Raspail came to blows. On November 26 in the lobby of the Palais Bourbon, Proudhon and Félix Pyat had an altercation which ended in an exchange of fisticuffs. A duel resulted. A little later Proudhon refused to fight another duel, this time with Delescluze.⁵

Some extreme revolutionists had great difficulty in deciding which candidate to support, Raspail or Ledru. The *Démocratie pacifique* of Considerant did not declare for Ledru-

¹ *Débats*, November 14, 1848; *Peuple*, November 18.

² *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 3547. The *Réforme* of November 21, 1848, attacked Alton-Shée in consequence of this poster, but on November 23 it asserted that this socialist had had a friendly interview with Ledru.

³ See *Peuple*, *passim*; *Peuple Souverain* of Lyons, November 18, 1848.

⁴ Election broadside called *The Treasons of Ledru-Rollin*, in the collection at Columbia University Library.

⁵ Mulberger: *Proudhon* 125; Castellane 4: 115.

Rollin until November 26. The *République* could never make up its mind and finally urged its readers to vote for either one as a protest against the existence of a presidency. Barbès's old Club of the Revolution had transformed itself into an electoral assembly, and there the debate waxed hottest between the partisans of the two nominees. The first meeting of this electoral assembly was held on November 17. Mathieu de la Drôme, Martin Bernard, and two other Montagnards supported Ledru-Rollin, but no decision was reached.¹ On the twenty-first the main discussion took place. Mathieu declared that Ledru had always adhered to socialistic doctrines and in order to prove this read Ledru's declaration in 1841 to the electors of Le Mans. Those present were not impressed. Mathieu continued, praising Barbès and Raspail. He dilated on the inconvenience of telling the provinces to vote for Raspail because they had already been instructed to vote for Ledru-Rollin. He dwelt on the necessity of defeating Cavaignac and Louis Napoleon, asserting that if either of them were elected, the only hope for France lay in the people of Paris. Madier de Montjau Jr., who became one of the leaders of the extreme left under the third republic, opposed Mathieu. He declared that Ledru was not a true revolutionist, for Ledru had not supported Louis Blanc and Albert on March 17 when they might have overthrown the moderates; he maintained that a revolution must always advance.² It was clear that the meeting was opposed to Ledru, but the Montagnards continued their defense on November 28 and on December 5. On the latter day Hervé, a friend of George Sand, made an effective speech in which he denounced Ledru for his actions on April 16 and criticized the Mountain for being non-

¹ *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, November 19, 1848.

² *Patric*, November 22, 1848; *Débats*, November 23; *Times*, November 25.

socialistic. He was answered by Mathieu and two other Montagnards. The following day the electoral assembly decided in favor of Raspail.¹

The *Peuple* of Proudhon attempted to make Ledru retire from the contest, and radicals tried to make Raspail withdraw, but neither was successful. There were rumors that Ledru would retire in favor of the other candidates. Of course his former connection with Lamartine caused the statement to be bruited about that these two men had combined forces.² Some even "surmised the intention of the red party to vote for Prince Louis Napoleon."³ There were many democrats who wished both Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin to retire in favor of the one man who had any real chance of defeating the Bonapartist pretender, namely General Cavaignac,⁴ and there were rumors that Ledru would thus step aside.⁵ All ideas of a compact between Cavaignac and Ledru were dispelled by the open break of November 25.

On Tuesday, November 21, in the Constituent Assembly Cavaignac asked Garnier-Pagès, Pagnerre, Duclerc, and Barthélemy-St. Hilaire⁶ whether they had circulated accusations against him in connection with the June Days. There was a discussion as to when the debate on these accusations should take place. Garnier-Pagès and his friends wished to await the arrival of Lamartine, who was absent. Ledru expressed his delight that at last the truth about the June Days should be known, but he desired the presence of

¹ Wassermann 225-7.

² *Times*, December 12, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*, November 28; cf. Guyon 2: 134.

⁴ *Atelier*, November, p. 342.

⁵ *Langue du Vipère*, November.

⁶ These four men were the chief members of a small group that vacillated between the left and the governmental left center.

Lamartine and Marie, as their evidence was necessary on certain matters and as the subject should be threshed out once for all.¹ Cavaignac pleaded for an immediate debate, saying that if he was willing to proceed in the absence of Marie, the opposition might forego the presence of Lamartine. The Assembly fixed on the following Saturday for the debate.

The next day Jules Favre was talking with Ledru as to interpellations of the government on using pressure in the elections.² Favre made his attack two days later, and a bitter attack it was. There was much hilarity in which Ledru joined when the orator asserted that he had always been a friend of Ledru-Rollin, for all remembered Favre's assaults on the executive commission. Jules Favre compared the use of influence by Cavaignac and Dufaure with his own conduct and that of his superior, the minister of the interior, in refraining from such use in the elections of the previous April.

On November 25 Cavaignac took the floor and declared that he did not desire a contest with the members of the executive commission, but merely information as to an attack on himself. Barthélemy-St. Hilaire, professor at the Sorbonne, thereupon declared that it was time that the truth about the June Days were known; up to now he and his friends had kept silent for patriotic reasons. He then read a *fragment of history* written by himself and his three colleagues whom Cavaignac had mentioned on November 21. This historical sketch gave a clear account of the actions of the executive commission during the June Days and for the first time revealed to the public that it was Cavaignac who had caused the delay in attacking the insurgents. At

¹ *Moniteur* 3297.

² *Patrie*, November 22, 1848.

times St. Hilaire even hinted that the general had plotted to overthrow the executive commission. The Assembly was hostile and the dull academic manner of the orator did not impress it. Cavaignac made a brilliant defense, singling out a few specific accusations and refuting them; he did not, however, attempt to disprove the general account. Bixio, a member of the left centre, objected to the insinuation that Cavaignac had incited the insurrection in order to repress it. St. Hilaire denied that he had implied this, and he renewed his attack on Cavaignac on certain military points. The general replied, explaining his tactics. Then Garnier-Pagès spoke, charging Cavaignac not with betraying France but with committing great faults. He accused the General of ingratitude, for Cavaignac had let the Assembly blame the executive commission for the lack of troops and had not come forward to tell the truth and exonerate it. Garnier-Pagès added a few words in appreciation of the activity of Ledru-Rollin during the June Days. Cavaignac again took the floor. He evaded the main charges, said nothing as to his silence as to who was responsible for the delay in attacking the barricades, but contented himself with denying that he sought the dictatorship and with stating that he had not known the true opinions of the executive commission when he accepted a ministry from it.

Garnier-Pagès had summoned his four colleagues of the executive commission to corroborate his statements, but only Ledru-Rollin responded to this appeal. He had no desire, said Ledru-Rollin, to make accusations; he only wished to defend himself against unjust calumnies. He then entered into an account of the military dispositions in June, combated the system of concentration, denied that Cavaignac had carried out even that system adequately. He declared that his sole desire was to undeceive the people and the National Guard. He wished to show the people that

the executive commission's plan was to prevent the uprising instead of repressing it; he wished to show the National Guard that he had not acted as a coward or a traitor on June 23. Ledru closed by saying that on all sides there had been misunderstandings, that the people in particular had been led astray by monarchical conspirators, and that therefore they should be pardoned; an amnesty should be proclaimed.¹ Ledru-Rollin was not favorably regarded by the deputies, but he made a stronger impression than the other opponents of Cavaignac. His accusations were not extravagant and his arguments were telling. "All together he disturbed Cavaignac," said Victor Hugo, at that time still a conservative.²

After General Bedeau had defended the plan of concentration and its execution, Cavaignac spoke for a fourth time. He claimed that he had concentrated his troops, but that he had not had time to tell the executive commission what he had done. He added: "Ledru-Rollin claims that he broke with me; I do not know which of us broke with the other, but I hope the break will continue forever." Thereupon the right and centre applauded frantically. Dupont de l'Eure pro-

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 131-7. For extracts, see chapter xiv.

² Hugo 1: 396. Hugo adds: "Ledru-Rollin, a sort of bastard Danton, leaning with his great buttoned chest against the tribune, had the hoarse voice of a Pétion and the rocking of the shoulders of a Mirabeau without the latter's eloquence . . . withal a certain lawyer's tact mixed with the violence of a demagogue. . . . When Ledru-Rollin returned to his seat beside Pierre Leroux and Lamennais, a man with long hair turning grey and a white vest, walked across the chamber and shook Ledru-Rollin's hand. It was Lagrange," the eternal advocate of amnesty. About this time, Thiers remarked to Falloux and Molé: "One may differ from the political views of M. Ledru-Rollin, but if one wishes to be just it is impossible to deny him great ability and a thorough appreciation of the situation. You will see how he will embarrass ministers who are not of his stature."—*Peuple*, December 3, quoting *Républicain de Lot et Garonne*.

posed an order of the day, saying that Cavaignac had deserved well of the republic. This was passed by 503 votes to 34. Even Flocon and David d'Angers joined the majority. Most of the left and almost all the Mountain refrained from voting.

This day was a glorious parliamentary success for Cavaignac; the general had outdebated the politicians; the dictator had received a magnificent vote of confidence. But he had ruined his chances of election to the presidency. He had only half gained the conservatives of the Rue de Poitiers and he had utterly lost the radicals of the Rue de Taitbout. In other words he had permanently split the party of the old republicans. The Mountain was cast out by the *National* moderates and the only path left for the Montagnards was violent opposition, and union with the socialists. After this rupture there was no chance that the radicals would vote for Cavaignac as against Louis Napoleon; by them Cavaignac was held as the worse of two evils. In the eyes of history too he had ruined himself, for Garnier-Pagès had shown his failure to give the executive commission its due, and Ledru-Rollin had shown his incapacity. Lord Normanby judged correctly when he said: "Upon the whole, in spite of General Cavaignac's undoubted parliamentary triumph, I am inclined to think that the permanent effect of this discussion will be rather to diminish the amount of merit posterity will accord him for the events of June."¹

Meanwhile the friends of Ledru-Rollin were working hard for his election as president. They wrote to their departments urging his candidacy.² Of course many news-

¹ Normanby 2:320-4. Even the hostile Chamier 2:242 was impressed by the arguments of Ledru.

² For letters of Lamennais, see Lamennais 2:221-5. For electoral details as to the North, see Gossez 328-330; as to the Sarthe, see Guyon 2:133-4.

papers exerted their influence in favor of Ledru-Rollin. In the departments they were most numerous in the Loire valley and in south-west France.¹ In Paris the most prominent were the *Réforme*, now edited by Ribeyrolles, the *Révolution démocratique et sociale* of Delescluze, semi-official organ of the Mountain, the *Démocratie pacifique* of Considerant, who though a socialist allied himself closely with the Montagnards, the *Peuple constituant* of Lamennais, the *Travail* of the Montagnard Baune, and the *Montagne* of Gally, devoted admirer of Ledru-Rollin.

Under the inspiration of Delescluze a campaign organization called the *Solidarité républicaine* had been founded and, as the law required, registered on November 4. In the preamble to its constitution it declared that in times of danger all republicans should unite, that the purpose of the society was "to assure by all legal means the pacific and regular development of social reforms, development which should be the goal and consequence of democratic institutions." At the trial of Ledru-Rollin and his colleagues in 1849, the prosecution claimed that this society had been started with the purpose of preparing armed resistance to the government, but no evidence was produced to support this statement. The *Solidarité républicaine* was clearly established as a piece of electoral machinery and maintained as the party organization of the Mountain. It had a central office at 50 Rue Faubourg St. Honoré, Paris, and branches throughout the departments. The original members were all well-known radicals, and new members could only be introduced by two associates. The president was Martin Bernard, one of the chief leaders of the secret societies under the July Monarchy; the treasurer was Deville, a prominent Montagnard; the secretary was Delescluze. The executive committee was composed of sixty-four republic-

¹ *Révolution démocratique et sociale, Réforme, passim.*

ans, over half of whom were deputies of the Mountain, such as Ledru-Rollin, Lamennais, Mathieu, and Félix Pyat. Its duties were to encourage the founding of newspapers, to enlighten the voters, to distribute pamphlets, and to find positions for workingmen.¹ All the members of the executive committee except Martin Nadaud² had voted to support Ledru, and Nadaud had been begged not to retire on that account. Nevertheless Nadaud publicly declared his dissent, and the *Révolution démocratique et sociale* had to explain Nadaud's isolation in the *Solidarité républicaine*.³

In this campaign much use was made of political posters. The Mountain issued three. On October 17 it declared that the republic had retrograded far from the glorious period of February, but that the people ought to remain calm, for the deputies of the left would successfully defend it.⁴ Early in November the executive committee of the club in the Rue de Taitbout issued the widely-discussed *manifesto of the Mountain*. The Montagnards, said the manifesto, had voted against the existence of a presidency, but they accepted the verdict of the legislative majority and they proposed a candidate who would work for the realization of their principles. To guide the republic the people must have not a mere name nor a man who had given pledges to the reaction,⁵ but a true republican. The Mountain there-

¹ These details come from Ledru's trial in 1849, *Moniteur* 3099. One of the newspapers founded by the society was the *Révolution démocratique et sociale*. For lists of members, see *Réforme*, November 7; *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, December 7; Lucas 240. For letter showing intimacy of Delescluze and Ledru, see appendix.

² Nadaud became one of leaders of the Mountain after Ledru's flight in 1849.

³ *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, December 4.

⁴ *Réforme, Débats*, October 19. Signed by Ledru and 42 other Montagnards.

⁵ Louis Napoleon and Cavaignac were here indicated.

fore proposed Ledru-Rollin, the organizer of universal suffrage, who had always stood for truly republican principles even if he had failed to obtain the application of his ideas by the governments of which he was a member.¹ In a third poster the executive committee gave the program of the extreme left: unity of power; reform of the administration, the legal system, the army, and the finances; free education; liberty of public meeting and association; repurchase by the state of railroads, canals, mines, etc.; the right of labor; "government of all and for all; the republic, one and indivisible, democratic and social." As Ledru-Rollin had supported all these ideas, the Mountain believed that he should be elected president.² The conservative newspapers found these posters surprisingly restrained in tone, but they objected to the demand for the right to labor.³

These were not the only posters in support of Ledru-Rollin. In December the democratic-socialist committee, a variant of the *Solidarité républicaine*, told how the national electoral congress of workingmen and soldiers of Paris had cast all their votes except three for Ledru-Rollin; the poster emphasized the need for unity among republicans and asserted that Ledru had always fought for the welfare of the

¹ *Réforme*, November 9, 10; *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, November 11. Approved by the seven members of the executive committee, Theodore Bac, Martin Bernard, Buvignier, Deville, Lamennais, Mathieu, and Félix Pyat, and by 49 other deputies including Ledru.

² *Affiches rouges* 310-2. On December 15, after the election, Ledru-Rollin and sixty of his colleagues issued a statement, reasserting their hostility to the institution of a presidency, their confidence in the people, and their devotion to the republic.—*Réforme*, *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, December 15, 1848; *Débats*, December 16.

³ *Assemblée Nationale, Débats, Evénement, Siècle, Univers*, November 11, 1848. The *Evénement* claims that the posters were partly composed by Ledru himself.

people.¹ A group of tailors, plumbers, and so forth issued a poster comparing the people who supported Louis Napoleon with those who supported Ledru. Some other persons contrasted the services of the three leading candidates, summing up thus; "Cavaignac: all for power. Louis Napoleon: extension of power. Ledru-Rollin: all for the people and by the people. Compare, judge, and vote." A combination of professors, sculptors, and artisans supported Ledru as the champion of the republic, labor, liberty, and equality. The day before the election twenty-three workingmen issued a supreme appeal for the union of all republicans on the name of Ledru-Rollin.²

Of course numerous public meetings were held both in Paris and in the provinces during the progress of the campaign. Various Montagnards made speeches for their candidate in the capital or in their own departments. Ledru himself addressed only one public gathering. On November 20 he made a speech in Paris devoting himself to refuting the charges which had been made against him. Electoral banquets were also frequent in the campaign. In the provinces many were held in Ledru's honor.³ In Paris banquets were held every day, but Ledru attended only three of them.⁴

¹ *Réforme, Révolution démocratique et sociale*, December 4; *Débats*, December 5.

² All these posters may be found in *Affiches rouges* 305-316. See also *Démocratie pacifique, Réforme, Révolution démocratique et sociale*, *passim*.

³ *Démocratie pacifique, Réforme, Révolution démocratique et sociale*, *passim*. For letters of regret to banqueters at Lyons and Marseilles, see *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, December 3, 5.

⁴ Ledru had accepted the chairmanship of a fourth, called the Banquet of the Federation of the People. Due, however, to the uncertainty of the date when it was to be held, he had to withdraw his acceptance. When the dinner took place on November 8, there was some slight disturbance owing to his absence.—*Réforme*, November 4, 10; *Constitutionnel*, November 9.

The first of these three banquets was given by the press and was held on November 19 at the Château Rouge under the presidency of Lamennais. Although the dinner was scheduled for three-thirty, by two o'clock the banquet hall was crowded. Two, or according to another estimate, four thousand guests were present, including many members of the Mountain. At five o'clock the speeches began. Toasts were proposed by various newspaper men and deputies; revolutionary poets recited their own works; the orchestra played patriotic airs. When Ledru mounted the platform, the room resounded with cheers. He declared that he was sure that all those present hoped for the establishment in the near future of the democratic and social republic, that union of all French republicans was the best means of achieving this aim. He then dilated on the failure of the republic to carry out its promise of aid to the democrats in Spain, Italy, the Danubian provinces, Berlin, Vienna. He paid a fine tribute to the martyred Robert Blum, the Viennese patriot.¹ He ended by saying: "Let our brothers abroad be reassured, for although provisionally democracy is in abeyance, we shall finally arrive by universal suffrage at understanding the desire of the people; and there will remain but one religion, but one feeling: fraternity. Long live the democratic and social republic!" Of course Ledru was wildly cheered and congratulated by everybody present.²

¹ For this he received thanks from the citizens of Hanau in Hesse and Treuen in Saxony.—*Réforme*, December 9, 26.

² *Réforme*, November 21; poster in collection at Columbia University Library. Chauvelot, a prominent socialist, who met Ledru at this banquet, declared a month later: "I found Ledru-Rollin much excited; I believe there is in him much of the woman; that disturbed me. I fear that he has not force enough to bear the burden of public affairs."—Testimony at trial of Vassentier and Etex on December 13, *Moniteur* 3554. A similar impression was made on Castille at a Banquet of Fraternity, the date of which cannot be located: "M. Ledru-Rollin played

On November 24 at the Barrière du Roule a banquet was given by the wine merchants, and the entire Mountain was invited, but only Ledru and six colleagues attended. Ledru apologized for the absence of the other Montagnards, necessary "inasmuch as from today's session may be obtained the proof that when a party attains power by inexplicable conduct, by means of acts or influences that cannot be avowed, it may have recourse to scandalous measures to retain this power."¹ A guest here interrupted: "That is not true." For a quarter of an hour vociferations and menaces were heard. The stewards of the banquet tried to restore order and finally succeeded in expelling the man who had started the disturbance and a friend who aided him in continuing it. Then Ledru, who had been standing calmly on the platform throughout this tumult, resumed. He explained that the Mountain was with the wine merchants in desiring the abolition of excise duties on meats and light liquors; he entered into statistical details to show the hardships entailed on the poor by the imposition of these taxes. At this point some one else tried to cause a new disturbance but was easily silenced. Ledru asserted that it was the radical party alone that had consistently advocated the repeal of the tax on wines, that the provisional government had

on the multitude like a great artist. . . . When Duprez during his prime appeared at the Opéra, he produced an impression no deeper than that produced by this tall, broad-shouldered man of the ruddy countenance. . . . This elaborate speech clothed in the finest language was uttered and listened to with a fervor difficult to describe. . . . I perceived that each gesture with which M. Ledru-Rollin accentuated his statements imparted to his cheeks, already ruddy and purple with generous blood, a tremolo which involuntarily made me say: *There is an amiable man who will not found a republic.* Ledru-Rollin reminded me of those great whig lords."—Castille: *Ledru-Rollin* 4-7.

¹ This remark was made the day before the discussion between Cavaignac and the members of the executive commission concerning the June Days.

carried out this reform, whereas the conservatives had restored the tax. After two more speeches the members of the Mountain retired, and the wine merchants turned to private affairs.¹

The various educational institutions of Paris, always prominent in democratic movements, organized a banquet at the Barrière de Sevres and invited the members of the extreme left, many of whom accepted. From noon to four o'clock on December 3 two thousand guests listened to speeches. The government sent a policeman to watch the proceedings. The organizers of the banquet protested against the supervision but were willing to let the police officer remain as a private citizen. Ledru and a few other deputies left the hall in order to visit the prefect of police and to make their protest to him. In the meanwhile the speeches began. Several students made fiery addresses and several poets recited socialistic songs. Challemel-Lacour, later Gambetta's assistant under the third republic, made his maiden speech; lies, he declared, were the arms of the royalists, faith the weapon of the republicans. At this point Ledru returned to the hall; amid universal applause he told of the success of his mission to the prefect of police and showed the policeman an order to retire. Then Ledru toasted the republic, pleaded for union among democrats, proclaimed that the institution of a president in the constitution was merely another form of monarchy, prophesied the triumph of liberty after the tribulations through which it was passing, defended his own Italian policy, namely support of the Italian people against the pope and the princes of the minor states. "Let us abolish the privileges of the past," he said, "and prepare

¹ *Débats*, November 25; *Réforme*, November 26; *Times*, November 27. The conservatives frequently cited the disturbances at this banquet to prove the disorderly conduct of radicals, but as conservative guests were the originators of the tumult, the Montagnards can hardly be blamed for it.

for the equality and happiness of the future; let us be revolutionary, and let us not stop until the revolution has made the tour of the world."

Proudhon spoke next. He made a long explanation of the different schools of socialism. A few more orators made brief speeches, and the banquet closed peacefully.¹ Delescluze in his newspaper tried to make it appear that this banquet was a tribute to Ledru-Rollin's candidacy, but the schools that had organized the banquet denied this; it was a union of all republicans, they said, followers of Raspail as well as of Ledru-Rollin. Delescluze was forced to publish a similar statement.²

During the electoral campaign rumors had spread that the government feared troubles from the reds and that it believed that the radical deputies were implicated. On December 9 Joly, a member of the Mountain, interpellated the cabinet on these rumors and asked whether the government intended to close the clubs. Dufaure, minister of the interior, admitted that he had feared a riot; he declared that he would ask for a law against the clubs when the need for such a law should arise; he urged that all parties work for peace.

¹ *Réforme; Révolution démocratique et sociale, Débats*, December 4; *Peuple, Réforme*, December 5, 1848; Fonvielle in *Nouvelle Revue* 110: 472-487; Sarcey 47-9. Sarcey writes: "It was there that for the first time I heard an eloquent man, Ledru-Rollin. He has a whiff of popular eloquence that carries one away."

² *Nouvelle Revue* 110: 486; *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, December 6, 8; *Peuple*, December 7. A little later, on December 26, Delescluze wrote to a friend: "You are severe on Ledru; I assure you no one leads a busier life than does he. If he does not reply to everything, do not accuse his lack of knowledge or his courage. He is perfectly capable of understanding any situation, I am convinced; only he is not a man given to details. As to his attitude in the Assembly, is he free? In order to be listened to, he is obliged not to cheapen his utterances, but he is as revolutionary and as devoted as anyone."—Quoted at Ledru trial, *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 3099.

Ledru spoke next. He asserted that a law closing the clubs would be unconstitutional, for the constitution recognized the right of public meeting. He protested against Dufaure's misquotation of the speech he had made at the Banquet of the Schools. The minister of the interior had declared that Ledru-Rollin had advocated taking up arms in Paris whereas Ledru had merely stated that it would be necessary for France to take up arms if Austria invaded the Legations. The misrepresentation resulted, Ledru said, from the reports of a contemptible police agent.¹ "I protested no such provocative words were ever uttered either in the clubs or in the electoral assemblies. We have only one thought, that of union. . . . As long as the constitution is not violated, no uprising whatever can turn to the advantage of true friends of the republic." He closed with a declaration of loyalty to the republic. "We are not trying to ruin it by dissensions, for after all it is our work, not years."² This speech is a clear defense against the calumnies spread abroad; its importance consists in Ledru's declaration that only a violation of the constitution would justify an uprising.

On December 10 and 11 the presidential election was held. Most people foresaw that Louis Napoleon would win, but few expected the overwhelming triumph he received. The votes stood:³

¹ This accusation of a police agent caused much talk. Two days later Ledru publicly told the Assembly that he did not mean the prefect of police, Gervais de Caen.—*Moniteur* 3540. Everybody was now sure that he meant Carlier. Carlier himself thought so too and wrote a public letter in which he denied the accusations and accused Ledru-Rollin of being double-faced.—*Débats*, December 13. Ledru took no notice of the letter.

² *Moniteur* 3522.

³ *Moniteur* for 1848, p. 3640. Other accounts give slightly different figures.

	<i>France</i>		<i>Paris</i>	
Bonaparte	5,534,520	74.25%	157,000	55%
Cavaignac	1,448,302	19.5 %	83,000	30%
Ledru-Rollin	371,431	5 %	24,500	9%
Raspail	36,963	0.5 %	14,000	5%
Lamartine	17,914	0.25%	3,200	1%
Changarnier	4,687	0.05%
Scattered	12,434	0.15%
Votes lost	23,219	0.30%
<hr/>				
Total	7,449,471			

This was a brilliant victory for Louis Napoleon but did not represent his real strength in the country, for the conservatives who had feared to put up a candidate of their own, discontented moderates such as Crémieux, radicals willing to vote for anyone to defeat Cavaignac, socialists seduced by the vague socialistic ideas in some of the books which bore the name of Louis Napoleon—all voted for the prince. There were therefore more radicals than were shown by the vote for Ledru-Rollin but nevertheless the small amount of ballots cast for him was a bitter pill. In only eight departments did Ledru receive more than ten thousand votes. In nine departments he ran second, ahead of Cavaignac; of these nine, six were in the south-west corner of France, three in the Loire valley.¹

¹ *Débats*, December 18, 22, 1848. The nine departments were Allier, Corrèze, Dordogne, Upper Garonne, Gers, Indre, Lot et Garonne, Eastern Pyrenees, Saône et Loire.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE BARROT CABINET

ON December 20 Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was installed as president of the republic, and the same day he announced that he had formed a ministry with Odilon Barrot as president of the council of ministers.¹ The contrast between the president and the premier was striking; the former was unscrupulous and wily; the latter was honest and credulous. The future emperor is one of the hardest characters in history to fathom. Certainly up to the day that he was crowned emperor one thought dominated his actions, the idea that he was the successor of his uncle. Under Louis Philippe he had made two ignominious attempts to gain the throne, but from these failures he had learned wisdom. It is hard to believe that the foolhardy pretender of the July Monarchy is the same man who picked his way carefully through the republic, letting his enemies destroy each other. When there was plotting to be done, Louis Napoleon left it to his subordinates so that he could disavow them if they were unsuccessful. He allied himself now with one party, now with another, and for each he had his appeal. The workingmen were attracted by the vague doctrines of benevolence and good-will, which could be read in the books which bore his name. To the bourgeoisie he promised encouragement of trade and commerce. The clerical conserva-

¹ So little was known of the new president's tendencies that there had been rumors that Ledru-Rollin had been asked to join the cabinet.—*Pot-aux-Roses*, December 18.

tives relied on his devotion to the church. Now, when he had been elected president, he looked for a premier who would be neither conservative nor republican.

Odilon Barrot was the choice made. He had been a monarchist under Louis Philippe, but as leader of the opposition he had never entered a cabinet,¹ and unconsciously he had helped to prepare the way for the overthrow of the Orleanist king. He had accepted the republic and was on good terms with the moderates. His chief virtue was his loyalty. Even when he differed from his colleagues in the cabinet, he defended them bravely in the Assembly, but so unstable were his ideas that he was willing to become the advocate of what he had denounced a year earlier. Few public men have equalled him in his ability to be deceived. He helped Louis Philippe to the throne only to discover that their ideas were too wide apart to be reconciled. In the banquet campaign of 1847 and 1848 Barrot tried to obtain slight reforms and the monarchy was overthrown. He worked loyally to support the Prince-President, and the day came when he was to his great surprise shown the door to make way for his own brother. And in spite of all this Odilon Barrot would never admit that he was or had been wrong. In his *apologia pro vita sua* otherwise called *Posthumous Memoirs*, he tried to prove that every single measure he ever took was the wisest possible under the circumstances. Another phase of his blindness was his unfairness to opponents. Calumnies he remembered, refutations he forgot or overlooked. He misread statements to fit his own preconceptions. A more unfit statesman rarely ruled France.

Of this honest chameleon now in a conservative atmosphere, Ledru-Rollin, the consistent democrat and republican, was the *bête noir*. In February Ledru had snatched the

¹ The ephemeral ministry of February, 1848, which lasted barely twenty-four hours, need not be counted.

reform movement out of his hands; in August he had roused the Assembly against the investigating committee of which Barrot was president. From then on until the fiasco of June 13 Ledru-Rollin was to seize every opening given him to attack the Barrot government. The following is Barrot's estimate of his opponent:

M. Ledru-Rollin was a vehement orator in whom the demagogue and the statesman combined in such a way as to make him a redoubtable adversary. . . . He belonged to that class of men in whom ambition and pride are restrained neither by the brain nor by the heart. Place such a man in private life, and he will fill his existence with foolish enterprises and end with a catastrophe; throw him into the midst of a revolutionary crisis, and he will be Danton or Robespierre according to his temperament, sanguine or choleric. M. Ledru-Rollin was of the type of Danton, full of audacity and faith in his own powers; but sensual and pleasure-loving he united in his person . . . the requirements for a demagogue but not for an apostle. Hence his vacillation and irresolution. In him ambition replaced fanaticism. He could menace society, disturb it profoundly, utter the most temeritous ideas . . . work with the agents of disorder, undertake and abandon conspiracies in company with them; we do not believe that he would have consented to a bloody reign of terror.¹

The first occasion for a conflict between Barrot and Ledru came on December 26, 1848 less than a week after the inauguration of the new ministry. Barrot addressed the Assembly, telling how the unanimity of the country was shown by the vote of December 10. He said that the government desired order and hoped to usher in a period of security after that of unrest, that order meant liberty and progress. This had an attractive sound, but several days earlier General Changarnier had been appointed both commander-in-chief

¹ Barrot 2: 25, 40-1.

of the National Guard of the Seine and commander of the first military division, that is the regular army stationed in and about Paris. These two offices, accordingly to the law, could not be held by the same individual. Ledru-Rollin rose and protested against this independent chieftain who, according to the decree investing him with power, could for twenty-four hours issue commands without consulting the minister of war, against this dictator who "on his own responsibility could take all the measures inspired by reason, interest, caprice." The basis of the constitution, Ledru said, was the responsibility of all officials; yet here was an official who for twenty-four hours would be responsible to no one. Moreover this double command violated the law of 1831 which forbade an officer holding an active command both in the army and in the National Guard. Paris was now quiet; so there was not even the excuse of abnormal times. "The situation is perilous, for here is liberty, here is the republic under the formidable menace of a forest of bayonets. It ought to be sufficient, merely to point out these considerations; they must impress all sincere republicans and all serious minds."¹ This speech differs from Ledru's orations earlier in the year; it is the clear, dispassionate pleading of a lawyer, proving the violation of the spirit of the constitution and the letter of the law of 1831. Ledru-Rollin had a remarkable faculty for making legal exposition clear to laymen.

Barrot admits in his *Memoirs* that in this debate Ledru had right on his side: "We had hardly taken possession of our ministries when M. Ledru-Rollin began that series of interpellations which filled and tormented all our ministerial existence. He chose for his first attack an excellent ground . . . I refrained from denying the violation of the law of

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 149-154.

1831; the violation was evident. But I armed myself with the exigencies of the situation.”¹ In fact Barrot now started out well on his career of apologizing for manifest infractions of the law, infractions of which he himself did not approve. He declared that he was glad to reply to all scruples based on the high ground of constitutionality, but he insisted that the ministers were still responsible for any acts of Changarnier as they had the power of revoking the general’s command. These were not ordinary times, Barrot said; the period of uprisings had scarcely ended, and unity of command was necessity; the chief aim of the cabinet was to maintain order.

Ledru again took the floor to rebut the minister. He stated correctly: “I have put as clearly as possible a constitutional question; the minister, being unable to reply to the texts I have cited, has merely uttered fine words.” He reiterated that the ministers were not truly responsible for the acts of Changarnier, for of what avail was the revoking of his command if in the meanwhile the general—this was a mere hypothesis—should dissolve the Assembly. Deputies protested against such a suggestion, but Laissac, a member of the left, shouted: “The Eighteenth Brumaire was something like that.” When quiet was restored Ledru-Rollin continued to his second point, the violation of the law of 1831, and he showed how extraordinary times were explicitly defined in that law in such a way that the term could not be applied to the existing state of affairs. Ledru contrasted the contradictory pictures drawn by Barrot, on the one hand the revival of commerce and the return of confidence, on the other hand the fear of unrest. “You have been unconstitutional,” Ledru-Rollin said in closing, “according to yourselves through lightheadedness, according to

¹ Barrot 3: 49-50.

us deliberately; but whichever way you take it, you are from this day on nothing but an arbitrary ministry; a sad, a very sad beginning.”¹ This rebuttal strongly reenforced Ledru’s first speech.

Maleville, minister of the interior, made the best of a bad case. He declared that the best guarantee of order was the concentration of command, and that the twenty-four hour limit was a sufficient guarantee of the responsibility of the cabinet. He ridiculed the solicitude for the constitution shown by the former minister of the interior who had sent out the commissioners, and he warned Ledru not to talk so lightly of infractions of the constitution. After another member of the Mountain, Dain, had repeated the arguments of his leader, the Assembly, unwilling to censure the cabinet, passed to the order of the day.

Barrot had successfully passed through the ordeal of the session, but the honours of the debate went to the extreme left. Victor Hugo judged correctly: “It was superficially a success, fundamentally a check. One was astonished to see Odilon Barrot, an old jurist, stumble at his first step over the text of a law. The lawyer used a quibble at his début, and Ledru-Rollin was for Odilon Barrot in 1848 what Barrot had been for Guizot in 1830.”²

During the remaining life of the Constituent Assembly Ledru’s speeches may be divided into two classes. He expounded the foreign policy of the Mountain (this subject

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 155-9.

² Hugo 1: 416. Corkran 356-7 believed that Ledru had defeated Barrot in the debate but was routed in turn by Maleville. As to the newspapers of December 27, the *Débats* declared that Ledru had been most restrained and that he occupied the place of Barrot under the July monarchy, but it asserted that Ledru’s texts paled before Barrot’s reasoning. The *National* was gradually coming over to the side of the radicals; it considered Ledru profound and Barrot weak. The *Peuple* began a period of fulsome praise of all Ledru’s speeches.

will be treated separately) ; he delivered a series of attacks on the arbitrary acts of the Barrot cabinet. The next opportunity for a conflict with the government occurred on January 20, 1849. The legislature had created a high court for the trial of treason, and the ministry desired to send before such a special court at Bourges the leaders involved in the affair of May 15. Eugène Raspail, a member of the Mountain and the nephew of the prisoner of Vincennes, protested that the law creating this tribunal had not been enacted until after May 15, and that it was not retroactive.

After Bonjean, a deputy of the right, had denied retroactivity, Ledru-Rollin obtained the floor. He declared that he would speak clearly and avoid legal hair-splitting. It was a commonly accepted principle, he said, that when a malefactor committed a crime, he should know the penalty attached. It was unfair to say that there were two distinct matters, the penal law and the law of procedure, and that the latter could be modified after the crime, for there were cases where a man might prefer a Draconian law and a jury to a milder law administered by a court sure to condemn him. The only two exceptions to the principle of change of venue did not apply in this case under discussion. Besides, when once a certain court had taken charge of a matter, as had occurred in this case, the jurisdiction could under no circumstances be changed. In the constitution the executive, legislative, and judicial powers had been clearly separated; now the legislature was trying to encroach on the judiciary. Ledru-Rollin next considered the question of non-retroactivity. He quoted Merlin de Douai on the Cadoudal case which, he showed, presented an identical situation. He quoted Solicitor-General Dupin, the chief advocate for the law under discussion, and also Odilon Barrot on the Transnonian affair of 1834. Ledru claimed that the rejection by the Assembly of the Deville amendment that crimes com-

mitted before the promulgation of the constitution should not be submitted to extraordinary courts did not imply that the Assembly adopted the contrary policy, for it might have believed that it was unnecessary to insert this amendment in the constitution. Ledru admitted Dupin's claim that when a court had been destroyed, it was necessary that a new court should take over its jurisdiction, but he showed how this principle of law did not apply in the present case since the court of sessions, before which the prisoners taken May 15 should be sent, was still in existence. He closed with an appeal to beware of arbitrary power.¹ This speech is another example of Ledru's clear exposition for lay minds of a complicated legal question. It is also an example of his habit of refuting his opponents by quoting from their earlier orations.

Dupin, the solicitor-general, replied with a lawyer's plea, emphasizing the refusal of the accused insurgents to accept any jurisdiction. When the discussion was continued two days later Baroche, the district-attorney, and Barrot spoke for the government; Jules Favre, Crémieux, and Dupont de Bussac, all members of the left, for the opposition. The ministers obtained a majority in favor of sending the accused before the high court at Bourges, but the entire left was in the opposition.²

On January 26, Léon Faucher, the minister of the interior,³ declared the intention of the government to bring

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 171-184.

² The *Peuple* of January 23 said: "To give you an idea of Jules Favre's speech we need only repeat the words of Ledru-Rollin to those who interrupted Jules Favre: *There is not one of you capable of making a similar speech.*" On January 20 the Mountain had not taken part in the vote for vice-president, and 44 Montagnards, including Ledru-Rollin, published a letter declaring this fact.—*Réforme, Révolution démocratique et sociale*, January 21, 1849.

³ Maleville had quarreled with Louis Napoleon and, together with Bixio, the only old-line republican in the cabinet, had resigned.

in a bill closing the clubs; he requested urgency for the bill. A committee was to be chosen by the bureaux to consider the question of urgency.¹ In the first bureau Ledru opposed urgency. He declared that he spoke in a bureau for the first time in his parliamentary career. The bill violated the constitution, he said; the danger of public security seemed to him a joke; the government would next demand the suppression of the press. The ministry should respect the right of association as had the executive commission. The vote for a member of the committee from the first bureau was close; only on the third ballot was Bavoux, a member of the right, chosen by 25 votes to 24 for Ledru-Rollin.²

On January 27 Sénard, member of the left centre and reporter for the committee to which the demand for urgency had been submitted, declared that the subject of closing the clubs was too important for a hurried discussion and that the existing law was sufficient for all needs. Barrot asserted that the idea of closing the clubs had long been in people's minds and that there would be no hurry if urgency were agreed to; that a definite decision must be reached and that the government preferred defeat to uncertainty. Ledru-Rollin replied that the entire responsibility for the existing agitation about the clubs lay with the government, and that to consider closing the clubs was a violation of the constitution, for that document guaranteed right of public meeting, liberty of petition, and freedom of the press. "Only the exercise of these rights can be limited in order to maintain public security." Urgency should not be voted to mutilate the constitution. Barrot asked why delay was

¹ The French legislature is divided by lot into bureaux which discuss any bills before the official debate in the united assembly and which elect members of committees to consider bills.

² *Constitutionnel, Débats*, January 28, 1849.

necessary if the question was a constitutional one. Sénard declared that it was a question of expediency as well as of constitutionality. The question was put, and urgency was rejected by a majority consisting of the lefts and the centre combined.¹

After this vote Ledru presented an impeachment of the ministers for considering the closing of the clubs. It was signed by Ledru-Rollin and forty eight other Montagnards.² This action was a mistake in policy, for the Mountain fell into the error against which Maleville had warned them, that of declaring at too slight a pretext that the constitution had been violated. It was a debatable point whether the constitution would have been violated by this law, but the consequence was that, when in June 1849 the Mountain had a far better case, the country felt that the extreme left had already cried *wolf* too often.

A period of agitation now followed. Thiers remarked to Persigny, the confidant of the Prince-President; "The country is lost. . . . We are tumbling into anarchy. The Assembly is dominated by the clubs of Paris; Ledru-Rollin is master of the situation. In a week we shall have the terror and the scaffold. . . . Tell the Prince that I can do nothing for him."³ According to Victor Hugo, Marrast made the remark: "This brute of a Ledru-Rollin will end by throwing us to that brute of a Blanqui."⁴ As a matter of fact real danger was threatened rather by the Bona-

¹ Ledru was again a candidate for membership on the committee for the discussion of the bill, but he received on the first bureau only 8 votes out of 42.—*Débats*, January 30, 1849.

² *Réforme, Révolution démocratique et sociale*, January 29, 1849; *Times*, January 31. Five newspapers and the presidents of various clubs also asked the impeachment of the cabinet.—*Révolution démocratique et sociale*, January 27.

³ Persigny 39-40.

⁴ Hugo 2: 13.

partists. On January 29 an uprising was feared. The events of this "day" are very obscure. Marrast, president of the Assembly, ordered certain troops to approach the Palais Bourbon and protect it. General Changarnier, neglected, overlooked, or disobeyed the order, and assuming dictatorial powers, told the troops to listen only to his commands. But times were not ripe for a change, and on the thirtieth Paris awoke to find that neither the threatened popular uprising nor the Bonapartist coup d'état had materialized. The day had, however, shown the insubordination of General Changarnier.

As nothing was done about the impeachment of the ministers, on January 31, Vezin, a member of the right, asked whether it had been withdrawn, and if not why it had not been referred to the bureaux. Ledru replied that he himself had been instructed by the signatories to make the same demand; not only was the impeachment not withdrawn but further accusations would be added to it.¹ In fact the extreme left published a protest against the events of January 29.² On February 3 Baze, a member of the extreme right, asked why the further accusations had not been produced and demanded urgency for the discussion of the impeachment. The Assembly rejected this demand, and that was the last heard of the entire matter.

One of the clubs which the government most feared was the *Solidarité républicaine*. On January 10 Léon Faucher had written to the prefects that there existed such a club with central offices at Paris and branches in the departments, that this was a state within a state and therefore a menace, that it was an unauthorized society and a secret club, and the law of July 23, 1847 forbade both secret clubs and cor-

¹ *Moniteur* 331.

² *Réforme*, February 3; *Debats*, February 1. The signatories were almost the same as those to the impeachment.

respondence between clubs, that the government had not used its authority during the electoral period, but that it had closed the central club on December 12 with the approval of the Assembly, that the association did not consider itself dissolved, and that therefore the prefects were to prevent its meetings.¹ The officers of the *Solidarité républicaine* replied that their club had never been dissolved, and that it could not be since it had complied with all legal restrictions.² Léon Faucher admitted that it was not the *Solidarité républicaine* that had been raided on December 12 but another club using the same rooms, but he maintained his earlier instructions since the *Solidarité républicaine* was a club with branches and since its failure to declare itself before the authorities and its clandestine work constituted it a secret society.³ Thus Faucher admitted that he had given incorrect information in his first circular, but declared that he did not care if he had, and he made new accusations for which he produced no evidence and which were partly false.⁴

One of the government's actions on January 29 was another raid on the rooms of the *Solidarité républicaine*. On the thirty-first Martin Bernard, president of the society, interpellated the government on this high-handed procedure. Barrot replied that the raid was a purely legal matter. Ledru desired to know whether the government claimed that there had been a plot or whether it was bringing charges

¹ *Moniteur* 273, January 27.

² *Ibid.*, 303; *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, January 29. Signed by Ledru, 13 other deputies, and 14 non-deputies. See also *Gazette des Tribunaux*, December 14, 1849.

³ *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 303.

⁴ The club which was closed on December 12 may have been the *Friends of Political Democracy*, formed for purposes of discussion by the Mountain and the members of the left. Ledru, Flocon, Landrin, Glais-Bizoin, and Lamartine were all members. For details, see *Réforme*, December 28.

against an association; in the former case it was a matter for the judiciary, in the latter for the legislature. He warned the Assembly that all kinds of associations might be attacked, conservative as well as radical. Baroche, the attorney-general, interrupted to declare that it made no difference whether there had been a plot or an accusation against an association, that the government had turned the matter over to the courts, and that the previous orator should defend himself there. Ledru resumed: The association had been attacked, for twenty-seven of its members had been arrested at its headquarters. The courts were slow and it had always been the practice to bring such matters before the legislature. The raid was not a mere isolated occurrence but part of the general high-handed proceedings of January 29. The *Solidarité républicaine* was not the only association with branches; for instance, there existed the conservative *Friends of the Constitution*. The matter concerned a violation of the right of public meetings. The *Solidarité républicaine* was not a secret society; its constitution had been published and its placards had been openly posted. It was a society founded for electoral purposes and to give aid to workingmen. It had been registered as prescribed by the law. It had none of the characteristics of a secret society as defined by Solicitor-General Dupin. All parties ought to side with the Mountain on this question, as all clubs existed by the same right as this one. "The *Solidarité républicaine* has its roots in the constitution and you cannot close it without violating the constitution."¹ This speech made out a good case for the association, but rambled more than Ledru's better orations. The Assembly was tired of the discussion and passed to the order of the day.

A few days later the radical deputies complained to the attorney-general of the slanders against the association in

¹ *Moniteur* for 1849, pp. 331-2.

the legitimist *Assemblée nationale*. Of course no action was taken against this newspaper.¹

When the first anniversary of the foundation of the republic arrived the republicans could not let it pass without notice. On February 24 Ledru was toasted at various banquets in the provinces and even in England.² At Paris on the twenty-third fifty-six members of the Mountain, including Ledru, eight radical or socialist newspapers, and various associations which supported the policies of the extreme left issued a proclamation exalting the republic but urging the people to be quiet.³

On February 25 a great banquet was held in the Rue Martel. Twelve hundred guests, including many members of the Mountain, sat down to table, and the galleries were filled with spectators. Special tables were reserved for the families of the prisoners at Vincennes and of the deported revolutionists. Several speeches were made. A certain Brice-Bar from the United States declared that the republics of the new world considered France as a sister. Ledru-Rollin replied. He thanked the American, but declared that homage was due particularly to their absent brothers, the martyrs in the prisons, and the revolutionists deported to the colonies. Republicans might feel bitter, Ledru said, when they looked at the existing condition of affairs, but a glorious future awaited them. The revolutionary movement had three forms: the movement of nationality, the political revolution, and the social transformation which was the final goal. All started from the revolution of February, and no reactionary government in the world could stop them.

¹ *Révolution démocratique et sociale, Peuple*, February 3. These papers published the names of 47 signatories including Ledru, "but others will sign tomorrow."

² *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, March 15.

³ *Ibid.*, *Réforme, Peuple*, February 24.

The force of the democratic *idea* was invincible; the army was powerless against it. "The army! But it is composed of our brothers. Let it remain but a month in Paris and it becomes socialist. Do you know what is done then? The authorities send from the capital the diseased regiments, as they call them, and these diseased regiments carry to the provinces the disease of socialism." Ledru said that his party demanded not merely universal suffrage but the organization of labor and that this demand would be obtained; that his opponents might as well oppose the course of a mountain torrent as the will of the people.¹

Of the speeches made at this banquet of February 25 the most remarked were those of Pierre Leroux, Félix Pyat, and Ledru-Rollin. Ledru's discourse is very important as it marks the point where he proclaimed himself a socialist. The significance of this has rarely been grasped by historians. Not a single belief did the leader of the Mountain change. He had always advocated social reforms, but he had denied that he was a socialist since he thought that that meant accepting communism. Now he accepted neither communism nor Utopianism, but he changed his opinion as to the meaning of the word *socialism*, and he was willing to let his ideas be called socialist, the same ideas, as Mathieu de la Drôme had pointed out, that he had held in 1841. This attitude of Ledru meant a union of the radicals and socialists in the *democratic and social party*, an alliance which lasted through the second empire.

Ledru-Rollin's speech, especially the part on the socialist propaganda in the army, caused much alarm in conservative ranks. Molé desired that Ledru's assertion as to the army be publicly denied in the Assembly,² and General Bugeaud

¹ *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, February 26; *Réforme, Peuple*, February 27.

² Castellane 4: 140.

wrote to Faucher that Ledru ought to be prosecuted for his utterances.¹ The government printed in the *Moniteur* a statement that Ledru-Rollin's words were "an insult to the army. . . . France is not socialist; M. Ledru-Rollin and his friends know that perfectly well."² Ledru wrote to the *Moniteur*, asserting that Faucher was evidently the author of this notice and, that deputies ought not to be attacked in an official publication. He denied the rumor that any one had cheered the guillotine. He maintained that the army was attached to democratic principles and he mentioned a banquet of non-commissioned officers in which the Mountain and the democratic and social republic were toasted, but he declared that this was not an insurrectionary gathering as Bugeaud and Changarnier had been similarly honored.³ The *Moniteur* acknowledged receipt of this communication but refused to publish it "because it rectified nothing and there is nothing to rectify."⁴

On March 1, 1849, the schools held a banquet, but it was closed by the police. On the third Martin Bernard interpellated the minister of the interior on this subject. He declared that the schools held these banquets every Thursday, that on March 1 the prefect of police had interfered and that he himself had argued with the prefect as to the right to intervene, that the police had made a sudden and brutal attack, and Bernard asked whether the minister of the interior approved this action. Léon Faucher replied that the radical banqueters did not care for publicity as did the liberal monarchists under the July monarchy, that the very periodicity of the school banquets proved their political character, that the red ribbons on the platform and on the

¹ Letter of March 3 in *Révolution de 1848*, 3: 193.

² *Moniteur* 679, March 2.

³ *Réforme*, March 3; *Peuple*, March 4.

⁴ *Moniteur* 693.

orators proved the desire for disorder, that by the law of 1790 the prefect of police had the right to enter, that no violence had been used. Pierre Leroux claimed that the banquet was a friendly affair. Victor Grandin, member of the right, asserted that the ministry was not sufficiently severe, that the terrible poverty was caused by the doctrines enunciated in the clubs, by such statements as those of Ledru at the banquet of February 25.

Of course this challenge brought Ledru-Rollin to his feet. He ridiculed the fear of the radicals as "a pitiful phantasmagoria employed by the late monarchy against M. Grandin himself when he was in opposition." He quoted Duvergier de Hauranne, Maleville, and Barrot in connection with the banquet agitation in 1847. Ledru asserted that it was foolish to blame the misery of the people on those who were constantly working for the amelioration of the lot of the proletariat by social reforms. Turning to the legal aspects of the matter Ledru showed that the law of 1790 as interpreted by the constitution of 1791 did not apply to such interference as had just occurred. He ended brilliantly. He told how Guizot had warned Barrot when the latter was defending the right of public meeting: "Take care, for if you are ever on the same benches as we, pursued by the same exigencies, you will act as we are acting;" how Barrot had cried: "I guarantee that I shall not, I take a formal engagement to that effect;" how Guizot had disdainfully retorted: "I do not accept M. Barrot's guarantee." Then Ledru concluded; "When the head of the present government thus verified M. Guizot's suspicions to the letter, he underwent in my eyes the cruellest of all punishments."¹

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 198-205. On March 4 the *National*, now a whole-hearted supporter of the radicals, considered Ledru's speech "concise, nervous, extremely logical." *The Révolution démocratique et*

It is no wonder that Odilon Barrot did not like the consistent Ledru-Rollin who over and over again refuted him out of his own mouth. Barrot was the kind of lawyer who could argue equally well on either side of a question. He now made an attempt to defend himself. He declared that the government stood for liberty against license, that his party had always welcomed the presence of the authorities at the banquets, that his duty was to defend the public.

Bérard, a member of the right, tried to turn against the leader of the Mountain Ledru's own device of proving the inconsistency of his opponents; he asked whether the radical leader who had just spoken was the same man who had gloried in suppressing the insurrections of April 16 and May 15. Denjoy, bitterest of conservatives, protested against the partiality of President Marrast, who had allowed the left to interrupt Barrot but who had silenced the right while Ledru-Rollin spoke. The Assembly, glad to end a discussion in which the conservative majority did not shine, passed to the order of the day.

At last the bill on the closing of the clubs came up for discussion, and against the strenuous opposition of the entire left, joined by part of the centre, article one was passed by 404 votes to 303. On the law itself the extreme left refrained from voting. One hundred and nine deputies signed a protest: "Article one of the law on clubs is a violation of the constitution. We have protested by our vote; we have protested by refraining from voting."¹

*social*e said: "It is generally admitted that M. Ledru-Rollin has become the greatest orator of the Assembly." The *Peuple* continued its policy of praising Ledru.

¹ *Révolution démocratique et sociale, Réforme, Peuple, Débats, Constitutionnel*, March 22-25. Sixty-seven members of the Mountain and forty-two independent members of the extreme left, such as Etienne Arago and Flocon, signed. Seven newspapers signified their approval.

CHAPTER XIX

END OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

By March 1849 parties in the Constituent Assembly had become definitely organized. The Mountain had become smaller than it was nine months earlier, but it now voted as a solid unit. Long before March Jules Favre, Landrin and the members of the left had separated from this group. Somewhat later Flocon and the less revolutionary members of the extreme left had severed connections with the radical club. There remained, therefore, a comparatively small but united group. Its headquarters had been moved from the Rue de Taitbout to 7 Rue neuve des bons Enfants, and on April 16 they were to be moved again to 6 Rue du Hasard, where they were to remain till after June 13, 1849. Lamennais was the titular head of the Mountain, but Ledru-Rollin was its guiding spirit and chief spokesman. There exists no list of the members of this group, but from the numerous manifestoes, impeachments, and protests signed by them, it is possible to ascertain who were certainly Montagnards, who were possible members of this group, and who belonged to the independent extreme left.

Undoubted Mountain	66
Questionable Mountain	13
Independent extreme left	49
<hr/>	
Total extreme left	128 ¹

¹ Undoubted members of the Mountain were: Arnaud du Var, Astaix, Bac, Baune, Benôit, Martin Bernard, Bertholon, Bravard-Toussaint,

Working in frequent cooperation with the extreme left was the left proper, composed of such deputies as Jules Favre, Glais-Bizoin, Landrin, Récurt, and Trélat; this group met at the Palais National. Crémieux, Lamartine, and their friends were not affiliated with this organization but worked with it, and the Garnier-Pagès coterie frequently supported it. The other parties of the Chamber of Deputies were the left centre (François Arago, Marrast, Sénard), the centre (Cavaignac, Marie), the Dufaure right centre, the Barrot right centre, the right (Thiers), and the extreme right (Falloux). The three last-named groups met together in the club of the Rue de Poitiers.

Ledru-Rollin continued his attacks on the Barrot government. On April 3 he and a member of the left centre named Deludre introduced an amendment to the budget, cutting off the salary of General Changarnier as commander-in-chief

Breymand, Brives, Bruys, Buvignier, Calès, Cholat, Clement, Dain, David d'Angers, Delbetz, Demontry, Detours, Deville, Doutre, Dubarry, Paulin and Xavier Durrieu, Fargin-Fayolle, Gambon, Gent, Greppo, Guinard, Jandeau, Joigneaux, Joly Jr., Joly Sr., Labrousse, Lagrange, Lamennais, Lasteyras, Laurent de l'Ardèche, Ledru-Rollin, Pierre Lefranc, Pierre Leroux, Madet, Maichain, Mathé, Mathieu de la Drôme, Ménand, Michot-Boutet, Auguste Mie, Morhéry, Mulé, Demosthène Ollivier, Pegot-Ogier, Pelletier, Perdiguier, Proudhon, Félix Pyat, Eugène Raspail, Raynal, Robert, Ronjat, Germain Sarrut, Victor Schoelcher, Signard, Terrier, Vignerte. Questionable members of the Mountain were: Bochard, Pierre Bonaparte, Delbrel, Ducluzeau, Ducoux, Laussedat, Piétri, Pin, Renaud, Renou de Ballon, Richard, Target, Yves. Independent members of the extreme left were: Antoine, Emmanuel and Etienne Arago, Arnaud de l'Ariège, Audry de Puyravault, Azerm, Bajard, Baume, Bourzat, Francisque Bouvet, Brard, Bruckner, Canel, Champy, Chauffour, Chavoix, Considerant, Curnier, Demortreux, Dudouy, Durand-Savoyat, Espagne, Fawtier, Flocon, Carlos Forel, Gloxin, Guiter, Hingray, Kestner, Koenig, Laflize, Lagarde, Lebarillier, Lefrançois, Alphonse Marie, Médal, Millard, Pascal d'Aix, Penières, Picard, Quinet, Reverchon, Martin Rey, General Rey, Jean Reynaud, St. Gaudens, Schlosser, Viox, Westercamp.

of the National Guard. Deludre explained that Changarnier had now held his illegal double command for three months and ought not to receive a double salary. Léon Faucher asserted that the double command was only a temporary measure and that fear of disturbances was not yet over. Ledru could not let slip this opportunity of criticizing the government. The ministers originally stated, he declared, that this violation of the law of 1831 was a temporary measure, but they had attempted to make it permanent by eternally declaring that order had been troubled. "The necessity of maintaining order is constantly being asserted. But order does not exist when there is anarchy in the laws." Ledru then reiterated his claim as to Changarnier's lack of responsibility. He insisted that either the cabinet should regularize the situation by having the law of 1831 repealed or that the Assembly should refuse the appropriation for the salary of the dictator.¹ Faucher again asserted the responsibility of the ministry for the acts of Changarnier. Various orators of the left and centre supported the reduction of the budget, and the amendment was passed 361 to 304. A self-respecting cabinet would after this either have resigned or have rectified the act blamed. Faucher and Barrot did nothing.

The conservatives received another setback a few days later. The imposition of the tax of forty-five centimes was one of the most unpopular acts of the provisional government. On April 12 accordingly, during the discussion on the budget Chavoix, a member of the extreme left, introduced an amendment to repay the sums collected on this tax. During the debate Duclerc, minister of the treasury under the executive commission, asserted that the finances had been in a flourishing state until Ledru-Rollin's circular

¹ *Moniteur* 1224.

of March 12 had caused a panic. State bankruptcy had been proposed, he added. "By whom?" inquired Ledru. Duclerc refused to answer, but said that paper money was proposed by Ledru-Rollin. This attack brought Ledru to his feet. He declared that the word *bankruptcy* had been pronounced and that the name of the person who had suggested it ought to be made public. He showed how the financial condition of France had been bad before February 1848 and how consequently the circular of March 12 could not have caused the lamentable state of affairs. Ledru said that he had advocated a tax of one franc fifty but only on the rich, and also paper money and proportional taxes, but that he had opposed state bankruptcy.¹ Duclerc now admitted that neither Ledru nor Flocon had advocated bankruptcy, and he stated that he had not mentioned the tax on the rich alone as it was an undemocratic measure. Goudchaux, the first finance minister of the republic, asserted the absolute sanity of all Ledru's financial suggestions and declared that no member of the provisional government had advocated bankruptcy. Dupont de l'Eure made a similar statement. The amendment to repay the money collected on the tax of forty-five centimes was now rejected, only the left favoring it.²

The subject of the financial policies of the provisional government was resumed on April 21. Goudchaux explained that bankruptcy had never been proposed but that suspension of payments had been suggested to several members of the provisional government and to their ministers. He then asked the author of the suggestion to arise, but no one moved. Ledru asserted that it was all-important that

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 271-8. For extracts, see pp. 86-9.

² On April 14 the Ducos commission presented its report exonerating the financial administration of the provisional government. See pp. 63, 83, 90, 131, 164, 241. Ledru had been heard before it on March 16.

the person who had advocated the suspension be named, that this person could defend his idea as he was a deputy. Ledru then related how Delamarre¹ had proposed a forced loan. He explained that calumnies had been circulated against his own personal integrity and that the courts had declared that they had no jurisdiction in such a case.² Thus it was his duty, Ledru said, when the opportunity offered, to tear the mask from one of his opponents.³

Goudchaux maintained that he was in honor bound not to violate the confidence reposed in him and that therefore he could not name the man who had proposed to him suspension of payments. He told how Fould, a Bonapartist banker, had criticized him for paying out money as obligations came due. Ledru and a fellow-Montagnard interrupted to say that Fould then must be the man who had suggested suspension of payments. "I say no," replied the Bonapartist banker. "I say yes," shouted Goudchaux. Imagine the sensation. Fould tried explanations and denials, but his defense was overthrown by Goudchaux, supported by Marrast and Crémieux. Even Barrot was convinced that Fould was prevaricating.⁴

This debate was a triumph for the republicans. The onus of shady financial suggestions was thrown back on a prominent Bonapartist, Fould, and on a prominent Orleanist, Delamarre. The latter sent a letter to the Assembly asking for authorization to prosecute Ledru-Rollin for his

¹ Ledru did not name him, but members of the extreme left shouted his name from their benches. See pp. 89-90.

² See page 61.

³ *Moniteur* 1480.

⁴ Barrot 3: 188-9. Barrot admits that Ledru was cleared of the charge of advocating bankruptcy, but unable to be just to an adversary, he adds: "When M. Ledru-Rollin proposed paper money . . . did he not render bankruptcy inevitable?"

calumnies. On April 25 at Ledru-Rollin's own request the letter was read. The accused deputy maintained his statements. The Assembly on the motion of Barraguey d'Hilliers, president of the Rue de Poitiers group, voted the previous question, as representatives could not be prosecuted for statements made in the Assembly.

Meanwhile Ledru had found a new opportunity to attack the government. Preparations were being made for the elections to the new legislature and the various parties were holding campaign meetings. On April 10 Ledru-Rollin interpellated the minister of the interior on the intervention of the police in these meetings. He explained that many large cities were irritated at this intervention and that in some cases the municipal authorities had even handed in their resignations in consequence. He asked how the government justified this interference.¹ Faucher replied that many clubs had transformed themselves into electoral assemblies and that it was necessary to discover which were true campaign meetings and which were clubs. Either the meetings were secret, he said, and therefore forbidden, or they were public and then the police merely looked on. He gave examples of anarchistic doctrines uttered by extreme revolutionists. Faucher ended by declaring that he wished complete liberty in the elections and he asked whether the issuing of *Bulletins of the Republic* had been consistent with such liberty.

Then Ledru spoke again. He began by saying that the minister of the interior had, according to custom, tried to envenom the debate, but that he himself would remain calm, whereupon a terrible uproar arose during which Ledru and a member of the extreme right indulged in recriminations.

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 340-9. Ledru had requested permission to interpellate the previous day.—*Moniteur* 1316.

When order was restored, Ledru continued. If anarchistic sentiments had been pronounced in public meetings, he said, they were but a reprisal for those uttered by a certain conservative who had declared that socialism must be destroyed not refuted. Denjoy interrupted: "You would prefer society to perish!" A bitter altercation ensued in which Denjoy considered himself insulted. Referring to the legal aspect of the matter, Ledru compared Faucher's circulars to his subordinates with the law of 1790 on which the right of interference was based, and he expressed a doubt as to whether the minister had ever read the law. He cited a law of 1789 specifically denying the right of police intervention. Ledru next began a line of argument which he claimed to have taken from Maleville; he declared that an interpretative circular in connection with the law of 1790 had excepted electoral meetings from police surveillance. Besides, he added, the Constituent assembly of 1790 had blamed the municipality of Dax for police intervention. He went over the arguments again and then summed them up. This piece of convincing but ill-arranged and dull dialectic was interrupted by a fist-fight: a Montagnard, Eugène Raspail, had struck Point, a deputy of the right. When the debate was resumed, Ledru declared that he had practically finished and would say no more.¹

Barrot tried to quibble with Ledru-Rollin's arguments. The police, he said, had a right to attend political meetings as citizens. The right to dissolve a meeting was not the same as the right of surveillance. The police had to keep order and prevent clubs from transforming themselves into electoral assemblies. Barrot claimed that Ledru had confused the right of surveillance and the right of prevention. His speech was clever but sophistical.

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 249-264.

Ledru-Rollin, replying maintained that Barrot's arguments were the same as those used against him (Barrot) in the banquet campaign of 1847. Buffet, the minister of commerce, and Abbattucci, a Bonapartist, tried to confuse the orator by interruptions, but Ledru raised a laugh against them by inviting them to take the floor. (Both were poor speakers.) When the law abolishing clubs had been passed, Ledru continued, the Assembly had definitely declared that political meetings were excepted. The government had then pointed out the probability of the clubs changing themselves into electoral meetings, and still the Assembly had excepted the latter. Ledru repeated the arguments of his previous speech and quoted Barrot himself against the tendency to degrade a question like the liberty of elections to a mere police question. He ended by saying: "The government must be obeyed when it is not arbitrary, but when the government violates the law, only the right of resistance remains."¹ This was the first time that Ledru had spoken openly of resistance to the government.

Barrot again took the floor. He declared that Ledru reproduced other people's words to satiety, that Ledru was bold in confounding the right of prevention and arbitrary prohibition, that it was time that accusations against the ministry should cease since they affected the ignorant masses if not the deputies, that the authorities must have the right to preserve order. Barrot asserted that the single case of Dax had been cited against the government's contention whereas many cases might be cited in favor of it, but he took good care not to specify any of those. Let the question be submitted to the judiciary, he said. After this weak reply of Barrot, Ledru proposed an order of the day denouncing the intervention of the police, but the Assembly passed to

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 264-270.

the order of the day pure and simple against the opposition of the entire left and of a part of the left centre.

The altercation between Denjoy and Ledru resulted in a duel. Duels between deputies were common in 1848 and 1849.¹ Reports of duels by Ledru-Rollin had been circulated² but his affair with Denjoy was the only one in which the leader of the Mountain took part. On April 13 at five in the evening the opponents met near the Pont de Neuilly. It was raining torrents, but the adversaries were placed at twenty paces with pistols. Ledru fired and missed, but only the cap of Denjoy's cartridge exploded. Ledru-Rollin insisted that his antagonist shoot again, but the latter refused. Denjoy offered his hand, saying he had always had a high opinion of Ledru-Rollin personally. Ledru replied that no agreement was possible between persons who held such different views, but Denjoy still persisted and the two shook hands. At the Assembly Considerant was lecturing on socialism, and over two-hundred deputies escaped to the lobby to discuss the duel. When Denjoy arrived, Faucher shook him effusively by the hand.³

The Mountain continued its attack on the ministry. The Assembly had sent an expedition to Italy to prevent an Austrian attack on Rome. The troops had attacked the

¹ For other duels, see Arcay 252.

² On November 9, 1848, the *Réforme* denied that Ledru had been wounded. On December 19 the *Révolution démocratique et sociale* denied that he had been killed in a duel with a fellow-deputy.

³ Gallois 89-90; *Dix Décembre*, April 14; *Times*, April 16. For official declarations of the seconds, see *Réforme*, April 14; *National*, April 15. Ledru's seconds were two Montagnards, Pyat and Joly Sr.; Denjoy's were Baraguey d'Hilliers and Laussat, two deputies of the extreme right. For clever satire see *Lampion*, May. 10. The following couplet is given:

"Ce grand représent, n'étant qu'un palloquet,
Ses temoins sont partis, mais pas son pistolet."

Roman republic and on May 7 the deputies voted their disapproval of this attack. Nevertheless Louis Napoleon congratulated the troops and the cabinet did not disavow this action.¹ Thereupon on May 11 sixty members of the Mountain, including Ledru, proposed the impeachment of the president and his ministers.² A motion to send the impeachment to the bureaux was rejected, the lefts mustering only 128 votes against 388, and the subject was referred to the committee on justice where it died a peaceful death.

The adverse vote of May 7 on the Italian expedition had occurred on the eve of the elections, and Léon Faucher telegraphed to the departments a list of those who had voted against the government, advising the electors not to vote for these deputies. The Assembly was angered by this abuse of power and in an order of the day the minister of the interior was censured. Only Denjoy and four other members of the extreme right opposed this vote of lack of confidence. Of course after this Faucher was obliged to resign.

On May 22 Changarnier again showed his insubordination. This was the fourth time that this general had manifested his contempt for the Assembly. First of all he held an illegal double command. Then on January 29 he had disregarded the orders of Marrast, president of the Assembly. Thirdly, after the Assembly had manifested its disapproval of Louis Napoleon's congratulations to the army near Rome, Changarnier had posted these congratulations in all the barrack rooms by military command. Finally on May 22 when Marrast feared trouble on account of a legislative deadlock over Italian affairs³ and ordered General Forest to bring his regiments to the Palais Bourbon, Changarnier wrote to his subordinates to obey no orders but his

¹ For details, see p. 349.

² *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 1759; *Réforme*, May 10.

³ See p. 350.

own, and no troops responded to Marrast's command. The deadlock was broken, but Changarnier had again shown his insubordination.

On the next day, May 23 Crémieux interpellated the government on the rumors of attempts to reestablish the empire. He told how there was talk of an agreement between Louis Napoleon and the northern monarchs to destroy democracy in Europe and also rumors of the replacement of the honest Barrot cabinet by a Thiers-Bugeaud-Falloux combination which would carry out a coup d'état. Considerant and St. Romme, another deputy of the extreme left, supported these accusations.

Ledru then obtained the floor. He asserted that the events of the previous day were circumstantial evidence of a plot. He told how President Marrast had informed the premier of the deadlock. Barrot shouted a denial, but Marrast vouched for the truth of this fact. Ledru-Rollin continued, waxing wroth at the denial of Barrot. At the very time, he said, when the troops should have been ready to obey the commands of the officers of the Assembly, Changarnier had written to the colonels of the army to obey only orders given by himself. "He did well," cried Quentin-Bauchart, whereupon Antony Thouret, a member of the left, made an angry retort. Marrast had great difficulty in quieting these two disputants. Ledru resumed, saying that if the Assembly required proof of a plot, it should name a commission to interrogate Changarnier and the colonels. He gave examples of earlier defiances of the legislature by Louis Napoleon and Changarnier, and he asked what clearer proof of conspiracy could be wanted than the repeated disobedience of the general. He said that the Montagnards desired an investigation so that it would be clear to all that if anyone were violating the constitution, it was not they but their opponents.¹

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 316-321.

Barrot asserted that the army would never betray the constitution. A member of the extreme left supported Ledru's accusations as to the disobedience of Changarnier. Michot, a Montagnard, declared that certain soldiers had been instructed to shout: *Three Cheers for the Emperor*; Lagrange, another Montagnard, said that the army was loyal to France but not to its leaders. Barrot declared that all the charges were absurd and trivial, that not a coup d'état but an uprising was to be feared, that Changarnier had written no letter to the colonels as Ledru had stated. Here Ledru handed a copy of the letter to President Marrast, and Barrot had to change his line of argument. He said that Ledru ought to have given him the letter earlier, that he could not imagine when the order to bring troops to the Palais Bourbon the previous day could have been delivered, that he was sure that Changarnier did not know of the order and had not wilfully disobeyed the Assembly. Ledru-Rollin asked that the discussion be postponed so that the head of the cabinet might have time to learn the facts.³ The Assembly agreed to continue the debate the next day.

Accordingly on May 24 the subject was renewed. Barrot declared that General Changarnier had no intention of insulting the Assembly, but his explanation of this statement is difficult to understand. Considerant expressed his belief that Barrot and Louis Napoleon were honest, but that conspirators existed who were making use of the president's name.

Then Ledru spoke again. He showed how the ministry was constantly shifting its line of defense. "What is the sense," he said, "of declaring for General Changarnier on five or six occasions: Yes, he actually violated the constitution, he issued commands in contravention of the law,

¹ *Moniteur* 1879.

he disobeyed the orders of the Assembly, he wished to fight against it in behalf of the government—all that is true, but his intentions are excellent, he profoundly respects the Assembly?" Ledru observed that it was absurd to plead ignorance of events in Changarnier's behalf, that the general could not have written his letter to the colonels except to cancel Marrast's orders, that Changarnier even thought the letter so important that he had written it with his own hand. Here Barrot interrupted to explain that Changarnier had not written but had dictated the letter. Colonel Charras, a member of the extreme left, denied this, and General Clement Thomas asked why Changarnier, who had a seat in the legislature, did not explain matters himself. Ledru continued, asking for an investigation into the affair and repeating his former arguments. Although an investigation might prove merely that a folly had been committed, what, he asked, were Louis Napoleon's attempts to gain the throne in 1836 and in 1840 but follies?¹

There had been excitement all through Ledru's speech but nothing to equal the outburst of indignation at this last question. Emile de Girardin, the influential free-lance journalist, declared that it was not permissible to call the elect of six millions a fool. Etienne Arago and Martin Bernard had an angry colloquy with Barrot. The latter declared that the president of the republic could be attacked by constitutional methods, but that it was illegal to attack a man who could not answer. President Marrast mildly rebuked Ledru-Rollin for the words he had used.

Finally Ledru resumed. He declared that his statement was not an insult but history. He believed in the absolute honesty of Barrot and he did not accuse the president of the republic, but there were many conspirators in Louis Napo-

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 322-9.

leon's entourage. He said that he did not accuse Barrot of dishonesty or even of inordinate love of power. "If I had to qualify you, I would never call you a conspirator; I would say what has already been said of you, that you are blind." Barrot retorted: "I did not know that it was in my destiny to be treated as blind by both M. Guizot and M. Ledru-Rollin." Ledru-Rollin concluded, asserting that he did not fear a successful coup d'état, but that he did fear a Bonapartist uprising and consequent bloodshed.¹

Falloux, the legitimist member of the cabinet, undertook to answer Ledru. He maintained that there was no urgent need of a committee of investigation, that the minister of war could do all the investigating necessary. Since February 24, he said, there had been no danger from Bonapartist agents. It was foolish to threaten the country with an August 10, a September 2, a May 31, or a tenth Thermidor. "You stop before the eighteenth Brumaire," shouted Ledru. Falloux continued, inveighing against all disturbers of the peace, and then swinging off to the subject of the National workshops.

On the following day May 25, the debate was continued, but most of the discussion dealt with the National Workshops, Falloux's opinions on the history of the sixteenth century, the opinions of the Montagnard Joly in 1831, and what Considerant had recently said to Barrot in a conversation between the two. Ledru-Rollin had moved the appointment of a committee of investigation, but only the left and the left centre supported him, and accordingly the Assembly passed to the order of the day by a vote of 308 to 260.

The next day, May 26, was the last of the Constituent Assembly. A final attempt at obtaining an amnesty for

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 329-333.

political prisoners was lost by four votes, most of the centre abstaining from voting. There was a brief discussion in which Ledru took part as to the powers of the officials of the Assembly in the period before the new legislature should meet, but an harmonious agreement was reached.¹ Armand Marrast read his president's address, and the Assembly passed into history.

¹ *Moniteur* 1910.

CHAPTER XX

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

THE trial of Barbès, Blanqui, and the other revolutionary chiefs involved in the affair of May 15 began at Bourges on March 6, 1849. Most of the prominent statesmen were summoned as witnesses, including the members of the provisional government. On March 18 Ledru arrived in the city. He was fêted by the inhabitants and in the evening he spoke at a banquet held in his honor.¹ During the afternoon he had given his evidence; he had shown a friendly feeling towards most of the accused, but with Blanqui he had quarreled.² One of Ledru's remarks attracted attention: "When a revolt in behalf of the regency is attempted, one does not cheer the regency. When a revolt in behalf of legitimacy is attempted, one does not cheer legitimacy. One makes use of the feeling animating the people, one destroys the existing administration, and by a sleight of hand one obtains the goal desired."³ Beaumont-Vassy, a conservative onlooker, said: "The pantomime with which M. Ledru-Rollin accompanied these words impressed them on the memory of all present."⁴

¹ *Révolution démocratique et sociale, Constitutionnel*, March 21; Breton, *Boissy* 2: 124.

² For evidence, see *Moniteur for 1849*, pp. 947-8, 962; *Réforme*, March 21, 1849. For extracts, see pp. 83, 121, 126, 139, 153-4, 159, 189.

³ *Réforme*, March 21. Cf. Beaumont-Vassy 4: 485; Breton, *Boissy* 2: 126; *Moniteur* 947; *Constitutionnel*, March 23.

⁴ Beaumont-Vassy 4: 485.

The court was unfair to the prisoners but not so unfair as the one that sat later at Versailles to try Ledru-Rollin and his friends on account of the fiasco of June 13. Finally on April 13 sentence was pronounced. General Courtais was acquitted. All the other prisoners were found guilty of sedition. A peculiarity of the sentence was that Blanqui, undoubtedly more involved in the affair of May 15 than Barbès or Raspail or Albert, received a lighter penalty. Louis Blanc and Caussidière had escaped to England; the prosecution produced no evidence against them but condemned them in their absence. This was the first of these political condemnations by the judiciary, with which the government of Louis Napoleon was continually busy.

In another trial Ledru-Rollin acted as lawyer for the accused. Delescluze was prosecuted for inciting to hatred and for attacking the Constituent Assembly in his articles in the *Révolution démocratique et sociale*. On March 12, 1849 the case was tried.¹ Ledru deplored the revival of animosities which had begun to die out. He claimed that it was absurd to accuse Delescluze of hatred for the republic, as for twenty years he had been advocating a republic. He defended the truth of Delescluze's newspaper accounts of the National Workshops, of the June Days, and of January 29, and asked why republicans only, never royalists, were brought to trial. He declared that attacking Cavaignac was not attacking the Assembly. He maintained that it was unjust to protest against newspaper discussion of the June Days. He compared the prosecution with the refusal of the courts to hear cases of calumnies against conservative

¹ It had been postponed from February 13 on account of the illness of Ledru-Rollin. Delescluze had told the court: "The sickness of Citizen Ledru-Rollin is serious. For several days he has been spitting blood plentifully. . . . This morning when I left him, he was about to be bled."—*Révolution démocratique et sociale*, February 14. On the twentieth Ledru had completely recovered.—*Ibid.*, February 20.

newspapers. The jury, however, brought in a verdict of guilty on both counts, and Delescluze was sentenced to a year's imprisonment and a thousand francs' fine.¹ The radical and socialist newspapers helped pay the fine.

On April 10 Delescluze was again condemned, this time to three year's imprisonment, 11,000 francs' fine, and costs. At the same time, Darimon, his colleague of the *Peuple*, was sentenced to three years' imprisonment and a fine of 6,000 francs. The Mountain published a letter declaring its support of the two newspapers and contributing 500 francs to each journal. The *Presse*, the *National*, the *Réforme*, the *République*, and the *Vraie République* declared their moral solidarity with the condemned newspapers and contributed towards the payment of the fines.² Delescluze never served his term, though the reason for this cannot be discovered.

Meanwhile the electoral campaign was in full swing. Early in April the Mountain thought it necessary to issue a declaration of principles. "We accept the constitution even though it does not include the right to labor or the abolition of the death penalty; we accept it in spite of its imperfections because it is the result of universal suffrage and because it can be revised." The work of the Constituent Assembly, the Mountain declared, had been illogical because the monarchists who composed a large part of it were incapable of establishing a republican regime. The time had now arrived when the voters could reject those deputies who had voted for the maintenance of the state of siege, the deportation of political prisoners, the bonding of newspapers, the law against clubs, internal duties on meats

¹ *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, March 13; *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 827. For extract see pp. 193-4.

² *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, April 11, 12.

and wines, the eleven-hour day; they could elect those who had voted for the reduction of postage rates, the abolition of the salt tax, the budget, and the preamble to the constitution. The foreign policy of the Mountain was that all nations should be free and should be given aid to liberate themselves when they asked for it, that France was pledged to succor Poland, Italy, Germany, Hungary. The internal policy of the Mountain was to improve the condition of the people and to enlighten them; to follow up the expulsion of the monarch with the expulsion of misery and ignorance. Property was the basis of the family and of society, but that involved the right to labor. The state should extend aid, that is instruments of labor, to all. Taxes should be progressive. The size of the army and the length of service should be reduced, a reserve should be organized, and pensions should be granted. Education should be free and administered by the state, and the salaries of teachers ought to be increased. The emancipation of the lower clergy, judicial reform, state administration of such natural monopolies as railroads and mines were other items in the program of the Mountain. In the sphere of political organization it advocated universal and direct suffrage; unity of power and division of functions; an executive revocable by the legislature and subordinate to it. "Finally, all the consequences of the three great principles of the revolution; that is, government of all, by all, and for all; the republic one and indivisible; the democratic and social republic."¹ This proclamation is the best summary of what the radicals of 1848-9 advocated. Half of what they demanded has since become law; the other half occupies a prominent place in the programs of the progressive parties of today. All these ideas are reasonable; none are impracticable.

¹ *Ibid.*, April 5, 1849; *Réforme*, April 6; *Peuple*, April 7. The seven most important radical and socialist newspapers and 56 deputies, including Ledru, signed this declaration.

In Paris the Democratic-Socialist Committee, the electoral machine of the Mountain, met about April 25 and chose its candidates for the new assembly. In the balloting the first four names and the votes they received were as follows: Pierre Leroux 179, Félix Pyat 177, Ledru-Rollin 173, Greppo 165.¹ There were twenty-eight deputies to be chosen for Paris, and the Democratic-Socialist Committee filled out its list with such names as Cabet, Proudhon, Lamennais, Considerant, Alton-Shée, and two sergeants prominent in the democratic movement in the army. These twenty-eight candidates united in a declaration to the effect that the republic stood for "the rejuvenation of society; dying of corruption; the control of the state by the people; liberty, equality, and fraternity." They promised that with the aid of the people they would save the political and social revolution in France and in Europe.²

The conservatives, on the other hand, drew up a list of candidates headed by Barrot, Bugeaud, Cavaignac, Changarnier, Falloux, Marie, and Thiers.³ This was a combination of conservatives, Bonapartists, and the right wing of the moderates. An association called The Friends of the Constitution put forward a list which took from each of the others the less extreme names, such as Ledru-Rollin and Cavaignac, and composed the rest from the centre and left of the old legislature.⁴ These were the three prominent lists in Paris.

The campaign was unlike that of April 1848, which had

¹ *Peuple, Réforme, Révolution démocratique et sociale, National*, April 26; *Times*, April 27.

² *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, May 9; *Peuple*, May 14, 1849.

³ *Constitutionnel*, May 9; *Atelier*, May.

⁴ *National*, May 7, 1849; *Constitutionnel, Times*, May 9. This list contained seven members of the provisional government and ten other officials of that government or of the executive commission.

been a campaign of individuals. Now three distinct parties were bringing forward their candidates. On one side were the radicals and socialists headed by Ledru. On the other side was the combination of all types of conservatives: Bonapartists, Orleanists, legitimists, clericals. Between these two and attracting little attention was the great parliamentary group of the left and the centre, the moderates of the provisional government, the supporters of Cavaignac.

Besides being a candidate in Paris, Ledru also ran in at least fourteen departments.¹

The government worked against Ledru-Rollin. At Valenciennes the authorities tried to stop men from wearing his picture. At Cherbourg the prefect spoke openly against him. At Marmande the sub-prefect persecuted all officials who supported him.²

"The departments were full of rumors published by the anarchists," said an English traveler. "One country paper announced that Louis Napoleon had been deposed, another that Ledru-Rollin and Marrast had been appointed dictators, and another that Napoleon had proclaimed himself emperor."³

The friends of Ledru thought that it would be advisable for him to tour the provinces. He could not accept all the invitations he received. To Bordeaux he sent a friend in

¹ Allier, Eure, Gard, Upper Garonne, Gers, Gironde, Hérault, Indre, North, Bouches du Rhône, Saône et Loire, Sarthe, Lower Seine, Var. Besides, his name was proposed in Ain, Aisne, Creuse, Mayenne, and Pas de Calais, but his name was not on the official socialist list. In Ardennes, Eastern Pyrenees, and Somme Ledru withdrew his name. For Upper Alps, Ile et Vilaine, Landes, Maine et Loire, and Tarn no statistics are available. In the Sarthe when the departmental committee balloted, Ledru came first with 801 out of 820 votes.—Guyon 151; *Courier of Le Mans*, April 29, 1849.

² *Constitutionnel*, May 29; *Réforme*, April 14, March 11.

³ Senior I: 133, May 15, 1849.

his place.¹ There were rumors at various times that Ledru would visit the Midi, but he never found time.

The citizens of Le Mans invited Ledru, Pyat, and Joigneaux to a banquet in their city. Pyat refused, disliking a night in the diligence, but the other two Montagnards accepted. They set out on April 21. Ledru made a brief speech on the way at La Ferté.² Early on the following morning the two deputies reached Le Mans, both tired. A reception of two hundred delegates was scheduled for ten o'clock. "Ledru was not in a state to receive them," says Joigneaux; "he was spitting blood, which happened to him often. He told me that he needed two hours of absolute repose and that I would oblige him by making his excuses." Joigneaux spent a pleasant two hours. A peasant asked permission to shake Ledru's hand. Joigneaux brought him to Ledru, and Ledru discovered that the peasant had come on foot over ten miles just to shake his hand, and that he was obliged to return immediately to his sick wife. "Hardly had the peasant left," continues Joigneaux, "when Ledru, deeply affected, threw his arms around my neck, leaned his head on my shoulder, and with eyes filled with tears exclaimed: *Oh, my dear friend, what devotion, what a heart we have seen! Anyone who would deceive him must be a great villain.*" Then Ledru graciously received the delegates.³

The rain was pouring when, a little after noon, Ledru set out for the banquet. On an island in the Sarthe several thousand democrats had assembled from all the villages in the neighborhood. The conservatives had paid certain men two francs apiece to hiss Ledru. One of them admitted this

¹ *Réforme*, May 10.

² Joigneaux 2:9. *Union* of Le Mans quoted in *Débats*, April 29; *Réforme*, April 26.

³ Joigneaux 2:9-12.

to Joigneaux, who said to him: "Here are three francs; now be quiet." Joigneaux spoke on progress, and various local politicians made addresses.¹ The guests were protected by canvass, but the speaker's platform was in the open air, and for three quarters of an hour Ledru spoke with the rain beating upon him. He glorified the democratic *idea* and prophesied its eventual triumph. He explained his fiscal and foreign policies. He supported the right to labor. He denied that the Mountain advocated abolition of property, destruction of the church, or sanguinary measures. He said that success was assured to the people, not by violence, but by the peaceful method of the ballot box.² After this speech Ledru attended the meeting where the candidates were selected and made another brief address. The crowd escorted him back to his hotel and stood under his window cheering him. Joigneaux says: "Ledru did not like these demonstrations and told me the pain he felt at this crowd insisting on standing under his window in spite of the pouring rain." Accordingly the two deputies caused the rumor to be spread abroad that they had departed, and the crowd dispersed.³

Ledru and Joigneaux received no one during the evening as both needed rest. The latter relates: "I had a fever and Ledru was more worried than was necessary. He made me leave the door between our rooms open, and five or six times during the night he rose to inquire how I was. I had great difficulty in reassuring him. He hardly slept that night in spite of his need of rest." At five the next morning the two deputies left the city quietly. They took

¹ Joigneaux 2: 11-15. See also *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, April 26; *Réforme*, *Times*, April 28; *Débats*, April 29; *Courier of Le Mans*, April 25.

² *Réforme*, April 27; *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, April 30.

³ Joigneaux 2: 15-16.

a carriage and reached Tours without being recognized. There they took a train for Paris.¹

Another city visited by Ledru during the campaign was Châteauroux.² He went via Bourges and Issoudun, and while the train stopped at the latter station, he addressed a few hundred people gathered there.³ At half past five o'clock on April 28 he arrived at Châteauroux accompanied by three deputies of the extreme left. He was received by a committee and walked to his hotel through cheering crowds.⁴ He took dinner with twenty five delegates of the cantons and afterwards received a group of workingmen. He retired early.

The next day a thousand pounds of bread were distributed to the poor by the democratic-socialist party. In the afternoon Ledru started out for the banquet hall, accompanied by forty committee-men and by twelve young girls dressed in white with red sashes. One of these girls presented Ledru with a bouquet; he thanked her, speaking of the interest of the Mountain in the lot of working girls. At the banquet his fellow deputies and local celebrities made speeches.⁵ Ledru himself toasted the democratic and social republic; he explained the policies of the Mountain.⁶

¹ *Ibid.*, 2: 16-18; *Journal de l'Indre et Loire*, April 25.

² For acceptance, see *Journal de l'Indre*, April 25; *République de 1848* of Bourges, April 27.

³ *Droit Commun* of Bourges, May 1.

⁴ *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, May 3; *Journal de l'Indre*, May 1, 2. The conservative papers claim the reception was chilling: *Times*, May 3; *Constitutionnel* of Châteauroux quoted by *Débats*, May 2; *Représentant de l'Indre*, May 2.

⁵ *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, May 3; *Journal de l'Indre*, May 2. The conservative accounts try to make the affair as ludicrous as possible with the damsels munching gingerbread and forgetting to applaud when the signal was given.

⁶ *Journal de l'Indre*, May 2.

At seven o'clock that evening he left Châteauroux. He stopped off at Issoudun to make a second address there. Late at night he arrived at Bourges and was again forced to speak. The next morning he left for Moulins.¹ So far his trip had been a great success,² but it was to end with some unfortunate occurrences.

Ledru-Rollin reached Moulins in the evening of April 30 and was accompanied by a crowd of several thousand citizens from the barrier to the house of the Montagnard Mathé, where he was to lodge.³ The next day a banquet of five thousand radicals and socialists took place in a closed garden. On a boulevard from which this garden could be overlooked conservatives had collected to hiss the orators and drown their speeches. Nevertheless the banquet passed off smoothly. Ledru enunciated the principles of his party,⁴ and other orators gave voice to their opinions. The banqueters intended to march out from the garden, but they were attacked by the conservatives on the boulevard. Ledru and his friends restrained their followers and a violent collision was avoided. The moderate newspaper, the *Constitution* observed: "A quarrel arose between those leaving

¹ *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, May 3; *Droit Commun* of Bourges, May 1; *République de 1848* of Bourges, May 2.

² See Spuller 249, and for the attitude of a conservative, see Breton, *Boissy* 2: 131.

³ Throughout the account of the occurrences at Le Mans, the narrative of Ledru in *Discours politiques* 2: 292-6 is closely followed. It is confirmed by the account in Mauve 68-74 and by the testimony at the Riom trial which followed these events; also by the radical *Républicain de l'Allier* quoted in the *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, May 3, and by the moderate *Constitution de l'Allier* quoted in the *Peuple*, May 5. The conservative papers, the *Mémorial de l'Allier* and the *Echo de l'Allier*, differ somewhat; they insist that Moulins was hostile to the radicals and that the faction of Ledru started each of the disturbances.

⁴ For speech, see *Républicain*. The conservative newspapers falsely claimed that the speech was incendiary, an appeal against the priests and the rich.

the garden and the crowd outside; the provocation evidently came from the latter. Fortunately the restraining influence of the republican leaders at the banquet prevented any serious disorder."

The banqueters reconducted Ledru to Mathé's house. The prefect of the department had had the *rappel* beaten, and the National Guard prevented any further disorder. Ledru remained at Mathé's from four o'clock until seven, and the city seemed to have quieted down during this time. Accordingly the prefect dismissed the National Guard.

In order to avoid any occasion for a demonstration and a riot, Ledru advanced the hour of his departure. He left in a carriage with Mathé and four other friends. Unfortunately some workingmen recognized the leader of the Mountain and cheered him. Ledru induced them to withdraw, but not before the crowd in the chief square had become aware of his presence. This crowd was composed of conservatives and was led by members of the National Guard. Ledru's carriage was stopped and its inmates were threatened by swords, rifles, and bayonets. The glass windows were shattered by stones. Bayonets were thrust through the rear of the carriage. A sabre blow was directed at Ledru, which he parried with his cloak. Mathé threw himself in front of his leader to prevent a repetition of this danger. The brutality of the assailants saved the day, for one of them struck the postilion with a violent blow on the hands; the horses felt the reins quiver and started off like lightning. Ledru and his friends were quickly carried beyond the pale of danger.¹ The night was peaceful at

¹ Ledru, Mauve, the *Républicain*, and the *Constitution* all claim that the attack was premeditated. The prosecution at Riom admitted the attack, but claimed that it was not premeditated and that Ledru's death was not desired. The *Mémorial* and the *Echo* belittled the violence, denied premeditation, and claimed that the riot was suppressed by officers of the National Guard.

Moulins while Ledru and Mathé sped on to Paris, making no stop at Bourges where they caught a train.

On May 2 the Constituent Assembly was in session when Ledru and Mathé rushed in. Ledru was given the floor immediately. He related his adventures and declared that the insult of Moulins concerned the entire Assembly as some of its members had been attacked. He feared reprisals and hoped the Assembly would order an immediate investigation and the trial of those who had assailed him. As a jury in the department of the Allier would be prejudiced in favor of the National Guard, he asked that the trial take place elsewhere. Ledru declared that he himself believed that the affair was the work of a few conspirators.¹ Barrot replied that in spite of differences with Ledru-Rollin he deeply felt the insult, that violence led to violence and must be punished, that the Assembly might rely on the government to order a judicial investigation immediately.

Mathé presented a formal demand that the trial should not take place in Moulins; he added that a royalist agent had tried to stir up trouble at Sançoins, but that fortunately he and Ledru had not passed through that town.² A preliminary report of the attorney-general maintained that there was provocation at the banquet, that there was no premeditation in the attack.³ The government transferred the trial to Riom in the department of Puy de Dôme. Fourteen individuals were arrested, but all but three were released before the trial began on August 19. The prosecution proved the attack, and apparently identified the accused as assailants, but it showed no energy in its arraignment and claimed that the attack was unpremeditated. The defense

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 292-8.

² *National*, May 7, 1849; *Peuple*, May 9.

³ Archives Nationales BB30-361, quoted Lebey, *Ministère* 304.

asserted that the members of the National Guard were the defenders of the peace against agitators. The three prisoners were acquitted.¹ This trial took place after the pseudo-uprising of June 13 and the flight of Ledru-Rollin, and the government was not anxious to convict those who had attacked one of its enemies, no matter how unjust the attack.

On May 13 the elections to the Legislative Assembly took place quietly. Everywhere the moderates were defeated. Besides Ledru, only Crémieux of all the provisional government was returned; the others with most of the former moderate ministers suffered defeat. The conservatives obtained an overwhelming majority, but the democratic-socialist ticket was successful in many departments. In Paris the outcome was a mixed one. A Bonapartist came first, then Ledru-Rollin. Nine others from the socialist ticket were returned among the twenty-eight deputies from Paris. Ledru was elected in five departments; in the other nine in which he ran he was defeated. However, it was a splendid tribute to receive a fivefold election; no one else was returned by more than three constituencies. The people of Allier, the department in which Ledru had been attacked showed their sympathy for Ledru. Seventy-four officers and soldiers resigned from the National Guard,² and the department returned the entire radical-socialist ticket. Ledru's total vote was about half a million, more than he had received for president.

¹ The *Courier de la Limogne*, August 26, and the *Gazette des Tribunaux*, August 28, both give incomplete stenographic reports. Mauve 91-3 gives an excellent secondary account.

² Mauve 71; *Peuple*, May 9, 1849.

<i>Department</i>	<i>Number of votes</i>	<i>Place in list</i>	<i>Number of deputies elected</i>
Seine	129,459	2nd	28
Saône et Loire	75,510	1st	12
Allier	40,407	5th	7
Hérault	31,202	8th	8
Var	27,751	3rd	7
Lower Seine	39,837	18th	16
Sarthe	39,127	—	—
Gironde	33,045	—	—
Upper Garonne	30,622	—	—
Bouches du Rhône	25,266	13th	10
Eure	11,131	—	—
Gers	10,099	—	—

Total 492,556 *

In the Legislative Assembly which had just been elected parties were clearly defined. The conservatives formed a solid phalanx, the Mountain another. The independent members of the extreme left always and the left usually acted with the Mountain. The left centre headed by Cavaignac swayed between the left and the right. The relative strength of the three groups was shown in the vote for president on June 1:

Dupin, candidate of the right	336
Ledru-Rollin, candidate of the lefts	182
Lamoricière, candidate of the left center	76
Scattered	11 †

The left was probably divided as follows:

* This total does not include Gard, Indre, and North, nor the departments where Ledru may have had a few scattered votes. In Indre, where nine deputies were elected, Ledru-Rollin was tenth on the list.

† All the other candidates of the left were also defeated. For Montagnard candidates, see *Débats*, May 30. On May 29 Ledru-Rollin was defeated for the chairmanship of the first bureau; he received only 9 out of 24 votes.—*Ibid.*, May 30.

Undoubted members of the Mountain	129
Doubtful members of the Mountain	27
Independent members of the extreme left	19
Total members of the extreme left	175
Total members of the left proper	45
Doubtful members of the left	6
<hr/>	
Total members of the combined lefts	226 *

Thus almost one third of the legislature of 750 belonged to the lefts. So strict were party lines than on votes as to the verification of powers only thirty-one members of the assembly switched from the majority or vice versa.

Ledru-Rollin was the undoubted leader of the Mountain. There was no one else in the party who was nearly as prominent, no one else who could compare with him as an orator. It was to him that the new members looked for advice.¹ Before the Legislative Assembly opened, the new members had gathered at the club in the Rue de Hasard and had listened to the debates.² This was an exception to the rules of the club, for ordinarily all persons who were not deputies were strictly excluded except the paid secretary. During the Constituent Assembly the caucus system had

* The undoubted members of the Mountain were the signers of the appeal to German democracy, those who had belonged to the Mountain in the Constituent Assembly, or those included in a list in the *Réforme*, August 15. The doubtful members of the Mountain are those additional deputies whose names were appended to the poster of June 13, and four deputies absent in May and June. The independent members of the extreme left are additional deputies who signed the impeachment of the ministry. The left proper are those who voted with the extreme left on votes as to verifications of power. The doubtful members of the left are those who changed sides more than once on these votes. For later membership of the extreme left, see Durand-Savoyat manuscripts at Library of the Chamber of Deputies, ms. 1440.

¹ Nadaud 329 wrote a special letter requesting an interview.

² Commissaire I: 224.

been used, but early in June this was abolished at the suggestion of Michel de Bourges, and each deputy remained free after the Mountain had voted on any question.¹ Besides Ledru the most prominent members of the Mountain were Michel de Bourges, the leader of the party of action; the fiery Félix Pyat, ever ready to fight; Martin Bernard, the former leader of secret societies, now grown less extreme; Considerant, socialist editor of the *Démocratique pacifique*, opponent of all violent procedure; Lamennais, whose liberal religious views had caused him to adopt radical political opinions, but who opposed appeals to force; Deville, who usually acted as chairman; Gambon, who attended to the business of the club; Pierre Leroux, the pacifist-socialist. Certain Montagnards, like Michel and Pyat, were for violent action; others like Considerant and Lamennais opposed any appeal to arms. Between these two groups were Bernard, and the great mass of deputies, all undecided and looking to Ledru-Rollin to declare whether an uprising was necessary.

The Mountain was proud of the size of the minority in the Legislative Assembly. The *Presse* of Emile de Girardin even suggested that Louis Napoleon form a red cabinet under Ledru.² The *Emancipation* of Toulouse advocated the dictatorship of Ledru-Rollin.³ Caussidière wrote: "Ledru-Rollin is one of the most progressive representatives of February. He rallies about him a section of the bourgeoisie whose tendencies are not sufficiently revolutionary but who

¹ St. Férreol, *Mémoires* 2: 161, 187-8. Prosecution at trial of Ledru, *Moniteur* 3100; Lauferie, the paid secretary, in *ibid.*, 3208-9, 3220. On May 27 officers of the Mountain were chosen. Ledru, Baune, Deville and Lamennais were elected presidents. — *Réforme*, May 29; *Débats*, May 30.

² *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, May 23, which was disgusted at the idea, as it wished no compromise with the prince-president.

³ *Vraie République*, June 6.

frankly accept all the consequences of socialism. Elected anew by the people, Ledru-Rollin owes to it all his hopes and the most absolute devotion, for it has forgotten the official to remember only the eloquent tribune whose sympathies are truly popular. Ledru-Rollin must now adopt a vigorous policy; better surrounded than in the past, the great artist must be more persistent and obtain a practical result in the matters with which he concerns himself. That is what his friends desire from the foremost orator of the legislature."¹

Except for interpellations on Italian affairs, there occurred but one important debate in the Legislative Assembly during its first week's sittings. On May 30, during the third session, Kératry of the extreme right was presiding as the oldest member of the Assembly. Chavoix, an independent member of the extreme left, interpellated the ministry on the removal of the officers appointed by the previous legislature to defend the Palais Bourbon. Lacrosse, who had succeeded Faucher as minister of the interior, made a weak explanation. Chavoix returned to the attack. A tumult arose. When it had quieted down, President Kératry explained that he had authorized the change of officials in writing. Ledru at last obtained the floor. "Chavoix had merely skimmed the surface of the question," says Quentin-Bauchart; "Ledru-Rollin plumbed its depths."²

Ledru-Rollin admitted that organization was the first duty of the Assembly, but he declared that even before that it must learn whether it had the right to exist. He told how the orders of the Constituent Assembly had been disobeyed repeatedly, how twenty-four hours before the Legislative Assembly met, the officers had been transferred whereas only

¹ Letter in *ibid.*, June 7.

² Quentin-Bauchart I : 258.

the president of the legislature had the right to change those officials, how President Marrast had protested to the ministry and had forced General Changarnier to delay the removal. "Thus," Ledru said, "you see that it was a most flagrant violation of the orders and wishes of the Assembly You cannot overlook the question without being unfair to yourselves; you cannot overlook the question without violating your own law of sovereignty, without your own room being violated against your orders."

Chairman Kératry here interrupted the orator to say: "It is not we who violate the rights of the Assembly, but you and your friends." This remark was delivered in a low voice, loud enough to be heard in the tribune though not in the body of the hall. Ledru in his loud voice told Kératry that he (Kératry) did not have the floor; thereupon the right got angry. Ledru told the deputies what Kératry's remark was. The president repeated it. Ledru asserted that he had been insulted by the president, that the tribune was not free, that he would not reenter it as long as Kératry was in the chair. The left exploded with wrath. Barrot rose to calm it, but members of the extreme left drowned his voice with demands for an apology. The six youngest members of the Assembly were acting as secretaries, and four of them who were Montagnards resigned in protest and were replaced by the next youngest. Barrot admits: "The fault of the president was so evident that it was difficult for the majority to uphold him. The disorder was at its height. I mounted the tribune and urged M. Kératry to withdraw his remark."¹ Accordingly Kératry finally mumbled: "I am sorry to have excited such a tumult. . . . If M. Ledru-Rollin heard words displeasing to him, I am sorry." Ledru said that he understood the president had withdrawn his re-

¹ Barrot 3:285-6. Here for once he is more just than Quentin-Bauchart 1:258-9, who justifies Kératry.

mark (Kératry did not deny this) and that he was satisfied.

The trouble should have been over now, but the confusion as to the secretaries had to be adjusted. The four Montagnards went to resume their places, but the new officials refused to vacate their positions. The tumult raged as fiercely as ever. Ledru pleaded that the incident be closed by the restoration of the old order, that an act of justice be done by permitting those to return to their posts who had resigned only because they thought him insulted. Then a remarkable thing happened. Bugeaud, the arch-conservative general—Bugeaud, the most bitter opponent of all liberals, entered the tribune; he hoped that “he would often agree with M. Ledru-Rollin or rather Citizen Ledru-Rollin.” Majorities, he said, more than minorities needed to practice moderation. Thereupon the entire left applauded one of its chief adversaries, and the Assembly ordered the original secretaries to resume their posts.

Ledru now continued his interrupted address. He enumerated the protests of the Constituent Assembly against Changarnier's double command and also the general's repeated refusals to obey Marrast's orders. Now, he said, the command of the forces of the legislature was given to that very General Forest who had a week earlier disobeyed President Marrast.¹ As to the ratification of the appointment by Kératry, that was given on May 30 whereas the change was made on May 28; thus Kératry had not authorized the transfer, he had merely agreed by complacency to an illegal act. Ledru ended by demanding an inquiry into the subject.²

Barrot, as usual, made the best defense possible. He asserted that he had insisted on the retention of those excellent

¹ See page 289.

² *Moniteur* 1941-3.

officers who guarded the Palais Bourbon, until the president of the new Assembly could sanction the transfer, that the whole question was whether Kératry ratified the change or merely agreed to it, that he was willing to have an inquiry on that point. But the partisan Assembly, ready to uphold the ministry right or wrong against the left, passed to the order of the day.

There were too many interruptions to make Ledru's speech remarkable, but in the eyes of history the honors of the day should go to the left. The insult of Kératry, the attempt to change officials during the forty-eight hours when there was no legislature, the appointment of Forest known to be more friendly to Changarnier than to the body he was to defend, all were striking evidences of the contempt for justice and legality of the government of Louis Napoleon and of the party for which Odilon Barrot was the continual apologist.

CHAPTER XXI

ITALIAN AFFAIRS

LEDRU ROLLIN's connection with foreign affairs is so important that it is best treated separately; it has therefore been omitted from the account of his parliamentary career. It will be remembered that under the provisional government there was a slight difference in policy between the radicals and the moderates. Both were friendly to the cause of republicanism in Italy and elsewhere, but Lamartine desired to wait until the help of France was asked before sending troops against the reactionary monarchs whereas Ledru wished to send troops without awaiting a formal request. Lamartine issued a manifesto expressing his views.

The executive commission continued the foreign policy of Lamartine, and on May 24, 1848 the Constituent Assembly expressed its approval in an order of the day: "The National Assembly invites the executive commission to continue to follow the wishes of the Assembly summed up as follows: a fraternal pact with Germany, the reconstruction of a free and independent Poland, the liberation of Italy."

The February Revolution in Paris had set the spark to revolutions all over central Europe. In Germany a liberal parliament composed of delegates from all the German states met at Frankfort; in the Hapsburg dominions the various nationalities revolted; in Italy the minor states forced their rulers to grant liberal constitutions. The Austrians had been expelled from Lombardy-Venetia with the exception of the famous quadrilateral where General Radetzky was

being besieged by the troops of the King of Sardinia and by small auxiliary forces from the other states of Italy. The policy of the executive commission was to send an army to Italy only at the request of the inhabitants of the peninsula, but Italy's slogan in 1848 was *Italia fara da se*, and no request came. Bixio, the French minister at Turin warned his government that even a friendly army would be badly received. Nevertheless Ledru wished to send some troops, and he won Lamartine over to this policy. François Arago was strongly opposed, and persuaded his colleagues to await a formal request.¹ Perhaps the executive commission modified its decision, for Ledru-Rollin claimed in a speech of the following year that "a fraternal entrance under the name of sequestration into the County of Nice and the states of Savoy" had been decided upon, and that only the fall of the executive commission had prevented orders being sent to the Army of the Alps to enter the Piedmontese dominions.²

By the end of September 1848 reaction had commenced throughout southern and central Europe as well as in France. The Frankfort Parliament had been unable to work its will in Schleswig-Holstein where Russia had intervened; Austria had quelled the insurrection in Bohemia; General Radetzky had inflicted a crushing defeat at Custozza on the combined forces of Sardinia and of the revolting provinces of Lombardy-Venetia. Meanwhile the government of Cavaignac in France had offered mediation and had done nothing.

On September 29 the Montagnard Buvignier asked leave to interpellate the minister of foreign affairs. Lamoricière, minister of war, tried to show that an interpellation was inopportune. Ledru-Rollin spoke next.

¹ Speech of March 30, 1849, in *Discours politiques* 2: 226-7.

² Garnier-Pagès 10: 5-9.

There has been a decided deviation, [he said,] from the foreign policy of the provisional government. . . . That deviation should receive our serious attention . . . and we must know what is the policy of the government, and whether it is one we are likely to regret. . . . We are told: the question is pending. Oh, how I have suffered from hearing such language; I have heard it for so long. Every time that under a former administration we asked for information as to the progress of diplomacy, we were told that silence was imperative, that the question was pending. And later, when the administration had entered on a false course, we were told that the affair was settled. Pending questions and settled affairs are the two points between which we have been fruitlessly tossed for eighteen years. Such conduct might be appropriate to a monarchy; it is not appropriate to a republic. . . . The newspapers announce that Russia and Prussia . . . insist upon a European congress for the settlement of all questions. A congress! What would be its bases? The treaties of 1815, the principles of which have been declared abrogated in the manifesto issued by the honourable M. de Lamartine. . . . The government might commit you against your wishes. No matter how pure, how patriotic, how honourable, its intentions, it might be badly advised, it might adopt an unfortunate policy. . . . The horizon of Europe is charged with heavy clouds. . . . Under such conditions it would be abdicating, abdicating the dignity, the greatness of France for the government not to explain its intentions clearly.¹

After some further debate President Marrast fixed a day for the interpellations.

On the appointed day, October 2, Buvignier asked for information on foreign affairs. Cavaignac declared that it was inopportune to reply. Then Ledru spoke.

It would indeed be most extraordinary [he said], that under a republican government based on publicity, this Assembly

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 114-7.

should know less of diplomatic questions than under the monarchy. . . . How can we aid with our advice an administration that tells us nothing? You remain obstinately silent, not concerning questions of detail—that would be comprehensible—not concerning diplomatic correspondence—that also would be comprehensible—but concerning questions of principle you do not reply; you do not say on what bases you are negotiating. . . . Our policy should consist not in inciting peoples to revolt but in encouraging the spread of our doctrines, and in supporting, by force if necessary, those nations which proclaim them spontaneously. That was not only the policy of the provisional government and of the executive commission, but of the Assembly itself. . . . The existing government understood for a while the wishes of France on this subject. . . . The minister of foreign affairs says that we can undertake no mediation which does not have as its object the complete freedom of Italy. . . . Now Russia and Prussia desire to intervene . . . and we hear that the European powers wish to unite in a congress to deliberate; do you not recognize in this suggestion a revival of the Holy Alliance, a return to the treaties of 1815! . . . I understand that the government believes that it can enter a European congress and yet escape the application of the treaties of 1815, but that is an utter mistake; inevitably the majority of the countries represented will carry our government with them or there will be a disadvantageous war, that is, a war undertaken after a failure to obtain a compromise.

In Germany the same weak policy is maintained. France should encourage the sole hope of that land, a union of all the minor states without Austria or Prussia. See how Prussia has already abandoned the interests of Germany in Schleswig-Holstein, and France supports her policy.

Thus you can see, citizens, in Italy and Germany the abandonment of hopes, of promises. Is the revolution of February to be compelled, as was that of July, to let the movement it had

communicated to other nations subside? . . . Our only true policy is not an alliance with kings, it is solidarity with peoples, so that on the day of battle we shall have on our side not twenty-five million soldiers, but, as M. de Lamartine once said, all Italy and Germany. . . . We members of the Mountain do not desire war; the democratic party has rarely gained thereby. . . . No one in this hall wants the calamities of war for the sake of war. . . . But if owing to the weakness of our government war is inevitable, I ask under what conditions we can best wage it, whether it is not better to carry it on in foreign countries rather than suffer it in our own territory.

The monarchs wish to repress republicanism forever, and once they have extinguished it in their own dominions they will try to extinguish it in France, the cradle of liberty.

To remain isolated and threatening in her isolation has long been the policy of France and America. The situation of the two countries is doubtless not the same, but when Washington was counselled to make alliances he replied: *No alliance with the continental monarchies*. . . . Therefore I ask that the government pursue no more negotiations, . . . that it declare firmly that what it wished in February, it still wishes, that it desires freedom, complete independence, that it will insist on this by force of arms. And let it do this as soon as possible, for before long it will be too late. The peoples that you can still have as auxiliaries, as a vanguard, as advanced sentinels, will soon be enslaved anew and used against you. Confiding in your own resources, you would still be victorious, I swear it by the genius of France, but only after bloody efforts, after the fatherland, which can still be preserved, has been ravished.¹

This speech presents eloquently the fundamental ideas of Ledru's foreign policy, namely the union of the democratic

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 118-130.

nationalities of Europe under the leadership of France against the Holy Alliance of Russia, Prussia, and Austria and the consequent overthrow of the reactionary dynasties which would inevitably attack France, the source of progressive ideas, after they had restored the old regime elsewhere. These ideas are not as wild as is generally believed; they embodied the only hope of preventing a reaction in Europe. Ledru clearly saw what would happen if France did not intervene. Perhaps he was too optimistic in believing that even with French aid the forces of progress would have been victorious. But if France could have united in a single group the various liberal elements, the Frankfort Parliament, Mazzini, Charles Albert, Kossuth, and possibly Poland and Rumania, then perhaps the reign of republicanism in Europe would have begun in 1848-9 instead of in 1917-9. These ideas haunted Ledru throughout his life. He advocated them consistently in his parliamentary speeches; during his exile they constituted the guiding spirit in the formation of the Central European Democratic Committee.¹ In 1850 it was too late; early in 1849 there was still a chance of success.

After Ledru, Creton spoke. Instead of replying to Ledru, he attacked his attitude in the Risquons-tout fiasco. Cavaignac declared that the government would not interfere in the internal affairs of foreign countries, that it had no love for the treaties of 1815 and would not accept them as a basis for negotiation in Italy. Buvignier proposed an order of the day approving intervention in Italy, Flocon one approving the ideas formulated on May 24, namely Italian independence. The latter attracted much approval among the members of the left and left centre, but the order of the day pure and simple was carried 441 to 336.

¹ See Calman, *Ledru-Rollin après 1848*, Chapters VI and VII.

The Pope at this time was Pius IX. Elected in 1846, he had started out upon what seemed a liberal policy and had carried through a few mild reforms. The news of the February Revolution had excited the Roman population and Pius had been hurried along rapidly on the road of democracy. He finally decided, however, that affairs had gone too far and he started to beat a retreat. He had seemingly promised aid to the provinces of Lombardy-Venetia in their revolt against Austria, and many volunteers had left the papal dominions to swell the armies of Charles Albert of Sardinia, but at the eleventh hour Pius evaded his promise and proclaimed neutrality. A little later he replaced his liberal cabinet by a more conservative one under Rossi, former minister of Guizot to the Vatican. Then the inhabitants of the Eternal City took matters into their own hands. On November 15, 1848 some fanatics murdered Rossi, and the newly assembled popular legislature heard of this unmoved. Disorder broke out in the streets, armed bands threatened the palace of the Pope. Pius IX yielded, called a radical ministry, and proclaimed many reforms. But he felt himself a prisoner. The Roman populace maintained the greatest respect for the pontiff, but indicated its determination to impose its will on him as a temporal ruler. The French government of Cavaignac sent a small force to insure the safety of the Pope and to invite him to France.

On November 28 Bixio, member of the left centre and former minister of the provisional government at Turin, interpellated the government on its attitude toward Lombardy oppressed by Austria and toward Rome oppressed by anarchy. Cavaignac replied that Lombard affairs had made little progress and that an envoy had been sent to Rome to investigate conditions and to restore liberty to the Pope if he were under restraint. He told of the French expedition sent to insure liberty to the Pope, but declared that it

would use force only as a last resource. He demanded a postponement of the debate. Ledru preferred an immediate discussion but acquiesced in a two days' postponement.¹

On November 30 accordingly, Ledru told of the murder of Rossi, the quiet that prevailed in Rome, the unanimity with which the Roman army and people had demanded a change of ministry, the uncertainty of the diplomatic corps in the Eternal City as to what attitude to assume, the despatch of the French expedition. He declared that he was in no way opposed to protecting the Pope, whom he revered as the head of Christianity, but that he considered the expedition foolish, for the cry of the Roman revolutionists had been *Down with the foreigner*, and it was as *il fuorestiere* that Rossi had been slain. The Pope was no longer in danger, Ledru said, but the 3500 French troops were sure to be attacked and overwhelmed as foreigners, and then the anger of the Roman population might turn even against the Pope. Ledru did not believe that Pius himself desired the intervention. He asked how the spiritual prince who was to be protected could be distinguished from the temporal lord, and why the government intervened so hastily in behalf of the Pope while it did nothing for oppressed Lombardy, for Robert Blum, the patriot murdered by the Austrian authorities, or for the Danubian provinces occupied by Russia. He insisted that the sending of so small a force was either a folly or an act done with the consent of Austria, and that the executive should have consulted the legislature before sending the expedition, for it was an infraction of the constitution to aid a prince against his people.² This last point Ledru just touched on in this speech; we shall see it grow in prominence in later utterances.

¹ *Moniteur* 3387.

² *Discours politiques* 2: 138-148.

Montalembert declared that he hoped that Venice would defeat Radetzky, but that that was a purely Italian question, whereas France as a Catholic country had an interest in protecting the Pope who was a universal sovereign; that the spiritual and temporal powers of the Pope were inseparable; that Rome was not a democracy but a mobocracy. Other conservatives desired France to continue her habitual policy of protecting the papacy, or declared that the Assembly was still supreme as it could recall the expedition if it so desired. On the other hand, Quinet favored moral aid only to the Pope and material aid to the Italian people. Jules Favre maintained that from Jesus Christ to Charlemagne the Pope had not been a temporal lord, and that Ledru-Rollin was therefore right in distinguishing the spiritual and temporal powers of the papacy, that the executive had no right practically to declare war by despatching an expeditionary force, that Rome was quiet and the Pope had accepted the new cabinet, that there were far more reasons for intervention in Lombardy. Minister Dufaure claimed that the government had been forced to suspend offers of mediation in Lombardy where there was no need for immediate action, that the troops had been sent to Rome merely as a preventative measure. Cavaignac declared that the Assembly could have stopped the expedition when it was first announced.

At the close of this discussion five orders of the day were proposed varying from complete approval to complete disapproval of the expedition, this last signed by Jules Favre and eleven Montagnards. Complete approval was voted 480 to 63. The left centre and most of the left refrained from voting, but Favre and Lamartine joined the Mountain in the minority.

The Pope had not waited for the French expeditionary force to reach Rome. He had preferred a refuge in a nearer

and less democratic country than France, and had fled to the Neapolitan border-town of Gaeta. When the Roman legislature appointed a provisional junta and called a constituent assembly, Pius refused to recognize the new government and called on the countries of Europe to reinstate him. Soon after this Louis Napoleon became president of France with Odilon Barrot as premier and Drouyn de Lhuys as foreign minister.

It is worth while stopping here to indicate the different shades of opinion in the French legislature on the question of intervention. They are very hard to distinguish, but probably they were somewhat as follows. Ledru-Rollin and the extreme left desired the recognition of the Roman republic soon to be proclaimed. Favre, Lamartine, and the left did not wish to recognize the republic, but neither did they wish France to exert even moral pressure on the internal affairs of Rome. Sénard and the left centre desired to give Rome an opportunity to decide freely what it wanted, believing that a liberal constitution under the Pope would be accepted, and that moral pressure might be exerted in favor of the Pope. Cavaignac and the centre wished to liberate Rome from the tyranny of a few revolutionists and give it an opportunity to restore the Pope peaceably. Barrot and the right centre differed from Cavaignac in emphasizing the desirability of expelling the *anarchists*, and in refusing to consider the possibility that Rome might not desire the restoration of the Pope. Drouyn de Lhuys, Thiers, and the right desired the restoration of the Pope by France, if it could be done without antagonizing the French legislature. Falloux and the extreme right desired the restoration of the Pope by France by no matter what means. Montalembert and the particularly zealous Catholics desired the restoration by France or by any other country.

All parties except the clericals favored armed interven-

tion against Austria if she invaded the Roman dominions. The extreme left wished coöperation with the forces of the Roman republic, but it knew the Constituent Assembly would not consent to this and it feared that an expeditionary force would restore the Pope by force; therefore it opposed the despatch of French troops to Rome by the government of Louis Napoleon. The left, the left centre, and the centre favored the sending of a force to the Eternal City to oppose Austrian aggression, but they were against the use of this force to attack the Roman republic. The right centre did not desire to authorize an attack on the Roman republic, but it was willing to accept a *fait accompli*. The right favored an attack, the extreme right insisted on it, and the clericals regarded it as the sole advantage to be derived from an expedition to the Roman States.

The position of the Prince-President is hard to determine. His antecedents would have placed him with the Mountain, for in 1831 he had fought for Roman independence. But he was now posing as a good Catholic. Probably he cared little about the subject except as it might be used to strengthen his position in France; accordingly to gain the adherence of the clericals he worked for the restoration of Pius. Moreover Falloux was the member of the cabinet who had the greatest influence over Louis Napoleon.

On January 8, 1849 Baune, a member of the Mountain, interpellated the ministry on its Italian policy. He declared that it was time for France to send aid to Rome and Venice, that joint intervention with England should be abandoned as the interests of the two countries were different. Drouyn de Lhuys, the new minister of foreign affairs, asserted that the Italian question was still too delicate to be discussed, that the government stood for the official policy of peace instead of the subterranean policy of war. Lamartine contrasted the attitude of the existing administration

with his own open diplomacy under the provisional government.

At this point Ledru-Rollin intervened in the discussion. He declared that he took the floor because of the minister's assertion of two policies. If by subterranean policy, he said, anyone meant the Belgian affair of Risquons-tout, let him declare so openly, and an answer would be given once for all. (No one replied to this challenge.) The provisional government, Ledru continued, had adopted a policy of peaceful propaganda alone. The existing government had abandoned this line of conduct. Ledru offered three instances. In connection with Sicily the administration had had to abandon its mediation. In connection with Rome it had acquiesced in a joint restoration with Naples and Austria of the Pope. However, the revolution at Rome had as legitimate an origin as that at Paris. The Pope as a spiritual lord was different from the Pope as a temporal prince, and the right of the Roman people to overthrow the latter should be recognized. In connection with Lombardy the French government was foolishly entering into negotiations, since Austria had not accepted as a pre-condition the independence of that province. Ledru spoke of the solid line of reactionary armies from Holstein to the Adriatic and of the Russian fleet in that sea. He claimed that the reactionary armies threatened France and that a horrible conflict between civilization and barbarism would soon begin, that France must act.¹ Again Ledru had clearly indicated his policy and with more precision.

Drouyn de Lhuys made a weak reply to Ledru, saying that all these affairs were matter for negotiation not war. A Montagnard, Bouvet, protested against a dishonorable state

¹ *Ibid.*, 2: 160-170. The *Siècle* of January 9 compared the speeches of Ledru-Rollin to balloons filled with hot air; the *Peuple* of January 10 retorted by comparing Barrot to a wheezy bagpipe.

of peace. The legitimist, La Rochejaquelin, demanded that the ministers reply to the facts given by Ledru-Rollin and which he believed were false. He declared that the Roman revolution differed from the French Revolution since in Paris there were no assassins; that in Rome the Pope was liberal and the existing government composed of foreigners. Drouyn took the floor again to declare that the Sicilian negotiations were still open, that there never had been any idea of attacking Rome in company with Austria and Naples, that there was little danger of an attack on France and no need of ultimatums.

Ledru-Rollin reasserted his former declarations and maintained that the government was badly informed by its official envoys, for he had been privately informed that the Belgian government had been told that the concentration of troops near her border was aimed not at her but at France.¹ Here we have the first indication of the fact that Ledru was the recipient of private information through letters. The leader of the Mountain had a large foreign correspondence, particularly with acquaintances at Rome.

Drouyn replied that Ledru should have confidence in the embassies, as they were filled largely by appointees of Lamartine and Bastide, that there was no need for further justifying his own foreign policy. The minister of the navy, Tracy, ridiculed Ledru's assertion that there was a Russian fleet in the Adriatic. The Assembly closed the discussion by passing to the order of the day.

Soon after this the Roman legislature established a republic, passed some anti-clerical laws, and tried to unite all Italy in a league. Mazzini became the leading figure in Rome and other persons came from all parts of Italy to aid

¹ *Moniteur* 67. Ledru and La Rochejaquelin had a dispute over the offer of the Turkish embassy to the latter by the provisional government.

in the government of the new republic, but the overwhelming majority of the members of the legislature, of the government, of the army were natives of the Papal States. Florence also proclaimed itself a republic. On February 24 the Mountain sent congratulations to Rome, and on March 14 to Florence.¹ The Roman republic sent Frapolli to Paris as its envoy. The French government refused to recognize him, but he was well received by Ledru.²

On February 20 1849 Ledru-Rollin interpellated the ministry on foreign affairs. He proclaimed the glorious news of the declaration of a republic at Rome, and he denounced a rumored plan to restore the Pope by Sardinian troops while France and England patrolled the coasts.³ Drouyn de Lhuys replied that the Roman republic must prove its stability and absolute ability to maintain order before France could send it aid, that the intervention of Piedmont was not as easy as Ledru implied since there were intermediate states between it and Rome, that the spiritual character of the Pope made the Roman question a special one and France was interested in it like all Catholic countries, that the desire of the government was to see order reestablished at Rome and that many plans had been discussed, that the Assembly would be informed whenever anything was decided.

¹ *Réforme*, March 3, 21.

² Feugère: *Lamennais* 414. Envoys from other democrats also came to Paris. Karl Blind, who later became an intimate friend of Ledru, and Schuetz, who translated into German Ledru's *Décadence d'Angleterre*, were sent by the Frankfort parliament; their first visit was to Drouyn de Lhuys, their second to Ledru. — Blind in *Fraser's Magazine* 91: 246. Arnold Ruge, who later became one of Ledru's colleagues in the Central European Democratic Committee, and Struve came to Paris on behalf of the German republicans to make an alliance with the French radicals through Ledru and Savoye, another member of the Mountain and former minister at Frankfort.—Ruge 2: 93.

³ *Discours politiques* 2: 189-190. The previous day he had asked permission to make interpellations.—*Moniteur* 566.

Then Ledru spoke again. Amid numerous interruptions he distinguished between the temporal and spiritual lordships of the Pope separated even recently in the cases of Pius VI and Pius VII without disturbance to the church. The government, he continued, should follow the line of conduct traced by the Assembly on May 24, 1848 in favor of the liberation of Italy. Ledru acknowledged his respect for the spiritual prince, but he also declared his respect for the judgment of the Roman people against the temporal ruler. He observed that the Roman republic had proved its stability contrary to the hopes of the French ministry, and he demanded that it be recognized. Ledru protested against a war of religion in the nineteenth century. He repeated his query as to the intervention of Piedmont. He declared his confidence that the Roman republic would triumph in spite of the intrigues of reactionary diplomats.¹ This speech is rather rambling, but it does drive home some strong arguments. Again Ledru gave information based on private letters. Frequently the government denied the information thus obtained, but in the majority of cases history has proved that Ledru was right. In this case it is certain that there were negotiations with Sardinia, though the cabinet would never admit this to the Assembly. After a few more speeches, the discussion ended.

On March 8 there were more interpellations. Buvignier was again chosen by the Mountain to begin the discussion. He spoke of the new Holy Alliance against Italy, asserted that the government seemed to accept the treaties of 1815, and asked the recognition of the Roman and Tuscan republics and an approval of the vote of May 24 in favor of the liberation of Italy. Drouyn de Lhuys made no real

¹ *Discours politiques* 2:190-7. Beginning at this point, the chief secondary work is Clermont and Bourgeois: *Rome et Napoleon III*, a work that becomes detailed after May 7.

reply; he merely declared that the Assembly had ratified the government's Italian policy.

Then Ledru spoke.

The government does not wish to declare its policy; I shall try to reply for it . . . well, what does that government reply? *The Roman republic! We cannot recognize it. The Roman republic! It is contrary to the wishes of all the great powers of Europe. The Roman republic! If it is threatened by foreign intervention, we cannot prevent it.* That is what the government says. It cannot contradict me. . . . In spite of such a liberticidal, such a reprehensible policy the minister of foreign affairs dares to say that his policy is the logical consequence of the order of the day of May 24. . . . Is such a statement serious? If it is serious, it is disgraceful and unworthy of France.

Ledru declared that not only had France pledged her support to the liberation of Italy, but that the past utterances and actions of those in power ought to be a guarantee for Rome. Drouyn de Lhuys was the chairman of the committee that proposed the order of the day of May 24. Barrot was the statesman who has said in 1831: "If a neighboring power should proclaim the right to forbid a people . . . to establish another social order than that existing, if that power should intervene in Italy . . . to stop an insurrection and to condemn the peninsula to remain . . . under the arbitrary rule of some petty despot or of some *government half theocratic, half despotic*, we could not permit such action." Ledru said that the only condition Barrot had imposed was that the time for a change of regime in Italy should be ripe, that in 1831 the moment might not have been opportune but that no one could deny that the present moment was. "To deny at Rome," Ledru insisted, "the right to expel the temporal

prince is to deny to France the right to expel Louis Philippe. M. Guizot was accustomed to speak in that vein. Give place to M. Guizot." As for the president of the French republic, Ledru continued, he had fought for Rome in 1831.

Yes, Rome has the right to count on you. Well, what are you going to do? Intervene? Intervene to extinguish liberty? You cannot do so without violating the French constitution What is said in article 5? This, that *France respects foreign nationalities; its forces shall never be used against the liberties of any people*. . . . To intervene directly by force of arms, to intervene directly by patrolling the coasts of Italy, or to intervene merely by lending moral support, by giving counsel, by entering into negotiations . . . all these methods are forms of intervention, and the constitution prohibits them with its inflexible phrase. . . . If anybody wishes to take the floor, and defend the indissolubility of the temporal and spiritual powers, I am ready to reply to him. My reasons are good for during fourteen years Napoleon distinguished the spiritual from the temporal power, and yet he was not an irreligious man for he reopened the churches. . . . Let not the Pope, a priest of Christ, provoke bloodshed for the worldly goods condemned by Christ. . . . The considerations which I have developed are not party considerations; they are considerations of national honour. . . . Our word is pledged to Italy; any vote which will lead to intervention is a vote which will dishonor him who gives it.¹

This is one of Ledru's most effective speeches on the Roman question. Most of his arguments were unanswerable and the ministers merely evaded replying to them. His quotation from Barrot was admirable. Barrot could always find eloquent words for any cause that he espoused. He frequently convinced his audience, but he never so

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 206-218.

thoroughly convinced himself but that he could argue on the other side on a later occasion. Unfortunately for him in 1831 he had a good cause, in 1849 a weak one to defend.

Ledru had declared that all the members of the provisional government except himself had abandoned the foreign policy of that government. This challenge brought Lamartine to his feet. Lamartine asserted that three policies were possible toward Rome: that of the Catholics, intervention; that of the radicals, indifference as to the Pope; that of statesmen, guarantee of the independence of the Pope but political power in the hands of the Roman People. (The latter policy would undoubtedly have received the whole-hearted approval of the radicals though Lamartine put their policy in a different category.) Cavaignac maintained that the policy of May 24 would have led to war and that his government tried to avoid war. Lamartine and Emmanuel Arago observed that the provisional government had prevented the invasion of Savoy. Sarans, a member of the left, asked three pertinent questions: What would the Barrot government do if Austria invaded Savoy? If the Catholic countries came to the aid of the Pope? If Austria invaded Tuscany? Drouyn de Lhuys made his favorite reply: it is too dangerous to answer. The order of the day pure and simple was then passed by 438 votes to 341, but the left centre joined the lefts in the minority.

In 1849 Sardinia, against the advice of the French cabinet, renewed hostilities with Austria, but on March 23 it suffered a second overwhelming defeat at Novara. Austrian troops even crossed the frontier into Piedmont. On the same day as the battle of Novara the government of Rome was entrusted to three triumvirs, Mazzini and two natives.

On March 30 Bixio, former minister of France to Turin, asserted that France must prevent an Austrian occupation of

Piedmont. Molé, a member of the right, saw no necessity for this. Clement Thomas, a member of the left, called on the ministry to explain its position. Drouyn de Lhuys declared that France would safeguard the integrity of Piedmont. Another member of the left, Billault, demanded a clearer explanation. Drouyn de Lhuys began his reply by attacking the provisional government for its unacknowledged assistance of the expeditions against Savoy, Belgium, and Baden, for its promise of aid to Italy and its failure to intervene when the time was propitious. He declared that it was more difficult to intervene now against a victorious Austria, that the government nevertheless still demanded the independence of Lombardy but felt forced to modify to autonomy, its demands for Venetia. Drouyn maintained that three policies were possible: that of chance or leaving Italy alone; that of individual action, which meant war with other nations: that of coöperation with the other great powers, the policy which the government was following.

Ledru-Rollin replied to the minister of foreign affairs. He belittled the promise to maintain the integrity of Piedmont since Austria had declared she did not menace that integrity. He declared that the question was a deeper one, for the Austrian army, supported in the rear by the Russians, was approaching the border of France and threatened her; that agreements with oligarchic powers were valueless and that France must support her own cause at Rome, Florence, Turin; that the provisional government had been ready to intervene in Italy whenever its aid was asked, and that now that situation had arisen since Italy had called on France for aid and there were legitimate republics to be protected at Rome and Florence. Ledru quoted Barrot and other conservatives who had desired to defend Italy in 1831 and who had sent an expedition to occupy Ancona. He quoted those who in 1838 had opposed the recall of the French

troops from Ancona: Barrot, Duvergier de Hauranne, and Thiers. "For the concert to be complete only one man is missing, M. Guizot," he said. He called on these men either to defend their former opinions or to admit that in 1838 the whole affair was merely "a war of miserable ambitions." Ledru closed by insisting that if the Assembly did not favor the liberation of Italy, the people of France did.¹

Drouyn de Lhuys asserted that the cabinet had substituted for a policy of agreement with England one of agreement with all the great powers. Jules Favre spoke in favor of energetic action. The centre united with the lefts to reject the order of the day which would have closed the discussion.

On March 31 the first speaker was Cavaignac. He admitted that the order of the day of May 24 was definite, but he claimed that it carried in it the germ of war and that his policy was to maintain peace, that his system of mediation had achieved this result and had carried out the wishes of the legislature. Thiers declared that France was not pledged to give aid to Italy, that isolated intervention would mean war with too many countries, that the wisest policy would be to wait until Italy was united and in the meanwhile merely to prevent other nations from intervening, that the manifesto of Lamartine has guaranteed the freedom only of the independent states, that Ledru-Rollin, inspired by good intentions, had desired to invade Italy under the provisional government but that at that time the army was unprepared, that it was too late now to fight a victorious Austria, that France should protect only Piedmont and aid only those states where order was maintained.

Ledru-Rollin replied to Cavaignac and Thiers. He insisted that the provisional government had been ready to

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 219-231; for extract see p. 316.

intervene whenever asked, that Cavaignac had been asked but had not sent aid. He denied that Cavaignac had followed the wishes of the legislature, for he had always kept it in the dark as to negotiations and had never asked its opinion. He declared that the speech of Thiers was most convincing, and that the only thing that gave him strength to reply was Thiers' equally convincing argument in 1840 in favor of war. Ledru spoke of the three policies mentioned by Drouyn, that of war, that of negotiations, and that of doing nothing at all, and he asserted that the last seemed to be that of the ministry. He declared that if the Mountain wished war, certainly the conservatives wished peace at any price, that the cause of Italy was not yet lost in spite of Novara, that he had letters from various places stating that the inhabitants of the peninsula were still ready to fight Austria. Ledru said that a failure to guarantee the independence of Italy now in 1849 would dishonor France far more than it would have in 1840 when Thiers and his friends spoke so much about dishonor. Ledru was sure that France would prefer war to dishonor.¹

Barrot made a reply abounding in attacks on Ledru, apropos or malapropos of the subject in hand. The gist of his speech was that the cabinet preferred armed mediation to war, that to occupy Savoy would be premature, that Ledru-Rollin did not realize the force of a conciliatory policy. Dupont de Bussac, a member of the extreme left, closed the debate; he ridiculed the idea of a congress in which eleven monarchies and the republic of France should take part, and from which republican and French ideas should come out victorious, and he asked that the policy of May 24 be maintained. An order of the day was passed by 444 votes to 320 approving the occupation of Piedmont if the government should think

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 232-247.

it necessary. The lefts and most of the left centre voted in the negative, not because they opposed aid to Savoy, but because they wished to show their disapproval of the general government policy.

Thus the vote of March 31 was a victory for the government. Up to this time, the ministries of France had negotiated, had offered mediation, but had taken no active part in Italian affairs. Emboldened by this vote, the Barrot cabinet clearly indicated to Austria that it would permit no invasion of Piedmont, and Austria acquiesced. This success gave the ministry the courage to pursue a vigorous policy, and it determined to intervene at Rome.

CHAPTER XXII

THE ROMAN EXPEDITION

FRANCE had prevented the invasion of Piedmont by Austria. Emboldened by this success, the cabinet formed the plan of sending a body of troops to the Roman dominions with the avowed purpose of preventing an invasion of them by Austria. The cabinet had sent two conservative diplomats to a conference at Gaeta, where the Pope was staying, and it knew that Austria, the Two Sicilies, and Spain intended to restore the Pope by arms. It decided to forestall these countries. Confident that the presence of French troops would encourage the Roman moderates to recall the Pope, the cabinet hoped that it would get all the credit for restoring a regime both papal and liberal.

Accordingly the ministers came before the legislature with a proposal to send a military expedition to Civita Vecchia, the port of Rome, and they asked for an appropriation. The Assembly appointed a commission which showed itself doubtful as to the advisability of despatching troops. Barrot and Drouyn de Lhuys assured the commission that any action taken would be independent of Austria, that force might be used at Civita Vecchia, but that it was impossible to think of using force against Rome. After this apparent promise not to attack the Roman republic, the commission decided to approve the government project.¹

On April 16 Jules Favre in the name of the commission

¹ Clermont 16.

approved the expedition which, he said, was to be sent to Rome to guard French interests, not to overthrow the republic. Barrot stated his position as follows. "The policy of the French government is not to allow a restoration in the Roman state in defiance of our principles." "Then it is a restoration that you wish," cried the left. Barrot continued, saying that the government denied solidarity with the republics of Rome and Tuscany, that it did not wish changes to occur in Italy without the participation of France, that the cabinet would not allow itself to be drawn into a war in behalf of the Italian republics, that it merely desired to safeguard French interests, real liberty, and good government. This was hardly an explanation to satisfy the left. After Ducoux, a deputy of the left, had suggested doubling the appropriation and using the second half to aid Venetia, Ledru obtained the floor.

"One phrase," Ledru-Rollin said, "struck me. . . . It was *the restoration of the Pope*." He declared that on one side were papal pretensions, on the other the sovereignty of the people; that the government policy was one entirely of expedients. He told how the cabinet had refused to recognize the ambassador of the Roman republic, but had sent an embassy to Gaeta and intrigued there with the other powers. He maintained that the ministers were confident of a kind reception at Rome only because they themselves had sown dissension there, that the sending of a military expedition violated the sovereignty of Rome and therefore the French constitution, which forbade attacks on the liberty of nations, that if the government intervened in the affairs of the Eternal City, it ought to be with the consent of the Roman republic. He asserted that the government policy meant either the forcible restoration of the Pope or war with Austria who desired this restoration, that in the latter case war would be waged under unfavorable conditions, for

Italy would not support France. Ledru said that it was a serious matter to extinguish the liberty of a nation. He asked what the government would do if Italy poured forth men to defend the Roman republic. He requested a plain statement as to whether the cabinet desired the restoration of the Pope, and issued a warning against such an action, for it would cause war and would amount to a betrayal of Italy.¹

The minister of war, Lamoricière, declared that the French troops would not save the Roman republic but would save Roman liberty. The Montagnard, Victor Schoelcher, asked what the French troops would do if the Romans should not receive the Pope back. That was the crux of the question and the ministers remained silent. Article one of the bill granting an appropriation was passed 395 to 283, against the vote of the lefts and parts of the centre. The next day the entire law was passed. The Mountain and the left voted in the negative; most of the left centre and centre did not vote. The Assembly had now agreed to let the troops of France enter the Roman territory to keep out Austria and give moral support to the restoration of a liberal Pope.

Late in April, 1849, the French troops sailed from Marseilles and after a little parleying landed peacefully at Civita Vecchia, the port of Rome. The command of the expedition had been entrusted to General Oudinot. He should have combined military and diplomatic ability, but unfortunately he was a mediocre soldier and no diplomat at all. It would have been difficult to make a worse choice. From the minister of war Oudinot received instructions to land at Civita Vecchia and to make arrangements to oppose any Austrian force that might invade the Roman state. From the minister of foreign affairs he also received orders; these

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 278-291. For Ledru's description of events of this day, see his *13 Juin*, reprinted in *Discours politiques* 2: 369-370.

orders the cabinet had not seen, and many of its members, including Barrot, would not have approved them. So strongly did these orders emphasize the fact that Oudinot should not recognize the Roman republic that the idea of opposition to Austria was almost forgotten, and that a blunt soldier like Oudinot could only conclude that he was to undertake military operations against the Roman triumvirs if he thought it necessary. In the meanwhile the Pope had issued an allocution that should have dissipated forever all hopes of a liberal papal regime; Cardinal Antonelli had replaced the liberals as adviser to Pius IX. However, the French cabinet continued its old policy toward Rome as though this reactionary allocution had not been uttered.

On April 24 the Mountain expressed its feelings in a letter that has never been printed, and which gives an excellent picture of its standpoint:

Our troops have left our ports. The soldiers of the republic are sent to Italy to lend the support of their presence, the prestige of their name, the power of their arms if necessary, to the restoration of the Pope to his temporal throne against the will of the Roman people. The French republic is thus to serve the monarchic principle against the democratic, princely legitimacy against popular sovereignty.

Liberated Rome is not strong enough to resist the coalition of kings and royalist conspirators. It will succumb, but it will leave behind the memory of a government which has not committed a single act of violence, which has always conducted itself with admirable dignity.

Pained as we are, we do not abandon hope. Force may temporarily repress the development of liberty, but liberty is immortal; it will conquer force as spirit will conquer matter. Pius IX after having betrayed the cause of Italian liberty by his anathema against the war of independence has fled from Rome. He may reenter it in the baggage-train of foreigners

as the Bourbons reentered France, but the same destiny is in store for him as was in store for them. The hatred and scorn of the Romans will hang over the Catholic pontiff who, in order to reconquer a vain throne by the force of arms and at the price of bloodshed, addressed himself to all the kings of the earth, even schismatic Prussia and Protestant England.

French democrats should protest against this act of libercidal violence which is about to take place on the banks of the Tiber. The deputies of the Mountain have decided to give the Italians a proof of their active sympathy by forming a committee specially charged with the interests of Italian independence and of which two patriots present at Paris shall always be members.

This committee is composed of Citizens Lamennais, Ledru-Rollin, Baune, Félix Pyat, and Victor Schoelcher. It has just organized with Cit. Lamennais as president and Cit. V. Schoelcher as secretary. Its purpose is the liberation of the entire peninsula; its motto is solidarity between the French and Italian republics.¹

At Rome Mazzini, who preferred a glorious fall to a compromise, had been strengthened by the arrival of the great Italian patriot, Garibaldi, and he had sent a message to Oudinot protesting against the French intervention. The French general replied that "he was resolved to enter Rome as a friend or as an enemy." The advisers of Oudinot told him that the French troops would be joyfully received by the inhabitants of the Eternal City, that they would be opposed only by a few anarchists and strangers. On April 29 Oudinot attacked Rome, but practically the entire city marched out against him and inflicted on him a humiliating defeat. Drouyn de Lhuys had given him instructions that did not comply with the desires of the French cabinet and

¹ Schoelcher Papers 2: 172-4. In handwriting of Schoelcher. See appendix. There is a similar but shorter article in the *Réforme*, April 29.

still less with those of the legislature, and Oudinot had gone beyond these instructions. After revealing his diplomatic incapacity, Oudinot had displayed his lack of military skill.¹

It was on May 3 that the French cabinet heard of this defeat, but it kept silent, and only on May 7 did the news become generally known. Then the Assembly made a strong protest. Jules Favre, who had advocated the expedition, opened the discussion. Blood had flowed in Italy, he said; France had not carried out her promise to aid Italy, but had attempted to overthrow the Roman republic. Barrot, who felt that he was in the wrong, could merely babble in reply that France could not let Austria impose her will, that Oudinot had proclaimed his good intentions toward Italy, that the cabinet would not disavow the general. Lamoricière, a member of the centre, asked for the appointment of an investigating committee. Flocon read a letter which he had received and which stated the almost universal resistance of the Romans. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he knew nothing of any universal resistance, that he too desired an investigating committee. Favre made a fiery speech. What will the ministers do now? he asked. So far they have acted stupidly.

A committee of investigation was appointed and the session was suspended while the committee listened for hours to the ministers.² Ferdinand de Lesseps, soon to become a

¹ Clermont 20-43. In the account of affairs at Rome, Clermont is rather closely followed, tempered slightly by other narratives, particularly those of Thayer and Gaillard. Barrot 3:205 admits that Oudinot was deceived as to the wishes of the Romans, that Oudinot made military blunders, and that Drouyn's instructions did not express accurately the wishes of the French ministers.

² On the committee were Schoelcher of the Mountain; Grévy and two other deputies of the left; Sénard, Goudchaux, and one other member of the left center; two deputies of the center; two of the right center; four of the right.

leading actor at Rome, was watching the scene from the galleries. In his memoirs he says: "The irritation in the Assembly was great; M. Ledru-Rollin and the extreme left were shaking their fists at the ministers and a free-for-all fight was imminent when. . . M. Sénard quieted his friends."¹ Sénard of the left centre was chosen as reporter by the investigating committee. In a calm manner he showed how the expedition to Rome had not carried out the purpose for which it was sent, and he asked an order of the day urging the government "to take measures without delay so that the Italian expedition be no longer kept from the purpose assigned it." Drouyn de Lhuys, minister of foreign affairs, tried to prove that Oudinot had had the right to expect no resistance, that the general had been received joyfully by the inhabitants of the Roman States, that it was only foreign adventurers who had opposed him, and that the Assembly had practically authorized an attack on the Roman republic by giving permission for the occupation of Civita Vecchia. This speech is capable of two explanations; either the minister was inexcusably blind or he was wilfully lying. Sénard replied that the Assembly had definitely insisted that the Roman republic should not be attacked and that the orders given to Oudinot had laid too strong an emphasis on the non-recognition of that republic. Goudchaux declared that even the French consul at Civita Vecchia had stated that there was strong opposition to the French. Drouyn de Lhuys asserted that other reports declared the contrary. The Sénard order of the day which blamed the assault on Rome was carried 328 to 241. The centre joined the lefts in the majority.² This was a crushing defeat for the Barrot ministry, a real vote of lack of confidence, but the

¹ Lesseps I: 130-1.

² For events of May 7, see Clermont 44-52. Ledru demanded the floor but did not speak.

French constitution unfortunately did not make the cabinet responsible to the legislature, and Barrot and his colleagues continued in office.

President Louis Napoleon aggravated matters. On May 8 he wrote a letter to Oudinot, congratulating him on the bravery of his soldiers and asserting that the stain on French honor would be avenged. A clearer defiance of the express wishes of the legislature would be difficult to find. Even Falloux, the member of the cabinet most favorable to the restoration of the Pope, admits in his Memoirs: "Most of the ministers would have refused to sign this letter, but they dared not disown it, and even M. Barrot defended it warmly."¹ This letter was entrusted to Ferdinand de Lesseps, the future builder of the Suez Canal, whom the cabinet had appointed as envoy to arrange an understanding with the Roman triumvirs. Lesseps' instructions were to negotiate with Mazzini and his colleagues and to make some arrangement with them for the French protection of Rome, but in no way to recognize them as a government *de jure* nor to offend the papal court at Gaeta.

On May 9 Jules Grévy interpellated the government on Louis Napoleon's letter. Barrot, who did not approve the epistle, wriggled cleverly out of his difficult position. He claimed that the letter was not an official document but a message of personal sympathy, and that in it there was nothing to conflict with the desire of the Assembly. He told of the mission of Lesseps and he asserted that the government merely desired to anticipate the Austrians and Neapolitans at Rome. He praised the investigating committee for the freedom it had left to the ministers. Barrot ended by declaring that he wished further information before giving a fuller explanation. This reply satisfied Jules Grévy but not the Mountain.

¹ Falloux I:451. The letter was published by the government organ, the *Patrie*, but it was not inserted in the *Moniteur*.

Ledru-Rollin opposed a postponement of the discussion. "Let me express my astonishment," he said, "that such a despatch is called private and confidential. . . . The commander-in-chief must place the letter of the president on the order of the day, and yet you claim that it is a personal act, one that has not the official character of an act countersigned by the cabinet!" Ledru admitted his realization that the Assembly did not share the desire of the Mountain to recognize the Roman republic, but he insisted that an entry into Rome had been authorized only if the inhabitants welcomed the expeditionary force or if the Austrians approached the city, that Oudinot had marched against Rome without either of these two conditions arising and against the advice of the French consul at Civita Vecchia and the protest of the Roman assembly. He asked why the president had waited five days after hearing of the assault and had chosen to write his letter the very day after the adverse vote in the legislature. Ledru declared that the check before Rome was no disgrace. "A battle is not gained," he said, "because one remains master of the field; in our opinion it is gained when one's cause is just and sacred in the eyes of the people." Ledru asserted that the French soldiers could no longer claim to act as liberators since the Romans had clearly expressed approval of their republic, that the ministers had given equivocal explanations, that they might delay their decision but must disavow Louis Napoleon's letter.¹ This is one of Ledru's best speeches; it is restrained, sincere, clear. An impartial secondary writer says: "Ledru-Rollin's eloquence, usually declamatory, was more dispassionate, and if he had had a little more finesse, he would have been the foremost orator of the Assembly."²

¹ *Discours politiques* 2:298-306, with hiatus. For complete version, see *Moniteur* 1735.

² Clermont 65.

Barrot was utterly unable to make a satisfactory reply, and he had recourse to the contemptible expedient to which he resorted too frequently—he accused Ledru of envenoming the debate and called Ledru's conduct outrageous. He reasserted that the presidential letter was not a political manifesto but a kindly personal message. Flocon proposed and Grévy seconded a motion to declare the letter null and void. Barrot announced the arrival of despatches, and the discussion was adjourned.

On May 10 Favre demanded what the despatches contained. Barrot said that the information in them was insufficient. Ledru requested that nevertheless they be read so that the Assembly could judge of their importance. He told the news he himself had received from private sources: There were 442 French casualties and 350 French prisoners taken in the battle near Rome. The troops had been encouraged to fight by being told they were attacking the Neapolitans. The Roman triumvirs had sent out doctors and medicine to help the French wounded. General Bedeau declared that these facts were impossible; unfortunately for him, whatever as a brave general he might think of the French army, most of the facts have been proved true by history. Against the protests of the ministers the Assembly insisted on hearing the contents of the despatches. The ministers of war and foreign affairs read the letters in which Oudinot gave his distorted version of the fight near Rome and of conditions within the city. The two ministers claimed that Ledru's statements must be false; really, however, it was Oudinot's despatches that were filled with manifest prevarications. The discussion was adjourned to the following day.

Meanwhile the hostility of the president's party to the legislature was plainly shown. Marrast, fearing trouble, had ordered General Forest to come to the Palais Bourbon

with his two regiments. The general's duty was to obey the command, but he sent only one regiment and told Marrast that he obeyed only the orders of his superior, General Changarnier. The latter was summoned by Marrast but sent only an aide-de-camp who expressed Changarnier's regrets and requested that in the future all military orders be transmitted through the commander-in-chief. "It was clear," says Clermont, "that General Changarnier was violating the law, that he was ready to violate it always; it was also clear that he acted at the instigation of the president." Barrot, who certainly condemned this action, defended the General and expressed regret for the *misunderstanding*. But, as if that were not enough, after the Assembly had shown its disapproval of Louis Napoleon's letter to Oudinot, after the ministry had declared it unofficial, Changarnier had this very letter posted in all the barracks of Paris with a few commendatory words of his own appended. It would be difficult to excuse so flagrant a transgression of the wishes and rights of the legislature.¹ And Barrot, who talked incessantly of respect for the wishes of the Assembly, did not insist on the removal of Changarnier. Barrot can only be acquitted of an inordinate desire to remain in office by admitting his superabundant stupidity.

On May 11, fortified by the occurrences of the past four days, Ledru-Rollin renewed his attack on the government. He asserted that the coördination of the events at Paris and at Rome proved that there was a desire to extinguish the Roman republic. He retraced the events of Oudinot's expedition and read new letters confirming his information of the previous day. He recapitulated his arguments on the letter of Louis Napoleon and denounced Changarnier's insolent actions. "You are characterized," Ledru told the Assembly, "as the enemies of the army! You are designated

¹ Clermont 67-9.

as prey for its bayonets! And to whose profit? To the profit of the pretended head of the government, that is, an imperial and royal simulacrum." Ledru spoke of how he himself had defended the army under the provisional government while the royalists lay in hiding. He continued, reiterating his belief in the existence of a counter-revolutionary plot and demanding an impeachment of the ministers for violation of the constitution, since they seemed to be in league with Oudinot, Changarnier, and Louis Napoleon. Even Barrot in his *Memoirs* admits "Had M. Ledru-Rollin ended here, he would have carried a new vote of censure against us, and he would have made our position increasingly difficult."¹ But Ledru went too far and ended with an appeal to recognize the Roman republic, something the Assembly was unwilling to do.²

Odilon Barrot profited by Ledru's mistake and launched into an oration about the inadvisability of recognizing the Roman republic. He claimed that the real purpose of those who magnified the importance of the skirmish near Rome was to reject the result of universal suffrage³ and to cause civil war. Again Barrot had used the expedient of envenoming the debate, and this time his manoeuvre was successful, for an angry clash arose between the left and the

¹ Barrot 3:226. Cf. Clermont 69.

² *Discours politiques* 2:307-315. The conservative Whig, Senior 1:22 describes the scene: "Ledru-Rollin was speaking, or rather screaming, from the tribune. He is a large red-faced man with an enormous voice and violent action. His speech, and in fact that of every speaker on that day, was not a continuous discourse; it was a series of short sentences, each of which was interrupted or followed by an explosion of fierce denial and furious abuse from the other side of the chamber. His voice, I have said, was powerful, but he mouthed his words in order to give them emphasis and dropped his voice at the end of each sentence."

³ The vote for members of the Legislative Assembly was two days off.

right, in which the centre forgot the real subject of discussion, forgot the inexplicable conduct of the cabinet, and sided with the ministers. Barrot then proceeded to the lame explanation that Changarnier had merely wished to encourage the soldiers, that Changarnier had committed neither a political act nor one defiant of the Assembly. Clement Thomas, a member of the left, expressed the fear that Barrot himself by his actions was preparing for civil war, Favre made the same statement with his customary vehemence; unfortunately, he read a letter in which some French prisoners of the Romans were said to have offered to fight with the Romans against the Austrians. This was exactly what they were sent to Italy to do, but Tracy, minister of the navy, declared that then these French soldiers were willing to fight against France if necessary, and the centre was further alienated from the left. After some more discussion the order of the day pure and simple was passed by a small majority. The parties in the Assembly were hopelessly split on this vote.¹

Léon Faucher, minister of the interior, telegraphed to the departments the result of the vote and advised the electors to cast their ballots in the coming election only for those who had voted with the majority. This abuse of his position caused his fall from office. Ledru-Rollin and the Mountain proposed an impeachment of the ministry, but the proposal was buried in the committee of justice.²

The ministry had emerged successfully from this series of arbitrary acts and clumsy subterfuges. The end of the Constituent Assembly was now near, and Barrot hoped soon for clear sailing with a subservient majority. But in the opinion of a prominent French historian the events and de-

¹ Thus Lamartine voted with the government, Cavaignac with the lefts.

² On both subjects see p. 289.

bates of the past few days had made only too clear "the duplicity and brutality of French policy toward the Roman republic."¹

On May 22, Sarrans, a member of the left, interpellated the government. He spoke of a manifesto against free peoples issued by the Czar, claimed that that monarch would invade Italy when he had subdued Hungary, and inconsequentially concluded that Oudinot's advance on Rome ought to cease. Drouyn de Lhuys declared that the Italian question had been sufficiently debated. A desultory discussion followed.

Ledru spoke of the danger of an attack on France by Russia when she had snuffed out the revolutionary conflagrations in Germany and Italy. He compared the Czar's manifesto to that of Brunswick in 1792, and he declared that France ought to answer the Emperor of Russia as she had answered the Emperor of Austria.²

Barrot asserted that Russia was friendly to France and that there was no danger; he again accused Ledru of trying to arouse the passion of the Assembly. Crémieux and other orators came to the support of the leader of the Mountain. On the order of the day there was no quorum. President Marrast feared trouble and ordered up some regiments, but Changarnier again instructed his subordinates to obey no orders but his own. Barrot prevented trouble by inducing a few members of the right to vote and the order of the day was rejected 459 to 53. The crisis was past, but Changarnier had once more shown his insubordination.³

The discussion was continued on the following day. The extreme left had proposed an order of the day protesting

¹ Monod in introduction to Clermont v.

² *Moniteur* 1866.

³ For debate on this act of insubordination see page 289.

against the actions of Austria, Prussia, and Russia; the centre had proposed one calling the attention of the ministry to Russian affairs. An attempt to reconcile these two points of view failed. The cabinet adopted the vague order of the day proposed by the centre, and it was passed against the vote of the lefts. The debate was of little importance; it did, however give Ledru an opportunity to emphasize once more his fear of an alliance against France among the reactionary monarchs.

Meanwhile in Rome all manner of rumors were rife. On May 12 it was even announced that there had been a revolution in Paris which had carried Ledru to the presidency of the French republic.¹ After the battle near Rome on April 30 the Roman party which favored conciliation had lost all power. Mazzini was in complete control of the reins of government. He still hoped to negotiate with Oudinot, but an attempt through the liberal Father Ventura came to naught. Mazzini tried to touch French sympathies by releasing his prisoners, but Oudinot did not even inform the French government of this act. Although the General refused to turn Civita Vecchia over to the Pope, he still expected to attack Rome and still entertained the illusion that a large part of the city was friendly.

To Oudinot's great regret Lesseps now arrived and superseded him as negotiator. The new envoy soon grasped the situation and all its difficulties. He first arranged an armistice. Then he began negotiations. Unfortunately Mazzini was unwilling to make any concessions and lost precious time when an agreement permitting the French troops to enter Rome and guarantee her independence against Austrian attacks might have been attained at the price of his own resignation and the entrusting of the

¹ *Débats*, May 22.

government to native Romans. This would have been a slight blow to the sovereignty of Rome, but it was the only chance of safety and had Mazzini been less of an egotist, he would have agreed to it. In the meanwhile Garibaldi had defeated the invading Neapolitans, the court at Gaeta had refused to issue a liberal manifesto, and the French elections had given an overwhelming majority to the conservatives in the new legislature which would replace that which had passed the order of the day of May 7 adverse to the attack on Rome.

Lesseps continued his negotiations. Oudinot consented to abandon his demand for the resignation of the triumvirs but insisted upon an entrance into Rome by the French troops. It was Mazzini who was implacable and refused to treat unless the Roman republic was recognized. Oudinot as a further sign of amity consented to send some ambulances to Rome. Mazzini, confident that the French elections would return a radical majority, had dragged the negotiations out until Lesseps was on the point of breaking them off. Oudinot had become convinced that force should replace diplomacy, and it was with the greatest difficulty that Lesseps induced him to wait a little longer. Finally, convinced that Mazzini was playing with him, the French envoy left Rome.

But Lesseps had succeeded in building up a strong anti-Mazzini party in the city and when he finally sent, with the approval of Oudinot, a project which he declared was an ultimatum, Mazzini was forced to give in and to agree to a similar project with immaterial changes except that instead of *protection* France should give *friendship* to Rome. Unfortunately in the interim Oudinot had been completely won over by reactionary influences, and when Lesseps returned from a visit to Rome with the conditions which the General had approved Oudinot declared that the new treaty was con-

trary to everything that France desired. Yet the new treaty was an agreement almost identical to the one he himself had authorized.

The ministry in Paris had meanwhile been slightly altered, and the Constituent Assembly which had been hostile to the cabinet policy had dissolved. Accordingly despatches arrived recalling Lesseps and authorizing Oudinot to attack Rome. Thus just at the moment when the plenipotentiary of the French republic had succeeded in carrying out the instructions given him, when he had overcome insuperable difficulties to reach the precise result which the Constituent Assembly on April 16 and May 7 had favored, he was disavowed. There is but one explanation of this action. The cabinet had not wished him to succeed; it had merely sent him to gain time. In other words it had deceived the Assembly and its own envoy into believing that it wished to carry out the desires of the Assembly, whereas at heart it had determined to attack Rome, to do exactly that for which it had been blamed on May 7.

The cabinet, as has just been said, had undergone a change. The president of the republic had desired to form a more conservative ministry, but Bugeaud, to whom he turned, had asserted that this was inopportune, and Louis Napoleon had then turned to Barrot. The latter wished to strengthen his own party in the cabinet and insisted on the admission of three friends. This would have made the ministry too liberal for Falloux. Probably in order to conciliate him the attack on Rome was decided on. Thereupon Drouyn de Lhuys resigned, either because he did not approve the disavowal of the agent who had carried out his instructions or because it was better to have at the foreign office a man who could claim that he had had no part in giving the instructions. Thus when the new Assembly met, it was con-

fronted by a changed Barrot ministry with Tocqueville as foreign minister.¹

At Rome Oudinot announced the end of the truce, and contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the armistice, he immediately occupied a few advanced points. Fighting began on June 3, and for a month the Romans, united under Garibaldi, made a brilliant defense, but the force of numbers and the ability of Vaillant, who acted as adviser to Oudinot, brought about the final and inevitable success of the French. The Roman assembly surrendered and on July 3 the attackers entered Rome. A little later the Pope was restored, not the liberal pope the French had hailed but a reactionary pontiff dominated by Cardinal Antonelli. After using all manner of subterfuges to gain their end, the Barrot cabinet discovered that it would have to be satisfied with something none of its members, except Falloux, desired.

¹ Clermont 73-174.

CHAPTER XXIII

ON THE EVE OF AN UPRISING

THE Legislative Assembly met on May 28, 1849. In the Assembly ready to combat the government at every step was the Mountain, a well-organized group of socialists and radicals. Besides its own forces, this group could rely always on the support of the independent members of the extreme left, and when it did not become too violent, on the left proper. Outside the Assembly the opposition was composed of various elements. There still remained some remnants of the clubs, and these were ready to raise a riot at a sign of the Mountain. The most important of these secret associations was the Society of the Rights of Man.¹ Then there was the so-called committee of twenty-five, which had been appointed by the democratic-socialist party to take charge of the elections to the Legislative Assembly and which continued to hold meetings after the elections were over; this committee seemed to favor the use of violence. Thirdly, in the National Guard there were still liberal elements, headed by such persons as Etienne Arago, Schmitz, and Forestier.² A fourth element was the press. The radical, Delescluze, editor of the *Révolution démocratique et sociale*, was the chief organizer of the opposi-

¹ On June 11 this society held a permanent session awaiting orders from the Mountain. — Accusation at Ledru trial, *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 3101.

² For letter of Arago, see Lièsville collection; it was published in *Peuple, Vraie République*, June 13; *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 3103. Reply by commanding officer is in Lièsville Collection.

tion to the government outside the Assembly. Besides his journal the legislative opposition was supported not only by the great radical and socialist newspapers, the *Démocratie pacifique*, the *Peuple*, the *Réforme*, the *République*, the *Travail affranchi*, and the *Vraie République*, but also by such moderate journals as the *Crédit*, the *Liberté*, the *National*, the *Temps*, and the *Tribune du Peuple*, and even by the *Siècle*, with which Barrot had formerly been connected, and by the *Presse* of Emile de Girardin, a free lance always in opposition.

The opposition relied upon three articles of the constitution when it declared that that document had been violated by the government in authorizing an attack on Rome. These were the following. Article 5 of the preamble: "The French Republic respects foreign nationalities as it intends its own to be respected: it does not undertake any war for the purpose of conquest and it never employs its forces against the liberty of any people." Article 54 of the constitution itself: "The president watches over the defense of the state, but he cannot undertake any war without the consent of the National Assembly." Article 110: "The National Assembly assigns the safe-keeping of the present constitution and the rights which it consecrates to the guardianship and patriotism of all the French."¹

On June 4, a week after the sessions of the Legislative Assembly had opened, Ledru-Rollin demanded permission to interpellate the government on Italian affairs. Although Tracy, minister of the navy, insisted that the time was inopportune, the Assembly appointed the seventh for the debate. On June 7 the president of the Assembly read a letter from Ledru, who was ill, having been confined to his bed since the fifth. The letter requested the adjournment

¹ Anderson 533-7.

of the interpellation, and the Assembly consented to an adjournment until June 11.¹ Nevertheless Emmanuel Arago, an independent member of the extreme left, insisted on telling of the agreement made by Lesseps, and Bac, a member of the Mountain, asked whether the agreement had been rejected. Tocqueville, the new minister of foreign affairs, refused to make any declaration until June 11, and Barrot claimed that no satisfactory agreement had been proposed; neither Barrot nor Tocqueville, however, made any mention of the attack on Rome, which had already been ordered.

When the news of this attack became public, liberals² as well as radicals were wild with rage. On June 10 an attempt was made to bring these elements together. A meeting of the former members of the Constituent Assembly was held at the Palais National, and an executive committee was constituted with the moderate Goudchaux as chairman. A few conservatives had attended the meeting but had quickly withdrawn. The rest of those present signed a statement declaring their interpretation of the three violated articles of the constitution, an interpretation which coincided with that of the Mountain.³

On the same day one hundred and twenty-three members of the Mountain drew up a proclamation to the German democracy. Although the affairs of Italy were more serious, they said, their brothers across the Rhine ought not to be neglected; the proclamation was merely a word of encouragement. This manifesto was published on June 11 in the radical newspapers.⁴

A little before noon on June 11 a meeting of the radical

¹ *Moniteur* 2017.

² By liberals are meant such persons as Cavaignac and the members of the left center of the Legislative Assembly.

³ Gent at Ledru trial, *Moniteur* 3206.

⁴ *Moniteur* 3101. The *Réforme* gives 124 signatories.

and liberal press was held at the offices of the *Démocratie pacifique*. Considerant occupied the chair at first but soon ceded it to Girardin. Considerant proposed that if the Assembly should reject the impeachment which was to be moved, the deputies of the opposition should announce that the constitution had been distinctly violated, that they should declare the people, the officials, the National Guard, and the army released from their oath to the executive power, that these deputies should proclaim themselves the only legal representatives of the people and should form themselves into a rump assembly by right of article 68 which provided for such a contingency. A desultory discussion followed, and finally Girardin spoke. He declared that the freedom of the press and universal suffrage must be defended, that the best means of defending them was for the minority of the Assembly to declare the majority outside the law, but he opposed any rioting, any insurrection in Paris. This was an approval of Considerant's scheme for a rump parliament. The meeting voted unanimously in favor of the adoption of this plan of action, and it charged Considerant and the two other deputies present to inform Ledru-Rollin and the Mountain of its decision.¹

Considerant went immediately from this meeting to a gathering of the Mountain. He presented his propositions for a rump parliament and urged that they be published directly after the legislative session.² Apparently the Montagnards came to no decision at this time.

As soon as the Assembly met on that day, June 11, Ledru-Rollin brought forward a motion for the impeachment of

¹ Accusation at Ledru trial, *Moniteur* 3108; Toussenel, Brunier, Chataud, and Vidal, *ibid.*, 3160-4. The latter testified that Girardin opposed Considerant, but the other authorities say the contrary. See also Darimon 155; Considerant 25-7.

² Considerant 27.

the ministry, signed by one-hundred and forty-eight deputies, Montagnards and independent members of the extreme left. The ministry was accused of violating the constitution.¹ Ledru said that there were supreme moments when phrases were useless. He told of the attack on Rome made on June 3 and of the repulse of the French cavalry. Barrot and Tocqueville denied the repulse, but Ledru read detailed accounts from a Marseilles newspaper and from a letter he had received. The leader of the Mountain told how a suspension of hostilities had been asked by and granted to Oudinot in order that the dead might be buried. He pointed out how the constitution guaranteed protection to the republic of Rome, how the vote of May 7 in the Constituent Assembly had disapproved attacks on the Roman republic, how Oudinot had transgressed the wishes of that Assembly while the ministers were professing obedience to them. "Interpellations," said Ledru, "are worse than useless. . . . The truth is that the government has failed in the most sacred of its duties, that it has violated the constitution; the truth is that an impeachment is the only act that can be directed against it." Ledru explained his definition of French honor, not the capture of a city by a nation of thirty-six millions, but the support of right and justice. He repeated his demand for an impeachment of the president and the ministers.² After leaving the tribune Ledru added a request for urgency.³

Barrot began his reply by doubting the news in Ledru's letter. (This was simply tactics, for he knew that every word in it was true.) He declared that impeachment was a

¹ The *Moniteur* 3102 states that there were 148 signatories but mentions by name only 146. The radical papers of June 12 published the list of signatories giving 142 to 146 names.

² *Discours politiques* 2: 334-9. Cf. Clermont 181-2.

³ *Moniteur* 2044.

serious matter and asked the Mountain whether it would remain within the bounds of legality; Ledru and others nodded assent. Barrot then entered upon explanations which explained nothing and statements which were lies or half-truths. He claimed that Rome had been attacked only when French honor demanded it. (Yet he had refused to support the president's letter to Oudinot a month earlier.) He asserted that the recall of Lesseps was due to the dishonorable terms of the revised treaty made by that envoy. (But Lesseps's recall antedated by a week the treaty.) He delivered a eulogy on the liberalism of the Pope. (Pius had just rejected the few liberal concessions requested by the French envoys at his court.) Barrot declared that Oudinot had come to Rome as a friend and had encountered war. He compared the two agreements of Lesseps and read into the revised one all manner of interpretations which no sane man could find there. He emphasized the need of entering Rome before the Austrians and maintained that France was defending liberty at Rome. The Assembly would have backed Barrot no matter what he said; so Barrot deserves little of the praise frequently given him for the persuasiveness of this speech. If he had come out plainly, with the intention of changing the policy towards Rome, the Assembly would have agreed, and all which could be charged against him would have been a violation of the constitution. Instead he misrepresented facts and gave false reasons. This is the same Barrot who had stigmatized with his burning eloquence the far less flagrant insincerity of Louis Philippe's ministers. Human psychology is peculiar; how could Barrot, who was undoubtedly honest, reconcile himself to this hodge-podge of lies and misrepresentations? ¹

Of course this tissue of subterfuges called Ledru back to the tribune, but he was no longer the calm, dispassionate

¹ Cf. Clermont 182-7.

orator who had delivered an unanswerable indictment of the cabinet; he was the leader of the extreme opposition, boiling over with unrestrainable rage. During the earlier part of his speech he controlled himself slightly, but as the majority remained impervious to his irrefutable arguments, his passion was too much for him and he let himself utter phrases that seemed an incitement to civil war.

Ledru said: "There is something profoundly sad in seeing to what a point the most solemn acts are forgotten or disfigured by verbal jugglery." He quoted the decrees of the Constituent Assembly, the words of Jules Favre on April 16 and on May 7 and those of Sénard on the latter date. "I declared to you," Ledru said, "that there are times when one is overcome by despair. I do not know of any power of words that can struggle against such passages and such resolutions as I have quoted. . . . You asserted that you had the right to go to the heart of Rome and make French blood flow; I deny that right. You said to the members who did not belong to the National Constituent Assembly that it gave you the right; I say that it did not." Ledru showed the duplicity of the government in the Lesseps mission; he asked what act of the Romans had caused the sudden rupture of negotiations and the attack on their sovereignty; he accused the government of subservience to the Pope. Summing up his arguments, he declared the government's statements false. So far his indignation had only made his arguments the more forceful, but now he was carried away. "You said to us in the beginning as if to intimidate us. . . . Are you sure of remaining within the limits of the law? You are most insolent: you have violated the constitution and you address such a question to us. Our answer is simple; *The constitution has been violated; we will defend it by all means possible, even by arms.*"¹

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 340-9. Cf. Clermont 187-8.

An eye-witness thus described the scene at this point ;

I can again see M. Ledru-Rollin at the tribune on June 11. His thundering voice filled the entire hall. . . . All at once these words—I can hear them still after twenty years—were heard. . . . There was an explosion. . . . Every one was on his feet shouting. The entire Mountain clapped its hands. The conservatives glared at the left of the Assembly, and the Montagnards replied by shaking their fists at their adversaries. In the midst of the tumult M. Ledru-Rollin never left the tribune. His provocative attitude was striking; his arm was raised in a menacing manner, and his head was thrown back defiantly. He replied with a disdainful smile to the call to order of the president, and anew his sonorous voice rang out.¹

For twenty-five minutes disorder reigned. The president was forced to suspend the sitting. The Mountain reechoed the defiance of its leader. The right trembled with rage at the audacity of the phrase. Were Ledru's words justified? They were unfortunate as they gave support to the conservative claim that Ledru-Rollin advocated an uprising. But there was no such intention in the speaker's mind. Ledru always tended to extremes in his oratory, and this was the strongest phrase he could find to express the devotion of the Mountain to the constitution. Arms might be used as a last extremity, but he had pledged his word to Barrot to exhaust all legal means first.²

¹ Achard 229-230.

² In general the extreme left approved what Ledru had said. Thus Nadaud 333 wrote: "It was amid the applause of the extreme left that Ledru-Rollin declared . . . in a discourse that would suffice to immortalize his name that we would oppose that monstrous war [against Rome] even with arms in our hands." But a few Montagnards felt that Ledru had gone too far. Among them was Commissaire 1:232, who declared: "These words were extremely serious; pronounced by Ledru-Rollin they amounted to a declaration of war. . . . The Mountain, however, had not authorized the great orator to compromise it imprudently

Finally the disorder subsided, and President Dupin reopened the session. He called the orator to order severely. Ledru retorted by invoking article 110 of the constitution and reiterating his final words. General Bedeau declared that all cherished the constitution, but that it was for the entire Assembly rather than for the minority to decide whether it had been violated. Ségur d'Aguesseau protested against the *anarchical* doctrines which had been uttered; he accused Rome of treachery and asserted that the vote of May 7 was self-contradictory. Emmanuel Arago showed the inconsistencies of the government and asked for a statement of its policy. Larabit expressed the opinion of the left centre when he disapproved of the wild words from the tribune but at the same time censured the Italian policy of the cabinet, Crémieux of the left and Adelsward of the left centre proposed orders of the day approving respectively the policy of May 7 and of the Constituent Assembly, but the right passed the order of the day pure and simple by 361 to 201 votes. Thus ended the eventful session of June 11.

On the evening of this day there was another meeting of the liberal and radical journalists, this time at the office of the *Peuple*. Ledru and other Montagnards were present. Darimon, an editor of the *Peuple*, spoke to Ledru and was surprised to find that after his words at the Assembly the leader of the Mountain was still opposed to an uprising.¹ Considerant renewed his proposal for a rump parliament. Girardin insisted on the right of the press to criticize. Then he and the editor of the *National* retired while the radical

and audaciously. The deputies of the Mountain could have refused to accept the responsibility of this declaration as did the other republicans of the Assembly. M. Ledru-Rollin would have lost a little prestige, but the republic would have been spared all the harm done by June 13."

¹ Darimon 155.

newspaper men went to the headquarters of the Mountain in the Rue de Hasard to inform the deputies, who were holding a meeting there, of the position of the press.¹

On June 12 Paris arose fearing trouble. The National Guard under the leadership of Schmitz held meetings to plan a great demonstration.² The radical press printed three proclamations. One from the Mountain said: "We presented an impeachment against the executive. We shall sustain it tomorrow. We wish to try every means which the constitution places in our hands. Let the people continue to have faith in its representatives as its representatives have faith in them." A second proclamation was from the democratic-socialist committee (committee of twenty-five); it pledged support to the Mountain. The third was an appeal from the schools that all Frenchmen join in the protest against the violation of the constitution.

The editorials in the radical and liberal newspapers of June 12 supported the extreme left. The *Peuple* "hoped that the Mountain would hold to the oath pronounced by its leader." The *Démocratie pacifique* insisted that it was time to appeal to the country. The *Vraie République* went into ecstasies over Ledru's oratory. The *République* said that there was no longer a constitution. The *Révolution démocratique et sociale* urged the Mountain to march forward since the National Guard and the army were with it. The *Réforme* desired the defense of the constitution even by arms. The *National* insisted that Ledru had made no appeal to violence, and it ridiculed the attitude of Barrot and Thiers. The *Presse* asserted that the right of inter-

¹ Darimon 155; Considerant 27; Laulerie, Girardin, and Toussinel at Ledru trial, *Moniteur* for 1849, pp. 3168, 3208, 3220, 3262. There is no evidence as to the deliberations of the Mountain on the evening of June 11.

² Accusation at Ledru trial, *Moniteur* 3102.

pretation of the constitution by the legislative majority was the negation of that document; it praised the oratorical triumph of Ledru; and it violently attacked the Roman expedition. The *Crédit* maintained that the majority in the Legislative Assembly was playing with the constitution. The *Temps* considered the constitution violated. The *Siècle* declared that the entry into Rome would be similar to that of the Vandals. On the other hand, the incapacity of the Mountain, its inevitable defeat, and its desire for civil war were the points emphasized by the conservative newspapers.¹

The members of the Legislative Assembly met on June 12 expecting further developments. A member of the right, more frank than his colleagues, said to the Montagnard Commissaire: "We know as well as you that the constitution has been violated, but it has been violated in the interests of the great party of order which desires the re-establishment of the monarchy, and we do not wish the constitution to be violated in the eyes of the country."² About noon the extreme left held a caucus. Considerant again proposed his idea of a rump parliament. Many of the deputies feared that the government would seize the occasion of the peaceful demonstration planned for the morrow in order to provoke the semblance of an insurrection. Ledru in particular was anxious to take precautions to prevent such an occurrence.³

Lacrosse, one of the ministers, demanded urgency for the discussion of the impeachment, and it was granted unanimously. A committee of fifteen was appointed to consider the advisability of an indictment, but the Assembly showed its utter lack of fairness by appointing to it fifteen members

¹ Thus *Assemblée Nationale, Constitutionnel, Courier Français, Dix Décembre, Gazette de France, Patrie, Pays, Union, Univers*.

² Commissaire 1: 236.

³ Versigny at Ledru trial, *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 3168.

of the right; not even the left centre was given a place on the committee. Among the members were Thiers, leader of the right proper, Ségur d'Aguesseau, who had distinguished himself on the previous day by a violent attack on Ledru, Daru, a prominent member of the Rue de Poitiers group, Attorney-General Baroche, Bedeau, who had several times contradicted the orators of the left on the Roman question. In fact, the committee was composed of men who had so compromised themselves that a recommendation for impeachment would have been a self-accusation. Grandin asked whether the left accepted responsibility for the appeal to arms. Pierre Leroux replied that he and his friends appealed to reason, not to arms.¹ Dufaure, minister of the interior, expressed himself as pleased with this answer, Now the committee had finished its deliberations and Daru spoke for it. Naturally he completely acquitted the government and claimed that it had faithfully carried out the wishes of the Constituent Assembly. Canet, a Montagnard, inquired what government France intended to give to Rome. Barrot avoided the question and talked banalities about doing his duty. Laclaudure, a member of the extreme left, wanted to see the documents on which the committee's report was based. Tocqueville was willing to produce them since, he said, they were favorable to the ministers, but he claimed that it would prolong the debate, for all the important ones had been published in the *Moniteur*.

Ledru-Rollin now spoke. There has been much comment on the mild tone of his speech delivered after the fiery word of the previous day. Barrot repeated in his memoirs the common account that within the ranks of the Mountain there was indecision as to the advisability of an uprising, and

¹ Many writers emphasize the fact that Ledru was silent, but there was no reason why he should have answered that question rather than one of his colleagues.

that the party of quiet had the advantage on the twelfth.¹ Clermont believes that the moderation was caused by the advise of Rusconi, an envoy of the Roman republic, who considered that an uprising at Paris would ruin the hopes that Rome still retained in the French government.² But Clermont looks too much to Rome and too little to the psychology of Ledru and the Mountain. The explanation is probably simpler. When Ledru had declared that he would defend the constitution with arms, he was not making an appeal to insurrection, he had no desire for using violence, he was merely carried away by the heat of a moment to forceful expression, he was emphasizing *defend the constitution* and not *even with arms*. Therefore it was natural that the next day, when his anger had cooled, he should adopt a tone which clearly implied a desire for a peaceful solution.

Ledru spoke in favor of the communication of documents. After protesting that the Mountain had no desire for agitation he insisted that always between the demand for impeachment and the final decision the documents in the case must be produced. He claimed that there were certain vital ones, notably the contradictory orders given to Oudinot and to Lesseps, which had not yet been made public. He asked how the Assembly could know that the indictment was frivolous if it did not know the facts in the case. "You can render a decision," he said; "you have the majority, I know—M. Guizot always acted with a majority." The right shouted that this was an insult to universal suffrage. Ledru replied: "I believe in universal suffrage, it is my faith, but I also believe that there is something superior to universal suffrage, for the electors may be deceived. That

¹ Barrot 3: 291-2.

² Clermont 189.

superior something is eternal right and justice, that indefinable thing called human conscience." Ledru-Rollin ended with an explanation of his words of the previous day. "All pacific means to defend the constitution, but if it is violated . . . as I said, it must be defended by each of us with arms in his hands."¹ It is remarkable how peaceful these words now sounded when divested of the air of defiance with which they had previously been uttered.

President Dupin desired to put the vote whether they should proceed to the discussion of the question of the impeachment. Coralli, a member of the left centre, wanted the matter referred to the bureaux. Laclaudure, a member of the extreme left, again insisted on seeing the documents. But the president persisted in putting the question. The indignant left refrained from voting, and the motion was passed 377 to 7.

And still Pascal Duprat, an orator of the extreme left, insisted on seeing the documents. Barrot declared this unnecessary. Crémieux maintained that the signers of the impeachment might be convinced of the guilt of the ministers, the majority of their innocence, but that there were some members of the Assembly whose minds were open and who needed documentary proof. Then Thiers rose and made the great speech for the defense. He asserted that Crémieux had the right to ask for the documents but not the signers, who had asserted the previous day that the case was clear without them;² that the committee had examined everything and had seen no basis for impeachment; that the Assembly had realized, when troops had been sent to Civita Vecchia, that force might be needed; and that these troops had defended liberty as well as order. All the facts were known, Thiers claimed, and there was no attack

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 350-7.

² This was a hit at Ledru, Laclaudure, and Duprat.

on liberty. The government had tried negotiations and had been compelled to use force. "We think that the country must know two facts; that the government did not violate the fundamental pact, and that a government which knows how to make the law respected has us behind her to aid her in her task." Thiers did not have a promising cause to defend, but he made a remarkably eloquent and convincing argument. He was the only orator in the Assembly who could defeat Ledru in the forum.

Of course the leader of the Mountain was compelled to reply. He insisted that he was convinced of the guilt of the ministers but that he needed the documents to convince the country. Thiers claimed, Ledru continued, that this was a struggle between demagogy and order. But the demagogy at Rome was a republic. Thiers had twisted the intentions of the Constituent Assembly; why did he not reply to Sénard and Favre on May 7 with his distorted version? Why all this energy to repulse the Austrians when all Rome asked was permission to repulse them herself as she had repulsed the Neapolitans? As to the declaration that this was a struggle between demagogy and order, this was not the declaration of Thiers but of the Emperor of Russia in a manifesto. It is a question of monarchy or republic, said Ledru. The Roman republic could not be reproached with the murder of Rossi, for that occurred five months before its proclamation. The Roman republic was not a demagogy, for it was based on universal suffrage and the approval of the population. "It is order that is advancing throughout Germany," Ledru said; "it is the order of Prussia that is advancing to our borders, to Kehl. It is order that menaces our frontiers. You belong to the party of the Cossacks; you are not republicans."¹ Again we have

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 358-364.

a convincing if slightly rambling discourse, in general moderate in tone but ending defiantly.

President Dupin was about to call the orator to order when Thiers rose to reply. Thiers insisted that he took the words just uttered as applying to himself. Ledru interrupted from the floor to say that the word *Cossack* was merely a retort to the word *demagogue*. Thiers responded that he had used the word *demagogue* in a general sense and that it was Ledru-Rollin's fault if he thought that the shoe pinched him. Let the country choose between the two parties, Thiers continued. His party desired order as well as a republic, in Italy as well as in France. It desired order and therefore fought Ledru's influence. Again Pascal Duprat, supported by Crémieux, Pyat, and Latrade, insisted on a vote on the question of the production of the documents, but Dupin asserted that the question had been decided and that the Assembly should now vote on the committee's report. This was accepted 377 to 8, for again the entire left refrained from voting. The left centre voted with the majority. Thus ended the session.

June 12 was a mere lull in the struggle and brought no permanent results. Ledru had made able speeches, but had added nothing to what he had said the previous day. The reader should notice the emphasis given to that higher law which was declared superior to universal suffrage, the old theory of natural law. Thiers had shown himself a remarkable defender of a bad cause and with him resided the honours of the debate; but he had employed the favorite device of the right, to turn the question from the subject in hand to a general accusation of the extreme left. The right had conspicuously shown its unfairness. The impeachment had been submitted to a committee composed wholly of the right. The production of the documents, demanded by the most elementary rules of equity, had been refused by the

majority. The discussion had been closed before the subject had really been debated, for all the speeches had been on the question of the production of the documents. It was manifest that the conservatives would give the opposition no chance to establish its case.

Meanwhile the committee of republican journalists and the committee of twenty-five had each sat all day June 12 in permanent session at the offices of the *Démocratique pacifique*. No member of the Mountain was present.¹ The Mountain held no meeting in the Rue du Hasard that day although members ran in and out of the headquarters.² The Montagnards considered that place unsafe and went to the offices of the *Démocratique pacifique* where a room was placed at their disposal. Various independent members of the extreme left were present at their meeting but no non-deputies. Considerant still insisted on his plan for a peaceful protest and a rump parliament. No one was prepared for an insurrection, and Baudin and Nadaud declared that the people would not rise. There was fear that the authorities would fire on the peaceful demonstration planned for the morrow. The general feeling of the meeting was that they should definitely declare themselves as opposed to violent action. But Michel de Bourges rose and favored an insurrection. Baudin changed his opinions and a former member of the Constituent Assembly promised six thousand men. This was not believed, but the question of appealing to force remained open.³ Commissaire declares in his memoirs: "If Michel de Bourges had not come and had not spoke at this meeting, it is probable that June 13 would have been merely a peaceful demonstration."⁴ This state-

¹ Ledru trial, *Moniteur for 1849*, pp. 3102, 3134-6.

² *Ibid.*, 3208, 3220-4, 3408. Ledru went there about 10 A. M.

³ Commissaire 1: 236-9; Ledru trial, *Moniteur* 3142, 3168, 3220.

⁴ Commissaire 1: 239.

ment is an exaggeration, for it will be seen that on the morning of June 13 the Mountain was still opposed to anything like an uprising. Ruge, a German democrat and a friend of Ledru, wrote on June 12: "There will be no fighting, merely a peaceful demonstration."¹

A committee composed of Ledru-Rollin, Pyat, and Considerant withdrew from this meeting to draw up a proclamation. They asserted that the people alone was sovereign, and they declared that article 5 of the preamble and article 54 of the constitution had been violated. The only method left was to confide in the people, the National Guard, and the army in accord with article 110 of the constitution. "People, this is the supreme moment," declared the proclamation; "the government has ranged itself on the side of kings against peoples. . . . Liberty is order, is the constitution, is the republic. Rally to the cry of *Hurrah for the Republic! Hurrah for the Constitution!*"² The deputies all approved this manifesto, but some thought that it was not strong enough. A declaration of the *Friends of the Constitution* was read, which quoted article 110 and added: "Let a great manifestation, calm as justice itself, as the sacred cause of nationalities, proclaim boldly the protest of the French people against the audacious enterprises of the authorities, and let it thereby assure the triumph of the constitution." This declaration was also approved by the meeting.³ About three o'clock in the morning of June 13 the deputies of the extreme left separated after handing to

¹ Ruge 2: 101.

² *Moniteur* 3102-3; radical papers of June 13. Pyat 103 declared apropos of this proclamation: "Neither Ledru-Rollin nor Considerant nor I drew it up; we only looked it over with its author"; unfortunately he does not say who the author was. Was he perhaps Michel de Bourges? All other accounts attribute the composition of the proclamation to the three deputies.

³ Ledru trial, *Moniteur* 3103, 3168.

the press the declaration which they had drawn up. It was unsigned; so the newspapers appended at the end the names of those deputies who had signed the proclamation to German democracy.¹

It is clear that at the end of this meeting no plans for insurrection had been made. Michel de Bourges had prevented a decision against an appeal to violence, but that was all. One declaration had been drawn up, another approved, both of which declared that the constitution had been violated and that the last appeal was to the people, but both of which advocated the use of merely peaceful means of opposition.

¹ *Moniteur* 3168; *Commissaire* 1:239.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE GRAND FIASCO

THE events of June 13 have rarely been correctly interpreted. The common account is that Ledru-Rollin did not desire to head an uprising but was forced by his followers to organize long beforehand a definite insurrection. He is supposed to have declared: "I am their chief; I must follow them."¹ This explanation of the events of June 13 is untenable, for every shred of evidence indicates that there was no premeditated conspiracy.

A more reasonable explanation of June 13 is that Ledru and the Mountain were undecided as late as June 12, but that they finally declared in favor of an insurrection and worked with that end in view on the thirteenth.² Thus Maz-

¹ This is the account given by Ledru's contemporaries: Ambès 1: 204-9; Barrot 3: 297-312; Falloux 1: 481-2; Freycinet 56-7; Granier de Cassagnac 2: 89-94; Maupas 1: 60-2; Melun 2: 39; Persigny 72-4; Quentin-Bauchart 1: 266-274; and by such secondary writers as Forster 250-1; Gradis 2: 375; Jerrold 3: 89-96; La Gorce 2: 167-180; Pierre Quentin-Bauchart in *Nouvelle Revue N. S.* 16: 538; Weill 323-6. This is the thesis adopted by the prosecution at Versailles. Calumnious accounts also exist. Vielcastel 1: 114 declares that Ledru was induced to revolt by his mistress, Judith, an actress and police spy. Lavarenne, *Rouges* 61-2, and Mirecourt 88-90 claim that Ledru was forced at the point of a pistol to support an uprising. . . . As to the phrase "I am their chief; I must follow them," it is probably apocryphal. The only definite testimony on this point is by Pressensé in *Revue Bleue* 19²: 549, who declares that Ledru made this remark to Maleville.

² Among contemporaries, Beaumont-Vassy 4: 496-7 and Castille 4: 96-122; among secondary writers, Lebey, *Ministère* 444-509; Martin 3: 220; Pierre 2: 156-214; Rénard 151-2.

zini says in his *Note autobiographe*: "On June 13 our friends in the French assembly under Lédru-Rollin's leadership attempted to arouse Paris against the infamous actions which had been committed, but they were unsuccessful. Their attempt was a summons to insurrection without the preparations necessary to initiate it."¹ The nephew of Jaeger, a disciple of Fourier, gives a peculiar piece of testimony: "Ledru-Rollin had promised to Considerant, that he would establish a phalanstery if he arrived in power. Considerant and Cantagrel supported Ledru-Rollin at Paris in the hope of obtaining this. Jaeger was informed by them of their hopes and obeyed their order to join the uprising."² This narrative does not fit in which the testimony of other contemporaries as to the actions of Considerant.

Far nearer the truth than the idea either of a premeditated plot or of an unpremeditated uprising is the version, prejudiced to be sure, adopted by those contemporaries who took part in the movement against the government. They insist that there was no insurrection at all.³ This was also Ledru-Rollin's opinion. In 1874 he declared in a speech: "There was an attempt at a peaceful manifestation which was intended merely to take the form of a declaration before the National Assembly, but there was no appeal to

¹ Mazzini 5: 192.

² Muller 182. Cf. *Révolution de 1848*, 5: 711.

³ Commissaire 239-245; Considerant, *passim*; Guinard in *Messenger du Nord*, June 26, 1849; Nadaud 334-5; St. Férreol; *Mémoires* 2: 190-7; various persons at Ledru trial. Also all those who knew the radicals, Blind in *Fraser's Magazine* 91: 246-8; Prolès, *Delescluze*, 26-8. Also all the radical newspapers of 1849 and many liberal ones such as the *National*. Among secondary writers the only ones who accept this view are Hamel 343-8, who accepts it on faith, and Raoul de Félice in *Révolution de 1848*, 6: 133-157, 243-252, who accepts it after a long investigation. Félice gives the only satisfactory account of June 13; he believes that the supposed uprising was a Bonapartist plot. Seignobos 138-9 is non-committal as to the responsibility of the Mountain.

arms and indeed not a shot was fired.”¹ Late in 1849 Ledru-Rollin wrote a pamphlet called *Le 13 Juin*; in it we would naturally expect to find a good deal of evidence concerning the events of that day, but it contains only generalities. Ledru demolished many of the arguments of his opponents, but he gave no definite account of his actions in June 1849.²

It is difficult completely to absolve the Mountain from the charge of taking part in an insurrection. Certainly before June 13 the Mountain engaged in no conspiracy. A few of its members, notably Michel de Bourges, desired to resort to violence, but most of the Montagnards up to and through June 12 were opposed to any sort of uprising. On the thirteenth the deputies of the Mountain did not know what course to take when they heard that the manifestation had been dispersed. Embarrassed by the unrealisable scheme for a rump parliament advocated by the pacific Considerant, the leaders of the Mountain seem finally to have decided to use force to defend themselves. Before they had time to draw up any definite plan of action, they were routed. The Mountain should, therefore, be absolved from the charge of a premeditated plot, but should be found guilty of a half-hearted appeal to arms at the eleventh hour for the purpose of an armed resistance to the authorities. As to the Democratic-Socialist Committee, otherwise called the Committee of Twenty-five, and the Society of the Rights of Man, probably some of their members had been preparing for an insurrection, but the evidence on this point is inconclusive. Certainly the government made use of the resistance which it knew was slight and unexpected to pretend

¹ Speech of June 3, 1874, in *Discours politiques* 2: 481.

² *Discours politiques* 2: 379-387. For details see Calman, *Ledru-Rollin après 1848*, 41-3.

that there had been a great insurrection; certainly it magnified the undecided policy of the Mountain into a widespread conspiracy. The police may have built the few barricades that were erected and may have defended them by means of *agents provocateurs*, but that is uncertain.

The radical and liberal newspapers, all of which had shown their hostility to the attack on Rome, continued their program of opposition to the government. On the morning of June 13 the seven great radical journals published the proclamation drawn up the previous evening by the Mountain as well as one signed by the Committee of the Republican Press, the Democratic-Socialist Committee, the delegates of the Luxembourg, and the Committee of the Schools. They also published a circular signed by Schmitz and other members of the fifth legion of the National Guard and a letter of Etienne Arago approving the stand of the parliamentary opposition. The editorials in these newspapers violently denounced the actions of the majority in the Assembly and vaguely advocated peaceful opposition.

About half past nine on the morning of the thirteenth crowds began to gather at the Château d'Eau whence the projected procession was to start. Changarnier in a public letter a little later claimed that as early as June 10 he had known that trouble was brewing. If that was so, his logical course should have been to prevent the assembling of the crowd, but he desired a personal triumph over an insurrection and so allowed the procession to form. Lacrosse, one of the ministers, crossed the square in front of the Château d'Eau and was jostled by the hostile crowd, but Gent, a radical who had been a member of the Constituent Assembly, prevented any violence being used against him. It was half past eleven before the procession started, headed by Etienne Arago, Schmitz, and Perrier of the National Guard, by Bastide, Gent, and Raynal, former deputies.

The Mountain took no part in this manifestation. The people were quiet or harmlessly cheered the Mountain, the constitution, and the Roman republic. All the evidence points to the peaceful character of the procession; the presence of former deputies of the left centre, such as Bastide and Perrier, was not compatible with an uprising.

The procession was marching along laughing when suddenly about one o'clock Changarnier issued from a side street at the head of his troops and charged the procession. His soldiers and gendarmes slashed right and left in an unnecessarily cruel manner. The people could not disperse as all the side streets were thronged with spectators. Then and then only, amid the disorder, an officer in a low voice read the riot act. The policemen and soldiers again jostled the unresisting crowd with their horses and attacked it with bayonets, sabres, clubs. The people offered no resistance and dispersed as quickly as they could. A few extremists cried: *To Arms! They are massacring our brothers!* But such cries were few and scattered. The attack of Changarnier was illegal as he made his assault before reading the riot act. It was unnecessary as the manifestation was peaceful and might have been dispersed before it formed in marching array. The attack was cruel and brutal; this was evidenced particularly in the actions of a gendarme named Petit. When a youth thrown down by the onrush of the troops bared his breast and in a melodramatic frenzy cried: "Kill me," Petit slashed at the boy with his sabre. For this action the gendarme was not dismissed or even reprimanded; in fact a little later he even received promotion.¹

The procession was not the work of the Mountain. The

¹ For accounts of the procession see Ledru in *Discours politiques* 2: 385-6; Changarnier in *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 2103; Ledru trial in *ibid.*, 3115, 3206, 3163; Herzen 60; Ruge 2: 103. Séze in *Révolution de 1848*, 10: 21-2; Fonvielle in *ibid.*, 8: 469-475.

Mountain approved of it but took no part in it. Some of the deputies had gathered during the morning at the headquarters in the Rue du Hasard. Ledru had arrived there a little after eleven o'clock.¹ Contradictory news was continually brought in during the morning and the deputies decided that half of them should go to the Assembly, the other half should remain in the Rue du Hasard. Many of them were out at lunch when crowds of fugitives were heard rushing down the neighboring Rue de Richelieu with occasional cries of *To arms!*² The feelings of Ledru at this stage he himself described in a pamphlet: "At the sight of these bloody acts carried out under the very window of our meeting-place, I remembered the words of General Changarnier spoken the previous day: *I shall set fire to the city*; I remembered clearly the two decrees already issued against the press and the artillery. I had but one idea, that of defending the constitution in the midst of the people."³ Thus apparently, at this point Ledru decided to throw in his lot with the people; as yet he had no thought of armed resistance—probably Considerant's plan for a rump parliament was uppermost in his mind. This meant a defiance of the existing authorities but neither the use of force nor a secret conspiracy, an impossible position.

One thing was decided on by the Mountain; the Rue du

¹ *Affaire du 13 Juin* 1: 551. A lieutenant in the National Guard who was collecting contributions for one of his injured soldiers had been told that Ledru would be sure to contribute. On the evening of June 12 he called at Ledru's home in the Rue de Tournon, but a valet told him that his master was out. The lieutenant returned at half-past ten the next morning and was told that Ledru was busy. The neighbors were surprised that he had failed to receive a donation from Ledru.—*Ibid.*, 1: 520.

² St. Féreol: *Mémoires* 2: 191; Commissaire 244-5; Ledru trial in *Moniteur* for 1849, pp. 3209, 3222.

³ *Discours politiques* 2: 386. Cf. Commissaire 245.

Hasard was not a safe place in which to deliberate. "To the Conservatory of Arts and Trades!" cried some one. Ledru took up the cry, and the Montagnards started off for the Conservatory in order to have amid the people a refuge in which to deliberate. Common sense told them that it was not a stronghold to defend.¹

They wished, however, to have some protection against the attack they expected, and accordingly they went to the neighboring Palais National² where the National Guard artillery under Guinard was quartered. Guinard was a convinced republican, a Montagnard member of the Constituent, but an opponent of violence. He had been adjutant to Courtais, former commander of the National Guard, and was now head of the National Guard artillery. This artillery had been disbanded that morning, but Guinard, fearing a coup d'état, had disregarded the order. Ledru and ten colleagues entered the garden of the Palais National about two o'clock in the afternoon. "As soon as I heard that Ledru was in the garden," said Guinard later,

I took him by the arm and entered my office. We talked together for a very short time. I felt as he did, that there was an attempt to violate the constitution. No more than I did he need to decide on his part. . . . I thought that Ledru-Rollin went to the Conservatory because he was convinced . . . that the constitution had been violated, that the authorities themselves, by charging a body of citizens without having first legally summoned them to disperse, began the insurrection. The first idea was to remain at the Palais National, but near by was a large division of the regular army. All defense was impossible at the Palais National. We feared the possibility of having to defend the republic. We wished

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 386; Boch at Ledru trial, *Moniteur* for 1849, pp. 3143, 3239.

² Now the Palais Royal.

to place ourselves in the midst of a population whose loyalty to the republic had been proved. . . . We went to the Conservatory to consult and to learn what would result from the events that had already happened. I say with all frankness that we did not intend to incite an insurrection.

Thus there was as yet no intention to cause an uprising although there was the intention of resisting the illegal acts of the legal authorities. There was to be no offensive war on the government, but there might be a defensive one.¹

Guinard and the deputies of the Mountain entered the garden of the Palais National. "I assembled the few artillerymen who were in the garden," continued Guinard in his account. "I explained to them the situation as it was known to me, and I asked them whether they wished to take under their protection the members of the National Assembly. On their replying in the affirmative I gave the sign for departure. I declare in the most positive way that nobody but myself made a speech. Ledru-Rollin said nothing. . . . I deny that I urged the artillerymen to overturn the government. I merely took under my protection the members of the National Assembly who appeared to be threatened."² A proof that the artillerymen left with no intention of taking part in an insurrection is the fact that they did not arm the mob that accompanied them with the weapons in the Palais National.³

The artillerymen formed a line on each side of the street and between them marched the representatives four abreast.

¹ Guinard at Ledru trial, *Moniteur for 1849*, pp. 3143-4. Cf. other witnesses, *ibid.*, 3229, 3239-3241, 3325; *Affaire du 13 Juin* 1:15; Ranc 46-7.

² *Moniteur for 1849*, pp. 3143-4. Cf. other witnesses, *ibid.*, 3225, 3240-2. The government declared that Ledru made a speech in the garden but it produced no witnesses to this fact at his trial and those heard at the preliminary examinations had only second-hand information.

³ Guinard in *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 3228.

In front were Guinard, Ledru and Deville, arm in arm. They passed several small military posts without paying any attention to them. There were continual shouts for the constitution and the republic, interspersed with some for the Roman republic, the Mountain, and Ledru-Rollin, and an occasional *Down with Changarnier!* or *To Arms!* Probably about sixty representatives, three hundred artillerymen, and a mob of a thousand civilians left the Palais National, but their numbers decreased as they marched along.¹ On the way, said Considerant later in a pamphlet, "we repeated to each other that our role was traced, that it was no time to deliberate, that we should avoid a call to arms, that we should place ourselves at the head of the manifestation and receive there, if necessary, the charge of bayonets and the rifle fire."²

When the deputies reached the Conservatory, they declared: "We are representatives and we wish to enter."³ The few soldiers in this public building were not numerous enough to resist, and they permitted the deputies to enter with their escort. Ledru and Guinard went into the second courtyard where they met Pouillet, the director of the Conservatory, who had left his office as soon as he heard of their arrival. Pouillet's story is as follows;

"Arrived there, I saw before me . . . a group of deputies in scarfs and full insignia, and behind them in the first courtyard, the red plumes of the National Guard artillery, hats and caps bearing the level card, symbol of the Society of the Rights of Man, and above all a forest of bayonets, disorder, and great agitation." There were four hundred who entered and were

¹ Guinard and other witnesses, *ibid.*, 3225, 3238-3246; Ranc 46-7; St. Férreol, *Mémoires* 2: 192-3.

² Considerant 33.

³ Ledru trial, *Moniteur* for 1849, pp. 3247, 3278.

in the Boulevard St. Martin. "I arrived before the group of deputies and soon by his attitude, by his lofty stature, I recognized the leader of the Mountain. . . . It was to him that I addressed myself. . . .

" 'What do you want?'

" 'An asylum.'

" 'This establishment is the asylum of science and peace, not of war. Go elsewhere with your banner.'

" 'We are being tracked and sabred in the boulevards and in the streets.'

" 'The Conservatory will not save you; it will be fatal to you.'

" 'In the streets we would be massacred.'

" 'Here you will be enveloped, assailed from all sides without possible defense.'

" 'Time presses, we wish to deliberate; have you a room for us?'

" 'You have forced your way in. Alone against you and your army I have only my words with which to oppose you. If you do not believe them, if you will not see your peril, come and I will open up a room for you.' " ¹

Guinard and Ledru returned to the first court. A corporal who was stationed there testified later: "A man of fine appearance with a black beard put his hand on my shoulder and said: *Do no be afraid, corporal; no harm will come to you. . . . It is Ledru-Rollin who is talking to you.*" ² Other deputies had gone in search of a plan of the building. ³

Pouillet had opened up the old amphitheatre for the deputies, but this room did not suit them. The new am-

¹ Pouillet 5-6. Cf. Considerant 33-6; Guinard and Pouillet in *Moniteur* for 1849, pp. 3144, 3277, 3544. For good secondary account of events at the Conservatory, see Castille 4: 109-118. The account in Barrot 3: 200-2 is naturally inexact.

² Crance in *Moniteur* 3277.

³ *Ibid.*, 3277.

phitheatre was refused them; consequently after the director had left, they forced their way into the Spinning Room (*Salle des Filatures*).¹ "Near the entrance to this room," testified Dupin, Pouillet's secretary, "was a small table which was being used by various people, secretaries who were writing, others who were giving orders. M. Ledru-Rollin was very close to this table. He gesticulated, he seemed quite worried, he looked like a sick man."²

There were at least fifty-seven deputies present at the Conservatory. Of these Ledru-Rollin, Martin Bernard, Considerant, and twenty-five others were later prosecuted for insurrection; the presence of Michel de Bourges and the others was unknown to the government.³ A proclamation was later produced supposed to have been drawn up at this meeting. It said: "To the French people, the National Guard, and the army: The constitution has been violated, the people are rising to defend it, the Mountain is at its post. Hurrah for the constitution!" The proclamation was dated: "At the Conservatory of Arts and Trades at two o'clock." The authenticity of this document is doubtful.

The reasons for considering it authentic are various. Commissaire, one of the deputies present, says in his memoirs:

Ledru-Rollin, Michel and Considerant were the three most influential persons present; they formed a group apart. A little later they decided to post a call to arms. Ledru-Rollin wrote the appeal with a pencil. The paper was placed inside his hat. . . . Most of those who were at the Conservatory were ignorant of the call to arms; no one signed it. Ledru-

¹ Pouillet 7-10.

² *Moniteur* 3279.

³ For lists of those present, see St. Férreol, *Proscrits* 1: 46-7; St. Férreol, *Mémoires* 2: 197. Gambon and Pyat, although not present, were also prosecuted.

Rollin told the person who was to print it that the names of those who had signed the impeachment of the ministers should be affixed.¹

St. Férreol, another deputy present, says in his memoirs :

Michel de Bourges drew up a proclamation on a page torn from Jules Maigne's note-book, and this proclamation at the foot of which were placed the names of all the deputies present—who did not need to sign it—was sent to the newspapers which it reached too late.²

In a letter seized later Rolland and five other deputies told the people of Chalon-sur-Saône of the events at Paris and added: "We are drawing up a proclamation to call the people to arms." Three deputies wrote to Chalon and to Grenoble calling on the citizens to rise in revolt.³

There are, however, several reasons for doubting the authenticity of this proclamation. First, the account of Commissaire and St. Férreol do not agree as to who wrote it and as to whose names were affixed. In fact, as regards the latter point, neither was right. The names of twenty-six of those who had signed the impeachment petition were not appended, and the name of one man who had not signed was added. The list of signatories included many who were not present at the Conservatory. As to Rolland, he as well as many other deputies, denied having signed the proclamation, although in this he may have quibbled, for no one claimed that he wrote his signature. Again the proclamation is dated "at two o'clock," but the deputies did not arrive at the Conservatory until nearly three o'clock. Of course this may have been an oversight on the part of whoever drew up the document. Then the "insurgents"

¹ Commissaire 1: 245-6.

² St. Férreol, *Mémoires* 2: 194.

³ Ledru trial, *Moniteur* for 1849, p. 3145.

did not act in conformity with the proclamation; they opposed firing on the government forces when they arrived. Still there is the possibility that they acted thus because there was no chance of a successful defense or because they wished the good will of the army. The strongest evidence against the authenticity of the proclamation is the statement made a few months later by Considerant; "I did not see the proclamation said to have been seized, and I swear, as I was beside Ledru-Rollin or near him all the time, that he did not see it either."¹ This would seem decisive, but Considerant may have lied to save his friends who were in prison or he may have been absent a moment while the proclamation was being written.

Thus the evidence is conflicting as to the authenticity of the proclamation. It may be—although this is a pure hypothesis—that a proclamation calling on the people to defend the Mountain but not inciting them to insurrection was drawn up by the leaders, a proclamation different from that seized by the government. Such a proceeding would have been in line with the peculiar policy of a defensive war against the authorities, the policy earlier adopted by the Mountain.

Whether or not a proclamation had been drawn up, the deputies in the Conservatory took no actual measures of defense. In times of revolt it was the common practice in Paris to build barricades. But to this the Montagnard leaders were opposed. Guinard asserted later: "I had given the most positive orders to prevent the construction of barricades. I told my officers to treat as enemies of the republic all who tried to erect any." In fact he prevented the raising of several.² There were no barricades within

¹ Considerant 36.

² *Moniteur* 3144-5. Cf. *ibid.*, 3140, 3310.

the Conservatory. Outside in the Rue St. Martin a group of workingmen built one, but the artillerymen did not aid them. In the Rue des Gravilliers, some distance off, the workingmen had been persuaded to demolish the one they were in process of constructing.¹

Ledru had hoped that a part of the National Guard would demonstrate in his favor, and he relied particularly on a certain Colonel Forestier. He became impatient and remarked: "Why doesn't Forestier come?" Suchet, a deputy, offered to go to the office of the colonel and induce him to parade with his troops. Suchet was arrested before he reached Forestier. The colonel himself had hesitated as to what course to take. Finally he decided to march through the streets with his troops. Before he had gone far he was arrested without difficulty. The government later claimed that Suchet had wished to urge an attack on the army, but all the evidence points to a desire on his part, as well as on that of Forestier and Ledru, for a mere show of force to prevent Louis Napoleon from making a coup d'état. The Colonel was acquitted of the charge of insurrection; consequently the government's claim that beforehand Ledru-Rollin and the Mountain had planned an uprising with Forestier as military commander falls to the ground.²

Pouillet, director of the Conservatory, had been wandering about, watching the National Guardsmen, the people, and the unarmed leaders of the Society for the Rights of Man. At last he accosted Guinard and urged him to leave the Conservatory since it was untenable; he pointed out its lack of strategic importance as well as the facts that it was dominated by the buildings opposite and that its walls were weak. Guinard consented to accompany him to Ledru,

¹ *Moniteur* 3145-6, 3158.

² Ledru trial, *Moniteur* for 1849, pp. 3117, 3158, 3278-9, 3309, 3325, 3455; Changarnier in *Moniteur* 2103.

whom they found in the Spinning Room. "I accosted M. Ledru-Rollin," said Pouillet in his account,

and in a loud voice repeated to him and to the group around him the same thought and perhaps the same words that I had just used to Colonel Guinard. . . . My conviction was as strong as ever; in fact from minute to minute the likelihood of an outbreak of hostilities seemed to me to be growing greater. . . . I can affirm that the deputies began immediately to deliberate on the question as to whether they should leave the Conservatory or remain there. . . . The deliberation was neither regular nor solemn. It was a conflict of opinions and contradictory assertions, an indescribable confusion. Nobody demanded the floor, everybody took it.

Pouillet himself tried to convince individual deputies of the advantage of quitting the Conservatory, and he won Considerant over to his side. A quarter of an hour was wasted in debate while a committee of five deliberated in secret as to whether or not a government should be formed at the Conservatory. All was still undecided when shots were heard outside.¹

Changarnier had sent two regiments against the Conservatory. A few scattered shots were fired at them, but the deputies tried to prevent all resistance. The Montagnard, Boch, cried: "Don't fire." The artillerymen held the stocks of their muskets in the air. But the regular troops steadily advanced and entered the Conservatory. There was no organized defense on the part of those inside and no attempt to make one.² Neither did the deputies wish to flee. "There was so little thought of flight," said Deville, a deputy, later, "that we all went up to the troops, Ledru-

¹ Pouillet 10-16.

² *Moniteur* for 1849, pp. 2103, 3141, 3143, 3223. Commissaire 249 claims that there was no resistance only because there was no time to organize one.

Rollin at our head. The Artillery held their muskets reversed and were cheering the republic and the constitution.”¹

When the first detachment of troops entered the Conservatory, Ledru left Guinard to whom he was talking and advanced a few steps. He addressed a few words to the captain in command, but the captain was angry or drunk. He disregarded Ledru and said to the deputies: “Line yourselves against the wall; we are going to shoot you with your arms in your hands.” One of the the deputies mounted a table and wished to make an address to prevent the firing. The captain seized him by his official scarf and pulled him down, saying that he did not recognize that badge.²

Ledru in a pamphlet thus described the scene: “We saw death very close, I and my friends. Lined up against a wall without arms or means of defense, we were placed six paces from the muskets of a half-company which had already taken aim and awaited only the final command. The officer, drunk with passion and with wine (say several witnesses), lifted his sword to give the death order when a superior officer galloped up and had barely time to order the guns to be lowered. *They are prisoners* he said; *if they move, fire on them immediately*. A moment more and we should have fallen, assassinated without provocation, without warning, without explanation, without trial, like a herd butchered in a slaughter house. Well, at that supreme and tragic moment did a single one of those men flinch? Did any one of them traffic for his life by supplications or buy his body with his honour? Who then are the cowards, those who did not pale under the shadow of death or those who insulted them the next day, prudently protected behind the bulwark of a state of siege? No, no, during that day of sacrifices I did

¹ *Moniteur* 3280. Cf. *ibid.*, 3279; *Considerant* 39.

² *Moniteur* 3145, 3280, 3304.

not forget for one moment that of all the deputies I was the one that France had honoured with the most votes.”¹

Thus the deputies of the Mountain were saved from being shot by the timely arrival of a superior officer. Ledru said to him: “Major, is it possible that orders have been given to shoot unarmed men?” The major ordered the threatening guns to be lowered.² At this point Colonel Alphonse arrived; Guinard and Ledru spoke to him. Guinard said “You can regard us as your prisoners. Ledru-Rollin and I answer for all the citizens here.” Alphonse nodded assent. Was this a promise to remain in the Conservatory? Alphonse so conceived it, but Guinard did not,³ and Ledru said later: “I did not give my parole.”⁴ The leader of the Mountain can hardly be blamed for not considering that this speech by Guinard bound him not to escape.

At this juncture for some unexplained reason the soldiers withdrew from the Conservatory; the Mountain and its defenders had absolute control within. Already many of the deputies and citizens had escaped by breaking the windows, jumping out of them, and then departing through the garden and the unguarded rear gates. Deville insisted on staying in the first courtyard; others agreed with him. “We will all stay,” said Ledru. The importance of his escape was pointed out, but still Ledru resisted. Then Pilhes seized him by the arm and forced him bodily into the building; further Ledru would not flee.⁵ Soon the first courtyard

¹ *Discours politiques* 2: 367-8.

² *Moniteur* for 1849, pp. 3310, 3323.

³ *Ibid.*, 3222-3. Cf. Guinard in *Messager du Nord*, June 26.

⁴ *Discours politiques* 2: 368.

⁵ *Révolution de 1848*, 17: 48; cf. *Moniteur* 3279; Pouillet 16-9; St. Féreol, *Mémoires* 2: 194.

was reoccupied by the troops. Deville and five other deputies, who had remained there, were made prisoners.

"Here we are, absolute prisoners," said Considerant who was wandering through the building with Ledru-Rollin, Martin Bernard, and Guinard.

"Let us wait and talk; we have nothing better to do," replied Ledru.

"Do you understand why they let everyone go out and why they leave us alone and masters of the interior?"

"I understand nothing. We heard some further gunshots. Perhaps they expect an attack from outside."

By this time the four men were alone. "Truly," remarked Considerant, "the building has other exits and we are masters in it. Why not leave? Let us look at the rear exits." And he and Martin Bernard departed.¹

Soon after Ledru also left. Guinard conducted him through various passages to a side door which led to the garden. There they separated.² "Ledru did not escape through a window as was falsely reported, but he left by a door opening on the garden. . . . That door was opened by a laboratory boy named Peugnot, who later became concierge of that famous establishment."³ Dupin, the secretary of Pouillet, is responsible for the famous story of how Ledru squeezed through a casement window (*vasistas*), dropped to the ground, and was then guided by himself, Dupin, to the gate.⁴ This story should be put to sleep

¹ Considerant 44.

² Guinard in *Moniteur* 3278-9 and in *Messenger du Nord*, June 26; St. Férreol, *Mémoires* 2: 195.

³ Fonvielle in *Révolution de 1848*, 8: 473.

⁴ *Moniteur* 3279. Corroboratory statement by Coeur Desvoy in *ibid.*, 3545. Dupin's chief point in upholding his story against the denial of Guinard and others was that the door to the garden was locked, but we have seen that it was opened by Peugnot.

forever by the following statement: "Signard escaped by the famous *vasistas* of which there was so much talk on the occasion of the flight of Ledru-Rollin. Signard was mistaken for Ledru, owing to the fact that they had similar figures and were both stout. Now, the truth is that Ledru left only at the end of the manifestation and by a door under the very eyes of the officials, who let him pass, whereas Signard and others got away as best they could by a broken window." Ledru-Rollin, who knew the truth, let the reactionary papers calumniate him,¹ probably because he did not wish to reveal to the government the presence of Signard at the Conservatory. The matter in itself is not of great importance, but the picture of the fat orator squeezing through a small opening was long a mine of satire for the conservatives, who dubbed the members of the Mountain *Conspirateurs du Hasard*² and Ledru-Rollin Vasistas I, King of Window-panes.³ The ridicule also affected the republicans. Thus Lamber, the father of Juliette Adam, was disgusted not at the failure but at the "hesitating and ridiculous rôle played by the last two champions of his ideas."⁴

As soon as Ledru emerged from the garden of the Conservatory he was recognized and surrounded by a crowd who shouted: "Here is our leader; here is Ledru-Rollin." Ledru tried to silence them. A short deliberation was held and then Ledru, together with Considerant and Martin Bernard who had joined him, walked off in the direction of the Madelonettes prison, accompanied by five or six civilians. The director of the prison had received favors in the past

¹ Joigneaux 2: 23.

² Conspirators of Fortune. Remember the Mountain headquarters were in the Rue du Hasard.

³ Seurre 2: 321.

⁴ Adam 333.

from Ledru-Rollin and therefore came up to express his sympathy and to give advice as to how to avoid the government patrols. He strongly urged Ledru-Rollin and his friends to proceed along the unguarded Rue Vertbois. He later testified: "M. Ledru-Rollin had his coat on his arm; his clothes were not in disorder, and he wore a black felt hat." ¹

Considerant later thus described the flight:

We had not gone sixty yards before we were recognized at every step and saluted by spontaneous and enthusiastic vivats. Three times I was obliged to dismiss a compromising escort, and twice we had to change our direction or retrace our steps in order not to run into the cordon of troops. *We must seek shelter in some house*, said Ledru-Rollin to me. Within five minutes we would have run into some patrol and could have been arrested and a conflict would have resulted. The unknown friends who were with us saw that it was necessary to act. Our tranquil gait and composed features had so far deceived everyone as to our situation. We took counsel together. While our friends were talking with Ledru . . . a youth of fifteen or sixteen approached me.

The youth took Considerant to a place of safety.²

As a result of the discussion between Ledru and his companions, Martin Bernard went up to a woman and asked permission to use her rooms temporarily. The woman consulted with her husband and then refused. The husband had recognized Ledru whom he later described: "He had a package under his arm and wore a large brim hat; he was an imposing figure."³ According to the *Événement*, the wife of an insurgent who had been transported after the

¹ *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 3341. Cf. *ibid.*, 3343, 3345.

² Considerant 44.

³ *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 3324.

June Days offered Ledru a refuge, but Ledru declined it and continued on down the Rue Vertbois. He was not disguised and walked along tranquilly.¹ After this we lose sight of him. Somewhere or other in Paris he found a safe hiding place for that night.

Thus without any resistance the so-called headquarters of the insurrection were captured. Colonel Guinard had remained some time after Ledru's departure, had conversed quietly with Pouillet, and had finally gone home where he was arrested the next morning. In all Paris only three barricades had been constructed and three more started; these had been easily captured. Colonel Forestier had offered no resistance when he was arrested.²

It is thus clear that there was no organized resistance to the government on June 13. The leaders of the Mountain had no intention of causing an uprising and had made no plans for one. The few arms that were within reach were not even taken. The arms at the Palais National remained in the armory. A small amount of ammunition for hunting was left at Ledru's country house, not brought to Paris. On the other hand, the conduct of General Changarnier on this day should sully his name forever. He attacked an unarmed procession for no cause, illegally, and with useless cruelty. He talked much about putting down a great revolt whereas nowhere did he meet resistance. The Bonapartists exaggerated this little disturbance and lied about its size. Very possibly they instigated what little fighting there was.

As to the leaders of the Mountain, it is hard to decide whether or not to blame them for their actions on June 13. They saw that the executive was ready to defy the constitution in its own interest. They saw that the legislative

¹ *Événement*, June 21, 1849.

² Ledru trial, *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 3117; Changarnier's account in *ibid.*, 2103.

majority, partly accomplice, partly blind, would acquiesce in any measures against its opponents. They were unwilling to revolt but desired to protest. Now this middle course is almost impossible to hold. Step by step they were driven on. First protests from the tribune, then impeachment, then Considerant's idea of a rump parliament, then willingness to defend themselves by arms against the illegal attacks of the legal authorities. The difference between this last attitude and insurrection is difficult to show although there certainly is a theoretical difference. Possibly at the Conservatory the leaders of the Mountain decided on insurrection although it seems more likely that they did not; without doubt they had no intention to revolt when they left the Rue du Hasard, and if they did come to such a decision later in the day, they had no time to carry it out in the slightest degree. Not a shot did they fire against the troops of the legal authorities. The Mountain was forever ruined on that day, but it is doubtful whether it could have done any practical good if it had not openly protested. After its denunciations of the Roman policy of the government, it would have looked like timidity to submit to the will of the majority. The force of events, the duplicity of the cabinet, the wiles of Louis Napoleon made the defeat of the Mountain inevitable. Its members may be blamed for lack of wisdom; their courage, honesty, and loyalty are unquestionable.

And what did the Assembly do on June 13? It met amid general excitement. Of the extreme left only a few members were present. Barrot announced that a conspiracy was on foot and read a message from the president of the republic asking for a state of siege. Lagrange, a Montagnard, protested against bloody methods of repression. A permanent session was decreed. Dufaure demanded a state of siege. The committee to which the question had been

referred approved. In spite of an eloquent protest by Pierre Leroux the state of siege was decreed 394 to 82, the left voting in the negative. A proclamation was adopted calling on the people to rally to the support of the Assembly. The arrest of Suchet was announced. Crémieux and the Montagnard, Canet, protested; but attorney-general Baroche defended the arrest and the Assembly voted the previous question 328 to 97. After the arrest of the six deputies in the courtyard of the Conservatory had been announced, the members of the Assembly separated.¹

¹ For good account of the session, see Barrot 3: 302-312.

CHAPTER XXV

AFTERMATH

DURING the latter half of June 1849 Ledru-Rollin was in hiding somewhere in France. The police were most anxious to arrest him, "for they believed his capture would be a sort of guarantee to Europe for the peace of the capital and the suppression of turbulence elsewhere."¹ Even after the fugitive had reached London, the police continued their search; French gendarmes ran up and down the banks of the river which separated Piedmont from France, looking for Ledru-Rollin or at least Félix Pyat.² From everywhere came reports of the presence of the fugitive. He was supposed to have escaped to Geneva, to Belgium, to England, to be in hiding in Cambrai, to be captured in Lyons. Actually no one knew anything of his whereabouts. The most likely story is that he passed the first night at Luciennes near St. Germain and then went on to Poissy or La Châtre.³ The first positive information comes from two letters written by Martin Bernard to his brothers on July 6:

I crossed the frontier of Belgium this morning at 3:20, and at 5 I was threading the streets of Brussels. . . . Our escape was crowned by insolent good fortune. Three of us left together, Ledru-Rollin, Etienne Arago, and I. . . . We entered our railroad carriage a few minutes before eight at the Gare du Nord. As you may well imagine, to reach our wagon with-

¹ *Times*, June 21, 1849.

² Herzen 2:66.

³ For references and details see Calman, *Ledru-Rollin après 1848*, p. 19.

out being obliged to undergo the inspection of the men of the Rue de Jerusalem [policemen] the mysterious intervention of devoted friends was needed. As for me, I almost doubted of success. . . . Once on the train, I considered our operation as crowned with success. We were asked for our passports at the Quiévrain station. I shall always regard the inspector as a brave and loyal official. . . . In brief, at five o'clock we got out at the station in Brussels.¹

Ledru remained in Belgium only a short time, for the Belgian liberal ministry asked most of the French proscripts residing there to leave the country. Accordingly he proceeded to England and settled in London. As soon as his wife was assured of his escape, she followed him.²

In the French departments rumors were current that the government had been overthrown. As a result there was a serious uprising at Lyons on June 15 which was finally put down³ and another at Colmar and Strasbourg in Alsace.⁴ There were minor uprisings at Amiens, Bordeaux, Dijon, Grenoble, Montpellier, Rheims and Riom.⁵ Order was soon restored in the provinces. There the authorities spread calumnies against Ledru. The peasants were told: "Ledru-Rollin was a thief. There were forty thousand people in Paris who paid him forty sous a day apiece. He intended to make himself king. It was the money he carried off that made the republic poor."⁶

The radical newspapers continued to defend the Montagnard refugees, but most of these journals were either

¹ Bernard, 73-5.

² For details see Calman, *Ledru-Rollin après 1848*, pp. 20-1.

³ *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 2091.

⁴ Muller 64-5, 180-7.

⁵ Dufaure in Assembly, June 16, *Moniteur for 1849*, p. 2084; Ledru trial, *ibid.*, 3118.

⁶ Senior 1: 181.

suppressed directly by the government or failed as a result of the fines imposed.¹ The liberal papers hesitated to defend the Mountain; the *National* complained that in Paris only the radical newspapers, the *Liberté*, and the *Temps* aided in the defense of Guinard.²

In the Legislative Assembly the deputies embarked upon their task of enacting reactionary legislation and began with a stringent law concerning the clubs. On June 14 permission to prosecute Ledru-Rollin, Considerant, and two other deputies for conspiracy and insurrection was demanded by Attorney-General Baroche. A committee composed of fourteen conservatives and one member of the left centre brought in a unanimous report in favor of granting the permission to prosecute. Tamisier, a member of the extreme left, pleaded for Considerant, and the Montagnard, Bac, appealed for moderation after victory. But the Assembly granted the desired permission. Demands were also made for permission to prosecute other deputies, and permission was granted in all but two cases.³ On August 19 by a special decree the accused were to be tried by a high court at Versailles.

Meanwhile domiciliary visits were being made. At four in the afternoon of June 15 a policeman visited Fontenay-aux-Roses. Ledru's gardener declared that his master had left on June 11 and had not returned since, but the policeman believed that this was a lie as in one of the rooms he found grouped about a sofa six or seven chairs which still bore the imprint of occupants, and in the park he saw the footprints of several men and one woman. He seized a box

¹ For details on the *Réforme*, see Calman, *Ledru-Rollin après 1848*, p. 24.

² *National*, June 15, 1849.

³ However, three of these deputies were never brought to trial.

of cartridges and some powder as well as five letters relative to political matters.¹

The first policeman that visited Ledru's Parisian home in the Rue de Tournon was told that Ledru had not returned since the morning of June 13. Berthe Leroux, the maid of Mme. Ledru-Rollin, admitted him to the deputy's study. There he found a quantity of pamphlets, books, and manuscripts, but a rapid survey showed nothing relative to a plot. A few days later another official arrived and found M. and Mme. David d'Angers with Henriette Ledru-Rollin in her bedroom; nothing was discovered there. In the study was Mathis, the private secretary, who declared that he had just entered; a stack of papers before him proved the truth of this assertion. The papers were in great disorder, but the policeman collected all those relative to political affairs. Mathis insisted they were of no importance, for Ledru was in the habit of destroying all his political correspondence. The official told him that this was his affair and went away with these papers as well as some letters in Italian and German. This appeared to disturb Mathis.² As these letters were not produced at the subsequent trial they must indeed have been innocuous.

Still later, on October 13, a third visit was made by the police, but this was only to look for Ledru, who was suspected of having returned. The cause of this visit is amusing. A neighbor thought that she heard a cat jumping about in the deserted apartments. She told her friends, and the story grew until it was asserted that the Montagnard chieftain was there.³ During July a search for the fugitive

¹ *Affaire du 13 Juin* 1: 516.

² *Ibid.*, 1: 517-8.

³ LR Papers 1: 563, letter of Mathis. For details see Calman, *Ledru-Rollin après*, pp. 18-9.

had also been made at the home of Babaud, Ledru's notary, near Pontoise.¹

On June 21 the Mountain headquarters in the Rue du Hasard were visited by a policeman. Sixteen deputies were present, and they signed a protest against the invasion of their rooms.² Most of the members of the Mountain were called before the judges charged to investigate the affair of June 13 but they refused to give information; they declared that they could not testify as they were half witnesses, half accused; besides, as deputies they were exempt from the obligation of testifying. Many, however, denied that they had signed the proclamation dated from the Conservatory.³ Of all the deputies only one, Versigny, consented to be a witness at the trial.

Ledru returned to Paris from London whither he had fled after June 13; he wished to surrender himself so as to lend his testimony to his friends at the impending trial, but influential members of the Mountain prevented him and induced him to leave France.⁴ Ledru-Rollin, Etienne Arago, Martin Bernard, and four other fugitives excused their absence from the prisoners' bench in a letter. In the first place, they said, they could not accept as accusers the very men whom they had declared violators of the constitution. Moreover, they did not recognize the jurisdiction of the special court. Thirdly they would fall into a judicial trap, for discussion of the violation of the constitution

¹ *Affaire du 13 Juin* 1: 519.

² *Ibid.*, 1: 4.

³ *Ibid.*, 1: 344-382. All but six of those whose signatures were appended either to the proclamation of the Mountain drawn up on the evening of June 12 or the one dated from the Conservatory were summoned. Two deputies of the left who were summoned, also refused information.

⁴ *Nation* of Brussels, August 25, 1849.

would be refused. Lastly, they could do more useful work at liberty abroad than in prison.¹

On October 13 the trial opened at Versailles. There were sixty-seven persons accused of whom twenty-nine were present. They were divided into four categories. 1° Socialist-Democratic Committee of twenty-five. 14 accused; 5 present. 2° Committee of the press. 7 accused including Delescluze; 3 present. 3° Deputies. 31 accused, including Ledru, Martin Bernard, and Considerant; 11 present. 4° Miscellaneous. 15 accused including Etienne Arago, Forestier, Guinard, and Schmitz; 10 present.² Prominent members of the radical and moderate parties acted as lawyers for the defense. Thirteen of them were deputies or ex-deputies, such as Buvignier, Crémieux, Jules Favre, and Michel de Bourges. Of the ten others, two were leaders of the bar: Madier de Montjau, Sr. and Thourel.

As soon as the trial began, all the accused present except two declared that the constitution had been violated and that therefore the court had no jurisdiction. Madier and Michel tried to argue the question, but the court refused to hear them. The general accusation was then read. The first point brought up was the formation of the *Solidarité républicaine* as a means of rousing revolt, but so weak was this point that it disappeared after the accusation had been read. Then letters of Martin Bernard and Delescluze were produced. Those of the former were decidedly peaceful, those of the latter could be interpreted as pacific or warlike. It is noteworthy that not a letter of Ledru was brought forward as evidence although his entire correspondence had been seized. The first proposal on the part of the Mountain

¹ *Ibid.*, October 4; *Tribune du Peuple*, October 3, 1849.

² *Moniteur* for 1849, 3193-9. For excellent, full account of the trial, showing unfairness of the judges, see Félice in *Révolution de 1848*, 6: 314-325.

for the impeachment of the ministers was mentioned; it was claimed without proof that this had been a pretext. It was asserted that January 29 was a radical uprising, but in support of this absurdity only a vague letter by one of the accused was produced. The fusion of the radicals and socialists was claimed to be for the purpose of insurrectionary agitation, but all that was shown was that a certain abbé was in April 1849 contemplating insurrection. It was asserted that in the original draft of the constitution of the Mountain the pledge to defend the constitution if violated contained also the words *with arms*. The proof of this allegation was not clear, and certainly all Frenchmen admitted that citizens were bound to defend the constitution by any means when violated. Next was produced an article which had appeared in several newspapers, declaring that if sacred rights were denied to the people, they had the right to defend themselves; this was considered as a clear incitement to war, but this very article included the phrase: "We do not wish to be accused of preferring the victory of blood to the victory of the ballot box." Such vague doctrines were hardly fit for a serious accusation. Next was discussed the transformation of the democratic-socialist election committee into the committee of twenty-five, but all that could be proved against it was that one of the members had desired to adopt the policy of Blanqui, that the committee had worked with the journalists, and that there were constant complaints in the press against the legislative majority. The solidarity of the Mountain was the next point in the indictment. It was claimed but not proved that the Roman question was a mere pretext to cause an insurrection and that Ledru was not sick when he asked for a postponement of the interpellations on June 7. It was asserted that the Montagnards were always declaring the constitution violated. This was true but had nothing to do

with the subject. Nor had the assertion that at a banquet of Alsatian cooks attended by none of the accused a toast was drunk to the cholera that killed Marshal Bugeaud. Neither was it a crime on Ledru-Rollin's part to receive from Italy letters abusing Oudinot and the policy of the cabinet. The meetings of June 11 were mentioned and they were stated dogmatically to be warlike, but every shred of evidence produced showed that they were pacific. It was asserted that the Society for the Rights of Man had declared for an appeal to arms if peaceful measures should fail. This was probably true, but note that peaceful measures were preferred. The speeches and manifestoes of June 11 and 12 were called a summons to arms, but it has been shown that they were really a peaceful protest. Then came the "military outbreak" of the thirteenth and the uprisings in the provinces; of course a biased version was given.¹

Altogether the prosecution had proved nothing. It had asserted that there was a conspiracy but had brought forward no proof. It had shown that the deputies of the Mountain had been at the Conservatory and it had charged them with insurrection, but again it had given no clear proof. It had hunted into the most obscure corners and all it had shown was that the accused believed that the constitution had been violated and that a few other men not among the accused had clearly advocated a revolt. It had twisted innocent facts into incriminating evidence, and, when even that had been impossible, it had made a bare assertion that there had been a conspiracy.

After the general accusation had been completed the individual accusations were taken up. That of Ledru-Rollin told of his presence at the various meetings, but it falsely stated that he had made a speech at the Palais National. It added that fifty cartridges, two cases of gunpowder, and

¹ *Moniteur* for 1849, pp. 3099-3103, 3115-8.

balls of a small calibre had been found at Fontenay. In the first place, all the ammunition might have been intended for hunting. Secondly, it was a small amount for a revolt. Lastly, the fact that the ammunition had been found in the country instead of in Paris was presumptive evidence that no revolt was intended on June 13.¹

After the accusation was finished the prisoners were examined, but most refused to answer. Then the witnesses were put on the stand. One of the first persons to testify was Girardin, and he was a doughty adversary for the prosecution. He showed how a lawyer for the prosecution had interfered unwarrantably in his preliminary examination. President Béranger, the presiding judge, refused to listen to his complaint. Girardin then wanted to explain the justice of the remarks on the constitution made in his and other newspapers, but the court refused to hear him. Thereupon Girardin declared the liberty of witnesses violated and declined to give further testimony.² This is but one of the cases where the court stretched its powers to the utmost to aid the prosecution. The worst incident occurred later. The court was hearing evidence on the procession and policeman Petit was on the stand. He admitted that he had slashed a kneeling youth³ and he seemed to take pride in having done so. A lawyer, Thourel, calmly rebuked him for this action, unworthy of a Frenchman. Thereupon Petit shouted: "Your're all sons of . . . all of you." The prisoners rose in protest. Two lawyers for the defense retired from the case. Then President Béranger declared both sides equally at fault, asserted that the rebuke of Thourel was as unjustifiable as the exclamation of Petit.⁴

¹ *Moniteur* for 1849, pp 3119-24.

² *Ibid.*, 3166-7.

³ See page 378.

⁴ *Moniteur* 3186.

It is frequently stated ¹ that the prisoners were insulting to the soldiers who testified. This is not true. To such an officer as Colonel Alphonse the accused were anxious to extend thanks for his courtesy. It was only when officers insulted them that they became angry. Once Daniel Lama-zière, one of the accused deputies, even gave the lie to a captain, whereupon he was fined by the court.² On October 25, 1849 the review of the general facts was completed; from then on until November 7 witnesses were heard relative to the individual cases of those present.

On November 7 District Attorney Royer summed up for the prosecution. He repeated the arguments used in the opening accusation. He gave the usual biased lawyer's plea. When analyzed, his speech offered no evidence of a preconcerted plot and was not convincing on the charge of insurrection.³

November 11 was appointed for the final argument of the defense. Michel de Bourges began by saying that if the constitution had been violated, insurrection would have been permissible. Royer interrupted to maintain that only the Assembly had the right to judge violations of the constitution. But this was precisely the point which the Mountain denied. President Béranger refused to let Michel proceed. Madier de Montjau, thereupon, in behalf of all the lawyers for the defense, declared that as the bench was exceeding its authority, none of them would plead.⁴ On the twelfth the presiding judge summed up, clearly in favor of the prosecution,⁵ and the next day was read the verdict

¹ *E. g.* Beaumont-Vassy 4: 549-550.

² *Moniteur* 3305.

³ *Ibid.*, 3546-3557.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 3612-5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 3642.

against those present. Fifteen of the accused, including Guinard and nine deputies, were sentenced to transportation; three, including one deputy, Suchet, were to be imprisoned for five years; eleven, including Forestier and one deputy, were acquitted. Five deputies were found guilty of conspiracy and insurrection; five deputies, as well as Guinard, were found guilty only of insurrection. In addition, the lawyers for the defense were told that their protest on the Petit incident would not be heard, and Madier de Montjau was admonished for asserting that the bench had exceeded its authority.¹ On November 15 all the accused who had succeeded in escaping were found guilty of both insurrection and conspiracy, and were sentenced to transportation.²

Was the conviction justified? The condemnation on a charge of conspiracy was absurd, for who conspired? It could not have been the Committee of Twenty-five, the Committee of the Press, the Mountain, or the fifth legion of the National Guard, for half of the members of each of these organizations were acquitted. Where then was the conspiracy? The government offered no solution to this question. As to the condemnation for insurrection, there was considerable evidence to support this charge, but if the benefit of the doubt had been given to the accused—such is not the custom in France—they should have been acquitted. But one thing stands out in this trial above everything else: the gross unfairness of the bench.

On January 30, 1850 Rouher, who had become attorney-general, reported the verdict to the Assembly, and on the next day the seats of the convicted Montagnards were declared vacant. On February 8 Michel de Bourges protested

¹ *Moniteur* 3659-62.

² *Ibid.*, 3686-7.

against the judgment of the Versailles tribunal. President Dupin called him to order, but Michel continued. The president maintained his censure and the Assembly approved. Pascal Duprat, a member of the left, had a hot debate with Dupin on this point, but the right and centre paid no attention to Duprat and proceeded to other business.

The government had not yet attacked all the prominent democrats. It decided to prosecute the leaders of the *Solidarité républicaine*. Many of these were already in exile or in the penal colonies, but on October 26, 1849 deputy Sarrut,¹ ex-deputy Buvignier, Delescluze, and six other civilians were charged with conspiracy. Although all except Buvignier and one civilian succeeded in escaping, a trial was held and on April 12, 1850 a verdict of guilty was found against them and penalties of one or two years' imprisonment were inflicted.²

The Mountain, thus reduced in size, was now under the leadership of Michel de Bourges. It is one of the ironies of history that the only leader who had openly advocated an uprising should be the one who was not arrested and should have succeeded as head of the party the far more pacific Ledru-Rollin. To replace the Montagnards who had been convicted, new elections were held in 1850, and in the main those who were chosen were radicals. Thereupon the frightened Assembly passed the law of May 31 mutilating universal suffrage. The following year it passed the well-known Falloux law giving education into the hand of the clergy. The Montagnard deputies protested but did nothing. Ledru in England wanted a more active policy. He helped organize various associations, such as the *Nouvelle Montagne* and the *Marianne*, which tried to stir up active

¹ The Assembly refused permission to prosecute three other deputies.

² *Gazette des Tribunaux*, December 14, 1849; April 13, 1850.

resistance. With Delescluze he founded the *Voix du Proscrit* in which they preached their policies. Ledru's most important articles were a defense of the referendum and an advocacy of abstention from elections as a protest against the policies of the French government. With Mazzini, Darasz, and Ruge he founded a Central European Democratic Committee, which attempted to unite all the democratic movements in Europe in one organization. The Central Committee founded sub-committees, sent out a few emissaries, issued many proclamations—and accomplished nothing except to frighten conservative governments. In France the Mountain and the bourgeoisie could not unite, and Louis Napoleon played them against each other until he was ready to be rid of both; on December 2, 1851 by a coup d'état he made himself ruler of France. A year later he was proclaimed emperor.

Ledru in England had to work for a living. The government, probably illegally, had confiscated even his wife's fortune. He supported himself by writing. His most important work was the *Décadence d'Angleterre*, a biased and worthless study of English economic conditions.

During the first decade of the second empire, Ledru was comparatively inactive in political affairs. He wrote a few articles. He continued to aid in republican propaganda by correspondence with the departments of France and through the Central Committee, reorganized in the form of a triumvirate consisting of himself, Kossuth, and Mazzini. The French government tried to implicate him in several conspiracies and even condemned him for participation in the Tibaldi plot of 1857, but his innocence is unquestionable.

During the sixties Ledru-Rollin was even less active. He devoted himself to astronomy, philosophy, and social studies. He came closer than before to a socialistic position in a letter to the *Association*, the organ of the society spon-

sored by Marx and Mazzini in 1864; he openly declared his adhesion to the movement for the association of labor and capital, for workingmen's combinations. The French government, due to his alleged part in the Tibaldi conspiracy, excluded him, and him alone of all the exiles, from the two general amnesties of 1859 and 1869. This together with the fact that he was one of the chief protagonists of the republican cause rendered him most popular in France. In the supplementary elections of November 1869 all Paris acclaimed his candidacy to the legislature. But Ledru refused to take the preliminary oath to the empire or to come to Paris for fear of arrest, and at the last moment he withdrew his candidacy. One of the first acts of the Ollivier ministry was to declare the amnesties applicable to him, and early in 1870 he returned to France.

Ledru took practically no part in the founding of the third republic although it was he who suggested to Gambetta the idea of forming the Government of National Defense from the Paris deputies. During the last months of 1870 he played a decidedly secondary part in the radical party, and early in 1871 he abandoned it because it seemed to be becoming too revolutionary, to be falling under the influence of his old opponent, Blanqui. Elected to the National Assembly in 1871 by three departments, he resigned his seat, stating that the election had been based on universal suffrage. The commune so disgusted him that he retired to England for two years. In 1874 he reentered public life. He defended universal suffrage on June 3 in a speech before the Chamber of Deputies, but that was his swan song, for on December 31, 1874 Ledru-Rollin expired at Fontenay-aux-Roses.¹

¹ For details as to his later life, see Calman, *Ledru-Rollin après 1848*.

CHAPTER XXVI

CONCLUSION

WITH the possible exception of Thiers and Lamartine, Ledru-Rollin is admitted to be the greatest orator of the second republic. One day Thiers was asked by a sovereign: "Who, after yourself, is the greatest orator of the Assembly?" He replied: "After me, Sire, comes Ledru-Rollin."¹

Ledru's ability lay rather in the field of eloquence than of logic. His chief quality was *chaleur*, which might be translated warmth and earnestness. No matter on what subject Ledru spoke, the depth and sincerity of his convictions were convincing. Closely allied to these was his sympathy, sympathy for the workingmen suffering from misery, sympathy for the Romans oppressed by the Pope, sympathy for the victims of an uprising he himself had helped to suppress. He lacked logic but he replaced it by a remarkable technical clarity; there were few orators who could equal this lawyer in his presentation of erudite legal or complicated financial problems in a form clear to lay minds. Honesty was another outstanding characteristic. Ledru never went off into tortuous quibbles as did Thiers; he never deceived himself into defending something contrary to his basic principles as did Barrot. Under the second republic when so many prominent statesmen changed their ideas frequently, Ledru stands out for his consistency.

¹ Bulletin Municipal de Paris pour 1908, p. 786. See also opinions of Delord 1: 81-3 and Babaud-Larivière 2: 15.

Differences in tactics we may find, but his fundamental beliefs remained the same throughout his life.

Still Ledru-Rollin had many faults. He could present ideas clearly, but he rarely presented facts plainly. That he could give an explicit narrative was shown by his account of the Moulins outrage. But usually he preferred to indulge in vague diatribes and hazy indications instead of in a simple exposition of the facts. In his pamphlet on June 13 he weakened his effect considerably by adopting this method. In the matter of arrangement he was not adept. Too often his lively temperament caused him to pass beyond his subject, and then he was forced to return to it in order to mention a forgotten argument. From this, result many useless repetitions. He also lacked the power of conciseness; most of his speeches would be improved by being reduced to half their length. His command of humor was slight. His nearest approach consisted of irony and of bitter, short replies to interruptors. But it must be remembered that most of his contemporaries had the same failing. He was egocentric; this was revealed clearly in his speeches. Usually the result was effective, but at times, as in his attack on Cavaignac on November 25, 1848, he weakened his oration by this tendency.

Certain minor characteristics of style should be noted. He had an effective habit, most irritating to his opponents, especially to chameleon Barrot, of quoting their own earlier words against themselves. Unfortunately for them they could not return the complement. Ledru's speeches were filled with certain phrases: *en effet, par hasard, encore un coup, j'en suis convaincu, je ne saurais trop répéter, permettez-moi de vous le dire*. He was overfond of appealing to the *consciences of the deputies*. The form of rhetorical question was a favorite with him.

We can notice various styles employed by Ledru in ad-

addressing the Assembly. First there was the purely emotional appeal. Secondly there was the technical argument. Then there was the passionate but vague denunciation. Also there was the jerky series of replies to interruptors. Lastly (the sole example is the speech on the Moulins incident) there was the straightforward narrative.

Above all else in Ledru's speeches was apparent his love for the first revolution. "The key to all his strength and all his weakness is his devotion to the first republic," said a republican publicist under the second empire.¹ He constantly wished to revive its institutions. He quoted Robespierre and Rousseau on every available occasion. The minor figures found their places, thus Hérault de Séchelles on constitutional, Cambon on financial matters. On all suitable occasions and on many others he dragged in references to the Constituent Assembly of 1789, to the Commune, above all to the Convention. With the exception of Machiavelli, he rarely quoted any one except the men of 1789 or 1792. In the minds of many of his contemporaries Ledru was merely an unthinking admirer of the first revolution, a man who desired the return of *the terror without the guillotine*. But they themselves admitted by the phrase *without the guillotine* that it was not the terror but the Montagnard institutions that he supported. By education Ledru was a devotee of the Mountain of 1792, and by conviction he had accepted its ideas. But he was sagacious enough not to adhere blindly to its entire creed. A few of its principles he rejected; some he adapted to the times; the majority he accepted as the best existing formulae.

His ideas of government were based on the constitution of 1793. During the first part of his life he emphasized

¹ Vermorel 151. He adds: "His constant dignity in words and actions made of M. Ledru-Rollin a great and honourable revolutionary figure."

universal suffrage; after 1849 during the period of exile he gave more prominence to the referendum. Here was the chief change in his ideas. Up to 1848 he considered the will of the people as the supreme arbiter: later he declared that there were certain rights superior even to the popular will. This was a revival of the the old, old theory of natural rights, a favorite theory with Rousseau. In financial matters Cambon was largely Ledru's master; from him he received the ideas of *assignats* and of the refusal of a salary to the clergy. But his fundamental beliefs were those that are steadily gaining ground today; taxation of luxuries, not necessities; a progressive and proportional income tax. It was with Cambon rather than with Robespierre that he sided on religious matters, for he advocated a complete separation of church and state. On education he accepted the principles of the Convention, of Lakanal and Robespierre: free, universal, secular, state education.

In foreign affairs Ledru combined the intense patriotism and the idealistic internationalism of the first republic. He was as touchy on French honor as any general, as proud of France as any chauvinist. For him France was the fountain-head of republicanism, bound to conquer the world by her ideas. Unlike the Girondins, he did not advocate an offensive war with arms to spread these principles; that was unnecessary. He advocated a defensive warfare of all the European democracies, headed by France, against the *Holy Alliance* of reactionary monarchs. From this war he hoped to see emerge a United States of Europe, a sort of League of Nations. Of foreign countries there was one that he abused until he learned by a long residence to know it, namely England; there was another for which he always expressed the greatest admiration although he did not reveal profound knowledge of it, namely the United States.

In judicial matters his two chief desires were the abolition

of the death penalty and the establishment of an elective magistracy. In military affairs he advocated the militia system in place of a standing army and the election of all but the highest officers. The inspiration for his ideas Ledru obtained from the *conventionnels*, but he was not a blind follower of the early Montagnards.

In one important matter his views were somewhat fluid. In 1792 social problems had not played an important part; by 1848 they had come into prominence. Ledru was always a social reformer, never a thorough socialist. Repeatedly he declared that the political revolution was merely a step towards the great goal of social reorganization. But he was an opportunist not a theorist, and he desired gradual evolution by mild experiments. With the Utopian theories of the French socialists he had no sympathy. The anarchism of Proudhon and the class-revolution idea of Karl Marx he abhorred. He accepted successively two ideas: farmers' loan banks and coöperative associations. He was also in favor of the extension of state ownership to railroads, canals, mines, insurance companies, and such organizations. If the acceptance of these ideas makes a socialist, he was one; probably it is preferable to call him merely a social reformer. To the end he remained faithful to his dictum of 1841: "I hate communism," even when he called himself officially a socialist. Property and the family were for him two basic principles that must not be touched; it was the unjust distribution of wealth and the difficulty of family life for the poor to which he objected.

To overthrow monarchies Ledru consistently advocated open means. He was never a conspirator. Under Louis Philippe no one accused him of plotting. All accusations that he took part in plots while he was in power are baseless. The pacific manifestation of March 17 he openly approved. When he believed that the demonstration of April

16 might become a riot, he took measures to prevent it. The movement of May 15 and of June he helped suppress. Later, when he saw the Bonapartists and the reactionaries trying to undermine the republic, he insisted on the right of revolution as a final weapon in the hands of the people, but he desired to use every peaceable means first. Even on June 13 he would have preferred not to come to blows. Under the empire he took no part in conspiracies; he felt confident that the mere force of pacific opposition, *the émeute of universal suffrage*, would be sufficient to undermine the rotten structure of a reactionary government.

Ledru-Rollin was not a great party leader. He was too easily swayed by his companions. He was too confident of an ultimate victory for his cause, and he did not clearly enough see the forces of his adversaries. He appealed to such measures as impeachment for too slight a cause. When he held the Assembly enthralled and might have obtained a vote adverse to the government, he frequently demanded too much and antagonized the moderates. The most notable example was on May 11, 1849 when he could have had Barrot severely censured and he asked for recognition of the Roman republic. But under the second republic he showed more wisdom than any other of the republican leaders. He was an opportunist and a man of comparative moderation. He saw clearly that the prime necessity for the true republicans was the union of all factions against the extreme revolutionists and the conservatives. Only one other prominent statesman saw this also; this was Lamartine. (Flocon and Crémieux can be considered merely as followers of Ledru and Lamartine.) Unfortunately neither the socialist theorists like Louis Blanc nor the timid moderates like Marrast would agree to this program. When this union became impossible, Ledru tried another, a union of all radicals and socialists on a platform of practicable reforms.

This was the Mountain, whose manifestoes were revolutionary but in no way ultra-revolutionary. But the moderates did not realize until too late how closely their ideas resembled those of Ledru. When Crémieux joined forces with the Mountain in the Legislative Assembly, the conservatives had already gained the victory. Opportunist Ledru ever was, ready to work with any one to obtain desirable reforms. Minor matters he would put aside for the moment, but basic beliefs he never abandoned. To obtain his desires he attempted Danton's policy of audacity, but here again he failed. He was always extreme in words, but he hesitated when it came to action. For him the motto of the Cordelier leader would have to be modified to: *Audacity, more audacity, and then no more audacity.*

Still he was the Danton of the second republic as Gambetta was of the third. Of the three men Ledru was probably the least great, but all had the same general policy and position. All three were opportunists, opposing the uncompromising attitude of a Robespierre, a Louis Blanc, a Madier de Montjau. All three were ready to unite with the more moderate party of a Brissot, of a Lamartine, of a Thiers, and disliked the extreme policies of the Hébertists, the Blanquists, the communards. In private life all three were generous in financial matters and fond of good living. All three, finally, were great orators, intense patriots, ardent democrats, leaders of the sane wing of the radical party.

Another leader whom Ledru resembled was Mirabeau. His oratorical style and gestures were so similar that he was accused of imitating Mirabeau consciously. Like the earlier tribune Ledru had the peculiar ability of assimilating a vast quantity of erudition at a moment's notice and of presenting it to an assembly in a fashion so marvelously clear and with a grasp of the subject so great that it would seem as though he had studied it for years.

Ledru-Rollin was always an optimist; the triumph of his ideas he saw always at hand. He was generous and expended his entire fortune and, with his wife's consent, a large part of her fortune in republican propaganda and aid to unfortunate companions. He was fond of luxury and the good things of life; in Paris he kept a fine house. He was fond of the fine arts, frequenting the theatre and purchasing the works of such artists as his friend, David d'Angers. He was loyal to his friends and their attachment to him never faltered. He was vain; in later life he even dyed his hair. He was conceited and because of this sometimes wounded his friends. He was superficial; he quickly mastered what he read, but he usually read only one side of a question. This appeared most clearly in his work written in exile, *La Décadence d'Angleterre*. His honesty has remained without a stain in spite of the innumerable attacks on it by his adversaries. His consistency has already been mentioned.

In what does Ledru-Rollin's importance in history consist? In the first place he was one of the greatest French orators of the nineteenth century. Louis Blanc, Caussidière, Delescluze, Rémusat, Thiers, all his contemporaries admitted his eloquence. In the second place he was the chief advocate of those radical reforms which have since gained general acceptance. Thirdly under the second empire he was the centre of one of those rare groups which maintained in its purity the republican tradition. Lastly he was the most consistent proposer of universal suffrage under the July monarchy, its organizer in a practical form under the second republic, its ardent defender against modifications under Louis Napoleon; when all else is forgotten about him, he will still live in France as the Father of Universal Suffrage.

APPENDIX

FRENCH VERSIONS OF UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS

CHAPTER III, PAGE 49. Léon de Maleville to Garnier-Pagès, February 24, 1848; 7 P. M.

" Mon cher Garnier-Pagès,

" Nommez à l'instant même un délégué au gouvernement provisoire au ministère de la guerre et au ministère de l'intérieur. Les ordres de M. Odilon Barrot ne sont plus suivis de personne.

" Je ne puis me charger de cette mission pour l'intérieur; ne songez pas à moi. Je vous le répète pour le vingtième fois: Quêtez des noms connus et éminemment populaires.

" Tout à vous. Léon de Maleville." ¹

CHAPTER IV, PAGE 62. Ledru to Dudont aîné, February 20, 1849.

" Je vous remercie mille fois de l'exemplaire de ma médaille que vous avez bien voulu me faire remettre.

" On se conçoit mal soi-même; mais mes amis et toutes les personnes qui l'ont vue trouvent que c'est le portrait le plus ressemblant qui ait été fait de moi. Il est d'une exactitude parfaite.

" Dites bien à l'artiste combien je lui suis reconnaissant d'avoir bien voulu me consacrer l'expérience d'un talent aussi éprouvé que le sien.

" Croyez, Monsieur, à toute la gratitude de votre bien dévoué, Ledru-Rollin." ²

¹ LR Papers 1: 240.

² At Bagnol-sur-Cèze, No. 105.

CHAPTER V, PAGE 81. Subervie to Ledru, March 19, 1848.

"Mon cher collègue,

"Vos ennemis sont aussi les miens. On vous travaille, on me travaille, parce qu'on sait que nos principes sont les mêmes. J'ai besoin de causer avec vous. J'irai vous trouver demain matin.

"Tout à vous, Général Subervie."¹

CHAPTER V, PAGE 82. Jacques Cavaignac to Ledru, March 7, 1848.

"Voici, Monsieur, le nom de l'enfant dont je vous ai parlé avant-hier: Charles Victor Peter, âgé de sept ans et quelques mois. Fils d'ouvrier, ce qui lui convient le mieux c'est l'éducation qui le mettra en mesure de gagner sa vie, d'avoir son pain au bout de ses doigts, ce que le temps où nous vivons doit nous faire apprécier plus que jamais.

"Vous m'assurez de la nomination au ministère de mon fils, dont chacun me parlait hier; j'avais besoin de me rappeler notre conversation. J'ai d'ailleurs, maintenant, la conviction que mon fils refuserait. Le nommer ministre ne serait donc que le renvoyer comme gouverneur.

"Vous m'interdisez les remerciements, Monsieur, sans m'interdire les obligations de la reconnaissance. Croyez que personne ne songe plus que moi au fardeau dont vous devez être écrasé, et n'est pourtant plus rassuré en vous le voyant porter.

"Veuillez croire aussi à tous mes sentiments, J. Cavaignac.

"Je cherche sans les trouver ces pauvres gens auxquels mon fils s'intéressait, et dont vous m'avez parlé."²

CHAPTER IX, PAGE 141. Taschereau to Ledru, undated but probably March, 1848.

"Mon cher ami,

¹ LR Papers I: 212.

² LR Papers I: 201.

“J’ai *absolument, absolument* besoin de vous parler immédiatement. Je ne serai pas *long*, mais je serai instructif.

“T. à. v., J. Taschereau.”¹

CHAPTER IX, PAGE 148. Landrin to Ledru, April 18, 1848,
11 P. M.

“Mon cher ami,

“Je suis si souffrant ce soir que je ne puis aller, comme j’en avais le projet, te serrer le main; j’aurai bien voulu aller me recorder auprès de toi. Ici nous avons passé une triste journée et pleine d’incertitudes. Si tu avais à me faire dire un mot, je suis toujours à ta disposition.

“Je voulais enfin te parler d’une affaire particulière à toi, dont Calon (?) m’a dit un mot. J’irai demain mercredi soir; je te trouverai, n’est-ce pas? Si tu n’y es pas, fais moi dire par un des tiens, Elias [Regnault] ou autre, quand je pourrai te voir.

“Je n’ai pas reçu de billets d’invitation pour la fête de jeudi; je le regrette ne fut ce que parce que je ne serais pas auprès de vous autres en cas d’alerte. Si tu le peux, fais m’en envoyer ou au parquet ou chez moi Rue d’Enfer 37. On m’a dit qu’il y aura des dames. Est-ce vrai?

“Le Moniteur de ce matin a commencé à parler. Mais ce n’est pas assez, pour Dieu. Que tes collègues t’écoutent ou tout se gâtera. Quoi qu’il en soit, je suis à toi. Mais j’avoue que je regretterais profondément en ce moment une levée de boucliers où un nom que j’aime et j’estime se trouverait forcément accolé à des noms sans avenir et sans portée.

“A toi, bien devoué, Landrin.”²

CHAPTER XII, PAGE 173. Landrin to Ledru, undated but probably May 7, 1848.

“Mon cher ami,

“J’ai vainement attendu Jules Favre chez le ministre de la

¹ LR Papers 1: 199.

² LR Papers 1: 214.

justice. J'en conclus que tu n'as pas écrit à Favre ou que tu as changé d'avis.

“ Permettez-moi de te le dire, mon vieux camarade, je serais désolé que tu prisses ce dernier parti. Tu dois, si on t'accepte sur le pied d'égalité, entrer au pouvoir et y porter ton drapeau, ta signification. Refuser, c'est déclarer la guerre, et déclarer la guerre, c'est t'insurger contre le principe avant qu'on l'ait méconnu et violé et précisément au moment où on te convie à participer à son application, à concourir à nous donner les conséquences. Il faut être net et logique. Si M. de Lamartine et toi formez les éléments du pouvoir nouveau, tout est sauvé, tout pour l'été au moins. Ceci dit, il faut que M. de Lamartine pèse de son poids sur la chambre et détermine son choix. Toi, il faut que le peuple sache de suite cette alliance et qu'ainsi les défiances soient désarmées, au moins celles des hommes honnêtes et dévoués qui craignent pour le salut de la cause du peuple et qui croient en toi qui les représente. Quant aux autres, ils peuvent bien prendre ton nom pour prétexte. Mais ils ne veulent de toi ni des autres; il ne veulent que d'eux et leur sanglante dictature.

“ J'ajoute que si, ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise, cela n'était pas compris par la chambre et qu'elle n'acceptait pas cette combinaison, tu rentrerais dans l'opposition, mais alors encore je n'accepte que l'opposition avec ses moyens réguliers, sa presse, ses sociétés fonctionnant régulièrement et pesant sur la *chambre* de toute l'autorité morale de la raison. Quant à un autre genre d'opposition, celle armée et menaçante, même en ce cas, je ne l'admets pas; je ne l'admets que si la chambre veut renverser la *forme républicaine*. C'est un droit que je ne lui reconnais pas; le peuple lui-même tout entier n'a pas ce droit. Il ne peut pas plus ne pas être républicain qu'on n'a le droit de renoncer à sa liberté individuelle.

“A toi. A demain matin, Landrin.”¹

¹ LR Papers I : 217.

CHAPTER XII, PAGE 173. Landrin to Ledru, date indistinct but probably May 7, 1848.

“ Mon ami,

“ Je te serre mille fois les mains pour ce que tu as bien voulu penser à faire pour mon brave et pauvre artiste et beau-frère; ce que tu lui donnes est au-dessus de mes espérances.—Merci encore pour nous tous, mon vieil ami.

“ Tu sais, et je t’ai dit, je n’ai pu voir Jules Favre. Je l’ai attendu jusqu’à midi chez Crémieux. Ne le voyant pas venir, j’ai craint que tu n’eusses changé d’avis, et je n’ai pas osé parler à Lamartine que j’ai cependant vu. Je suis si écrasé de ma journée et ai la tête si malade que je n’irai pas ce soir au ministère, au moins que tu n’aies besoin de moi. S’il en est ainsi, à quelle qu’heure que ce soit, envoie moi prévenir si tu désires que je fasse une démarche quelconque. Cette nuit, demain, je suis ton homme.

“ J’espère que la fameuse combinaison est arrêtée. Je serai bien heureux de l’apprendre. Mais de toute manière je suis à toi.

“ Je te serre les mains, Landrin.”¹

CHAPTER XIV, PAGE 206. Marie and Ledru to the Prefect of Lower Seine, June 23, 1848, 5 P. M.

“ Citoyen préfet, Des factieux ont jeté Paris dans une extrême agitation. Le concours de la Garde Nationale de votre département peut être utile. Dirigez-la en toute hâte sur Paris, ainsi que les bataillons de l’armée dont vous pourrez disposer. Le ministre de la guerre a dû donner des ordres en conséquence cette nuit. Si par hasard ils n’étaient point arrivés, que ceux-ci en tiennent lieu. Salut et fraternité, Ledru-Rollin, Marie.”²

CHAPTER XIV, PAGE 207. Executive commission to Prefect of Lower Seine, June 23, 1848, 10 P. M.

“ La commission du pouvoir exécutif invite le préfet de la

¹ LR Papers 1 : 219.

² Lille Library Ms. 985, No. 683.

Seine Inférieure à envoyer de suite sur Paris toutes les troupes de la Garde Nationale et la ligne dont il pourra disposer. Ledru-Rollin, Garnier-Pagès, Lamartine, Marie. Requêtez le chemin de fer pour transporter les troupes.”¹

CHAPTER XV, PAGE 219. Carton (?) to Ledru, August 6, 1848.

“ Mon cher Ledru,

“ Je viens seulement de lire le rapport de M. Bauchart et votre discours ; je me suis toujours tenu à distance de la vie politique, mais je ne puis en ce moment résister au désir de vous féliciter. J’ai retrouvé dans vos paroles chaleureuses cette sincérité et cette élévation de sentiment que depuis si longtemps m’ont attaché à vous, elles suffiront aux gens de cœur pour justifier, s’il en était besoin, la pureté de vos intentions et de votre conduite. A mes yeux le procès que vous fait la commission est jugé.

“ Je ne me serais pas permis de m’entretenir d’une émotion qui, bien que profonde en moi, a peu d’importance comme élément de l’opinion publique, si je n’avais trouvé chez mes amis, anciens conservateurs comme moi, les sentiments que j’ai moi-même éprouvés.

“ Ce petit témoignage de sympathie vraie vous sera peut-être de quelque douceur au milieu des amertumes de la vie publique.

“ Tout à vous de bien, A. Carton.”²

CHAPTER XV, PAGE 224. Marrast to Creton, August 20, 1848.

“ Le président de l’Assemblée Nationale a l’honneur de prévenir son honorable collègue, M. Creton, que s’il persiste à vouloir adresser des interpellations au ministre des finances, il aura la parole immédiatement après la lecture du procès-verbal.”³

¹ Lille Library Ms. 985, No. 683.

² LR Papers I : 244.

³ LR Papers I : 227.

CHAPTER XV, PAGE 224. Creton to Ledru, August 20, 1848.

"M. Creton reçoit à l'instant la lettre ci-inclus de M. le Président de l'Assemblée. Il s'empresse de la transmettre à M. Ledru-Rollin, afin qu'il veuille bien se trouver à l'ouverture de la séance. Salut et fraternité, Creton."¹

CHAPTER XVII, PAGE 253. Ledru to Delescluze, October, 1848.

"Citoyen,

"Il me semble que vous devenez diablement rare depuis le fameux banquet. Je ne vous vois plus.

"Nous avons besoin de vous ce soir Rue Taitbout à 8½ du soir. N'y manquez pas, je vous en prie.

"A vous. Ledru-Rollin. Le lundi, deux heures."

Note in the margin: "Le banquet du Fauborg Poissinière" which took place October 17.²

CHAPTER XXII, PAGE 341. Minutes of committee of Mountain in Schoelcher's handwriting, April 24, 1849.

"Nos troupes ont quitté le port. Les soldats de la république sont envoyés en Italie pour y prêter l'appui de leur présence, le prestige de leur nom, et au besoin la puissance de leurs armes à la restauration du pape sur son trône temporel malgré la volonté du peuple romain. La république française va servir ainsi le principe monarchique contre le principe démocratique, la légitimité princière contre la souveraineté populaire.

"Rome affranchie n'est pas assez forte pour résister à la coalition des rois et des royalistes conjurés. Elle succombera, mais en laissant le souvenir d'un gouvernement qui n'a pas commis un seul excès, qui s'est toujours conduit avec une dignité admirable.

"Si affligés que nous soyons, l'espérance ne nous abandonne pas. La force peut comprimer un jour le développement de la liberté, mais la liberté est immortelle; elle est au-dessus de la force comme l'esprit est au-dessus de la matière. Pie IX après

¹ LR Papers I : 225.

² Lille Library, Delescluze Papers.

avoir trahi la cause de la nationalité italienne en lançant l'anathème sur la guerre de l'indépendance s'était enfui de Rome. Il pourra bien y rentrer dans les fourgons de l'étranger, comme les Bourbons rentrèrent en France, mais il n'aura d'autre destin que celui des Bourbons. La haine et le mépris des Romains pèseront toujours sur le pontif catholique qui s'est adressé à tous les rois de la terre, même à la Prusse schismatique et à l'Angleterre protestante, pour reconquérir à main armée au prix du sang un trône de vanité.

“ Les démocrates français devaient protester contre l'acte de violence liberticide qui va se consommer sur les bords du Tibre. Les représentants de la Montagne ont décidé qu'ils donneraient aux Italiens un témoignage de leur vive sympathie en formant un comité spécialement chargé des intérêts de l'indépendance italienne et dont feront toujours partie deux des patriotes ici présents à Paris.

“ Ce comité est composé des Citoyens Lamennais, Ledru-Rollin, Baune, Félix Pyat, et Victor Schoelcher. Il vient de se constituer en nommant pour président le Cit. Lamennais et pour secrétaire le Cit. V. Schoelcher. Il a pour but l'affranchissement de la péninsule entière, pour devise : solidarité entre la république française et la république italienne.” ¹

¹ Schoelcher Papers 2: 172-4.

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

All the works mentioned below may be found in the library of Columbia University unless some other place is indicated in parentheses. They may also be found in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris except the following: Arçay, Bertrand, Freycinet, Garnier-Pagès Volume 11, and Vielcastel (to be found in the Bibliothèque de la Ville de Paris); Gossez, and Leroux (to be found at the Sorbonne library); Curtis, Foster and English, Lorand, and Holyoake (to be found in no French library). Sometimes, however, the French library contains only a different edition from that mentioned in this list. The following abbreviations are used in this bibliography: PL for New York Public Library, Wash. for Congressional Library at Washington, HCL for Harvard College Library, BN for Bibliothèque Nationale, VP for Bibliothèque de la Ville de Paris.

PART I. LEDRU-ROLLIANA

(A) BIOGRAPHIES

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Various other letters and articles previous to 1848.

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(C) MANUSCRIPTS OF LEDRU-ROLLIN

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Extreme conservative deputy, but usually fair. Admires few people except himself; admires neither Ledru nor Barrot.

Ranc, Arthur: *Souvenirs, Correspondence*. Paris, 1913, Cornély.

St. Férreol, Amadée: *Mes Mémoires*. Brioude, 1887-1892, Chauvet (BN).

Les Proscrits en Belgique. Brussels, 1870, Moucquart (HCL).

Montagnard gives little information prior to June 13, 1849.

Sand, George: *Souvenirs de 1848*. Paris, 1882, Calmann-Lévy (PL).

Reflective rather than historical.

Sarcey, Francisque: *Journal de Jeunesse*. Paris, 1903, Bibliothèque des Annales (Wash.).

Scheurer-Kestner, A.: *Souvenirs de ma Jeunesse*. Paris, 1905, Charpentier (Wash.).

Senior, Nassau William: *Journals kept in France and Italy*. London, 1871, King.

Conservative whig; writes light but not superficial account.

Tocqueville, Alexandre de: *Souvenirs*. Paris, 1893, Calmann-Lévy.

Bitterly satirical, brilliant, self-confident.

Véron, L.: *Mémoires d'un Bourgeois de Paris*. Paris, 1853-5, Martinon.

Unfair supporter of Thiers.

Vielcastel, Comte Horace de: *Mémoires 1851-1864*. Berne, 1880-4, Haller.

Malicious, slanderous gossip.

(E) HISTORIES BY CONTEMPORARIES

Anonymous: *Journées illustrées de la Revolution de 1848*. Paris, 1848, Plon (PL).

Detailed, colorless account to accompany illustrations.

Anonymous: *Le Risquons-tout en 1848*. Mouscron, 1848, Lerouge-Benoît (BN).

Very prejudiced against the affair, superficial, emphasizes resulting trial.

Arago, Etienne: *Les Postes en 1848*. Paris, 1867, Dentu (BN).

Personal account relating almost solely to his own ministry.

Arcay, Joseph de: *Indiscrétions Contemporaines*. Paris, 1884, Calmann-Lévy (VP).

Babaud-Larivière, L.: *Histoire de l'Assemblée Nationale Constituante*. Paris, 1850, Lévy (BN).

Brightly-written, just account by moderate deputy, emphasizing events in which he took part. Friendly to many, including Ledru and Cavaignac. Dislikes Marrast, Garnier-Pagès, and Louis Napoleon.

Beaumont-Vassy, E. F.: *Histoire de mon Temps*. Paris, 1855-7, Perrotin (PL).

Extremely conservative but fairly just.

Bedeau, General M. A.: 24 Février 1848. In *Revue de Paris* 1898, 3: 449-478.

Blanc, Louis: *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848*. Paris, 1870, Librairie Internationale.

Just, socialist account of his own conduct.

Blanqui, Auguste: *Réponse*. Paris, 1848 (BN).

Brief and passionate defense against Taschereau accusations.

Bouton, Victor: *Attentat de la Police contre la Souveraineté du Peuple*. Paris, 1848 (BN).

Absurd account by ultra-Blanquist.

Brougham and Vaux, Henry, Lord: *Letter to the Marquess of Lansdowne on the late Revolution in France*. London, 1848, Ridgeway.

A generalizing essay showing little knowledge and less political foresight. A stupid indictment of the radicals.

Cabet, Etienne: *Insurrection du 23 Juin*. Paris, 1848, Librairie du Populaire.

Hasty and partial account by leader of Utopian socialists.

Capefigue, J. B. H. R.: *La Société et les Gouvernements de l'Europe*. Paris, 1849, Amyot.

Biased conservative.

Carnot, Hippolyte: *Le Ministère de l'Instruction Publique et des Cultes depuis le 24 Février jusqu'au 5 Juin 1848*. Paris, 1848, Pagnerre (BN).

Good account of ministry of education by its head.

Carnot, Hippolyte: *Récit du 24 Février*. In *Révolution de 1848*, 6: 20-33.

Castille, Hippolyte: *Histoire de la Seconde République Française*. Paris, 1855, Lecou (Wash.).

Fair-minded, liberal Bonapartist. Sympathetic to Ledru; dislikes Barrot and Marrast.

Chamier, Frederick: *Review of the French Revolution of 1848*. London, 1849, Reeves, Benham.

Typically conservative account, sometimes fair, more often absurd. Almost wholly secondary.

Chenu, Adolphe: *Les Conspirateurs*. Paris, 1850, Garnier.

One of several pamphlets by unmasked police spy. Unreliable, malicious, probably to a large extent invented.

Considerant, Victor: *Journée du 13 Juin*. Paris, 1849, Lévy.

Moderately clear apology for fiasco by one of its leaders. More rhetoric than facts.

Corkran, J. F.: *History of the National Constituent Assembly*. New York, 1849, Harper.

Rather superficial, fairly unbiased, but with conservative tendency. Thinks Ledru was a bluffer.

Darimon, Alfred: *A travers une Révolution*. Paris, 1884, Dentu.

Largely a biography of Proudhon.

Delord, Taxile: *Histoire du Second Empire*. Paris, 1875, Germer-Baillièvre.

Delvau, Alfred: *Histoire de la Révolution de Février*. Paris, 1850, Garnier.

Poor partisan account by Ledru's private secretary. More discussion than history. Socialist and Blanquist who worships Ledru but thinks he was not sufficiently revolutionary. Diffuse and philosophical but not deep. Poor style.

Drevet, Père: *Mystères de l'Hôtel de Vilne*. Paris, 1850, Garnier.

Account by radical. Disliked Garnier-Pagès but liked Ledru and Lamartine.

Faure, Philippe: *Journal d'un Combattant de Février*. Jersey, 1859, Le Feuvre (BN).

Fonvielle, Wilfred de: *Banquet des Ecoles*. In *Nouvelle Revue* 110: 470-487.

Le 13 Juin 1849. In *Révolution de 1848*, 8: 459-475.

One of the minor radical leaders.

Forster, K.: *Du Royaume à l'Empire*. Paris, 1854, Firmin-Didot (PL).

Foster, G. G., and English, T. D.: *The French Revolution of 1848*. Philadelphia, 1848, Zieber (PL).

Gallois, Léonard: *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848*. Paris, 1849-50, Naud (BN).

Fair-minded radical; admires Ledru. Wholly secondary material.

Garnier-Pagès, Louis-Antoine: *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848*. Paris, 1864-1872, Pagnerre (Volumes 9-11 in HCL).

Remarkably impartial though it naturally over-emphasizes his own part. Best source on meetings of the provisional government, less full on those of the executive commission. Most detailed of

the contemporary accounts. Too fond of imagining arguments at conferences whereof he knew only by hearsay (*e. g.* cabals). In last volumes relies less on his own experiences and more on existing printed material.

Girardin, Emile de: *Bon Sens, Bonne Foi*. Paris, 1848, Lévy.

Eulogy on himself by well-known journalist; accompanied by a few general facts.

Granier de Cassagnac, A. B.: *Histoire de la Chute du Roi Louis Philippe I.* Paris, 1857, Plon.

Conservative account, chiefly secondary, by bigoted Bonapartist.

Guyon, Leon: *L'Odyssée d'un Candidat*, Charles Granger. Le Mans 1893 Drouin (BN).

Invaluable for Ledru's relations with the Sarthe. An extract was reprinted in the *Révolution de 1848*, 2: 257-265.

Lacratelle, Henri de: *Lamartine and his Friends*. New York, 1880, Putnam.

Christian democrat à la Buchez relates experiences with Lamartine and others. Probably the account is slightly touched up in view of later events.

La Hodde, Lucien de: *Histoire des Sociétés secrètes*. Paris, 1850, Julien, Lanier.

Distorted account by unmasked *agent provocateur* who was intimate with leading republicans. Full of gall and venom.

La Hodde, Lucien de: *Naissance de la République*. Paris, 1850, Beaule. Even worse than the preceding work.

Lamartine, Alphonse de: *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848*. Leipzig, 1849, Brockhaus and Avenarius.

Excessively conceited and inaccurate, declamatory, eloquent.

Lavarenne, P. C. M. de: *Le Gouvernement Provisoire et l'Hôtel de Ville dévoillés*. Paris, 1850, Garnier.

Violent Blanquist; gives detailed and confused account; full of calumnies.

Lavarenne, P. C. M. de: *Les Rouges peints par Eux-mêmes*. Paris, 1850, Allouard. (In John Crerar Library, Chicago.)

Unbelievably absurd collection of calumnies; much worse than the preceding work.

Laviron, P. E.: *Récit authentique de la Séance révolutionnaire tenue à l'Hôtel de Ville la Nuit du 24 au 25 Février 1848*. Paris, 1848, Col-libert (BN).

Lemer, Julien: *Les Gouvernements provisoires en France*. Paris, 1886, Simon (BN).

Leroux, Pierre: *La Grève de Samarez*. Paris, 1866, Dentu. (In Sorbonne Library.)

Longepied and Laugier: *Comité Révolutionnaire; Club des Clubs*. Paris, 1850, Garnier (BN).

Declamatory recital by two prominent members of the Club des Clubs, enunciating evolutionary and radical doctrines.

Lucas, Alphonse: *Les Clubs et les Clubbistes*. Paris, 1851, Dentu.

Descriptive list of clubs. Strong reactionary tries to be fair but remains unreliable.

Marx, Karl: *Dix-huit Brumaire*. Paris, 1900, Schleicher.

Opinions of great socialist on Louis Napoleon, his friends, and his enemies.

Ménand, Louis: *Prologue d'une Révolution*. Paris, 1849, Librairie du Peuple.

A Montagnard defends Caussidière.

Mill, John Stuart: *Vindication of the French Revolution of February, 1848*. In his *Works* 2: 335-410. London, 1859, Parker.

Brilliant defense of the revolution. Annihilates Brougham's flimsy tirade.

Nougarède de Fayet, Auguste: *La Vérité sur la Révolution de Février 1848*. Paris, 1850, Amyot (HCL).

Fair-minded account, details on February Days.

Ollivier, Emile: *L'Empire libéral*. Paris, 1897, Garnier.

Volumes 1 and 2 of this *apologia pro vita sua* deal with the second republic.

Pouillet, Claude: *La Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers pendant la Journée du 13 Juin 1849*. Paris, 1849, Garnier (BN).

Invaluable account by director of the conservatory. Gives facts in small compass followed by long defense of his own conduct.

Pyat, Félix: *Lettres d'un Proscrit*. Paris, 1851, Magen.

Regnault, Elias: *Histoire du Gouvernement provisoire*. Paris, 1850, Lecou.

Fair-minded account by Ledru's chief of cabinet. Chief fault is tendency to see plots where none existed. After Stern best contemporary account.

Robin, Charles: *Histoire de la Révolution française de 1848*. Paris, 1850, Penaud (BN).

Good republican account, chiefly secondary, detailed on February Days.

Roinville: Histoire du Banquet réformiste du Douzième Arrondissement. Paris, 1848 (BN).

Details by the chairman of the organizing committee.

St. Amant: Le Drame des Tuilleries après la Révolution du 24 Février. Paris, 1848, Feret (BN).

Account by governor of the Tuilleries.

Sarrans, Bernard: Histoire de la Révolution de Février 1848. Paris, 1850-1, Administration des Librairies (BN).

Moderate; sees faults in friends. Some primary material and much secondary material including some pure nonsense (*e. g.* cabals).

Seurre, Jules: La dernière République. Paris, 1860, Garnier (Wash.).

Facts on the department of the Saône and Loire.

Stern, Daniel (Comtesse d'Agoult): Histoire de la Révolution de 1848. Paris, 1878, Calmann-Lévy.

Best contemporary account; by a moderate. Rather philosophical but not too much so. Detailed through June Days. High opinion of Lamartine; finds Ledru weak.

Thomas, Emile: Histoire des Ateliers Nationaux. Oxford, 1918, Clarendon Press.

Fully documented account of Workshops by their head. Unsatisfactory on other matters. Heavy, tiresome style. Impassioned and envenomed.

Tirel, L.: La République dans les Carrosses du Roi. Paris, 1850, Garnier. Orleanist collects calumnies and pretends to document them.

Ulbach, Louis: Souvenirs de Février à Mars 1848. In *Revue Bleue* 25: 262-4.

Weill, Alexandre: Six Mois de Révolution. Paris, 1868, Dentu.

Just but unreliable moderate, collaborator of Girardin.

(F) SECONDARY GENERAL ACCOUNTS

Audebrand, Philibert: Nos Révolutionnaires. Paris, 1886, Frinzine (Wash.).

Radical tendency.

Bouniols, Gaston: Histoire de la Révolution de 1848. Paris, 1918, Delagrave (PL).

Good account of Assembly, following debates closely. Unprejudiced and placid.

Charléty, S.: La Monarchie de Juillet. Paris, 1921, Hachette (Vol. 5 of Lavis: Histoire Contemporaine).

Good account of February Days.

Gradis, Henri: *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848*. Paris, 1872, Lévy.

Conservative tries to be fair but fails. Good analyses of speeches. Sometimes unclear.

Hamel, L. A.: *Histoire illustrée de la Seconde République*. Paris, 1891, Jouvot.

Rather fair-minded but poorly informed radical sometimes stumbles on the truth.

Hillebrand, Karl: *Geschichte Frankreichs*. Gotha, 1879, Perthes.

Dramatic and just but with superficial information.

Jerrold, Blanchard: *Life of Napoleon III*. London, 1882, Longman, Green.

Violent Bonapartist prejudice; little value.

La Gorce, Pierre de: *Histoire de la Seconde République Française*. Paris, 1914, Plon-Nourrit.

Very conservative and clerical, moderately fair on provisional government. Gets more and more unjust, reaching a climax of prejudice on the Roman question (natural tendency of a clerical).

Lebey, André: *Louis Napoléon Bonaparte et le Ministère Odilon Barrot*. Paris, 1912, Cornély (PL).

The most detailed and the most unprejudiced account of this period. Filled with extracts from speeches. Very long-winded and dull.

Lebey, André: *Louis Napoléon et la Révolution de 1848*. Paris, 1907-8, Juven (Wash.).

Neither so dull nor so unprejudiced nor so detailed as the preceding work. Shows clearly liking for Louis Napoleon and dislike for Ledru. Makes some bad mistakes (*e. g.*, credits Ledru with publishing the sixteenth bulletin).

Martin, Henri: *Popular History of France*. Boston, 1882, Dana, Estes, and Lauriat.

Volume 3 contains clear, popular, superficial, anti-Bonapartist account.

Pierre, Victor: *Histoire de la République de 1848*. Paris, 1878, Plon.

Most violent and unjust of conservative accounts. Tells the truth, nothing but the truth, but not the whole truth.

Rénard, Georges: *La République de 1848*. Paris, 1906, Rouff. (Volume 9 of Jaurès: *Histoire Socialiste*.)

Excellent account. Unfortunately quite brief except on social phases. Philosophic treatment. Superdemocratic and socialist leanings but no such prejudice or distortion as in the conservative accounts.

Rittiez, F.: *Histoire du Gouvernement Provisoire de 1848*. Paris, 1886-7, Librairie Internationale (Wash.).

Fair-minded, commonplace account.

Seignobos, Charles: *La Révolution de 1848*. Paris, 1921, Hachette. (Vol. 6 of Lavissee: *Histoire Contemporaine*.)

Fills a much-needed want for a good, impartial history of the second republic. Selects important topics rather than gives a flowing narrative. Some faults, such as accusing Ledru too freely of plotting.

Spuller, Eugène: *Histoire parlementaire de la Seconde République*. Paris, 1891, Alcan (PL).

Brief, commonplace, radical account.

Tchernoff, I.: *Associations et Sociétés Secrètes sous la Deuxième République*. Paris, 1905, Alcan.

Weill, Georges: *Histoire du Parti Républicain en France de 1814 à 1870*. Paris, 1900, Alcan.

Two standard accounts on history of the republican party.

(G) SECONDARY ACCOUNTS ON SPECIAL SUBJECTS

Antony, Alfred: *La Politique Financière du Gouvernement Provisoire*. Paris, 1909, Rousseau.

Standard work on ministerial expenses.

Bertrand, Louis: *Histoire de la Démocratie et du Socialisme en Belgique*. Brussels, 1906-7, Dechenne.

Standard work on democrats of and in Belgium.

Calman, Alvin: Delescluze, Ledru-Rollin, et l'Echauffourée de Risquons-tout. In *Révolution de 1848*, 16: 44-50.

Contains two important letters of Delescluze.

Clermont, F., and Bourgeois, Emile: *Rome et Napoléon III*. Paris, 1907, Colin. (Clermont wrote part dealing with 1848-9.)

Standard work on the diplomacy of the Roman expedition. Good on Assembly debates and cabinet troubles in France, but less good on internal workings of the Mountain.

Crémieux, Albert: *La Révolution de Février*. Paris, 1912, Cornély.

Standard work on February Days.

Curtis, E. N.: *French Assembly of 1848 and American Constitutional Doctrines*. New York, 1907, Columbia Press.

Best work on the constitution. Clear account of the composition of the Assembly.

Dreyfus, C. Ferdinand: *L'Assistance sous la Seconde République*. Paris, 1907, Cornély.

Standard work on philanthropy under the second republic.

Félice, Raoul de: *La Journée du 13 Juin à Paris*. In *Révolution de 1848*, 6: 133-325.

Only good account of June 13 and of the Versailles trial.

Gaillard, Léopold de: *L'Expedition de Rome en 1849*. Paris, 1861, Le-coffre (PL).

Good account of affairs at Rome.

Génique, Gaston: *L'Election de l'Assemblée Législative en 1849*. Paris, Rieder, 1921.

Gossez, A. M.: *Le Département du Nord sous la Deuxième République*. Lille, 1904, Leleu. (In the Sorbonne Library.)

Nephew of Bianchi gives some new material. Clear and fair-minded account with radical tendencies.

Haury, P.: *Les Commissaires de Ledru-Rollin 1848*. In *Révolution Française* 57: 438-475.

Standard account concerning the commissioners, although containing some errors.

La Place de Chauvac, Gaston de: *Crises dans les Finances Publiques en 1848*. Toulouse, 1916, Marqueste.

Standard work on general financial policies.

Lousteau, Pierre: *Louis Blanc et la Commission du Luxembourg*. Paris, 1908, Bonvalet-Jouve.

Standard work on the Luxembourg Commission.

Mauve, E.: *Le Bourbonnais sous la Seconde République*. Moulins, 1909, Progrès Social (BN).

Standard work on Allier and neighboring departments.

Monin, Georges: *George Sand et la République de Février 1848*. In *Révolution Française* 37: 428-38: 185.

Valuable information on the *Bulletins of the Republic*.

Muller, Paul: *La Révolution de 1848 en Alsace*. Paris, 1912, Fisch-backer.

Standard work on departments of Lower and Upper Rhine.

Prod'homme, J. G.: *Le Musique et les Musiciens en 1848*. In *Révolution de 1848*, 10: 471-493.

Thayer, William Roscoe: *The Dawn of Italian Independence*. Boston, 1893, Houghton, Mifflin.

Very good account of affairs at Rome, though partial to Mazzini.

Wassermann, Suzanne: *Les Clubs de Barbès et de Blanqui en 1848*. Paris, 1913, Cornély (PL).

Standard work on these clubs, though partial to Barbès and Blanqui.

(H) BIOGRAPHIES

Breton, P.: *Mémoires du Marquis de Boissy*. Paris, 1870, Dentu.

Pierrot, Alfred: *Charles Buvignier à Montmédy*. Montmédy, 1907, Pierrot (BN).

Prolès, Charles: *Charles Delescluze*. Paris, 1893, Chamuel.

Des Cognets, Jean: *Vie Interieure de Lamartine*. Paris, 1913, Mercure de France.

Quentin-Bauchart, Pierre: *Lamartine, Homme Politique*. Paris, 1903, Plon-Nourrit.

Best biography as to political career of Lamartine.

Whitehouse, R. Remsen: *Life of Lamartine*. Boston, 1918, Houghton, Mifflin.

Better on literary than on political side. Many errors. Appreciates character of Lamartine and his evolution in 1848 but has little grasp of general events.

Feugère, Anatole: *Lamennais*. Paris, 1906, Bloude.

Pressensé, E.: *Léon de Maleville*. In *Revue Bleue* 19²: 549.

Cherest, Aimé: *Vie de A. T. Marie*. Paris, 1872, Durand et Pedone (BN). Includes many letters of Marie.

Morère, P.: *Un Révolutionnaire ariégeois, Victor Pithes in Révolution de 1848* 17: 43-54.

Mulberger, Arthur: *Proudhon, Leben und Werke*. Stuttgart, 1899, Frommann.

(J) NEWSPAPERS CONSULTED FOR ENTIRE PERIOD

(The names in ordinary type in parentheses following the newspapers indicate the editors; those in italics, the patrons.)

Orleanist: *Constitutionnel* (Véron, *Thiers*) (Wash.); *Journal des Débats* (PL); *Siècle* (*Barrot*) (Wash.); *Times of London* (PL).

Moderate: *Atelier* (Buche) (PL); *National* (Cavaignac, Marrast, etc.) (Wash.).

Radical: *People Constituant* (Lamennais) (PL); *Réforme* (Ledru, Flocon, etc.) (BN); *Révolution démocratique et sociale* (Delescluze) (BN); *Nation of Brussels* (in *Bibliothèque Royale, Brussels*).

Socialist: Commune de Paris (Sobrier) (PL); Démocratie Pacifique (Considerant) (BN); Peuple, or Représentant du Peuple (Proudhon) (PL); Vraie République, or Journal de la Vraie République (Barbès, Sand, etc.) (PL).

Ultra-revolutionary: Ami du Peuple (Raspail) (PL); République (Blanqui) (Wash.).

(K) NEWSPAPERS MENTIONED OR PARTLY READ

(Extracts from most of these may be found in PL)

Catholic: Ere Nouvelle (*Lacordaire*); Univers (Veillot).

Legitimist: Courier de la Chambre; Esprit National; France Nouvelle (Dumas); Gazette de France (Genoude); Lampion; Liberté (Dumas); Opinion Publique; Union.

Bonapartist: Dix Décembre.

Orleanist: Assemblée Constituante (*Guizot*); Assemblée Nationale; Gazette des Tribunaux; Journal de Villes et Campagnes; Patrie (Girardin, *Delamarre*); Pays; Spectateur de Londres (*Guizot*).

Moderate: Avenir National; Bien Public (Pelletan, *Lamartine*); Commerce; Courier; Crédit; Journal; Langue du Vipère, or Pot-aux-Roses.

Radical: Courier Français (Xavier Durrieu); Ecole Politique des Peuples; Montagne; Temps (X. Durrieu); Travail (Baune); Tribune du Peuple.

Socialist: Organisation du Travail; Populaire (Cabet); Travail affranchi (Vidal).

Ultra-revolutionary: Aimable Faubourgien (Delvau); Bonnet Rouge; Lanterne; Père Duchêne.

Personal: Evénement (Hugo); Presse (Girardin).

(L) DEPARTMENTAL NEWSPAPERS MENTIONED OR CONSULTED

(All BN)

Orleanist: Représentant of Châteauroux; Echo of Moulins; Memorial of Moulins; Union of Le Mans; Courier de la Limogne of Riom.

Moderate: Courier of Lyons; Constitution of Moulins; Journal of Tours; Constitutionnel of Châteauroux.

Radical: Journal of Châteauroux; Droit Commun of Bourges; République de 1848 of Bourges, Journal de la Somme; Impartial of Lille (Delescluze); Messenger of Lille (Bianchi); Républicain of Moulins; Emancipation of Toulouse; Courier of Le Mans (Regnault).

Socialist: Peuple Souverain of Lyons.

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
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